

The Virtue of Humility

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INTRODUCTION

The modern world with its many conveniences, luxuries, and highly developed machinery, is ever striving for a full, free, and enjoyable human life. Or to put it all quite simply, the world is striving for happiness. It utilizes most of its ingenuity and natural endowments toward this end. However, in so doing, it has rejected the one mean whereby such an aim can be accomplished, the mean which assures the attainment of this end. This mean is virtue, whose very nature is to break down the barriers to full, free, human living. Virtue sets the powers of man ever more free, thereby assuring him more and more as virtue increases of an ever fuller, freer and enjoyable life. Its reward "is that stamp of success on life, the attainment of the goal of life which constitutes happiness."¹ Thus, as Farrell says, "let man discard virtue and he is dedicating himself to making a failure of his human life, he is twisting his own nature, stunting its growth, making it lopsided."² And discard virtue is precisely what the modern world has done. And the reason for this is that the world has falsely conceived of virtue. It has misunderstood the nature and purpose of virtue. It has "pictured virtue in terms of the very simple, naive old pastor, the kind of person who is likely to misplace collar, vest or shoes; good as gold, with heart as big as himself--but

eccentric as the devil..."³ By some, virtue "is looked upon as something to be taken cautiously, in small doses and in careful correlation to the individual temperament."⁴ By others, it is considered as something beyond the ordinary, as something unhealthy or hypocritical. In reality, however, virtue "is not at all extraordinary, not at all mysterious, but rather a prosaic thing without which we simply cannot get through even an ordinary uneventful day."⁵ It is something which is necessary to facilitate our every operation.

Now every human operation comes from one of two principles, namely, the intellect and the will. Accordingly, virtue is divided into the intellectual virtues, which facilitate and regulate operations as flowing from the intellect, and moral virtues, which control the operations flowing from the will. Thus there ~~there~~ is a virtue for nearly every type of human activity. Consequently there are as many virtues as there are types of human activity.

Now of all these virtues, humility is perhaps the most misunderstood and, consequently, the least sought after. Thus some people "confuse it with a laughing protestation in denial of excellence, a denial that must itself be protested according to the rules of the game."⁶ Or again, it is considered as "a kind of hypocrisy that beats its breast and blunders into things

because of its shyly cast down eyes."⁷ Moreover, it is not merely misunderstood, but it is actually disdained.

In our day...the world despises humility. It despises humility because it holds a caricature of that virtue. The world conceives of humility as a sniveling, cringing sort of virtue...⁸ Then, too, humility has an abject look in modern eyes, for it does imply a recognition of one's limitations; and the pagan world does not dare admit limitations in its attempt to be wholly self-sufficient.⁹

Thus in order to assure a fuller understanding of the virtue of humility, we shall treat of it more at length. In so doing, we shall treat of it in the following order. First, the extent of humility will be determined. Secondly, it will be established that humility is a virtue. Thirdly, its position among the virtues will be pin-pointed. And fourthly, its rank among the virtues will be pointed out.

I. The Extent of Humility

The characteristic mark of humility as flowing from its very nature, is subjection. This subjection is twofold. Primarily and fundamentally, humility demands subjection to God. Secondly, it demands subjection to fellow human beings. Thus man fully considering his true nature, sees that of himself he is nothing. All that man can boast of as being his own is his deficiencies. For everything else, his perfections, his abilities, and his very being, he is totally dependent upon God. Without God he would cease to be. From this knowledge flows the

realization of God's consequent goodness and greatness. This knowledge immediately arouses in man a demand for complete subjection to God. This subjection is the very essence of humility. Thus St. Thomas says, "humility...regards most of all the subjection of man to God."¹⁰

Secondarily, however, it also demands the subjection of man to man. This subjection, however, is not as absolute as is the subjection of man to God. Accordingly a man must subject himself to another only in reference to that which the other has of God in reference to that which he himself has of his own. "...every man, according to that which is his own, should subject himself to his every neighbor with regard to what there is of God in the latter."¹¹

This does not mean, however, that a man must subject that which he himself has of God to that which another has of God.

Humility does not require that a man subject what there is of God in himself, to what seems to be from God in another. For those who participate the gifts of God know that they have them, according to that of I Corinthians: "that we may know the things that have been given us by God." (I Cor., II, 12.) And therefore, without prejudicing humility, men can prefer the gifts they have received to the gifts which seem to have been given to others.¹²

Accordingly, then neither should one prefer that which another has of himself to that which he himself has of God.

Whereas it is a sin against God Himself to prefer the deficiency and sin of others to the gifts of God in oneself, another's habit of rollicking drunkenness to one's own sobriety, yet humility does not demand that one believe his own gifts are less than another's, far less that one consider himself the least perfect creature that ever left God's hands.¹³

On the other hand one should prefer that which is of God in another to that which he himself has of his own. Thus an individual is even able to consider himself the worst of all sinners.

One can without error "believe and declare oneself viler than all men," (Benedict, Regula, Cap. VII ML. 66, 374A.), according to the hidden defects he discovers in himself and those gifts of God which lie concealed in others. Hence Augustin says, "Think that those than whom you are seemingly better, are secretly superior." (De Sancta Virginitate, Cap. LII, ML40, 427.) Likewise, one can confess and believe without falsehood that he is good for nothing and unworthy so far as his own powers are concerned in order to attribute his sufficiency to God, according to that of I Corinthians: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God." (II Cor., iii, 5.).¹⁴

Such then is the extent of the virtue of humility. First, the subjection of man to God and secondly of man to man. Farrell summarizes it all briefly thus:

Because a man recognizes his own limitations and deficiencies, he is able to see the perfections of other men and of God. You might say that humility recognizes the truth of man's humanity and so sees the perfection of God's divinity. Every man is a mixture of the divine and the human in the sense that in every man there are the things that are God's, namely, perfections; and in every man there are the things that are his very own, i.e., defects and deficiencies. Humility has an eagle eye for both divinity and humanity;

it is not to be confused and blinded by any blending of the two. So that if we consider what has come from ourselves, each of us not only can but should be subject to what there is of God in every other man....¹⁵

II. Humility is a Virtue

Now virtue in general "is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us."¹⁶ It "is simply another name for a certain kind of habit, namely, for a good habit ordained to facilitating operation!"¹⁷ Its function is the regulating of a "faculty's activity, in some such way as a conduit determines the direction of water flowing through it."¹⁸ Farrell speaks of it as "a power line to one definite determined destination."¹⁹ Under this general notion virtue is divided in a two-fold manner. Thus there are human virtues, which are a result of our own actions, and supernatural virtues, which are infused by the goodness of God. Now humility is defined as a virtue by which a person "considering his own failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode."²⁰ Or again it "is the moral virtue by which a person, considering his deficiency, holds himself to what is low according to his measure, out of subjection to God."²¹ Thus we see that humility is a virtue concerned about human action. Therefore it comes under the division of human virtues. Now "human virtue is that which inclines a man to something in

accordance with reason."²² In order for a certain virtue to be a human virtue then it must incline man to something in accordance with reason. Now humility inclines man to something, namely, to a moderation of the tendencies of the appetite toward some excellence. But is this inclination in accordance with reason? At first sight it would seem not to. For considering the etymology of the word "humility" and at the same time taking into account the nature and dignity of man, it would seem that to practice humility would be going against the very nature of man, thereby acting against reason. Now etymologically humility means lowliness or nearness to the ground. Thus to be humble means to regard oneself as lowly and worthless. It demands that one refrain from what is great and noble, from lofty positions in life, and from ambition. Man on the other hand is the noblest of God's creatures. He is made to the image and likeness of God and as such he has the highest place among the works of God. From the beginning of his creation he has been made lord of all creation. He is second only to the angels.

Thou hast made him a little less than the angels,
Thou hast crowned him with glory and honour,
Thou hast set him over the works of thy hands,
Thou hast subjected all things under his feet.²³

Viewing man's nature in this light, it would seem indeed to be going against his very nature, if he were to subject himself, make himself lowly, and consider himself the least of God's creatures. Thus it would seem that humility is unreasonable and

consequently it would not be a virtue. However, this is looking only at the glorious side of human nature. It is looking at it only in reference to what it has received from God. And in this sense man is indeed the noblest of creatures and the lord of all. But man's nature has another aspect, namely, that which man has of himself. In this sense we consider man as bereft of all the gifts of God, stripped of all his excellence and glory which he has received. As such he "is nothingness. Worse, he is nothingness befouled by sin."²⁴ It is impossible to conceive of the nature of man apart from that which is from God. For without God or apart from God, man simply would not be. This is why Christ has said: "If any man think himself to be something, whereas he is nothing, he deceives himself."²⁵ Hence all that man can boast of as proceeding from himself is sin.

We may consider two things in man, namely, that which is God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's; but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is God's.²⁶

Looking at human nature as it is stripped of its glory, man has every reason to practice humility and lowliness of heart. Foremost in this would be his subjection to God who made and sustains him; who has given him all his abilities and talents. This utter subjection of self to God, arising from a realization of our own nothingness, is, as was said above, the very essence of humility. "Humility denotes in the first place man's subjection to God."²⁷ It prevents the soul from falling below or exceeding

the measure of its capabilities. It prevents the soul from striving for that which is beyond its limits. Further, it enables the soul to achieve and acquire that which is within its limits. It demands that man "considering his deficiencies, holds himself to what is lowly, according to his measure."²⁸

Or again

The virtue of humility consists in this, that a person contain himself within his limits, not extending himself to what is above him, but subjecting himself to his superior.²⁹

In this way lowliness of heart is not contrary to man's nature and, consequently, not against reason. On the contrary, it is demanded. It is a necessity. For only by humility can we live truly according to the dictates of our nature; only by living a life of humility can we attain that which is the goal of life, namely, happiness.

Showing man his limitations, keeping his hopes within bounds of his abilities, humility keeps man in his proper place... Consequently, it cuts out at the roots the great obstacles to happiness.³⁰

Futhermore, humility is an unspeakable glory for him who practices it.

In loving and honouring God, our mind is subjected to Him; and it is in this that its perfection consists. For everything is perfected by being subjected to its superior as the body being vivified by the soul, and the aim by being enlightened by the sun.³¹

Thus humility is not only in perfect conformity to the nature of man, but it is a necessity in order that this nature can be realized fully. "The subjection proposed by humility and a full life are necessary for one another. This subjection is given to us by Him (God)."³² Thus in so far as by humility man subjects himself to God, realizing his limitations, his proper place, it is in accordance with reason and consequently it is a virtue. For as was said "human virtue is that which inclines a man to something in accordance with reason."³³

St. Thomas establishes humility as a virtue thus:

The difficult good has something attractive to the appetite, namely, the aspect of good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite, namely, the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now for those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse toward an object, there is a need of a moderating and restraining virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is a need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore, a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good; one to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility; and another to strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore, it is evident that humility is a virtue.³⁴

III. ITS PLACE AMONG THE VIRTUES

Thus having established the fact that humility is a virtue,

it remains to see precisely what its place is among the virtues. The virtues in general can be distinguished according to their formal objects. Accordingly there are three chief classes of virtues. First, the theological virtues, which have as their object God Himself. Secondly, the intellectual virtues, which have as their object the perfection of the intellectual or cognitive faculties of the soul. And thirdly, the moral virtues, which have as their object the perfecting of the appetite or the appetitive powers of the soul. With a little closer observation it is evident that humility is not a theological virtue because it does not have God Himself as its object, but rather the "moderation of the irascible appetite in its tendency toward the excellent."³⁵ For the same reason humility is not an intellectual virtue because the intellectual virtues are concerned essentially with the cognitive faculties of the soul in their consideration of the truth. Hence the conclusion must be that humility in some way belongs to one of the moral virtues, which have as their object the subjection of the appetite and the passions to the will.

From among the moral virtues there are distinguished four principal or cardinal virtues, namely, prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. These four virtues are a summation of all the moral virtues, for within them are contained all human virtues in so far as by them every possible source of human activi-

ty is controlled. Thus "prudence is in the reason itself, justice is in the will, temperance is in the concupiscible appetite, and fortitude is in the irascible appetite."³⁶ Accordingly they are defined as "good habits that help the soul act reasonably in its most basic operations which are hardest to keep within the limits of the moral law."³⁷ As such they deal with those human actions most difficult to control. "A principal virtue is one to which precisely is ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment."³⁸ Further, Farrell speaks of them as "the hinges upon which a man's life swings."³⁹

Because of the stress which is put upon humility in reference to the spiritual life and the other virtues, it seems as though humility would be one of the principal virtues. Christ Himself admonished us especially to the practice of this virtue when He said: "Learn of me for I am Meek and Humble of heart."⁴⁰ St. Thomas lays strong stress upon it also when he says: "the whole New Law consists in two things: in humility and meekness."⁴¹ Father Carlson refers to it as "the custodian and groundwork of all the virtues, strengthening them by its own strength."⁴² However, by recalling the nature and objective of the principal virtues and at the same time the nature and objective of humility, it is soon clear that humility cannot be on a par with

these principal virtues. For, humility, as we know is concerned primarily with the repression of hope. It aims to keep hope within the bounds of reason. Now hope, i.e. "a tendency toward great things",⁴³ is indeed a strong tendency of the appetite and necessarily demands great effort for its proper control. But it is not one of the strongest tendencies of the soul. As such it can be termed "medium hard" to control. Humility does not, therefore, deal with the most basic and primitive tendencies of the soul which are most difficult to control as do the cardinal virtues. For "anger and hope do not move a man as the fear of death does."⁴⁴ On this basis, namely, that the cardinal virtues deal with the most difficult tendencies of the soul while humility deals with the medium hard to control, humility is rejected from the rank of the cardinal virtues.

But nonetheless, in so far as both humility and the cardinal virtues are concerned about the appetitive powers of the soul, humility must in some way belong to one of them as a part. Now parts are of three kinds, namely, integral, subjective, and potential.

Accordingly, parts can be assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the things which need to occur for the perfect act of a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue...Secondly, the subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. Thirdly, the potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue.⁴⁵

Considering humility, then, as one of these three parts, we see that it must be a potential part. For:

...since humility is more than a condition necessary for a perfect act of virtue, being a specific habit with its proper formal object and motive, it cannot be an integral part; and since its matter is not principal but secondary, it cannot be a subjective one. It must, therefore, be a potential part..."⁴⁶

Now we have established that humility is a potential part of one of the cardinal virtues. It remains now to see of which one, however, it is such.

Certainly not of prudence, which is essentially an intellectual virtue; not of justice, of which the principal function is not to rationalize the appetite interiorly but to pay a debt to God or our neighbor; nor of fortitude, since "humility represses more than it uses hope or confidence in itself," whereas fortitude supports and enkindles the soul.⁴⁷

Obviously, then, humility must be a potential part of temperance. This can easily be seen further if it is realized that the function of both temperance and humility is quite similar, namely, the restraining of the appetite. The chief difference between the two is that temperance, as a principal virtue, carries out its function in reference to some principal matter, while humility, on the other hand, moderates the appetite in reference to things not so difficult.

Now the potential parts of temperance are three: continence, meekness, and modesty. Humility is placed under modesty which is a virtue moderating things that present ordinary difficulties.

Thus humility "is nothing else than a moderation of spirit."⁴⁸

The conclusion of this is, then, that humility is a potential part of temperance and is placed under modesty in its particular aspect.

IV. Rank of Humility

Even though it has been shown that humility is not one of the principal virtues, but rather a potential part of one of them, nonetheless, according to the importance laid upon it by the Church Fathers, many writers of Spiritual Books, St. Thomas, and even Christ Himself, it would seem that it is the greatest of all the virtues. St. Thomas quotes St. Augustine as considering humility as the foundation of all the virtues when he says: "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality? Attend first of all to the foundation of humility."⁴⁹ And in one of his objections, St. Thomas himself has the following:

Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the human nature which he assumed. Now he especially proposed His humilitly for our example, saying: 'Learn of Me for I am meek and humble of heart.' Moreover, Gregory says that 'the lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God.'⁵⁰

In another passage St. Thomas speaks of humility as "the foundation of the spiritual edifice."⁵¹ Father Pesch calls it "the indispensable groundwork of every virtue."⁵² Archbishop Ulla-

throne treats of it in the same manner in his book, Humility and Patience.⁵³ Sebastian Carlson, too, speaks of it as "the custodian and groundwork of all the virtues, strengthening them by its own strength."⁵⁴ Meschler values it as being "the foundation of all the virtues."⁵⁵ Father Canice, in his book on humility, treats of it under this same aspect.⁵⁶

Considering such statements, it would seem that humility indeed is the greatest of virtues. However, these statements must not be considered as absolute, but must be taken with some modification. For recalling what was discussed above as to the place that humility has among the virtues, it is quite evident that humility is not the greatest of the virtues, for a virtue is determined as to its excellence according as it pertains to the order of reason. This order of reason can be considered in a twofold manner. First, in reference to the end and secondly in reference to the means to the end. Now the virtue which directs reason to the greatest end most directly is the greatest virtue. Thus the theological virtues are the greatest since they have man's last end, God Himself, as their object. Next, the virtues which direct reason to the correct means to this end are second. The intellectual virtues do precisely this, namely, "assist reason to see and determine upon the best means for arriving at its goal."⁵⁷ They are, therefore, in second place. Thus the only other general remaining division of the virtues is that of the moral virtues. These, therefore, are in the third place. It is

their function to "facilitate all that man does interiorly and exteriorly to move toward his goal."⁵⁸ In other words, they control the appetites. This, too, as was shown above, is similar to the function of humility. It is on the basis of this similarity of function that we place humility amongst the moral virtues. Thus since the moral virtues rank below the theological virtues and the intellectual virtues, so, too, does humility. We thereby conclude that humility as a moral virtue is below the theological and intellectual virtues.

But what is its rank amongst the moral virtues? Is its rank as low amongst them as its position? According to St. Thomas, it is second in rank only to justice. Now the moral virtues obtain their degree of perfection or rank according to the degree in which they subject the appetite to the control of reason. Accordingly, the more perfectly a virtue controls or perfects the appetites of man, the greater and more noble is that virtue.

One moral virtue is greater than another if it subjects the appetite more universally to the intellect's determination that its ultimate goal is to be pursued in every act.⁵⁹

Now considered under this aspect, namely, its participation in the control of reason, justice stands foremost amongst the moral virtues, and humility stands second. The reason for this is that justice subjects the appetite more universally to reason

than does humility. It does so by controlling human operations in so far as it controls every act of the appetite. It regulates the human appetite completely so that there is no human act which does not have a social influence in some way or other. Humility, on the other hand, too, is a universal virtue, but it does not regulate and control all of man's appetitions. It controls merely one phase of the appetite, and, therefore, is not as universal in its operation as is justice. However, it is precisely in regulating this one phase of subjection of the appetite that it is placed above the rest of the moral virtues. The rest of the moral virtues bring about this subjection only in one particular field. Humility, however, effects it in every field or every line of activity. Thus to summarize; by the fact that humility is limited to this one mode of operation of the human appetite, it is ranked below justice which regulates the whole of human appetition. But it is due to this same fact that it is placed above the other moral virtues which effect this perfection only in some one particular field. So we can conclude this section by stating that humility is below the theological and intellectual virtues, below justice, but above all the other moral virtues. This, too, is in keeping with what St. Thomas states in the following:

The good of human virtue pertains to the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end: wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have the last end for their object. Secunderily, however, it is considered in re-

ference to the ordering of means to the end. This ordinance, as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by participation, it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore, after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues, which regard the reason itself, and after justice...humility stands before all others.⁶⁰

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, then, we shall summarize briefly. "Humility is truth."⁶¹ This, to put it quite simply, is the true notion of humility. It consists in each individual seeing himself for what he is, and the things with which he is concerned, for what they are, and then both of these in reference to God. This will eventually culminate in subjection to God, which is the essence of humility. To further this proper notion of humility, its exact place has been pin-pointed among the many different virtues, and, in so doing, its motives and functions have been indicated. And finally, employing the same norm which St. Thomas uses, its rank has been established among the virtues in the course of which its importance in the minds of the Church Fathers, St. Thomas, and Christ Himself has been exemplified.

FINIS.

FOOTNOTES

1. Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa, Vol. II, p. 192.
2. Idem, p. 192.
3. Idem, p. 178.
4. Idem, p. 178.
5. Idem, p. 179.
6. Idem, Vol. III, p. 461.
7. Idem, p. 461.
8. William R. Murphy, S.S., The Homiletic and Pastoral Review, 48(June 1948)712.
9. Walter Farrell, op. cit., Vol. III., p. 462.
10. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, c. 55 ad 17.
11. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II, II, q. 161, 3 corp.
12. Idem, II, II, q. 161, 3 corp.
13. Rev. Sebastian Carlson, Thomist, 7(April 1947)175.
14. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 161, a. 6, ad 1.
15. Walter Farrell, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 463.
16. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., I, II, q. 55, a. 4, arg.4.
17. Walter Farrell, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 179.
18. Rev. Sebastian Carlson, op. cit., p. 165.
19. Walter Farrell, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 181.
20. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 161, a. 1, ad 1.
21. Rev. Sebastian Carlson, op. cit., p. 152.
22. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 141, 1 corp.
23. Psalms, 8:6-8.
24. Rev. Sebastian Carlson, op. cit., p. 139.
25. Galatians, 6:3.
26. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 161, a. 3.
27. Idem, II, II, q. 161, a. 2, ad 3.
28. Idem, II, II, q. 161, a. 1, ad 1.
29. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Vol. IV, c. 55, ad 17.
30. Walter Farrell, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 464.
31. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 81, a. 7.
32. Walter Farrell, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 464.
33. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 141, 1 corp.
34. Idem, II, II, q. 161, 1 corp.
35. Rev. Sebastian Carlson, op. cit., p. 364.
36. Walter Farrell, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 206.
37. Rev. Sebastian Carlson, op. cit., p. 365.
38. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 137, a. 2.
39. Walter Farrell, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 205.
40. New Testament, Matt. XI, 29.
41. Psalms, 101:1.
42. Sebastian Carlson, op. cit., p. 365.
43. Idem, p. 148.

44. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 137, a. 12,
ad 26.
45. Idem, II, II, q. 48, 1 corp.
46. Sebastian Carlson, op. cit., p. 367.
47. Idem, p. 267.
48. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 161, a. 4.
49. Idem, II, II, q. 161, a. 5, arg. 2.
50. Idem, II, II, q. 161, a. 5, arg. 4.
51. Idem, II, II, q. 161, a. 5, arg. 2.
52. Tilmann Pesch, S.J., Christian Philosophy of Life, p.
350.
53. Archbishop Ullathorne, Humility and Patience, p. 16.
54. Sebastian Carlson, op. cit., p. 365.
55. Mority Meschler, S.J., Three Fundamental Principles of
Life, p. 128.
56. Rev. Canice, Humility, p. 35.
57. Sebastian Carlson, op. cit., p. 371.
58. Idem, p. 371.
59. Idem, p. 373.
60. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., II, II, q. 161, a. 5.
61. Walter Farrell, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 462.

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