


"The Division of Relation According to St. Thomas Aquinas"

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In his book entitled Categories, Aristotle distributed into ten supreme genera of essences all the possible predicaments of created being; that is, all that could possibly be said about a given thing. These genera, or predicaments, as they were called, were in turn divided into substance, that which received existence per se, and accident, that which received existence in alio, namely, in a substance.

Among the nine accidents was relation, a real modifier of the subject, but one that modified it solely in reference to something else. Thus St. Thomas called it ad aliquid, to another.

Relation, then, holds a unique position among the predicaments. With the other accidents, it is subordinated to and has existence only in a substance. Its esse,¹ or act of existing, is inesse, to exist in a substance. But the proper nature (ratio) of relation consists solely in its respect to something outside its own substance or subject of inhesion, and in the effect which this reference has on the subject. St. Thomas puts it this way:

...in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of relation, as in quantity and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its

respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be assistant, and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects the thing related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it.²

Another peculiarity of relation is the fact that another accident always serves as a basis for it. The reason for this is that relation is the weakest of the predicaments. It "has the least of esse among all the genera,"³ and "has the weakest esse,"⁴ as St. Thomas points out. Then, because of its tenuity, it must be supported by other accidents. They are quantity and action-passion. Edward A. Pace describes it in this way: "Back of relation or underlying it we come upon a more sturdy sort of accident, one of the strictly domestic inhereents. Finally, beneath them all is the subject, the res relata."⁵

Because of these two characteristics of relation, namely reference outside the subject, and basis in another accident, many difficulties have arisen, even concerning its objectivity. Philosophers, even to the present day, have denied relation. This is evident from the way St. Thomas opens several articles, treating different aspects of relation, with arguments for the reality of relation as a predicament.

There is also some difficulty concerning the division of relation, even among Thomists. For many modern Thomists disagree with the traditional division found in Thomistic

writings ever since the time of John of St. Thomas. They say that the great Commentators misinterpreted the doctrine of St. Thomas on this point, and that their error has persevered down through the years. And so the division of relation as found in textbooks of Philosophy such as those of Grenier and Gredt, has been challenged as contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas.

This thesis is concerned with this one aspect of relation, namely its divisions. It is an attempt to point out just what St. Thomas said, and why, when he spoke of the division of relation.

DIVISION OF RELATION A. Summa Theologiae, I, 13, 7.

One of the best and most easily understood explanations of the division of relation occurs in the Summa Theologiae, I, 13, 7, where St. Thomas, speaking of the names of God, asks whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated temporally of God. To prove his answer, which is in the affirmative, he must prove first that there is a relation in which the one term is related to the other only in so far as the other is related to it. Then he can say that since God is not related to creatures, but they are related to Him, it is possible to predicate their relations of Him temporarily. The body of the article is as follows:

I answer that, the names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea.

But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation requires two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only be between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing the same as itself. For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between being and non-being formed by reason, apprehending non-being as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.

Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes; and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only: and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intelligible existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v.) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, on the right is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that crea-

tures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him...⁶

Here St. Thomas has a two-fold division of relation, into real and rational (also called logical, as in the above translation, or relation of reason.) The ratio of relation is to establish a bond between two different things. But if, as in the first case mentioned by St. Thomas, a thing is said to be the same as itself, this relation, established by the mind, cannot be real, because the thing is itself, and so there is no real difference between the subject and the term. As for the relation of being and non-being, it is impossible for anything as unreal as non-being, whose whole esse is not to be, to have any real accidents inherent in it. Relations of genus and species, and the like, are invented by the mind in considering the order of something in the intellect to that which is outside, or even the order of things in the intellect; and so they exist only in the intellect, and are only relations of reason.

St. Thomas says that a real relation exists in both extremes of a relation when there is a habitude or reference between them according to a reality that belongs to both. As we have already seen, such relations are based either on quantity or action-passion. In either case the relation is based on a reality, and it is something real in each extreme. The example of father and son is unmistakably clear. A father has more accidental being than a man who

is not a father. By reason of paternity and the relation ensuing on it, something is added to his being; and yet, true to the ratio of relation, this something added is a reference outside himself, a reference to his son.

The third relation spoken of in the article, where St. Thomas says, "Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only;" is a mixed relation. Looked at from one extreme it is purely rational, but from the other extreme it is real. The words, "and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order;" are very important. It is a characteristic of this relation that the one extreme is usually a quality of the mind, as science, sense, etc., and as such is of the intellectual or sensitive order. But the other extreme is a res, a hoc aliquid existing in the world of nature, and as such is "outside the order of sensible and intelligible existence." Science and sense depend on this res, the knowable or sensible thing, for their entire existence. Thus the relation is mixed; it is real and rational, depending on which extreme is considered as the subject, and which as the term. If science is considered as the subject of the relation, there is a real relation in it, because it is ordered to the thing, which is known. But the thing is related to science only by a rational relation, in so far as ~~it~~ the intellect apprehends it as the term of the relation of science. So, it is relative, only in so far as science is related to it.

This enables St. Thomas to say, "whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him..." and thus prove his point.

The last illustration, that of the column being "on the Right" as regards an animal, is very clear. The column, in a stationary position, can have no relation to the animal until the animal comes and stands on its left. And so we do not determine its reference to the animal, but vice-versa.

The reader will notice that we have very carefully avoided using the terminology "predicamental" and "transcendental" in regard to relations. The reason is, that St. Thomas himself did not use this terminology; and, in my opinion, those terms only serve to confuse the issue. We are trying to find out the exact meaning of St. Thomas, so we will try to use only his terminology.

Here is a little diagram of the division of relation as contained in the Summa, I, 13, 7:

RELATION:	{	<u>Real</u> : Basis in quantity and action-passion A reality as regards both extremes
		<u>Mixed</u> : Basis- (not yet stated) A reality in one extreme, an <u>ens rationis</u> in the other extreme
		<u>Rational</u> : Basis in an act of reason An <u>ens rationis</u> in both extremes

B. De Potentia, VII, 10, c. and ad 5, 11.

Our next text, De Potentia, VII, 10, is a classic.

For wealth of material and clarity of expression, it is the

best text on relation. The question concerns the relation of God to creatures; is it a real thing? To prove his answer, in the negative, St. Thomas makes a complete division of real relations, assigning and illustrating the different bases in the process. He concludes that since the relation between God and creatures is not a real one based on action-passion, but is mixed, there is no real relation in God as regards creatures. Creatures are really related to Him, but since His action is "supremely free," the relation from Him to creatures is only rational. Although it is long, the text is well worth studying in its entirety.

But on the contrary....Besides, as the knowable thing is the measure of knowledge, so is God the measure of all things, as the Commentator says (Metaph.x). Now the knowable thing is not referred to knowledge by a real relation existing in it, but rather by the relation of knowledge to it, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v).

Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): Likeness is not reciprocal between cause and effect, for an effect is said to be like its cause and not vice versa. Now the same would seem to apply to other relations as to that of likeness. Therefore seemingly neither is there reciprocity in the relations between God and the creature, and we cannot argue that because the creature is really related to God, therefore is God really related to the creature.

I answer that the relations whereby we refer God to creatures are not really in God. To make this clear we must observe that since a real relation consists in the order of one thing to another, as already stated, a real relation is mutual in those things alone wherein on either side there is the same reason for mutual order: and this applies to all relations consequent to quantity. For since the notion of quantity is independent of all objects of sense, it is the same in all corporeal natures. And for the same reason that a quantitative thing A is really related to the quan-

titative thing B, B is really related to A. Now between one quantity, considered absolutely, and another there is the order deriving from measure and thing measured, under the name of whole and part and other such things that result from quantity.

On the other hand in relations arising from action and passion or active and passive power there is not always order of movement on both sides. Because that which has the nature of being patient, moved or caused must always have an order to the agent or mover, seeing that the effect is always perfected by its cause and dependent thereon: so that it is ordered to it as the cause of its perfection. Now agents, whether movers or causes, sometimes have an order to their respective patients, whether moved or caused, inasmuch, to wit, as the good or perfection of the mover or agent is to be found in the effect, patient or thing moved.

This is especially evident in univocal agents which by their action produce their like in species, and consequently perpetuate their species as far as this is possible. This is also evident in all other things which move, act or cause through themselves being moved; because by their very movement they are ordered to produce effects; and again in all those things where any good accrues to the cause from its effect. And there are some things to which are ordered others, but not vice versa, because they are wholly foreign to that genus of actions or power from which that order arises: thus knowledge has a relation to the thing known, because the knower by an intelligible act has an order to the thing known which is outside the soul. Whereas the thing itself that is outside the soul is not touched by that act, inasmuch as the act of the intellect does not pass into exterior matter by changing it; so that the thing which is outside the soul is wholly outside the genus of intelligible things.

For this reason the relation which arises^s from the act of the mind cannot be in that thing. The same applies to sense and the sensible object; for although the sensible object by its own action affects the organ of sense, and consequently bears a relation to it, just as other natural agents have a relation to the things on which they act, nevertheless it is not the alteration of the organ that perfects the act of perception, but the act of the sensitive power; to which act the sensible object outside the soul is altogether foreign.

In like manner a man who stands to the right of a pillar bears a corresponding relation to the pillar by reason of his motive power whereby he is competent to be to the right or to the left, before or behind, above or below. Wherefore such-like relations in man or animal are real, but not in the thing which lacks that power. In like manner again money is external to the action whereby prices are fixed, which action is a convention between certain persons: and man is outside the genus of those actions whereby the artist produces his image. Hence there is not a real relation either in a man to his image, or in money to the price, but vice versa. Now God does not work by an intermediary action to be regarded as issuing from God and terminating in the creature; but his action is his substance and is wholly outside the genus of created being whereby the creature is related to him. Nor again does any good accrue to the creator from the production of the creature: wherefore his action is supremely liberal as Avicenna says (Metaph. viii, 7). It is also evident that he is not moved to act, and that without any change in himself he makes all changeable things. It follows then that there is no real relation in him to creatures, although creatures are really related to him, as effects to their cause...

Reply to the Fifth Objection. God's knowledge has not the same relation to things as ours has: since it is related to them as their cause and measure, inasmuch as things are true so far as by his knowledge God ordained them. On the other hand things are the cause and measure of our knowledge. Wherefore just as our knowledge bears a real relation to things and not vice versa, so are things really related to God's knowledge and not vice versa. Or we may reply that God understands other things by understanding himself, wherefore his knowledge is related directly not to things but to the divine essence.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This distinction between relatives secundum esse and secundum dici does not prove the relations in question to be real. Certain relative terms secundum esse do not signify a real relation, for instance, right and left as ascribed to a pillar: and some relative terms secundum dici signify real relations, for instance, knowledge and sensation. Because relatives are said to be secundum esse when terms are employed to signify the relations themselves,

while they are said to be secundum dici when the terms are employed to signify qualities or something of the kind primarily, from which relations arise. Nor as regards the question at issue does it matter whether they be real or logical relations.⁷

The first new distinction that we find in this text is that of a mutual real relation, as opposed to non-mutual. "In those things only does a mutual real relation...": Here St. Thomas implies a different degree of reality for relations based on quantity than for those based on action-passion. Both relations are real; that is, in each case the extremes are realities and are really related to each other. But in quantitative relations the basis for the relation is the same in each extreme, because every sensible thing by its very nature must contain quantity, which is that basis. In action-passion relations the notion of efficient causality comes into play. The patient looks to the agent as to its cause; the agent looks to the patient as to its effect, and as the occasion of an added perfection to its own being. And so the basis of the order in action-passion relations is not the same. Still, just because it is non-mutual does not mean that the relation is not real, because the relatives are both real and are really related to each other. The example used by St. Thomas is that of the "univocal agent." Thus by the act of reproduction animals produce offspring of the same species, which is really related to them as to cause; and by perpetuating the species, the action adds a good to the agents. The agent, the mover, is in turn moved

by the very motion itself, which adds a good to the agent in addition to producing the effect.

Where St. Thomas says, "Now there are certain relatives to which others are ordered and not conversely," begins the treatment of the mixed relation. "That genus of actions or powers which such an order follows," refers to the genus of actions just discussed, whereby the agent and patient are related as cause and effect, and the agent is perfected by the action, so that a real relation ensues on the part of both extremes.

In the mixed relation the arrangement is quite different. In St. Thomas' example knowledge is really related to the knowable thing as to its extrinsic formal cause, which in this case is the object, the res, specifying the intellectual potency. Knowledge is dependant on the thing outside the mind and has a real relation to it. But the process of knowing is an immanent operation; that is, its term is within the mind, within the intelligible genus. But the thing outside the mind is outside this genus and wholly untouched by the process of knowing. Thus the relation can not possibly be in the knowable thing, but in knowledge. The knowable thing is related to knowledge only by a rational relation, in so far as knowledge is really related to it.

In the illustration of sense and the sensible thing, the situation is the same. St. Thomas' language can not be improved upon.

The example of the man and the column is similar to the one of the animal and the column used in I, 13, 7 of the Summa. The man's motive power allows him to move around, and thus to be in different relations to different objects. But the thing to which he is related, in this case the column, is the basis for the relation, since it measures the man. It is the stationary basis for the relation, but since it has no motive power it can not cause the relation; so there is a real relation only from the man to it, and not conversely. The pillar is related to the man only by a rational relation, in so far as the man is really related to it.

The last two examples, that of the coin and the price, and that of the man and his picture, fittingly close the discussion of the mixed relation; they very clearly illustrate the idea of measure and the measured, which is the basis for the mixed relation. The coin is the measure of the price, and the man is the measure of the picture. Yet neither is within the same genus as that which caused the relation. In the first instance, the cause is a convention of men; and the other relation is caused by an act of handicraft. And so neither is the coin related to the price, nor the man to the picture. But the price and the picture are really related to the coin and the man respectively.

The last part of the body of the article, where St. Thomas says, "But God does not act through an intermediary action," is an explanation of the act of creation. By "inter-

mediary action" he means an imperfect action, involving motion. The metaphysical analogy would be that of potency and act, in which habit denotes the motion of potency to act, and serves as the mid-point. All relations of action-passion in creatures involve motion, which is a transition from potency to act. But motion involves imperfection. And in God there can be neither motion nor imperfection. So the only conclusion is that "his action is his substance".

That entails that the action must be "wholly outside the genus of created being." And it is clear that if the action of God did involve motion on his part, then not only would the creature be produced, but also, by the very motion, some "good would accrue to the Creator." Then God would be necessarily related to the creature by a real relation based on action-passion, which is impossible. Rather, God's action is "especially free," and "He is not moved to act, but without any change in himself he makes all changeable things."

And so God has no real relation to creatures, but creatures do have a real relation to Him, which is most necessary. For they are related to God as to their cause; He is the first efficient cause of all creation.

In the answer to the fifth objection St. Thomas very neatly sums up the whole idea of the measure and the measured in regard to knowledge and the knowable thing. He points out that just as things are the cause and measure of our knowledge, so God is the cause and measure of things.

The relations work out this way:

<u>scientia Dei</u>	<u>scibile res</u>	<u>scientia nostra</u>
God's knowledge	knowable thing	our knowledge
real relation		real relation
←		←
rational only		rational only
→		→

In the answer to the eleventh objection, St. Thomas makes a distinction that has been constantly disregarded by his followers, beginning with John of St. Thomas and continuing down to the Thomists of our own day. This distinction is that the terms secundum esse and secundum dici have no direct bearing on the relation, and in no way determine its modality. They refer to the relative terms themselves, and determine whether or not these terms import a relation directly, or a quality or something of that nature directly, and a relation only secondarily. St. Thomas' language is very clear, and the accompanying examples leave no doubt. Secundum dici and secundum esse have nothing to do with whether the relations are real or not.

In support of this, Cardinal Cajetan has this to say in his commentary on the Predicaments of Aristotle:

Not all the names that signify ad aliquid signify relation equally. Therefore this distinction follows, namely that there are some relatives secundum esse, as lord, double, etc; others secundum dici as science, sense, etc. This distinction, as St. Thomas teaches in the questions De Potentia Dei, (VII, x, ad 11) must not be understood according to a distinction of real and rational relation thus that there are relatives secundum esse that import a real relation, and secundum dici that import a relation of reason, since such a false understanding is very apparent, from this: that sense really is referred to the sensible and know-

ledge to the knowable; but it must be understood according to the distinction of the meaning of the names. For those things are called relatives secundum esse, which are imposed to signify first of all a relation either real or rational, as lord, double, genus, specie, predicate, subject, etc; but those are called relatives secundum dici which first of all signify an absolute thing, and consequently import a respectum, either real or of reason, and such by another word are said to signify not so much a respectum as an absolute, respectively; as knowledge, sense and others. For knowledge formally imports that by which we know, which is a quality, but it imports this with a joined relation to the knowable, etc., and therefore it is called relative secundum dici.⁸

Cardinal Cajetan speaks for himself. He leaves no room for doubt. Now compare this with John of St. Thomas, who, as was mentioned earlier, seems to have been the first to get his terms mixed up regarding relation. The text I will quote is taken from his treatise on Logic, where he is speaking of relation directly, as a predicament. He says: "In speaking of relation in all its breadth, as it comprises transcendental, and predicamental, secundum dici and secundum esse, I don't know who will absolutely deny every relation."⁹ This is a far cry from St. Thomas' thought. Here is another example: "To understand predicamental relation you must distinguish it from both relation of reason, and from transcendental relation, which is also called relation secundum dici."¹⁰ Now it is easier to see how the textbooks got St. Thomas' terms mixed up. They are based upon John of St. Thomas, who evidently did not bother to distinguish between relative terms and the relation proper, and who used terminology different from that of St. Thomas.

St. Thomas was always very exact in his terminology. He made every effort to avoid equivocation. In translating we too should try to be exact. Here is an example of poor translation, taken from the Summa Theologiae:

Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as master and servant, father and son, and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental (secundum esse). But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental (secundum dici).¹¹

The relative terms secundum esse and secundum dici were translated by "predicamental" and "transcendental," terms which, as we have said, are generally taken to mean relations themselves. It is better to leave them in the Latin than to translate into inexact or ambiguous English.

C. In Metaphysica, V, xv (Lectio 17).

Our third text concerning the division of relation occurs in St. Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. In the commentary it is Lectio 17, numbers 1001-1032. The complete text has a long and highly-detailed discussion of quantitative relations which, although very excellent, does not apply here, and so will be omitted.

1001 Therefore, he (Aristotle) posits three modes of those things which are called ad aliquid: of these, the first is according to number and quantity, as double to half, and triple to the third part, and "multiplied", that is, multiple, to the part "of the multiplied," that is, to the sub-multiple, "and containing to the contained..."

1002 The second mode is precisely as some things are said ad aliquid according to action and passion,

or active and passive potency; as the heated to the heatable, which pertains to natural actions, and that which has been cut to that which can be cut, which pertains to artificial actions, and universally everything active to the passive.

- 1003 The third mode is just in so far as the measurable is referred to the measure. But this measure and measurable is taken not according to quantity, (for this pertains to the first mode, in which each is referred to each: for double is referred to half, and half to double), but according to the measure of esse and truth.

For the truth of knowledge is measured by the knowable. For from this, that the thing is or is not, a known utterance is true or false, and not conversely. And it is a similar case with the sensible and sense. And on account of this measure is not mutually referred to the measurable and conversely, as in the other modes, but only is the measurable referred to the measure. And likewise also the image is referred to that of which it is the image, as the measurable to the measure. For the truth of the image is measured from the thing of which it is the image...

- 1026 He (Aristotle) follows concerning the third mode of relations, and says that in this that third mode differs from those preceding, that in the preceding one thing is called relative from this, that it itself is referred to another; not from this, that the other is referred to it. For double is referred to half, and conversely, and likewise father to son, and conversely; but in this third mode something is called relative from this alone, that something is referred to it; as it is apparent, that the sensible and the knowable or intelligible are called relative, because others are referred to them. For something is called knowable, on account of this, that knowledge is had of it. And likewise something is called sensible because it can be sensed.

- 1027 Whence it is not called relative on account of something which is on the part of those things, which is a quality, or quantity, or action, or passion, as happened in the preceding relations; but only on account of the actions of others, which still are not terminated in those things. For if to see were the action of seeing coming to the seen thing, as cutting comes to the cuttable; just as the cuttable is referred to the cutting, thus visible would be referred to the seeing. But to see and to understand and actions of this sort, as will be

said in the ninth (book) of this work, remain in the agents, and do not pass into the things suffered; whence the visible and knowable does not suffer something, from this that it is understood or seen; and on account of this the things themselves are not referred to others, but others to them. And it is similar in all others, in which something is called relative on account of a relation of another to it, as right and left in a column. For since right and left designate principles of motions in animate things, they can not be attributed to a column and something inanimate, unless precisely in so far as the animated things in some way have themselves a bearing towards it, as a column is said to be on the right, because a man is on the left of it. And the situation is similar concerning the image in respect of the model, and the denarius, by means of which is the price of buying. But in all these the whole ratio of referring in two extremes, hangs on the other. And therefore all things of this sort have themselves somehow as measurable and the measure. For a certain thing is measured by that on which it depends.¹²

Here again we have an unmistakably clear division of relation according to the three bases of quantity, action-passion, and measure and the measurable. It is this text which led John of St. Thomas to say that the relation based on measure and the measurable is "predicamental," that is, the same as those based on quantity and action-passion. He says, "Nonetheless, with the common opinion, it must be asserted that both genera of relations, the first and the third, (that based on quantity, and that based on measure and the measurable) are predicamental..."¹³ And yet he claimed that the "transcendental" relation is distinct from the "predicamental."¹⁴

In order to understand our third text, we must understand the context from which it is taken. St. Thomas was

writing a commentary. He played the role of the faithful commentator, and tried to merely clarify the terminology of Aristotle. The Metaphysics was Aristotle's book, and St. Thomas was just trying to interpret it.

The fifth book of the Metaphysics is a sort of lexicon to all philosophy; in it Aristotle was "tying up loose ends." The fifth book, then, is a very precise, complementary catalogue of reality. Now when St. Thomas came across the triple division of relation, with all three modes seemingly placed on an even basis, he let it stand. And we have seen that the relation based on measure and the measurable is real from one extreme; that is why we called it "mixed." Why not, then, allow it to stay in the chapter on relation?

A Frenchman, E. Marmy, writing in Divus Thomas, has assigned several reasons why Aristotle meant to divide all real relations and not just those which are real from both extremes, or "predicamental" relations. His first reason is the one in the preceding paragraph. There is another, based on Aristotle's definition of relation in the Categories. There the mixed relation, since it is not a predicament, has no place. And so his definition: "Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation."¹⁵ The words, "the nature of which" eliminate the mixed relation,

since the nature of the one term is not to be related.

A third proof that the division in the Metaphysics is meant to embrace all real relations, and not just those which can be classed as a predicament, is the verb form used in the original texts. In the Metaphysics, supposedly written earlier, Aristotle uses λέγεται, "is said"; in the Categories he uses ἔστι, "is." While the former admits the mixed relation by "is said," the latter excludes all but relations which are real from both extremes, and so can be classed as predicaments. In this latter class fall, then, the relations based on quantity and action-passion, in which, in each extreme, the basis of the relation is an inherent accident, and the relation itself affects the extreme solely in respect to the other extreme.

But the most conclusive evidence can be gained from the text itself, where Aristotle points out, and St. Thomas very explicitly clarifies the fact that the one term is called relative only in so far as the other term is related to it.

In paragraph 1001, St. Thomas speaks of real relations based on quantity. When something is said to be the double of something else, "double" affects it solely in regard to the half, yet is a real accidental modification of the thing. Where Aristotle used "multiplied" and St. Thomas used "multiple," we would expect the word "product"; and where Aristotle said "of the multiplied" and St. Thomas said "sub-multiple," we would say "multiplicand."

In the paragraph on action-passion relations, the terminology can be confusing. What St. Thomas is pointing out is that the relation can be based on the action and passion, taking place right now, or on the active and passive potencies, which may have been actuated in the past, or will be actuated in the future. Thus he says, "heated to the heatable," meaning that that which is hot can heat that which can be heated. He refers to the potencies, which may or may not be actuated just now. If he refers to the action and passion taking place right now, it would be "heating to the heated."

Paragraph 1003 begins the discussion of the mixed relation. The doctrine is the same as in De Potentia and the Summa, but with some important clarifications. First it must be noted that St. Thomas has corrected Aristotle's terminology in regard to the measure and the measurable. For Aristotle said, "as the measurable to the measure, and the knowable to knowledge, and the perceptible to perception." And again, "that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a reference to it."¹⁶ St. Thomas has reversed this terminology, so that the measure refers to the thing in reality, and the measurable is our mind, whose knowledge is measured by the thing. It is evident that this is the only possible way, and that Aristotle was wrong, because, as we have seen before, if the mind measured reality, the whole order of

creation would be disturbed. And as St. Thomas says, "For from this, that the thing is or is not, a known utterance is true or false, and not conversely."

Paragraph 1026 enlarges on and gives examples for the fundamental idea of the mixed relation, that the one term is called relative, only because the other term is related to it.

Paragraph 1027 again brings in the idea of the immanent action, which we mentioned previously in regard to the text from De Potentia. The thing in reality is not relative on account of anything in itself; its relativity is entirely dependant on the action of the other term; yet that action does not cross over to this term. The illustration used by St. Thomas of the action of seeing and the visible thing makes this clear. And the old familiar column is with us again, this time with an explanation of just what right and left entail. The paragraph is summarized: "For a certain thing is measured by that on which it depends."

Here is a summary of St. Thomas' divisions of relation as treated in the texts analyzed: Summa Theologiae, I, 13, 7; De Potentia, VII, 10; In Metaphysicam, V, xv.

RELATION	{	<u>Real</u> : A reality in both extremes. Basis is: Quantity; a mutual relation, with the same basis of order.
		Action-passion; non-mutual, different basis.
		<u>Mixed</u> : A reality in one extreme only. Basis is: Measure and the measurable. (Not quantitative)
		<u>Rational</u> : An <u>ens rationis</u> in both extremes. Basis is an act of reason.

Relations must always be distinguished from relative terms which make up a relation.

RELATIVE TERMS	{	<u>Secundum esse</u> : primarily signify a relation, which may be real or rational. <u>Secundum dici</u> : primarily signify an absolute thing; secondarily import a relation, which may be real or rational.
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D. Minor texts.

We have now treated the three most important texts on relation in the works of St. Thomas. There are many others, long and short; but these three are the best for our purpose, the investigation of the division of relation.

E. Marry, whom we have mentioned before, mentions, besides the ones we have considered, eight other texts from St. Thomas which deal with the division of relation. These are not lengthy discussions of relation as such, but rather passing reminders. And so, relation is not considered in its broader sense, but only as a predicament. Two of these texts give a double basis for relation as a predicament, that is, a relation that is real from both extremes. But they have at least an indirect reference to a third basis. Marry calls them "reticent."¹⁷

...Because relation does not have a natural existence except from this, that it has a basis in the thing, and from this is placed in a genus; whence it is that the essential differences of relations are taken according to the differences of these other beings, as is apparent from the Philosopher, V Metaph. text 20, where he says that certain re-

lations are based on quantity, and others on action, and thus with others.¹⁸

But relation is especially based on two things which have an order to the other, namely quantity and action...Therefore the Philosopher manifestly expresses this division in V Metaph., but here he briefly touches it, saying that something is "to the other" according to surplus and shortage, which is based on quantity, as double and half; and the other according to the active and passive, and moving and movable, which are referred to each other, as is apparent per se.¹⁹

The last phrase in the first text, and the first in the second, both leave room for a third basis, probably measure and the measurable. The only possible conclusion to be drawn, is that St. Thomas referred not only to the completely real relation, but also the mixed, which, as we have said, is still real in one extreme, even though rational in the other. This seems more probable still from the fact that in both texts St. Thomas refers to the Metaphysics, where Aristotle gave the triple basis for relation. "Text 20" probably refers to page 1020b of the Greek text, which occurs in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, chapter fifteen - the exact location of the passage we have already discussed.

The other six texts definitely exclude the measure and measurable from the division of relation as a predicament. Any other bases but quantity and action-passion are denied.

But every relation, according to the Philosopher,

(V Metaphysica) is based either on quantity or what is reduced to the genus of quantity, or on action and passion.²⁰

Therefore there are certain relations which are based

on quantity, as equality which is based on one in quantity...²¹ But other relations are based on action and passion.

I answer that according to the Philosopher, every relation is based either on quantity, as double, and half, or on action and passion, as making and made, father and son, lord and servant, and others of this kind.²²

Relative opposites are based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and passion, as lord and servant, moving and moved, father and son.²³

One thing is ordered to another either according to quantity, or according to active or passive power. For from these two alone something is directed on one, with an extrinsic respect.²⁴

The Philosopher in V Metaph., assigning species to relation, puts some caused by quantity, and some from action and passion.²⁵

At least two of these texts, the third and fourth, form a very important part of a Theological argument. If the enumeration of the divisions of relation were not complete, the arguments would not be complete, according to Marmy.²⁶ It is not our purpose to analyze such arguments. It will suffice to say that the terminology of St. Thomas is clear and uncompromising.

Now that we have seen just how St. Thomas divided the different modes of relation, it would be beneficial to see, very briefly, how they are applied.

We know that relation holds a key position in the development of the doctrine on the Most Blessed Trinity. In addition, according to Norbert D. Ginsburg, St. Thomas applies to us the mixed relation, and:

...claims a real relation from a person to God. We maintain this real relation and indicate that it is the relative accident of religion, the necessary accepting by human beings of their dependence on God. This relative accident is the foundation for the complete union between men and God.²⁷

The relation of action-passion, according to the same author, is the basis, not only for the explanation of the Trinity, but also for justice and friendship among finite persons. It is the basis of paternity, the rights and duties of citizenship, the obligation of contracts, the favors and services of friendship, and other social obligations.²⁸

He concludes, and so do we:

These real relations (action-passion and mixed) are the real spiritual accidents which bring union and peace 1) between a person and God, and 2) between a person and a person. The first is the relation of religion, and the second is the relation of justice or friendship.²⁹

DEO GRATIAS

FOOTNOTES

1. See St. Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, translated by Armand Maurer, C.S.B. Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949, p. 12, for difficulties in rendering esse into English.
2. Summa Theol., I, q. 28, a. 2.
3. De Potentia, IX, a. 5, ad 2. Minimum habet de ente inter omnia genera.
4. Idem, VII, a. 9, ad 7. Esse debilissimum.
5. Edward A. Pace, "The Concept of Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," p. 63.
6. Summa Theol., I, q. 13, a. 7.
7. De Potentia, VII, a. 10.
8. Cardinal Cajetan, "in Praedicamentis Aristotelis," pp. 114-115. Quia vero non omnia nomina quae significant ad aliquid aequaliter significant relationem, ideo consuevit fieri alia distinctio, scilicet quod quaedam sunt relativa secundum esse, ut dominus, duplum, etc.; quaedam secundum dici ut scientia, sensus, etc. Quae distinctio, ut St. Thomas docet (De Pot. VII, 10, ad 11) in quaestionibus De Potentia Dei, non est intelligenda secundum distinctionem relationis realis et rationis ita quod relativa secundum esse sint quae important relationem realem, secundum dici vero quae important relationem rationis, quum patet manifeste falsitas talis intellectus, ex eo quod sensus realiter refertur ad sensibile et scientia ad scibile, sed intelligenda est secundum distinctionem significationis nominum. Ea enim vocantur relativa secundum esse quae imposita sunt ad significandum primo relationem sive realem sive rationis, ut dominus, duplum, genus, species, praedicatum, subiectum, etc.; ea autem vocantur relativa secundum dici quae primo quidem significant rem absolutam et ex consequenti important respectum sive realem sive rationis, et talia alio vocabulo dicuntur significare non tam respectum quam absolutum respective, ut scientia, sensus et huiusmodi. Scientia enim formaliter importat id quo scimus quod qualitas est, et ideo ad aliquid secundum dici vocatur:...
9. John of St. Thomas, Log. II, q. 17, a. 1. Loquendo de relatione in tota sua latitudine, ut comprehendit transcendentalem et praedicamentalem, secundum dici et secundum esse, non invenio qui absolute negaverit omnem relationem...
10. Idem, a. 2. Ad cognoscendum relationem praedicamentalem

oportet discernere illam et a relatione rationis, et a relatione transcendentali, quae etiam appellari solet relatio secundum dici.

11. Summa Theol., I, 13, a. 7, ad 1.

12. In Metaphysicam Arist., V, chap. xv, (lectio 17), 1001-3, 1026-7. Ponit ergo tres modos eorum, quae ad aliquid dicuntur: quorum primus est secundum numerum et quantitatem, sicut duplum ad dimidium, et triplum ad tertiam partem, et "multiplicatum" idest multiplex, ad partem "multiplicati", idest ad submultiplex, "et continens ad continentum."

Secundus modus est prout aliqua dicuntur ad aliquid secundum actionem et passionem, vel potentiam activam et passivam; sicut calefactivum ad calefactibile, quod pertinet ad actiones naturales, et sectivum ad sectibile, quod pertinet ad actiones artificiales, et universaliter omne activum ad passivum.

Tertius modus est secundum quod mensurabile dicitur ad mensuram. Accipitur autem hic mensura et mensurabile non secundum quantitatem, (hoc enim ad primum modum pertinet, in quo utrumque ad utrumque dicitur: nam duplum dicitur ad dimidium, et dimidium ad duplum,) sed secundum mensurationem esse et veritatis. Veritas enim scientiae mensuratur a scibile. Ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, oratio scita vera vel falsa est, et non e converso. Et similiter est de sensibile et sensu. Et propter hoc non mutuo dicuntur mensura ad mensurabile et e converso, sicut in aliis modis, sed solum mensurabile ad mensuram. Et similiter etiam imago dicitur ad id cuius est imago, tamquam mensurabile ad mensura.

Veritas enim imaginis mensuratur ex re cuius est imago... 1026 Prosequitur de tertio modo relationum: et dicit quod in hoc differt iste tertius modus a praemissis, quod in praemissis unumquodque dicitur relative ex hoc, quod ipsum ad aliud refertur; non ex eo quod aliud referatur ad ipsum. Duplum enim refertur ad dimidium, et e converso; et similiter pater ad filium, et e converso; sed hoc tertio modo aliquid dicitur relative ex eo solum, quod aliquid refertur ad ipsum; sicut patet, quod sensibile et scibile vel intelligibile dicuntur relative, quia alia referuntur ad illa. Scibile enim dicitur aliquid, propter hoc, quod habetur scientia de ipso. Et similiter sensibile dicitur aliquid quod potest sentiri.

Unde non dicitur relative propter aliquid quod sit ex eorum parte quod sit qualitas, vel quantitas, vel actio, vel passio, sicut in praemissis relationibus accidebat; sed solum propter actiones aliorum, quae tamen in ipsa non terminantur. Si enim videre esset actio videntis perveniens ad rem visam, sicut calefactio pervenit ad calefactibile; sicut calefactibile refertur ad calefaciens, ita visibile referretur ad videntem. Sed videre et intelligere et huiusmodi actiones, ut in nono huius dicitur, manent in agentibus.

bus, et non transeunt in res passas; unde visibile et scibile non patitur aliquid, ex hoc quod intelligitur vel videtur. Et propter hoc non ipsamet referuntur ad alia, sed alia ad ipsa. Et simile est in omnibus aliis, in quibus relative aliquid dicitur propter relationem alterius ad ipsum, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in columna. Cum enim dextrum et sinistrum designent principia motuum in rebus animatis, columnae et alicui inanimato attribui non possunt, nisi secundum quod animata aliquo modo se habeant ad ipsam, sicut columna dicitur dextra, quia homo est ei sinister. Et simile est de imagine respectu exemplaris, et denario, quo sit pretium emptionis. In omnibus autem his tota ratio referendi in duobus extremis, pendet ex altero. Et ideo omnia huiusmodi quodammodo se habent ut mensurabile et mensura. Nam ab eo quaelibet res mensuratur, a quo ipsa dependet.

13. John of St. Thomas, op. cit., a. 3. Nihilominus, cum communi sententia asserendum est utrumque genus relationum, primum et tertium esse praedicamentale, ut cum Aristotele, et D. Thoma, et Scoto tenetur communiter.

14. See p. 16 above, note 10.

15. Categories, Chapter 7; in Greek, p. 6b. The Latin text, as found in Cajetan's commentary, is as follows: Ad aliquid ergo sunt quaecunque ipsum quod sunt, aliorum dicuntur, vel quodolibet aliter ad aliud,...

16. Metaphysics, Book V, chap. xv. The Latin text as found in St. Thomas' commentary is as follows: Alia ut mensurabile ad mensuram, et scibile ad scientiam, et sensibile ad sensum...

Mensurabile vero et scibile, et intellectuale, eo quod aliud dicitur ad ipsum, ad aliquid dicuntur;...

17. E. Marry, "Examen d'une Division Traditionnelle: la Relation Predicamentale," p. 309.

18. In Sent. I, dist. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4. Quia relatio non habet esse naturale nisi ex hoc quod habet fundamentum in re, et ex hoc collocatur in genere; inde est quod differentias aliorum entium, ut patet ex Philosopho V Metaph. text. 20, ubi dicit quod quaedam fundantur supra quantitatem et quaedam supra actionem, et sic de aliis.

19. In Phys. III, chap. 1, lect. 1, 6. Maxime autem super duo fundatur relatio, quae habent ordinem ad aliud, scilicet quantitatem et actionem... Hanc igitur divisionem manifeste expressit Philosophus in Metaph. V sed hic breviter tangit, dicens quod ad aliud aliquid quidem est secundum superabundantiam et defectum, quod quidem fundatur supra quantitatem, ut duplum et dimidium; aliud autem secundum activum et

d

et passivum, et motivum et mobile, quae ad invicem referuntur, ut patet per se.

20. In Sent. III, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 1, acl. 1. Omnis autem relatio, secundum Philosophum (V Metaph. xv) fundatur vel supra quantitatem aut quod reducitur ad genus quantitatis, aut supra actionem et passionem.

21. In Sent. III, dist. 8, a. 5. Sunt ergo quaedam relationes quae fundantur super quantitatem, sicut aequalitas quae fundatur super unum in quantitate, ... Aliae vero relationes fundantur super actionem et passionem.

22. Summa Theol., I, q. 28, a. 4.

23. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, chap. 24. Relative opposita vel supra quantitatem fundantur, ut duplum et dimidium; vel super actionem et passionem, ut dominus et servus, movens et motum, pater et filius.

24. De Potentia, q. VII, a. 9.

25. Idem.

26. E. Marry, op. cit., pp. 310, 311.

27. Norbert D. Ginsburg, "Metaphysical Relations and St. Thomas Aquinas," p. 252.

28. Idem, p. 253.

29. Idem, p. 254.

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