The 1948 Presidential Election:

As Viewed by President Harry S. Truman

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THE 1948 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:

AS VIEWED BY PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN

Every four years the people of the United States fulfill tradition and elect a president to lead the nation for the next four years. This post, due to its prestige and power, beckons to the great political leaders of the nation to come forth to serve their nation as its leader.

When these politicians get together, in their respective conventions, speculation begins as to whom will win and what reasons prompted the voters to select the victor over another candidate. People spend as much time trying to pick a winner as the candidates do campaigning to be the winner.

The question that one often asks is, "Why does a man want to run for President?" This question gets increasingly difficult if you ask further why a man runs when everyone thinks that he will lose. These men must be hoping for the ever present (?) upset. Harry S. Truman wwas this sort of man in 1948. It is, therefore, the purpose of this paper to answer this pressing question: Why did President Harry S. Truman feel he could win the 1948 Presidential election, when all political experts predicted a certain defeat?

We shall look at the event in a four-step procedure. First, we shall look at the early planning of President Truman

and his staff for the 1948 election. Secondly, we shall try to uncover the problems that arose between the planning and election day. Thirdly, we shall study President Truman's attack that he waged on the Republican party during the campaign of 1948. And finally we shall view the final tally and determine where the Truman vote came from to see if his planning was correct.

In 1947 the question that people were asking was: "Will President Truman run for a new term?" Truman had come into the presidency at a particularly tough time. He had to replace Franklin Roosevelt towards the end of World War II. President Truman however, had his mind made up on the matter:

I always knew that from April 1945, until January, 1949, what I would really be doing was filling out the fourth term of Roosevelt, who was a great President, but I had some ideas of my own, and in order to carry them out I had to run for re-election and be re-elected, and that is exactly what happened. Of course I didn't say I was going to run for quite some time. I didn't do any harm that I could see to keep people guessing for awhile.

President Truman saw that there was still much work to be done. The Democrats had had control of the Presidency since 1932. In those sixteen years, twelve with Roosevelt and four with Truman, the Democrats were busy working on reforms for the nation. Instituting these reforms was the total goal of President Truman. The reforms that came under the "New Deal" and the "Fair Deal", were still weak and could not stand up to the attacks a Republican President would subject them to. So President Truman set his mind to be re-elected in order to protect and defend sixteen years of Democratic control.²

The world was going through a change in 1948, a change that was brought on by the growth of Communism. President Truman viewed himself as a fighter of Communism and all that it stood for. And, if the Communists wanted a fight, President Truman would surely give it to them.³

Re-election also means approval by the people of the work a President has done. President Truman believed in his work. "Any good politician with nerve and a good program that is right can win in the face of the stiffest opposition. Truman had confidence in himself and his program, but this confidence was not shared, of course, by his opponents. Just as Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt were fighting for liberalism so was Harry Truman. He was a liberal fighting for his liberal program. This liberalism was a necessity if the United States ever hored to totally warm itself from the cold of the Great Depression and World War II.⁵

Wrong decisions are, at times, the reason why a President is voted out of office. President Truman wrote to his sister saying that he deserved to be re-elected because he had felt that he had made the right decisions and that he had done a good job, and since he had done a good job it was not the time for a change.⁶

There were two major problems facing the President's re-election. First, was the fact that President Truman had never been elected President; he took office when Franklin Roosevelt died. His experience in the executive department was limited to three months as Vice-President. Prior to this President Truman had developed his reputation as a senator in charge of the Truman Committee and it was this committee that had saved the taxpayers billions of dollars on national defense. This made President Truman well known among his colleagues but it did not make him a household name.⁷ He was the head of the party but he was not the chosen head, so he was not as strong as many of his predecessors.

The second major problem facing the President was that he was always being compared to President Franklin Roosevelt. President Roosevelt was the man that brought the United States and the world out of the worst depression ever experienced. He was the same man that was seen leading the nation against Hitler and the Nazi Germans. He was also the only man that was elected to the Presidency of the United States four times and served in that position for more than twelve years. It was this man's footsteps that Harry Truman was expected to follow. This was, and is, an impossible task for any man.

CHAPTER

The stage was set forthCampaign, but the strategy was not written. Clark M. Clifford wrote the plan late in 1947 and presented it to President Truman on November 19th.⁸ The Clifford Memorandum analyzed past elections and attempted to use this knowledge to Truman's advantage in the 1947 election.⁹

The President read over the document and discussed its content with Clifford. He agreed with the strategy in general, although he did make some revisions.¹⁰

From this study Clifford devised a method for success in the upcoming election. It was a theoretical study since Mr. Clifford was unable to foretell the future, but in many ways he was very accurate. For example, he picked Thomas Dewey, Governor of New York, to be the Republican nominee. Mr. Clifford saw Dewey as the strongest Republican candidate, and at that time, November 1947, a strong candidate was needed to defeat President Truman.¹¹

Clifford predicted Henry Wallace would be a third party candidate. The backers of Wallace were Communist motivated, he stated; and Moscow had nothing to lose if the Republicans won. The Truman administration and the Kremlin had not been getting along well at the time, as the Berlin airlift showed.¹² Wallace's people such as C. B. Baldwin, Harold Young,

and Michael Straight were strong party-liners of the Communist party, and these people were able to manipulate Wallace to do what ever they wanted him to do. Clifford further said that total victory was not Wallace's plan but rather he hoped to simply insure the defeat of President Truman. A third party could not win because it could not be on enough state ballots. But if Wallace could get on enough ballots and was able to poll five to ten percent of the vote, he could split the Democratic party and ensure President Truman's defeat and be able to gain control of the party for the 1952 election. Clifford did not limit Wallace's support to the Communists. He was also supported by the young people, the pacifists, and also, as Clifford referred to them, the "lunatic fringe."

The answer to the Wallace problem was simple in 1947. First, if possible, the Democrats must urge him not to $run_{(i)}$ and if he chooses to $run_{(i)}$ he must become synonymous with the Communist party in the public mind.¹³

Turning to the geography involved in the election, Clifford looked towards the South. The South had been safely Democratic since the Civil War, and its leaders in 1948 were considered conservative by Clifford. Clifford considered the West as being liberal, making it the opposite of the South. But Clifford considered the South a sure thing and suggested 1.0

not worrying about it in the planning of the campaign. He stated that it would be safe to assume that the South would If the West could be won and the adminnot revolt in 1948. istration carried the South as it had done in 1944, 216 electoral votes would be won. This would leave the Democrats only 50 votes short of the 266 majority. President Truman was from a midwest state, Missouri, and it would be safe to assume that he could win enough of those states to combine with the eastern states to give him the needed votes. To be able to win the $West_0$ the President must help them to solve their problems and concerns; they were namely: reclamation, floods, and agriculture. The 80th Congress by its actions had made itself unpopular in the West. If the President could take advantage of this, and he must, he would win the Clifford labeled this "the Number One priority for the election. 1948 campaign."14

President Truman must also capture the independent voters and the minorities. In these groups were: the farmers, who go hand in hand with the West; labor, whose majority at the time was large and Democratic; liberals, who were split because of southern control of the Democratic party; and the Negroes, (or Negro Vote) who were powerful in large electoral states. Other less important groups were the Jews, Catholics, and Italians. Many of these groups voted in blocs and were located in large cities, and were, therefore, very important in achieving a possible victory.¹⁵

In regard to the foreign policy under Truman; the United States' relations with the Soviets were strained and would be strained more. But this was not a bad situation for the Truman administration to be in. In many people's eyes the Soviets were "evil" and since President Truman was not cooperating with them, he must be against evil. General Marshall, Secretary of State under President Truman, appeared to the public as being above politics and since this was so, there was immunity from attack by the Republicans.¹⁶

Mr. Clifford listed six major domestic issues that the President could expect to encounter during the campaign, and he also listed six answers to these issues. The first was high prices--the President must be seen as an inflation fighter. He could accomplish this by presenting a strong anti-inflation program to congress. Second was the housing issue; in this instance Clifford recommended that the President attack the Real Estate Lobby because of the effects it had on congress and its voting behavior. Third is the Marshall Plan, which the administration should be in total support of as an attack on Russian aggression. Next there was tax revision, and the memorandum suggested that by giving people more take home money, inflation would seem less severe. Fifth was that the President should show interest and concern for conservation of natural resources, especially in the West. Clifford concluded that the President should support a strong civil rights program to keep the Negro vote in the Democratic column.¹⁷

As a general plan, Clifford said that the President should attack the 80th Congress and its record in regard to these issues. The Republicans in the Congress could be linked with the Republican nominee.¹⁸

Two suggestions that Clifford gave in closing his memorandum was that the Democratic party should be rebuilt, beginning with a new chairman and that a "think group" should be developed to plan strategy. The new chairman could livenup the party and get it moving in a positive direction.¹⁹ The think group would plan strategy and coordinate efforts by the Democrats to insure a maximizing of their work. Clifford stated that these people should not be from within the administration so that a new and unbiased work would be done by them.²⁰

The memorandum had two purposes: it listed the probable and it listed a course of action that should be followed during the campaign of 1948.²¹ In a later interview Clifford described his thoughts concerning the election: "We've got our backs on our own one-yard line with a minute to play; it has to be razzledazzle."²²

President Truman welcomed Clifford's memorandum and agreed with its basic content. But the memorandum was just a piece of paper and it was useless unless it was put into practice.

One of the first actions by the President towards fulfilling the memorandum was when he realized the importance of the farmer and the fact that there the New Deal had been good to the farmer. Between 1940 and 1948, the farmer's purchasing power rose 70% while the national average was only 50%. During the same time span farm assest rose by \$69,000,000,000. Farmers' bank deposits also went up in amount, from \$4,000,000,000 to \$16,000,000,000, as did savings bonds, \$4,500,000,000. At the same time farm mortgages decreased from \$6,600,000,000 to \$4,900,000,000.²³ Yes, the Democrats had been good to the farmers and it was hoped that the farmers would be good to the Democrats.

Labor also saw good times under the New Deal, but those good times seemed to be coming to a close. In 1947 the 80th Congress passed the Taft-Hartly Act over President Truman's veto. This had a crippling effect on labor while it helped

management.24

Clifford offered President Truman advice on labor. He said that President Truman had to inspire labor just as Franklin Roosevelt had done while he was President. The way to do this, suggested Clifford, was to invite labor leaders to the White House to discuss current events in general and also make labor leaders appointees to different councils of the administration. By doing this the President could get labor to support him and work for him without the President working for labor. And if the President spoke in generalities, he would not be forced to follow labor's advice. This way there would not be hurt feelings.²⁵

The minorities would not be as easy to please as the farmers and labor. This was caused by the large numbers and the many differences that existed between groups of minorities. The major groups were listed by Clifford in his memorandum: the Jews, Catholics, Negroes, and Italians. Each of these had their differences, but all were important in a close election

The Negroes were important, due to their size and concentration in the large Northern cities. They had been voting Democratic during Roosevelt's tenure in office, but they appeared to be swinging over to the Republican ranks. Clifford's suggestion was a strong civil rights program to win them over to President Truman. Any votes that would be lost in the South would be overcome in the North.²⁶

The Negoswere essential in the state of New York, and since New York had the most electoral votes, 47, it was a coveted prize for the 1948 election. Since 1816, the heart of the Jewish population in the United States was in New York City and New York City was nearly mandatory if a candidate wanted to win the state. Only Woodrow Wilson, in 1916, had ever won the presidential election without winning New York.²⁷

Clifford generalized the Catholics into two areas. They were consistant Democrats and they feared Communism. By Truman's being tough with Russia, they could be in the President's column in November.²⁸

The Italiams were important in four states: New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and California because as Clifford said, ^Nit almost always votes as a solid bloc--is notoriously volatile, swinging easily from party to party." If President Truman could win over a few Italian leaders he could count on having the whole group. The job, however, would not be an easy one.²⁹

If the Democrats could off-set the Republicans in the Northeast, and if the South would remain safely Democratic all that was left was the West as the deciding factor for the election. As stated earlier the problems of the West were: flood control, reclamation, and agriculture. These problems had been seemingly ignored prior to 1948 and the blame for this lack of recognition could be placed on the 80th Congress. If the apathetic behavior of the Congress could be linked with the Republican nomine e_{i} the Truman campaign would be greatly aided. Both the congress and the major opponents for Truman in 1948 were Republican so the link would not be difficult to make. ³⁰

These domestic issues would be important ones in the campaign and the foreign issues would take a "back seat" to them, claimed Clifford.³¹ The main domestic issue was high prices. The Republicans had blamed the high prices on the President because he removed price controls and was for wage increases for labor. Clifford pointed out in his memorandum that the President had been for continuation of price controls but that congress was not. It would be necessary for the President to remind the people of this fact because the Republicans certainly would not.³² In the sixteen months before October, 1947, retail prices rose 23%. 33 This price increase could be related to the inflation rate that had struck before the depression in 1932. Many of the voters remembered the depression and its hard times and they would vote accordingly. Other voters did not remember the depression of 1932 but still voted with it in mind. 34 If the President

could link these memories to the Republican party he could only help his efforts for re-election. An examination of the business cycle for the first part of the 20th century shows many bad economic times while Republicans held office. Contractions in the business cycle occurred in: 1910 and 1911, Theodore Roosevelt; 1923, Warren G. Harding; 1927, Calvin Coolidge; and 1929 to 1932, Herbert Hoover. All these Presidents were Republican and if they could be linked with bad times the people would not vote for their party.³⁵

The Republicans had not held the executive branch of the government for sixteen years but they did gain control of congress in 1946. By this action they showed that they were on the rise. Any party that won the congressional midterm election won the Presidency two years later. There was only one exception to this, 1876, but the rule held true in 1892, 1896, 1912, and 1932.³⁶

Although there were 188 Democratic Representatives and 55 Democratic Senators in Congress, President Truman was unable to cooperate with the body on the whole. President Truman had six vetoes overridden by the 80th Congress. Among these was the Taft-Hartley Act and a \$4,700,000,000 tax cut.³⁷ A simple analysis of this situation would show that President Truman was not receiving the support of the Democrats in the Congress. In the house there were only 88 Democrats that

backed the President's tax cut while only ten Democratic Senators backed him.³⁸

The President knew that Congress would not improve his image during an election year by passing his proposed reforms. Because of this, the President was able to send recommendations to Congress in large numbers knowing that because of his timing they would never be passed. An example of this policy was the President's civil rights bill.³⁹

President Truman used these issues and called the 80th Congress a "do-nothing congress",⁴⁰ but this was not true. The 80th Congress had passed over 100 bills and among them were: The Taft-Hartley Law, the Marshall Plan, and the Vandenberg Resolution.⁴¹ This meant nothing. The President wanted a do-nothing congress in the people's minds and if he could do it, their record would become secondary.

The final concern that arose in the planning of the campaign was the image of the President himself. He had been cast as, "a man of the people trying to do his best." But this was to be changed, since humility was not needed in the arena of politics. He had to show poise and confidence, not a man "trying to do his best" but instead a man that <u>is</u> doing his best.⁴² He is a man that has wide interest as can be seen when he visits with Einstein and Henry Ford II, as <u>Clifford recommended</u>.

A President should be a man commanding respect, he is the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief is not a bungling fool but rather a very powerful and important man, and the people must be reminded of this.⁴³

The President was an F. D. R. man, because he was hand chosen by Roosevelt and he was still using Roosevelt's ideas. As the <u>Denver Post</u> put it, "The New Deal--its preservation, perpetuation, and completion is what Harry S. Truman is pinning his hopes on." The F. D. R. image was not dead as long as it remained in the minds of the people.⁴⁴

All this planning was done by executive people in strict secrecy. It was almost destroyed by new issues in 1948. But finally, on March 8, 1948, Democratic National Chairman J. Howard McGrath announced to reporters that the President would run if he was nominated.⁴⁵

CHAPTER II

With the beginning of 1948 President Truman's problems began with his re-election. Clark Clifford had seen the problem in 1947 when he described the Democratic party as "an unhappy alliance of Southern Conservatives, Western Progressives, and big city labor."⁴⁶

A general air of defeat hung over the entire party. Bernard Baruch, Cornelius Whitney and many others refused to take the job of Chairman of the Democratic Finance Committee. Finally Louis Johnson accepted the job.⁴⁷ The apathy of the party was a major blow to President Truman, but it was not the only blow he received during the 1948 fight.

There were two major concerns of the people in the upcoming election; one was the record of the 80th Congress. In this area President Truman had his strategy planned out well in advance. The other issue was Communism in the federal government. This came to a peak on July 30th when Elizabeth T. Bentley testified to a subcommittee on expenditures in the executive departments that she had received information from government officials to pass on to Communist spies.⁴⁸

This came in the same year that the Russians had taken over Czechoslovakia, which was the first democratic state

ever taken over by Communists. These two events combined to intensify the peoples' fear of Communism. 49

By the time she finished, Miss Bentley had compiled a list of spies that she knew were in the higher parts of the government. The list included: William T. Remington, from the Department of Commerce, Lauchlin Carrie, a one-time White House economic advisor, and Alger Hiss, a member of the State Department.⁵⁰

The President was hurt, politically, by the link that seemed to exist between his government and the Soviets, but he still fought for his administration. He referred to the entire affair as a "red-herring" devised by his opponents to damage him. He had to find a way of ridding himself of this and he began to look for the solution.⁵¹ The solution was found by linking the Communists with Henry Wallace.

In late 1947 and early 1948 many of the major polls predicted that President Truman would beat any Republican that ran against him. If Senator Robert Taft was his opponent, he would win by an overwhelming amount. But by the time the President announced his candidacy, his popularity plummetted and he was behind Thomas Dewey and Harold Stassen, with Earl Warren and Senator Taft not too far behind. President Truman had been popular due to his these programs were not followed by more relief programs. This was not all the fault of the executive department. Congress had refused to give Truman any support in the election year, so his programs suffered.⁵²

The <u>New York Times</u> polled the 48 states one month before the election and found Dewey winning 29 states and 350 electoral votes.⁵² All the other major polls followed this line of thought and picked Dewey as a sure winner. The Gallup poll did show a slip in the Wallace vote, which would help Truman, but the slide was too small to be of any significance. ⁵³

These polls were not just guess-work by high positioned journalists, the polls were thought to be scientific and accurate. In 1944 Roper polls were off by a mere .3% when they predicted a Roosevelt victory over the Republicans. The three major polls (Roper, Gallup, and Crosley) all agreed that Dewey was a sure thing in the election.⁵⁴

The newspapers were no help to the President. Over 65% of them, with 80% of the circulation backed Dewey.⁵⁵ The papers told how Dewey would run things and that President Truman did not have a chance of being elected. The <u>Detroit</u> <u>Free Press</u> told everyone not to worry about the President, he had a 25,000 dollar a year pension and could write a book or two, and he could work in radio.⁵⁶ President Truman

expected this kind of response from the papers and he was not worried about it, but we shall look at this later.

With President Truman's popularity dropping, there were many people trying to take over as President in 1948. One of these people was Henry Wallace, former Vice-President under Franklin Roosevelt, but more recently editor of the <u>New Republic</u>. In his editorials he attacked President Truman and his programs and at the same time he praised Russia. Since the Republican party was "beyond hope" and the Democratic party was a "party of war and depression" Henry Wallace threw his hat into the ring and announced his candidacy as an independent candidate on December 29, 1947.⁵⁷

President Truman's cold war with Russia and the development of atomic bombs were the given reasons for Wallace's candidacy. Civil Rights was a part of the Wallace platform but it was secondary to these two.⁵⁸ But other reasons for his candidacy surely existed. First he wished to push the Democratic party more to the left. Its affiliation with the South had driven it to the conservative right, which left many liberals in a depressed state. If Wallace could not push the party to the left, he could insure the defeat of the party.⁵⁹

One week after the Democratic convention, the Progressive party held its convention and nominated Henry Wallace for President, and Idaho Senator Glen Taylor for Vice-President. 60

A platform committee was formed, headed by Lee Pressman, who had been fired as General Counsel of the C. I. O., because of his leftist attitude. Wallace's platform consisted of four major points: peace with Russia, destruction of all atomic weapons, repealing of the draft, and many "far-reaching" domestic reforms.⁶¹

Support for this platform came from a wide range of people: Democrats disappointed in President Truman, liberals, and most of all, Communists. Russia had nothing to lose and everything to gain if President Truman was defeated. If Wallace could take away any of the Democratic vote, in a close election, the Republicans would find themselves in power.⁶²

Wallace received political support from the P.C.A. (Progressive Citizens of America). The P.C.A. was strong in the trade unions, especially the C. I. O. Wallace was also supported by the Citizens Committee for the Arts and Sciences which was made up of left-wing intellectuals who feared that the control of the atomic bomb would bring war, and also Democrats against President Truman because of his foreign policy.

The P. C. A. shifted into the Progressive party and by late 1947 boasted a membership of over 100,000 people in 25 states. But the P. C. A. lost many prominent Democrats when it nominated Wallace for President. Among them was Eleanor Roosevelt who turned to the anti-communist A. D. A. (Americans for Democratic Action). Because of the communist influence found in the Wallace party many trade unions, including the C. I. O., also turned away from the Progressive party.⁶²

The entire country was included in the Wallace campaign, including the deep South. Not even President Truman would go to the deep South. The deep South greeted Wallace at his speeches with jeers, sneers, and tomatoes. This did not bother Wallace because he saw himself as a martyr. He spoke to over 25,000 people during his tour in the deep South, but he converted only a few to his side. Even though he had few followers in the deep South, Wallace was on all of the southern states ballots, except Georgia and Oklahoma.⁶⁴

Early in the campaign the polls showed Wallace winning 5 to 6 million voters but his popularity kept shrinking as the campaign went on. By the end of it, he received only about 20% of his predicted total.⁶⁵

But Henry Wallace was not the only person who was trying to insure the defeat of President Truman. The Republican Party had many people campaigning for the Republican nomination. It was certain that President Truman would be the Democratic nominee and that he did not have a chance of winning. The chances of a third party winning were very small which left the Republican nominee as the leading contender and a number

of people sought that nomination.

The three front-runners for the spot on the top of the party ticket were Thomas Dewey, governor of New York, Senator Robert Taft from Ohio, and Harold Stassen from Minnesota.

Governor Dewey was by all odds the favorite for the nomination because he had a good record as governor of the largest state in the union. His work as governor during World War II saw many great achievements including: a raise in unemployment and disability benefits, a \$623,000,000 stockpile in the state treasury, and passage of laws ending racial and religious discrimination in employment.⁶⁶

Another reason why Governor Dewey was a leading candidate was because he was not a newcomer to presidential nominations. In 1948 Dewey made his third bid for the presidency. In 1940 he lost the nomination at the convention but he won the nomination in 1944 which made him the leader of the party in 1948. He lost to the Democrats in 1944 who were led by Franklin Roosevelt. This was the closest election for Franklin Roosevelt.⁵⁷ Surely Harry Truman would be no problem for a man that came the closest to defeating Franklin Roosevelt.

While Governor Dewey also had usually lost his first bid for a position, he usually won the second time, and 1948 was his second try for the presidency.⁶⁸

Despite all these promising attributes of Dewey, not all

of the Republicans wanted him as the nominee. A large group backed the Republican leader in the Senate, Senator Robert Taft.

Senator Taft was a true Republican who worked his way up in the party. He began his career as an Ohio State Representative, and later he became a State Senator before he took up office as a United States Senator.⁶⁹

Taft had two drawbacks facing him in his bid for the nomination. First, was that many republicans who agreed with his ideas saw him as being conservative. The second was his strong spirit and bluntness towards people. In September, 1947, he was asked for his solution to high food prices. His reply was, "we should eat less."⁷⁰

The final major candidate for the Republican nomination was Harold Stassen, former governor of Minnesota. Stassen resigned as governor in 1942, after being elected twice, to join the Navy in the war effort. After the war, President Roosevelt made Stassen a delegate in the founding of the United Nations. In 1946 he decided to run for the presidency and began his campaign two years early. He campaigned as a liberal Republican seeing the solution to the domestic problems by supporting a system of free enterprise. The United Nations was his answer to foreign issues.⁷¹

Stassen was a hard campaigner and kept his face before the public. <u>Newsweek</u> figured he covered 160,000 miles in 476 days

and made 325 speeches. During the same time he spent over \$1,000,000 on his campaign.⁷²

When the Republicans reached the convention site Thomas Dewey was in the lead with 350 delegates, only 198 short of the needed 548 total votes for the nomination. Taft and Stassen tried to form a "Stop Dewey" movement, but disagreement between the two stopped the effort.

On the first ballot Dewey polled 434 delegates while Taft managed 224 and Stassen took 157. When the second ballot was held, Dewey's total grew to 515. Seeing a certain win for Dewey, Taft called for a recess and met with Stassen to ask for his support. Stassen responded that he would release his delegates to Taft on the fourth ballot. Taft knew there would be no fourth ballot, so he conceded to Dewey and on the third ballot Dewey was nominated.⁷³

In his acceptance speech to the convention, Dewey stated, "I come to you unfettered by a single obligation or promise to any living person."⁷⁴ This summed up Dewey's strategy for the presidential race. President Truman and his staff turned the strategy for the presidential race around and used it against the Republican candidate, by pressing issues and demanding answers.

After Governor Earl Warren was chosen as the Vice-Presidential candidate, the delegates developed the platform.

The platform contained promises of collective bargaining, support of the U. N., a bi-partisan foreign policy, support of the Marshall Plan, a strong civil rights plan, and continuation of federal aid to the public.⁷⁵

After the Republican convention, the Democratic convention began. It is interesting to note that much of the early work done at the convention was not done <u>for</u> President but rather against him.

Both major parties, in 1948, attempted to draft General Dwight Eisenhower as their candidate. He had turned down the offers but organizational Democrats did not give up easily. They liked the thought of having the General lead their ticket. He was a much stronger leader than President Truman had ever been. However, his political views were unknown. That is why both parties were able to try to win him over to their side; and it was certain that he would help the local candidates.⁷⁶ By being willing to change the name at the head of the ticket the Democrats showed that they were not counting on winning the Presidential election. A change at this late stage in the nomination would insure defeat for the Democratic presidential candidate, but it might help the congressional candidates.

Eisenhower's support came from three different areas in the Democratic party. The liberals wanted him because they felt that Truman was not carrying out the New Deal policies

fast enough. Southern Democrats showed their dislike of Truman's stand on civil rights by supporting the General who they knew nothing about in regards to civil rights. Their thinking was surely he could be no worse that Truman. Organization Democrats just did not think that Truman could win and that even at the late date the General was their only hope of winning.⁷⁷

Eisenhower's response was not good as far as the organizational Democrats were concerned. The former general told them, "No matter under what terms, conditions, or premises a proposal might be couched, I would refuse the nomination."⁷⁸

When Eisenhower took his name out of contention for the Democratic nomination, many of his backers turned to Justice William Douglas, who also turned down the nomination.⁷⁹ The Democrats were "stuck" with President Truman whether they liked it or not.

Not all of the delegates felt that they were "stuck" with Truman as the candidate for their party. A number of Southern democratic leaders met in Jackson, Mississippi, on May 10, 1948. They developed a strategy where they hoped to block a Truman nomination by forming a Southern coalition, and supporting Dick Russell or Harry Byrd. If this failed they planned to bolt the party and meet at a States Right's

convention to select their own candidate. If no candidate received a majority of the electoral vote the election would go to the House of Representatives with each state receiving only one vote each. In the House the States Right's candidate would have a good chance of winning the election.⁸⁰

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President Truman was not worried about the nomination because he was head of the party and he knew that if the party repudiated him they would repudiate four years of Democratic rule. On the first and only ballot, the President received 948 votes to Russell's 263. All but 12 of the Southern delegates voted for Russell.⁸¹ Alben Barkley was then nominated as the Vice-Presidential candidate by acclamation. President Truman came to Philadelphia to accept the nomination in person. His speech was vibrant and he suprised everyone when he said:

On the twenty-sixth of July, which out in Missourippi we call 'Turnip Day' I am going to call Congress back and ask them to pass laws to halt rising prices, to meet the housing crisis--which they are saying they are for in their platform.

"At the same time, I shall ask them to act upon other vitally needed measures, such as aid to education, which they say they are for; a national health program; civil rights legislation, which they say they are for; an increase in the minimun wage, which I doubt very much they are for; extension of the Social Security coverage and increased benefits, which they say they are for; funds for projects needed in our program to provide public power and cheap electricity. By indirection, the Eightieth Congress has tried to sabotage the power policies the United States has pursued for fourteen years. The power lobby is as bad as the real-estate lobby, which is sitting on the housing bill.

"I shall ask for adequate and decent laws for displaced

persons in place of this anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic law which the Eightieth Congress passed. "Now my friends, if there is any reality behind the Republican platform, we ought to get some action from a short session of the Eightieth Congress. They can do this job in fifteen days, if they want to do it. They will still have time to go out and run for office. "They are going to try to dodge their responsibility. They are going to drag all the red herrings they can, across this campaign, but I am here to say that Senator Barkley and I are not going to let them get away with it.⁸²

With this the delegates cheered the President and praised his idea of calling for the special session of Congress.

Once the excitement of the nomination settled the delegates turned to planning and putting together a revised platform. Civil rights was the chief problem. President Truman wanted a continuation of the 1944 plan on civil rights which would not But liberals led by a young senator named upset the South. Hubert Humphrey wanted a plank stating the same points that President Truman said in his State of the Union address. Debates rose between conservatives and liberals, who were joined by the big city bosses. The bosses thought that since the national ticket was lost, a strong civil rights plank would help the local candidates. When the convention voted, there was $651\frac{1}{2}$ for the new plank and $582\frac{1}{2}$ against it. The Mississippi and half of the Alabama delegation got up and left the convention waving Confederate flags. The rest of the South stayed for the close of the convention. The remaining parts of the platform went according to Truman's plans.⁸³

Civil rights were very important in 1948 for many reasons. Blacks had a large population in the United States, especially in the industrial North. The blacks who had supported Franklin Roosevelt had begun to go to the Republican ranks. The feeling was that since the South was in control of the Democratic party, there was little chance for Negroes to advance in the party. This feeling was being supported by the NAACP.⁸⁴

Truman was at first willing to give into the South by adopting the 1944 plank on civil rights. The President saw civil rights as being important in fiction, but not in reality.⁸⁵ The new plank did offer advantages to the Democrats. It would certainly steal votes from Wallace, and it also insured the black vote.⁸⁶ The new plank was a break from the Roosevelt way, and now Truman was walking on new untested ground.⁸⁷

To say the South was upset over the new plank would be an understatement. Over 6,000 of them gathered in Birmingham, Alabama, for a one day convention. Only Mississippi and Alabama were there in total. Leading candidates for the nomination did not come to the convention--Dick Russell, Harry Byrd, and Governor Ben Laney were all absent.

The nomination went to Strom Thurmond, Governor of South Carolina, for President, and Fielding Wright, Governor of Mississippi, for Vice President. The convention made plans to hold another convention to select electors. The plan was even if the Democrats won the state, the electors would not vote for Truman. $^{\mbox{88}}$

With all this happening around him, President Truman began his campaign to win the Presidency.

CHAPTER III

Problems occur in every campaign for political office. There is only one winner in an election for the Presidency. The winner is the candidate that keeps his problems, in regard to the election, to a minimum; and the problems that do arise are overcome.

Harry Truman had problems just like the other candidates seeking office. We have already seen many of them in the first two chapters. The most basic problem facing the President was getting people to think he <u>could</u> win, and that he was the better man for the office. Truman's mother-in-law thought he was wrong for running against "a nice man like Thomas Dewey"⁸⁹ But Truman felt he had a strong enough chance to overcome these problems and he began his campaign in spite of them.

The President followed Clark Clifford's advice and began his campaign with the State of the Union address; which he delivered to Congress on January 7th.

In the speech the President outlined the issues that would arise in the following months and he stated his stand on them. He said he was for the following: a strong civil rights program; expansion of unemployment and Social Security benefits; a national health insurance program; federal aid for education and housing; rent controls to be reinstated; a higher minimum wage from 40¢ to 75¢ an hour; development of natural resources following the T. V. A. framework; and, finally, a tax cut of \$40 for each dependent.⁹⁰

He also asked Congress to pass his 10-point program to fight inflation. This was the same program that was rejected by Congress two months earlier.⁹²

The State of the Union message was directed towards people and groups that had been Democrats or might vote Democratic in the election. Wage earners, farmers, Negroes, and conservationists were all supportive of the ideology of the speech.

But the President did not stop here. In early 1948, he sent messages to congress to outline his plans. Between February 2nd, and March 1st, nine messages went from the White House to the Capital. These messages did two very important things. First, they gave the people the feeling that Truman was really fighting Congress for what the people thought was important. Also, by sending messages at different times, the President was able to keep his program on the front pages of the newspapers and on the radio.⁹³

Truman's messages to Congress did not put him in a high position with the Southern Democrats. The civil rights program he presented received a great deal of criticism from the Southerners. But Truman was following his strategy of

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concentrating on the North, because, at this point, the South appeared to be still Democratic. If Truman could win New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan, their electoral vote total would outweigh the South.⁹⁴ It was a risk for Truman, but it was not too big of a risk, so because of this he avoided the South while campaigning.

With the campaign already in motion, the President felt that he had to move too. But a problem arose here. Truman wanted to criss-cross the country by train. This costs money, money many Democrats did not want to spend on an election that seemed doomed to defeat. They wanted Truman to campaign strictly from the office of the Presidency. This would cut costs drastically. This left Truman to look for less expensive methods of campaigning.

An opportunity arose in the Spring of 1948 when the University of California offered the President an honorary degree. This gave Truman a chance to make a "nonpolitical" trip across the country with the federal government paying for the entire trip. He went by train and crossed through eighteen states and he made 76 speeches, including five major addresses.

Truman's off-the-cuff style of speaking was clear and biting. "You've got the worst Congress in the United States you've ever had. If you want to continue the policies of the 80th Congress, it'll be your funeral."⁹⁵ This type of speech with the 80th Congress as the enemy of the people, characterized the Truman campaign.

He was met by over a million people in Loss Angeles. While Eastern editors blasted the President for his lack of eloquence, the people of the West were generally cheering him on; and on he went.⁹⁶

By June 20th, Truman was back in Washington D. C. planning the "official" start of the campaign in Detroit, Michigan on Labor Day. But he had managed to get a quick start and he was ahead of the Republicans in work, if not in votes.

The Detroit speech had to be good, because it was meant for not only Detroit, but for New York, Pittsburg, Dallas, and Seattle as well. The President was speaking to more than 250,000 that crowded into <u>Cadilac Square</u>. In his speech, he asked for labor's support and said that the Republicans would hurt labor as was evident by the Taft-Hartley law passed by Congress.⁹⁷ The link of the Republicans with big business had begun.

Dewey's response to the Truman attack was minimal. He sent Stassen to Detroit to defend the Republican party, but he himself ignored Truman. Only 3,000 came to see Stassen.⁹⁸

Truman campaigned for 44 days and his major trips were:

DATE	AREA	MILES	SPEECHES
June 3-18 July 15-16 Sept. 5-7 Sept. 17- Oct. 6-9 Oct. 10-16 Oct. 18-19 Oct. 21 Oct. 22-24	West Coast Philadelphia Detroit West Coast N.J. & N.Y. Midwest Miami & Raleigh Washington D.C. Pennsylvania	9,545 266 1,800 8,600 1,400 3,556 2,200 840	76 1 7 135 27 46 3 1 5
Oct. 22-24 Oct. 24- Nov. 1 Nov. 4-5	Final Trip Victory Special	2,534 998	49 5
TOTALS	· ·	31,739	355 ⁹⁹

The President opened his first transcontinental "political" trip by speaking at the National Plowing Contest in Dexter, Iowa. This shows that there was no place too small for the President.

The trip lasted 16 days and was concluded in Los Angeles. Here President Truman described how he saw the campaign, "This is a championship fight--the American people are sold on the idea that nobody deserves to win a championship fight by running away....or ducking the issues."¹⁰⁰

On these campaign trips Clifford carried an extensive staff which included, William Batt, head of the research for speeches; David Niles, minority expert; Charlie Ross, Press Secretary; and probably the most important man, Oscar Chapman, who was the advanceman. It was his job to prepare a town to receive the President. He made many of the stops important

ones by insuring that a well-planned and well-publicized reception would greet the President.¹⁰¹

Even though the "Truman"Special" (The name of the President tial train) was traveling all around the country, constant contact with Washington was always maintained. Because of this, the President was aware of any major happenings that occured in the nation of the Republican party.¹⁰²

The plan of attack that Trrman used was not a new one. Touring the nation to get support of the people was first used by Andrew Johnson to get support for his reconstruction plan. The plan did not work for Johnson, but that did not stop Woodrow Wilson from trying it to get support for the League of Nations. Wilson traveled across the country but because of poor health his trip failed too.¹⁰³

This did not stop Truman from trying the plan. He thought that people make up their minds by personal observations. The only way people could see him is if he went to them, it was easier to move one man than millions of people.¹⁰⁴

Before he spoke to the people, Truman changed his speaking style. In his first years in the White House he tried to copy the formal style of Roosevelt. He did poorly speaking and tended to bore people. His new style would never bore anyone, and is the style of speech that many people remember; folksy, blunt, and sincere.¹⁰⁵ He used satire and ridicule to unite the people behind him against the Republicans. 106

The topics in Truman's speeches varied, but they always came back to the same thing, the evil of the Republicans. Truman explained domestic and foreign policies in plain English, and pointed out the problems in these areas caused by the 80th Congress.¹⁰⁷

Truman reminded the people of the hard times they suffered under the Republicans before 1933. The New Deal and its promises were not dead and the President made sure that no one forgot that. Where were not enough, the record of the 80th Congress was blasted by the President.¹⁰⁸

The President did give the people a choice; it was "between special interests and the public welfare."¹⁰⁹

After the election Truman summed up his reasons for the whistlestops:

I was sure the American people would agree with me if they had all the facts. I knew, however, that the Republican controlled press and radio would be against me, and my only remaining hope of communicating with the people was to get the message to the people in a personal way."¹¹⁰

To get the personal message to the people Truman had to get to know them. This was done by a research department headed by William Batt, Jr., and under the direction of Clark Clifford. The staff was made up of non-cabinet people, so a non-administrative point of view would be given. This group researched facts about local areas, so that the President could use the bits of information in his speeches. They also kept an eye on what Congress had done, and any opportunity where the Republicans could be hurt by the Congress was taken.¹¹¹

Truman's back platform speeches from the train followed a basic outline. The President began with a short introduction, often bringing in a local reference, supplied by the research department. Then one of three familiar propositions was mentioned: a vote for Wallace or Thurmond was a Republican vote; the Republicans were for the rich; and the Democrats were fighting inflation and were for world peace. From here an example was given to clarify the proposition. A plea was made for the people to register and vote, and Truman closed by expressing his confidence in his victory. In 15 to 20 minutes the back platform speech was over and the train began its trip to the next town.¹¹²

The speeches pointed out the New Deal ideas, ideas which were developed under Roosevelt. The reason why these New Deal ideas were not fully implemented was because the Republican Congress was stopping the President from doing his job. Truman suggested that a Democratic Congress would be easier to work with and more good would be achieved.¹¹³

The bad image of the 80th Congress was linked to Dewey by Truman.

Make no mistake, when we talk of the failure of the

80th Congress, we are talking about the policies of the Republican candidate. They are tarred with the same brush----theebrush that big business used to brush off the needs and the claims of the people. 114

The local people enjoyed the President and the first family. The speeches Truman gave excited listeners. Local politicians climbed aboard the Truman Special and traveled with the President while each supported the other.¹¹⁵

The people saw the great contrast that existed between Dewey and Truman. While Dewey was not committing himself to anything, Truman was taking a stand on everything. By Truman doing this he involved everyone in the outcome of the election. His veto of the Taft-Hartley law involved labor; congress' rejection of his price controls affected the farmers; and civil rights made the Negro aware of the situation at hand.¹¹⁶

The papers saw the response the people were giving the President but few of them were willing to change their earlier predictions. They were sure that the crowds would not elect him as President. Truman disagreed with them, "I found renewed encouragement and confidence in the response that came from the crowds that gathered at all the train stops on this first tour."¹¹⁷

The geography of the campaign trips shows which people and areas Truman wanted to win (See the enclosed map in table β). He was the <u>first incumbent</u> to campaign for president in Texas and he avoided the "solid south" entirely. While in Texas and Miami, he completely avoided civil rights and talked about economies and foreign affairs. This is proof that Harry did not always "giv'em hell." And since Truman avoided the "solid south" it was left to prominent southerners, like Senator George, Senator Pepper, and Governor Folsom. But even these strong southerners avoided civil rights.¹¹⁸

As the campaign went on, crowds grew larger for Truman and smaller for Dewey. Truman was constantly outdrawing Dewey and some people were beginning to have second thoughts, while others thought Dewey would be able to hangson for the victory. ¹¹⁹

While Truman was attracting large crowds all around the country, Senator Barkley was busy trying to do the same. Traveling in a DC3 plane, he visited 36 states and made over 250 speeches. He often led the Truman train into a town, preparing the people by warming them up with the same speaking style he used to win over the convention.¹²⁰

But the issue that the Democrats kept bringing up in the campaign was the 80th Congress. Because the Republicans had been out of the White House for over 15 years, many of the voters were unable to remember and Republican President. But everyone knew what a Republican Congress was and Truman wanted the image of the candidate to be the same as the Congress'.

In an effort to discredit the Congress, and at the same

time the Republican party, Truman called for a special session of Congress as he said he would at the convention. The special session was not new and they had been called by other Presidents in the past.

The session opened on July 26, 1948, and on the 27th Truman delivered his eight-point program in person to the congressmen. Parts of the program were leaked out to the press earlier so that the people would be well informed about it. The program called for: controls on inflation, a 75¢ minimum wage, extension of social security, federal aid for education, revision of the Displaced Persons Act, and approval by the Senate of the International Wheat Agreement. Most of these had been endorsed by the Republican platform six weeks earlier.¹²¹

A distinction must be made between a Republican congressman and a Republican candidate. Truman made them appear to be the same to the people, but this was not really true. Dewey had always been involved in state politics which was different from federal politics. Also, people in Congress were followers of their leader, Senator Robert Taft. This was the same Senator Taft that Dewey beat for the nomination. Taft and his fellow Congressmen cared little about Dewey and his promises. What alienated the two was when Dewey failed to stand up for the 80th Congress when it was attacked by Truman. By Dewey not answering the charges, many congressmen turned against him¹²²

Party leaders did meet with Dewey at the start of the session to see what he would like done. Dewey said that he wanted only two parts of the agenda passed: a loan to build the U.N. building in New York, and a revision of the Displaced Persons Act. Both of these had a direct affect on the State of New York.¹²³

Truman had figured on little happening at the session. "And of course they didn't do a damn thing. If they had been smart and even passed one measure along the lines they'd promised in their platform, I'd have been up a creek, but I knew damn well they wouldn't do it, and of course, they didn't."¹²⁴

When Truman presented an opportunity to Congress and they refused to accept it, the stage was changed from Truman versus Dewey to Truman versus the Republican 80th Congress.¹²⁵

After twelve days, six in filibuster, the session ended. The only measures that were passed were a \$65,000,000 loan for the U.N. building, and a limit on consumer credit.

At first the battle looked like a draw. The Republicans had not done anything and Truman's motives were purely political. This thinking changed and the affair became a win for Truman. The people saw Truman as working for them, and the Republican Congress working against that idea.¹²⁶

In defense of the 80th Congress, it must be said that a

President can act faster than Congress on legislation. Also, in an election year a party does not back legislation by the other parties, because they do not want to improve the other party's record.¹²⁷

The view of Congress by Truman in 1948 was not meritorious. Truman transmitted this view of Congress to the people by having the Congress be the major theme of his back-platform speeches. Truman felt that the only weapon hey had was that it was time for a change. By using the Republican Congress Truman was able to change this thinking.¹²⁸

Truman spoke about some of the actions of the 80th Congress mostly actions that went against the President. The Congress ended Democratic collective bargaining, social security, rent and price controls, and they yielded to lobby groups in housing, prices, and taxes; or so Truman said. The important thing is that Truman was able to get the people to agree with him.¹²⁹

Inflation was also blamed on Congress by Truman. But this was not Truman's primary target for inflation. Originally he blamed inflation on commodity speculation; but later, members of the Truman government were found to have over \$4,000,000 in such type of speculation.¹³⁰

Because of this, Truman changed his mind and placed the blame entirely on the 80th Congress for its lack of action on his proposed legislation. In the special session of Congress

Truman presented an anti-inflation program to the Congress knowing that they would not act on any of the legislation. Because of this lack of action, Congress was given the blame for inflation.¹³⁰

Inflation was a strong determining factor in the voting patterns of farmers and the farmers were an important group to the candidates in 1948. The farmers had been prosperous under the Roosevelt and Truman administrations and it was Truman's job to remind them of these good times.

In September, 1948, Harold Stassen blamed the Truman administration for keeping farm prices up. This was a major error by the Republicans. This pleased some housewives, and some food economists, but the wrath of the farmers was much greater, and there were more farm votes than the other two together.¹³²

At the same time Stassen was saying that the Truman administration was keeping food prices up, they were actually dropping. Corn went from \$2.46 a bushel in November 1947, to \$1.21 a bushel in November 1948. Wheat dropped from \$2.66 a bushel in October 1947 to \$1.98 a bushel in October 1948. Oats kept up with these two when it went from \$1.09 to \$.69 a bushel.¹³³

Truman took the blame Stassen laid on him, and turned it against the Republican Congress. Congress had been decreasing Commodity Credit Corporation (C.C.C.) storage bins. These

storage bins were used by farmers to put their crops in when the market price was low. Farmers could store their grain and receive a loan from the government with the grain as collateral. If prices went down, they would keep the load and the government would foreclose on the grain; if prices went up, the farmers sold the stored crops and paid off the loan. But by Congress's cutting back the storage space, from 292,000,000 bushels to 50,000,000 bushels between 1945 and 1948, fewer farmers were able to use the space and would be forced to sell their crops at lower prices.¹³⁴

The year 1948 was the largest year ever for corn and the second largest wheat crop ever. With the excess of crops, farm prices dropped because the market was flooded.¹³⁵

Domestic issues were not the only topics in the 1948 campaign. The foreign policy was very important too.

Up to this time the theme of Truman's foreign policy was to keep peace and this appeared to be a failure. There was conflict in the Middle East and the free nations of Europe were not coming together to stop any possible Soviet aggression. This certainly did not sound like peace.¹³⁶

But foreign policy was something too big to hide and it was only a matter of time before it surfaced in the campaign speeches. When this did happen the Democrats tried to make the Republican party, "the party of high tariffs and isolationism", while the Democratic party was "the party of international cooperation and peace." But the image was in danger because of the "Berlin Crisis" and a possible war with Russia. With this in mind, Truman decided to send Chief Justice Fred Vinson to Russia to speak to Stalin.¹³⁷ Truman thought that by sending Vinson to Russia, the U.S. could: open communications, show U.S. strength, and better relations with the Soviets.

The reasons were valid ones, so a press conference was called to announce the trip. But because it was in October in an election year the networks wanted to know something about the conference's content before they gave the President free air time. Part of the speech was disclosed to the press and the time was allotted.

Between the time the press was told and the conference was held, Secretary of State Marshall talked to the President. He was against the trip because it would undercut the efforts of the U.N., and that the press had built it up and was in effect destroying the trip. Truman decided to call off the trip which sent the press to their typewriters blasting the President.¹³⁸

This hurt the image of the President. It appeared that he was unsure of what was happening in his foreign policy. Already many people associated the foreign policy with Secretary of State Marshall. 139

Truman did take credit for the Marshall plan and the Truman Doctrine even though they were not entirely his own creations;¹⁴⁰ but because of these two policies people generally backed the President's foreign action. The Marshall Plan could have possibly caused a war with Russia, and relations were strained at the time. But foreign crises, such as the one in Berlin, caused the people to rally around the President because he was the Commander-in-Chief.

When people insult the President of the United States they insult the United States. The President is a symbol of the United States in foreign affairs and when foreigners attack him, many people feel that the United States is being verbally attacked and this triggers defensive action by many people.¹⁴¹

By fighting Russia diplomatically, Truman was fighting Communism. The people at the time were extremely worried about Communism. One of the reasons was the takeover of Czechoslavakia by the Communists on February 25, 1948. This was a democratic nation falling to the Communists, a democratic nation like our own. This meant the U.S. was susceptible to Communism, too.¹⁴² Many people felt that if Harry Truman was fighting Communism he must be doing a good job.

One group that was concerned with the idea of Communism was organized labor. Before 1948 labor did not get involved extensively with Presidential elections. The A.F.L., American Federation of Labor, was involved for the first time in a Presidential race in 1948.¹⁴³

Early in the year Wallace had large support from the unions, but this support dropped and was swinging over to the Truman camp. The major support that the unions gave was manpower. In the C.I.O., 5,500,000 of the 6,500,000 supported the Democrats; while 7,000,000 of the 8,000,000 in the A.F.L. supported the Democrats.¹⁴⁴

The enthusiasm of the unions could be seen in their leaders: Phil Hannah, head of the A.F.L. in Ohio, made over 150 pro-Truman speeches in two months. But the support came from throughout the organization. Truman received over \$1,000,000 from the A.F.L. and the C.I.O.¹⁴⁵ This support came to Truman after he vetoed the Taft-Hartley law. Even though Congress overrode his veto, the President was the victor because labor saw him as the man who represented their interests.¹⁴⁶

The timing of the unions could not have been better for Truman. Just when the party machines were falling apart, the unions were able to step in and take their place.¹⁴⁷

Truman knew he needed labor's support to win and his veto of Taft-Hartley insured it. The unions were not able to put all the industrial states in the Democratic column in November, but they were a major factor in Rhode Island, Illinois, and Ohio, and West Virginia.¹⁴⁸ Dewey's union support was limited mainly to John L. Lewis and the Building Employees.¹⁴⁹

Wallace was expected to draw labor away from Truman, but in actuality he helped push labor towards Truman. The reason for the lack of labor support for Wallace was his link with Communists. There were very few labor organizations that would support a candidate linked with the Communist party.¹⁵⁰

Since labor appeared to be safely Democratic, Truman spent time trying to win the votes of the minorities, especially the Negro.

Truman waited until February 2nd before he announced his civil rights plan. This was normally done in the State of the Union message, but by holding it back Truman was sure Congress would not pass any part of the plan. To make sure that is was not passed and to impress the minorities, Truman asked for a stronger program. This backfired on the President when at the convention it was this that was adopted as we have seen.¹⁵¹

The President did not leave civil rights on paper only. On July 26, 1948, he issued two executive orders on civil rights. One set up the Fair Employment Board and the other created equal opportunity in the armed services.¹⁵² The plan was, by winning the Negro vote, Truman would be able to cancel out the loss of the Solid South. This followed the line of thought in the Clifford Memorandum.¹⁵³ The Negroes were not the only minority Truman wanted, he also wanted the Catholic and Jewish vote. The Catholics were won by being anti-Communist, but that left the Jews who were valuable in New York.¹⁵⁴

The Jews came to the Democrats when Truman, on May 14, 1948, led the United States in recognizing, <u>de facto</u>, the state of Israel. Again Wallace was hurt when the Jews went Democratic.¹⁵⁵

Wallace's problems were not limited to the Jews however. One of his major problems was that he could not receive the support of well-known politicians.¹⁵⁶ Early in the campaign Wallace had welcomed Communist support, but by July he wished they would leave him alone. Truman had linked him to the Communists which cost him votes and freed Truman from any stain of Communism.¹⁵⁷

Truman was able to push the radicals and Communists onto Wallace and leave him open to attack Wallace, and be able to say that the Communists were supporting Wallace to insure a Dewey victory. This completely alienated the Communist issue from Truman. But Dewey did not criticize the Truman administration on the Communist issue.¹⁵⁸ When Elizabeth Bentley testified that there were Communists in the Truman government Dewey did not take advantage of this. There were two reasons why Dewey did not take up the Communist issue: the New York press called it a "witchhunt" and Dewey did not want to be linked with such a thought, and many of the names involved were Jewish and Dewey did not want to hurt his image and position with them.¹⁵⁹

To keep this pressure on Wallace, as well as Thurmond, Truman continued his trips across the nation. By his personal appeal he hoped to be able to overcome the losses he suffered from these two.¹⁶⁰

Truman saw himself as a common man fighting for what he thought was right. The person who would appreciate this the most was the common man. So Truman went to him.¹⁶¹

While Dewey stayed vague on most issues, Truman became a volatile personality and made promises to everyone.¹⁶² But while he was making these promises and gathering support, the polls still claimed Truman would lose. The polls did not bother the President. "These polls were all taken before the real 'wap' started," he told reporters on his train.¹⁶³

Truman had his own poll, which he preferred to the scientific ones of Roper and Gallup. It was conducted by Leslie Biffle, a Truman crony, in early August. Disguised as a chicken farmer, Biffle went around the country and reported that he thought Truman would win.¹⁶⁴

But the polls were not the only predictions of a Dewey victory. The press and radio networks were in agreement that

Truman would lose. Truman called them the "kept press and paid radio," but he was not bothered by the fact that they predicted his defeat. He was upset over what he felt was biased editorials because they could lead the uneducated astray. By going around the country on his "Truman Special", Truman was able to educate them. ¹⁶⁵ Also, the press' record on predicting winners was only 50% in Presidential elections. In the last 36 Presidential elections the press majority picked only 18 winners. ¹⁶⁶

It must be remembered that Truman did have the support of the nation's dargest party. The Democrats had been in control of the Congress from 1931 to 1947, and they had been in the White House since 1933. They were still the strong party in the nation.¹⁶⁷

But with all this taken into consideration, the 1948 election was still a fight between a Republican candidate and a Democratic candidate. Dewey's strategy seemed to be one of dignity and generalities. He did not want to lower himself to Truman's "level" which made him appear to be unfriendly and cold. ¹⁶⁸

Dewey spoke in generalities because he did not know national issues.¹⁶⁹ He told farmers, "I pledge you, that your next administration will cooperate with the farmers of the country, to protect all people from the tragedy of another dust bowl." Farmers were not interested in dust bowls, but rather they were interested in storage bins. But Dewey did not mention anything about the C.C.C.¹⁷⁰

In his first transcontinental trip, Dewey promised the following: a cut in federal spending, a cut in the federal debt, less bureaucracy, an attack on Communism, expansion of support programs, support and strengthing of soil conservation, building more public power projects, irrigation programs, and an end to the government monopoly on the atom. But with all these ideas, he never went into detail to explain how he was going to accomplish all these plans.¹⁷¹

Dewey ignored the one area where the Republicans had a solid record, that was the 80th Congress. He said, "I have never fought on a battle ground of another's choosing in a campaign." Another reason was the fact that by ignoring Congress Dewey neutralized Taft, whom he did not like.¹⁷² But in doing this he also neutralized many other Republicans.

This strategy seemed to help Truman as he stumped across the country. Truman's charges went unanswered and many Republicans wondered at Dewey's strategy. Among them was Vice-Presidential candidate Earl Warren, "Maybe they know what they're doing, but I can tell you I never won any of my campaigns this way."¹⁷³ Dewey's strategy rested on his past experience. He had fought hard against Roosevelt in 1944 and lost. He hoped that by staying aloft he would be able to handle any problems that arose in the party, and his theme of unity would be safe.¹⁷⁴ The results of the election show that he was wrong.

CHAPTER IV

Fall began to give way to winter and election day came upon the candidates. President Truman returned to Independence, Missouri, and voted in Memorial Hall. He expressed confidence in a victory as he had throughout the campaign.¹⁷⁵

That night, after the polls closed, Truman jumped into the lead for votes. Radio announcers told their listeners that these early results were from the cities and that Governor Dewey would gain when the rural votes began to come in. But this did not happen because Truman never lost the lead, and when Ohio and California went Democratic, Dewey conceded defeat.¹⁷⁶

When the final vote was determined, the results were indeed surprising.

NAME	POPULAR VOTE	ELECTORAL VOTE	STATES
Truman	24,045,052	304	28
Dewey	21,896,927	189	16
Wallace	1,137,957	0	.0
Thurmond	1,168,687	38	4
Others	240,594	0	0
******	*****	****	****
Totals	48,489,217	531	. 48 177

These figures were indeed startling because there was no prediction of the result. Truman had pulled one of the greatest upsets for the Presidency.

The Reasons why were thought of after the campaigning had

ended. The primary reason for the Truman victory was the support of the Democratic party. Other Democrats that ran that year generally outpolled the President: Truman was 549,000 votes behind Governor Adlai Stevenson; 374,000 behind Senator Paul Douglas.¹⁷⁸

The Democrats swept both the Senate, advancing from 45 seats to 54, and the House, winning 263 seats up from 188.¹⁷⁹ This kind of support tended to help the Presidential candidate and it certainly helped Truman. People often voted a straight ticket and if the congressmen were strong, people would vote for the President, too, rather than split their ticket. Truman received 73% of his vote total in this fashion.¹⁸⁰

One of the reasons why the Democrats did well in congressional races was because they offered fresh, new faces. The Republicans offered the same faces that Truman had been blasting the past summer.¹⁸¹

Truman was able to take advantage of these gains all over the country. Truman's win was certainly a national one. He overcame the four southern states he lost to Strom Thurmond by combining victories in the east, central, midwest, south, southwest, and the west coast. This helped break the South's hold on the Democratic party and converted it into a national party. Truman's barnstorming of the nation was responsible for this result.¹⁸²

The three major voting blocs that Truman tried to win, he did win. The blocs--labor, Negroes, and farmers--were essential to the Truman victory. Totally in the thirteen industrial states where labor and Negroes held the balance, Truman was the victor.¹⁸²

In the families where the head of the family was a member of a labor union, Truman was very strong. Truman took 56% while Dewey captured only 13% of these votes, but 27% did not vote.¹⁸⁴ Truman managed to win labor, but he still did not get them to come to the polls in a large mass.

In the Negro vote, Truman was even less successful. The strategy had been to have a large voter turnout, including the Negro. But 64% of the Negroes did not vote in 1948. Of the 36% that did vote, Truman won half of them. Dewey managed only 10% of the Negro vote, so even if the totals were lower than Truman hoped for, he still had to be happy with the results. ¹⁸⁵

The third bloc, the farmers, was very important to Truman. With their support he was able to win six of the eleven midwest farm states. These were traditionally Republican states and the loss of them was crippling to the Republicans. ¹⁸⁶ But the farmers, like the Negroes, stayed home in 1948. Only 46% of the farmers voted, compared to the national average of <u>64%</u>. Truman won 25% of the farmers which was almost twice

Dewey's total, 13%. 187

Truman was defeated by Dewey in the professional ranks, 15% to 57%, and in the white collar corps, 38% to 39%; but Truman was devastating in the other groups. Of the skilled and semi-skilled workers, Truman overwhelmed Dewey by winning 52% of them compared to Dewey's 15%; the unskilled vote also went overwhelmingly to Truman, 33% to 12%.¹⁸⁸

People were asked to categorize themselves and were asked who they voted for. The people who considered themselves as the "common man" made up 36% of Truman's total and less than ½% of Dewey's; labor made up 28% of Truman's final total and only 1% of Dewey's. The rest of Truman's count went as follows: 24% farmers, 6% Negroes, 6% machine politicians. Dewey's count read: less than ½% farmers, less than ½% Negroes, 1% machine politicians, and 29% business.¹⁸⁹

In a general election the Democrats, as a whole, have a smaller percentage of their advocates participating than the Republicans. But what the Democrats lack in percentage, they make up for in numbers because there are more registered Democrats than Republicans in the United States. The largest single group, skilled and semi-skilled workers, had a 29% nonvoting amount, but Truman won 52% of them, so he was still ahead.¹⁹⁰ One area where Truman's judgement was very wrong was the amount Wallace would take from the Democrats. Wallace's total of 1,137,957 was well below what was predicted. He did not hurt Truman as much as they expected him to, but he did prevent Truman from winning in New York, Maryland, and Michigan.¹⁹¹

Wallace took the liberal vote from Truman but left the religious vote for the President. Truman took the religious vote, but did not lose many votes for being a religious candidate. The reason why was because no one pointed out the fact that Truman was going after the religious vote, Catholic and Jewish in particular.¹⁹² It was Truman's work in linking W_a llace with the Communist party that subtracted votes in large amounts from him.¹⁹³

The other split from the Democrats, the Dixicrats, took only four southern states and 38 electoral votes. Their strength outside of the south was very limited. Truman limited their winnings to the states where they were listed as the Democratic party on the ballots.¹⁹⁴

Dewey was much stronger than these two, and was not as easy to contain. Truman's strategy of causing "waves" gave 195 problems for Dewey. Dewey's trouble lay in his campaign. He took the anti-Roosevelt votes of 1944 for granted and he thought that if that was added to the anti-Truman votes he would have his victory. But Truman countered this by giving

Dewey a real battle during the campaign, and winning back some of the anti-Roosevelt and anti-Truman vote.¹⁹⁶

Dewey was also a one-time loser, which was a difficulty to overcome. When this was added to the fact that the national income was \$210,000,000,000 a year and over 61,000,000 were working, he could not overcome it at all. The people decided they liked the way things were and voted to keep it that way.¹⁹⁷

Truman's strategy was wrong in another important area, that of the voter turnout. Truman thought a high voter turnout would be needed for his victory; but it was only 51%, less that 750,000 more voters than in 1944, a war year.¹⁹⁸

Neither candidate inspired the voter into coming out to vote. Dewey was even less successful because Republicans are more inclined to vote than Democrats.¹⁹⁹

A higher percentage of voters would have favored Truman because the number of non-voting Democrats was larger than nonvoting Republicans.²⁰⁰

Of the people that did vote for Truman, 46% of them said they voted for him because he was partial to a certain group. Other reasons were as follows; 18% would maintain prosperity, 18% domestic policies, 16% campaign effectiveness, 16% better man, 13% good record. When we add the campaign effectiveness to the better man image, we find the total of people that voted for Truman because of his personal appeal. The total of 32% was the difference between winning and losing. This compares to Dewey's total of 23%; 4% for campaign effectiveness and 19% for the better man image.²⁰¹

The Truman vote when compared to the Dewey votes showed Truman strongest in the metropolitan areas, receiving 47% of his vote from them, compared to Dewey's 32%. They also had the smallest percentage of non-voters, 17%.

Dewey pulled closer by winning the towns and cities. Dewey's total vote had 30% come from these areas compared to Truman's 27%. The rural vote pushed Truman over the top enroute to his victory. He won 24% of the rural vote compared to Dewey's 12%. Even though the rural vote proved to be the element that clinched a Truman victory, it had a limited effect on the election.²⁰²

The age of Truman's voters show his effectiveness of linking the Republicans with the Depression. Of the total Truman vote, 32% came from the 21 to 35 year-olds, and 38% from 35 to 44 year-olds. These groups were six to twentýnine years old in 1933, the last year of Republican rule, and the majority of them have been voting Democratic for the past 16 years. The only groups that Dewey won were the 45 to 54 year-olds, and the 55 and over group. These people could remember prosperous times under the Republicans. But these two were smaller groups than the other two and Dewey's margin of victory for them, 8%, was smaller than Truman's spread of 28% in the other two groups.²⁰³

The Democratic party was made up of people of all ages, but they were generally referred to as the "common man" and it was this person that Truman tried to get; and he did just that. He took 35% of the grade-school educated vote, and 34% highschool educated vote. Dewey took 16% and 29% respectively.²⁰⁴

In further support of Truman's claim to the common man; he outpolled Dewey in people who made under \$1000 a year, as well as those that made \$1000 to \$4000 a year. Since there were more common people in the country, Truman was able to concentrate on them.²⁰⁵

Truman took a stand on many issues, this gave people an opportunity to identify with his position. Dewey did not take a firm stand on many issues, and; therefore, he did not have this identification. Some examples of this identification can be found in the Truman voters.

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Many of these stands materialized during the campaign and many of the people's minds changed during the campaign.

About two-thirds of Truman's voters knew before the campaign started, they would vote for him, while 71% of Dewey's voters knew before the campaign they would vote for the Republican.

Truman took 14% of Dewey-intended vote, and the Republicans captured 5% of the Truman-intended vote. Score a small victory for Truman. The big gains for Truman came when he captured 40% of the uncertain vote and Dewey took only 19% of it. He also gained by drawing 10% of the people that did not plan on voting. This shows the effectiveness of the Truman campaign.²⁰⁷

Some conclusions can be drawn from the results of the 1948 election: people remembered that they had good times under the Democrats. The New Deal of Roosevelt was brought back to life by the peoples' concerns over socio-economic problems. The only people with the New Deal were the Democrats.²⁰⁸ Second, Congress was the evil of the day, or so Truman said so, and Truman was the only one fighting the Congress, so he couldn't be all that bad. 209 Third, the election of 1948 was a maintaining election. People were satisfied with the work Truman was doing. Neither side won over people from the other side, and since the Democratic party was the majority party, they were the winners (if enough people came out to vote). Fortunately for Truman, enough did. 210

When we combine these with the rest of Truman's strategy: personal appeal, labor support, and Communism in the Wallace party, we can see why President Truman had confidence in victory and he was generally right in his strategy. The Democrats in the White House had called the results very accurately, and this accuracy was the catalyst to the Truman win.

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APPENDIX A

MEMORAL FULL FOR THE PRESIDENT

The title of this memorandum might well be "The Politics of 1963". The aim of the memorandum is to colline a course of political conduct for the Administration extending from November, 1947 to November, 1943. It is obvious that such an outline cannot encompass the details of a political course because they will depend upon interim developments. However, it is my conviction that we must chart a course at this time which will contain the basic elements of our policy.

Comments that are presented here are based solely on an appraisal of the politically advantageous course to follow. In a democracy, action that is politically advisable may often accord with the merits of a particular policy. Sometimes it does not. It may generally be assumed that the policy that is politically wise is also the best policy for this country.

An old axiom claims that politics is no more than a study of the probabilities. If that is so, there can be no original or unusual thinking in such a survey as this; it must, rather, be devoted to a review of the usual. Most of the comments to be made on modern American politics have already been said and are constantly being restated.

For instance, the basic premise of this memorandum — that the Democratic Party is an unhappy alliance of Southern conservatives, Western progressives and Big City labor — is very trite, but it is also very true. And it is equally true that the success or failure of the Democratic leadership can be precisely measured by its ability to lead enough members of these three misfit groups to the polls on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, 1948.

It may, however, be useful to attempt an estimate, as of November, 1947, of what will probably happen in the next year and to suggest what steps the Administration should now initiate so that it, rather than the opposition party, will direct (insofar as direction is humanly possible), the decision of the American people on Election Day.

As of today some probabilities are apparent. These should determine the Administration's political course and bearing for the next four months and preferably until the Democratic Convention in July. Some of these probabilities appear almost certainties; others, to say the least, are extremely arguable. Taken together, however, they may afford the Administration a working hypothesis on which to base its political actions.

A. The Probabilities.

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1. Governor Devey will be the nominee of the Republican Party. This tentative conclusion is, of course, based on the usual factors. Among these is the fact that a strong candidate is required to defeat President Truman, as the recent Gallup Poll shows. Just as a year ago the probability was that any Republican could be elected, so the swiftly fluctuating currents of American opinion may again destroy the President's strong popularity a few months hence if "the breaks" -- such as an imminent European crisis which the American government fails to handle smoothly - are against his Administration. But as of November, 1947, it takes a strong candidate to defeat him. The policies of Senator Taft, for example, have probably so alienated large blocs of voters (viz, AFL President William Green's recent "dare" to the Republican Party to nominate Taft) that he permanently ruptured his chances for nomination. Although he may still be in a position to dictate the nominee, or in the alternative, there may be a deadlock between Dewey and Taft and the choice will fall on someone such as Eisenhower, Vandenberg or Marren, these possibilities are at this time so speculative it would be quite inadvisable to formulate a political program on them.

It should be assumed, therefore, that the candidate is Dewey (the only man to lead the President in the Fortune Poll); and that, because of his 1944 experience and because of the extremely efficient group of men he has drawn around him, he will be a resourceful, intelligent and highly dangerous candidate, even more difficult to defeat than in 1944.

2. <u>President Truman will be elected if the Administration will</u> <u>successfully concentrate on the traditional Democratic alliance between</u> <u>the South and West</u>. It is inconceivable that any policies initiated by the Truman Administration no matter how "liberal" could so alienate the South in the next year that it would revolt. As always, the South can be considered safely Democratic. And in formulating national policy, it can be safely ignored.

The only pragmatic reason for conciliating the South in normal times is because of its tremendous strength in the Congress. Since the Congress is Republican and the Democratic President has, therefore, no real chance to get his own program approved by it, particularly in an election year, he has no real necessity for "getting along" with the Southern conservatives. He <u>must</u>, however, get along with the Westerners and with labor if he is to be reelected.

The Administration is, for practical purposes, politically free to concentrate on the Winning of the West. If the Democrats carry the solid South and also those Western states carried in 1944, they will have 216 of the required 266 electoral votes. And if the Democratic Party is powerful enough to capture the West, it will almost certainly pick up enough of the doubtful Middlewestern and Eastern states to get 50 more votes (e.g. Micsouries 14 votes). We could lose New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Massachusetts -- all the "big" states -- and still win.

Therefore, political and program planning demands concentration upon the West and its problems, including reclamation, floods, and agriculture. It is the Number One Priority for the 1948 campaign. The Republican Congress has already done its share to give the West to the Administration. 3. Henry Wallace will be the candidate of a third party.

is of November, 1947, the majority of informed opinion does not favor this particular hypothesis. Nevertheless, the factors which impel Wallace toward a third party clearly outweigh those which do not.

For one thing, the men around Wallace are motivated by the Communist Party line. The First Lord of the Kremlin who determines the Party line is still Karl Marx. The Marxists emphasize that the capitalist reconomy holds within itself the seeds of its own destruction; that it must inevitably destroy itself by depression and collapse. But within this rigid ideology is the directive that when and where possible the Party must hasten the process. Moscow is sufficiently aware of American politics to perceive that a Republican administration would be rigid and reactionary, and would fail to take those governmental steps necessary to bolster the capitalist economy in time of crisis. It is also convinced there is no longer any hope that the Truman Administration will submit to the Russian program of world conquest and expansion. From the Communist long-range point of view, there is nothing to lose and much to gain if a Republican becomes the next President. The best way it can help achieve that result, and hasten the disintegration of the American economy, is to split the Independent and labor union vote between President Truman and Wallace - and thus insure the Republican candidate's election.

The best evidence supporting this probability is that the men who surround Wallace today are Party-liners such as C. B. Baldwin, political opportunists such as Harold Young, and gullible idealists like Michael Straight. These men will persuade Wallace it is his duty to his country to run, as they have persuaded him to do everything else they ever wanted him to do. The most recent reports on Wallace's personality by men who know him well are that while his mysticism increases, the humility which was once his dominant characteristic has decreased to the vanishing point; there is something almost Messianic in his belief today that he is the Indispensable There is some evidence to the contrary. Wallace has been cilent since the announcement of the Marshall Plan, except to claim that the idea was originally his. Within the last few weeks an American Communist Party manifesto which restated the Party line told the faithful that the American Communists are no longer interested in a third party. And Senator Claude Pepper, a devout if cynical follower of the Party line, said on the White House steps that a third party was impracticable and that Wallace could serve his country best as a private citizen.

But these are merely surface phenomena. A more accurate impression is that the Comrades are making a strategic withdrawal for the -moment. Tactical considerations, brought about by the refusal of Hillman's old union to back a third party and thus threatening a possible split in the New York-American Labor Party which the Communists only barely control, have caused a temporary soft pedal. The Party line can change swiftly with -events. Recent events, both international and domestic, (such as the Presidential veto of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Marshall Plan) do not favor preaching a third party for the moment.

The speech made by Vishinsky at the United Nations is surely proving embarrassing to Henry Wallace. The motives of this country in attempting the economic rehabilitation of Western Europe were attacked in vitriolic phrases which were glaringly inaccurate and unfair. The speech outraged the American people and Wallace surely knows this.

November and December may well show the Communist Party again moving toward the third party. On Labor Day Wallace broke his long silence to address the Wayne County CIO Council in Detroit. This labor council was recently captured by the Communists. His speech before 65,000 persons again threatened a third party, Reid Robinson and Lee Pressman, both party-liners, called for a third party at the August convention of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, a Communist-dominated union. The New York State CIO Council at its unnual convention on September 6th rejected a resolution against a third party. The casual comment by the professional politicians on third party talk is that it is futile since a third party cannot get on enough state ballots. This is dangerously unrealistic. Wallace is gambling for high stakes. He hopes to defeat President Truman by splitting the Democratic Farty and then inherit its leadership so he can be the candidate of 1952. If Mallace can get on the ballots of only a few states and can then draw five or ten per cent of the vote, that vote alone taken from the Democrats in a close election is enough to give the Republicans the electoral vote of those states and therefore national victory. And Wallace <u>can</u> get on the ballot of New York (American Labor Party) and California and other states.

It is also very dangerous to assume that the only supporters of Wallace are the Communists. True enough, they give him a disciplined hardworking organization and collect the money to run his campaign. But he also has a large following throughout the country, particularly of the young voters who are attracted by the idealism that he - and he alone - is talking and who regard war as the one evil greater than any other. He will also derive support from the pacifists, which means a great number of organized women and from whatever irreconcilable and die-hard isolationists remain. He will attract votes -- and money -- from the "lunatic fringe." The California Townsendites are already pledged to him.

In a close election, no votes can be ignored. The only safe -working hypothesis is to assume now that Vallace will run on a third party ticket. Every effort must be made <u>now</u> jointly and at one and the same time although, of course, by different groups — to dissuade him and also to identify him and isolate him in the public mind with the Communists.

4. <u>The independent and progressive voter will hold the balance</u> of power in 1948; he will not actively support President Trunan unless a <u>creat effort is made</u>. The Democratic and Republican Parties each have a minimum, a residue, of voters whose loyalty almost nothing can shake. The independent voter who shifts on the issues comprises a group which today is probably larger than both.

The truth is that the old "party organization" control is gone forever. Better education, the rise of the mass pressure group, the economic depression of the 30's, the growth of government functions-- all these have contributed to the downfall of "the organization." Tammany, Hague, Kelley and the rest of the straight party leaders, while still important, are no longer omnipotent, no longer able to determine the issues. For practical political purposes, they are moribund; they cannot be relied on to do the job alone.

They have been supplanted in large measure by the pressure groups. In these pressure groups are the farmers, still traditionally Republican, and organized labor which became "traditionally Democratic" under Roosevelt. Another loosely organized group are the progressives who followed Roosevelt for four elections but are increasingly restive under President Truman, mostly because of the reactionary domination exercised over the Democratic Party by the Congressional Southerners who, although a minority of the Democratic Party, are a majority of the Party-in-Congress and are assuming control of the Party organization councils. And also among these groups are the racial groups who have learned to use the vote as an economic weapon and who can no longer be satisfied with a Tammany turkey on Thanksgiving.

(a) <u>The Farmer</u>. The farm vote is in most ways identical with the Winning of the West — the Number One Priority. The farmer is at least at present favorably inclined toward the Truman Administration. His crops are good. However the high prices may be affecting the rest of the people, they help him more than hurt him. Parity will protect him — and the Marshall Plan will aid him. The economic and political trend of the Administration (except its tax program) is going his way. Whether prosperity makes him the conservative he usually becomes in good times remains to be seen - but, if it does, nothing much can be done about it in terms of more political or economic favors to woo him back to the Democratic banner.

(b) <u>Labor</u>. President Truman and the Democratic Party cannot win without the <u>active</u> support of organized labor. It is dangerous to assume that labor now has nowhere else to go in 1948. <u>Labor can stay home</u>.

The rank and file of the workers are not yet politically minded; they will not, therefore, vote or work actively unless they are inspired to do so. They were so inspired by Roosevelt. They were <u>not</u> so inspired in the 1946 Congressional elections. In those elections they did not vote Republican but they <u>did stay home</u>. The labor group has always been politically inactive during prosperity. When they are well fed they are not interested. They will probably be well fed in 1948. The effort to get out the labor vote will thus have to be even more strenuous than in 1944.

vehement dislike of the Republicans because they passed it over his veto does indicate that as of today Labor is friendly to the President. But to assume that it will remain so throughout 1948 is to assume that labor leaders are logical men. They are as deficient in that quality as other men. The situation in the two major Labor organizations presents a

The President's veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill, coupled with

number of curious factors,

The AFL always looks for a bargain. It will want a new one in 1948. The veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill was in 1947. In 1948 it is entirely possible that the attitude will be - "You haven't done anything for me lately." The rising leader of the AFL is George Meaney who heads the New York AFL Council. By his direction, and for the first time in many years, the AFL in 1946 refused to endorse the Democratic candidates for Governor and Senator in New York. In a radio speech in September, 1947, Neuney used some exceedingly significant language. Assailing the Taft-Hartley Act, he deliberately, and time after time, confined his attack to "<u>Congressional</u> Republicans." He carefully said nothing against the Party as a whole or against such non-Congressional Republicans as Covernor Dewey with whom he is friendly. It is entirely possible that the Republican Congress in the regular session in 1948 will pass minor amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, will pass an increased minimum wage bill and a health and housing program. This could be sufficient to cause the AFL to support the Republican Party if the candidate were someone other than Taft.

Apparently William Green remains enthusiastic about the President. You will recall that after the veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill he told the writer that it was a great decision on the part of the President and showed that he was on the side of the common man. Since that time he has had no personal contact with the President and it is for this reason that it is most important that the President see him on a subject <u>unrelated</u> to the Labor controversy. A conference between the President and Green on the Marshall Plan will give Green greater standing with his own men and will assist in formulating in Green's mind the attitude that he and the President are co-workers in striving toward the same goal.

The CIO is badly split between the Right Wing, who are trying to drive the Communists out, and the Left Wing who are constantly attempting to increase their influence in the organization. Phillip Murray's past course of conduct indicates that he will probably continue to do everything in his power to hold the CIO together even though it means a form of involuntary cooperation with the Communists inside the organization. It is coubtful, at the present time, if Murray has much control over the CIO. If future developments, however, weaken the position of the Communists in the CIO, Murray may emerge with greater strength. It is also felt that it is an extremely wise decision for the President also to see Murray with reference to the Marshall Plan. Of all Labor, only the Railroad Brotherhood seems at this stage to be completely friendly to the Democrats. The "flip-flop" of A. F. whitney, who once swore a bitter oath that he would defeat the President if it took thirty million dollars, is a surprising, but nonetheless encouraging, trend.

The moral is plain. Much work needs to be done with organized Labor. The moment will never be as propitious again. It is not suggested that the President must carry this load personally but the National Committee and certain Cabinet Members can render a real service in this field. We can expect that the Dewey forces will increase their efforts to cultivate Labor and the greatest progress in this direction can be made by our side if we make the effort now.

(c) The "Liberals". The liberal and progressive leaders are not overly enthusiastic about the Administration. Foreign policy has forced the large bulk to break sharply with Wallace and the fellow-travelers. And, of course, they find no hope in Republican activities as evidenced by the recent Congress. Fear of the Republicans may drive them to activity for President Truman, but at present there is no disposition to do much more than stay home on election day. Whether their reasons are valid or othernise, many of them feel that the progressive wing has been cut off by the Southerners and the "organization" leaders from any say in the Democratic Party. This is particularly true of such organizations as Americans for Democratic Action where most of the Roosevelt New Dealers have found haven. When Adolf Berle, after cilling on the President as chairman of the New York Liberal Party, announced he was against Hallace and a third party and that the New York Liberal Party would support President Truman, an almost universal criticism among the progressive groups of this statement was that Berle acted unintelligently - he had thrown away the bargaining power of his group a year before the election and had received nothing in return.

The liberals are numerically small. But, similar to manufacturers and financiers of the Republican Party, they are far more influential than nore numbers entitle them to be. The businessman has influence because he contributes his money. The liberal exerts unusual influence because he is articulate. The "right" may have the money, but the "left" has always had the pen. If the "intellectual" can be induced to back the President, he will do so in the press; on the radio, and in the movies. He is the artist of propaganda. He is the "idea man" for the people. Since the rise of the pressure groups, the men of ideas who can appeal to them on their own ground, in their own words, have become an essential ally to the alert candidate in modern American politics.

(d) <u>The Negro</u>. Since 1932 when, after intensive work by President Roosevelt, their leaders swung the Pennsylvania Negro bloc into the Democratic column with the classic remark, "Turn your picture of Abraham Lincoln to the wall - we have paid that debt", the northern Negro has voted Democratic (with the exception of 1966 in New York). A theory of many professional politicians is that the northern Negro voter today holds the balance of power in Presidential elections for the simple arithmetical reason that the Negroes not only vote in a bloc but are geographically concentrated in the pivotal, large and closely contested electoral states such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan. This theory may or may not be absolutely true, but it is certainly close enough to the truth to be extremely arguable.

In great measure, this explains the assiduous and continuous cultivation of the New York Negro vote by Governor Dewey and his insistence that his controllable legislature pass a state anti-discrimination act. No less an authority than Ed Flynn has said privately that Dewey will take New York from President Truman in 1948 because he controls the Negro and Italian blocs. This explains the strenuous efforts made by Wilkie in the 1940 campaign to get the Negro vote and it, of course, explains the long continuing solicitude of the New Deal wing of the Democratic Party toward the Negro. There are several straws, aside from the loyalty of his leaders to Dewey, that the northern Negro is today ready to swing back to his traditional moorings — the Republican Party. Under the tutelage of walter white, of the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People, and other intelligent, educated and sophisticated leaders, the Negro voter has become a cynical, hardboiled trader. He is just about convinced today that he can better his present economic lot by swinging his vote in a solid bloc to the Republicans. He believes the rising dominance of the Southern conservatives in the Democratic councils of the Congress and of the Party makes it only too clear that he can go no further by supporting the present Administration. Whether his interest lies in a Federal Anti-Poll Tax Statute, in the protection of his civil liberties, or in a permanent federal FEPC, he understands clearly that he now has no chance of success with any of these because of the Southern Senators of the Democratic Party.

As well aware of this Democratic chink in the armour as the Negro are the Republican politicians. They make no great secret of their intent to try to pass a FEPC Act and anti-poll tax statute in the next Congress. Whether they are successful — or whether Democratic filibusters will block them — they can't see how they can lose in such a situation either way. The Negro press, often venal, is already strongly Republican.

To counteract this trend, the Democratic Party can point only to the obvious — that the really great improvement in the economic lot of the Negro of the North has come in the last sixteen years only because of the sympathy and policies of a Democratic Administration. The trouble is that this has worn a bit thin with the passage of the years. Unless the Administration makes a determined campaign to help the Negro (and everybody else) on the problems of high prices and housing--and capitalized politically on its ciforts--the Negro vote is already lost. Unless there are new and real efforts (as distinguished from mere political gestures which are today

thoroughly understood and strongly resented by sophisticated Negro leaders),

the Negro bloc, which, certainly in Illinois and probably in New York and Ohio, <u>does</u> hold the balance of power, will go Republican.

(c) <u>The Jew.</u> The Jewish vote, insofar as it can be thought of as a bloc, is important only in New York. But (except for Wilson in 1916) no candidate since 1876 has lost New York and won the Presidency, and its h7 votes are naturally the first prize in any election. Centered in New York City, that vote is normally Democratic and, if large enough, is sufficient to counteract the upstate vote and deliver the state to President Truman. Today the Jewish bloc is interested primarily in Palestine and will continue to be an uncertain quantity right up to the time of election. Even though there is general approval among the Jewish people regarding the United Nations report on Palestine, the group is still torn with conflicting views and dissension. It will be extremely difficult to decide some of the vexing questions which will arise in the months to come on the basis of political expediency. In the long run, there is likely to be greater gain if the Palestine problem is approached on the basis of reaching decisions founded upon intrinsic merit.

(f) <u>The Catholic</u>. The Catholic vote is traditionally Democratic. The controlling element in this group today from a political standpoint is the distrust and fear of Communism. It is reported that Senator Mead, in his candidacy for Governor of New York, lost Catholic votes because he tolcrated a loose alliance with the American Labor Party which is controlled by the Communists. The attitude of the President and the Administration toward Communism should exert a definite appeal to this group but it is entirely possible that closer liaison should be established.

(g) <u>The Italian</u>. The Italian vote--which has weight in New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, California and several minor states because it almost always votes as a solid bloc-- is notoriously volatile, swinging easily from party to party. Roosevelt came perilously close to losing it with his offnand remark in 1940 about Mussolini's "stab in the back" of France. But he regained it, and in fact almost made it Democratic forever in 1943 when he formally declared Italian aliens were no longer classified as alien enemies for the rest of the war. Today the Italian racial leaders are again somewhat unhappy-this time because they regard the peace treaty for Italy as unnecessarily harsh.

(h) The Alien Group. As of today, the Administration enjoys good standing with the Harrison group interested in expanded inmigration quotas. This is a result of the President's forthright fight for the Stration Bill. But the leaders of this organization have learned "the hard way" to be politically sophisticated over the last few years. They deliberately plan to make the best trade they can for the DP's and the other alien groups they represent and have no interest in whether it is to be made with Democrats, Republicans or Hottentots. They are convinced that both parties are primarily interested only for the votes involved; they are ready to act accordingly. On this issue, too, the Administration must carry as its handicap the fact that the major opposition to lowering the immigration barriers comes from its own Southern conservatives. Although not as severely, the Republicans are similarly obstructed here because so many of their Congressmen are residents of small towns and rural areas whose people are bitterly opposed to further immigration. The Labor organizations, which originally caused the passage of the immigration laws, have publicly changed their minds and endorsed the Stratton Bill.

The immigration leaders today lean to the belief the Democrats are more sympathetic, but they maintain a flexible position.

5. The foreign policy issues of the 1948 campaign will be our relations with the USSR and the Administration's handling of foreign reconstruction and relief. The probability that the foreign affairs of the United States will remain on a basis of "bi-partisan cooperation" is unfortunately remote. The stakes in a Presidential contest are so huge that the temptation to make an issue of anything on which there is any segment or group of dissatisfied voters is too irresistable.

There is considerable political advantage to the Administration in its battle with the Kremlin. The best guess today is that our poor relations with Russia will intensify. The nation is already united behind the President on this issue. The worse matters get, up to a fairly certain point — real danger of imminent war — the more is there a sense of crisis. In times of crisis the American citizen tends to back up his President. And on the issue of policy toward Russia, President Truman is comparatively invulnerable to attack because of his brilliant appointment of General Marshall who has convinced the public that as Secretary of State he is nonpartisan and above politics.

In a flank attack tied up with foreign policy, the Republicans have tried to identify the Administration with the domestic Communists. The President adroitly stole their thunder by initiating his own Government employee loyalty investigation procedure and the more frank Republicans admit it. But their efforts will intensify as the election approaches, particularly when the meagre results of the civil service investigations are made public by the Republican Congress.

If the third party effort fizzles, it is quite possible the Communists will try to deliver the unions they dominate to the Republicans. The shoe may conceivably be on the Republican foot by election time -- and it will be the Democrats' turn to emphasize the red lining on the opposition banner. Then Bridges, Curran and Mike Quill "went down the line" for "illkie in 1940 under the whip of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, President Roosevelt tries to do exactly that but his charge was so new and unexpected, and the Communists so adroit in executing their directives, that the Democratic assertion, although true, just wasn't believed by a naive public. If this comes about in 1948 and the Democratic "timing" is better handled, it Tight prove invaluable, particularly as the American public is more sophisticated and more sensitive to the red issue than it then was. But domestic Communism is merely a sideshow to the "Big Tent." On the main issues, the Republican strategy on foreign policy as it appears to be developing is a very effective one. It is effective because of its simplicity -- "everything that is good about American foreign policy is Marshall; everything that is bad is Truman." In addition, there is increasing evidence that the Republicans are taking the line that they have played an important part in the determination of the successful phases of our foreign policy. Vandenberg is used as the symbol of Republican participation in foreign policy, always to the credit of the Republican Party and to the discredit of the Administration.

Republican propaganda is repetitious on the theme that Soviet expansion in Europe could and should have been stopped long ago and that only Roosevelt's bungling at Yalta and President Truman's actions at Potsdam prevented this from happening; that the money spent, 523 billion, for foreign relief seems to have done no good whatsoever; and that the occupation of Germany is a costly failure. This strategy was sharpened by Senator Taft in his Ohio speech when he very carefully emphasized that these weaknesses could not be blamed on the Republican Congress — only a strong Executive, said he, can give the nation a sound foreign policy. Congressman Bender of Ohio, a Taft spokesman, in early September urged that we abandon Europe since all the money poured in since VE-Day had been wasted.

The situation in Greece may become a political issue in 1948. Secret reports from the State Department indicate that the situation is worsening in Greece and the Communists are growing stronger and bolder. By the summer of 1948 the Truman Doctrine will have been on trial in Greece for a full year and, if conditions there have failed to improve, the Administration will be charged with having blundered. Every effort must be made to insure the success of our efforts in Greece. 6. The domestic issues of the campaign will be high prices

and housing. The High Cost of Living will be the most controversial issue of the 1948 campaign — indeed the only domestic issue. Whichever Party is adjudged guilty of causing it will lose the election. For that reason, the presentation of its case by the Democratic Party — the manner, the substance and the effectiveness of its evidence — is of crucial importance.

In a sense, Housing is a part of the larger price issue. Yet it has its own separate dramatic possibilities and for most purposes can be treated as separate. For instance, the World War II Veteran, not yet as politically conscious as prices may force him to be next year, has been led to believe (whether rightly or wrongly) that he has a vested interest in adequate housing. This alone is enough to cause concentration on who is responsible for the lack of housing -- the Democratic President or the Republican Congress. But the pressures on both landlord and tenant, on builder and buyer, will also result in expanding the issue so that almost every voter will be affected.

As part of the general strategy of their high command to move somewhat more to the "left" in the second session of Congress, the Republicans will push some sort of a housing bill. Whatever they do sponsor, in all probability a "watered-down" version of the Taft-Wagner-Ellender bill, will be an anathema to their financial backers but they know they must make a real attempt on housing to hold the so-called "middle class vote" which in 19h6 gave them control of the Congress.

The high cost of living will clearly be the main issue in 1948. The Republicans have already begun their attack upon the administration in this regard and have attempted to place the blame upon the President for high prices. They contend that the President is responsible because he encouraged wage increases for labor and because he, in the last analysis, removed price controls. It is extremely doubtful if the Republicans have made any progress in their effort to sell this package to the american people. The people remember the President's plea for continuation of controls and the Republican refusal to acquiesce in his request. When the right time comes, the President can clarify this issue greatly by reading the record to the people.

This will not be sufficient, however. The present price problem is so acute to the American people that they don't have nearly so much interest in who caused it in 1946 as in who is going to do something about it in 1947 and 1948. The President must present to the Congress a program for the control of prices that, if enacted by the Congress, will actually prove to be effective. If the President recommends a bold program and the Congress refuses to go along with him, then we will be storing up valuable ammunition to use at a later time - for we must face the fact that without some form of controls prices are not only not going to come down but they are going to continue to go up.

Our record on prices must be crystal clear because there is the ever present danger that if prices continue to go up, the people may be so irritable and irrational about the problem that they mill vote the "ins" out and the "outs" in.

The manner in which the Administration dramatizes the high cost of living and the effectiveness with which it can present its story to the people can largely determine the next incumbent of the White House.

7. The conflict between the President and the Congress will increase during the 1948 session. With both major parties making their records for the campaign, and with each trying to claim credit for popular issues and to place the blame for the unpopular ones on the opposition, the political atmosphere will be so pervading that little real "business" will be done. The mutual distrust which such conduct necessarily engenders must result in a continual conflict almost from the binized of the This may mean the end of "bipartisan cooperation" on foreign policy. In the election year atmosphere, it is quite difficult to "compartmentalize" issues. To expect reasonableness and partnership on foreign affairs while guerrilla warfare is going on in domestic matters is to expect that politicians overnight have become more than the mere mortal beings they are.

Insofar as it has control of the situation, the Administration should select the issues upon which there will be conflict with the majority in Congress. It can assume it will get no major part of its own program approved. Its tactics must, therefore, be entirely different than if there were any real point to bargaining and compromise. Its recommendations in the State of the Union message and elsewhere — must be tailored for the voter, not the Congressman; they must display a label which reads "no compromises." The strategy on the Taft-Hartley Bill — refusal to bargain with the Republicans and to accept any compromises — paid big political dividends. That strategy should be expanded in the next session to include all the demestic issues.

B. The Course of Action.

If the "Probabilities" (as discussed above), or most of them, are correct, there remain the twin problems of how to take advantage of those which are favorable and how to effect changes in those unfavorable.

The action required to achieve this should take place on two levels -- the political level and what can be called "the program" level.

1. The Political level.

(a) "The Party Organization." The one particular upon which all politicans agree is that the leadership of the Democratic organization is moribund. It is hardly important on this late day whether this is anyone's fault. The blunt facts seem to be that the Party has been so long in power it is fat, tired, and even a bit senile. Those alert party machines which, beginning with 1932, turned out such huge majorities in one one cross for the Danocratic ticket have all through the years of their victories been steadily deteriorating underneath -- until in 1944 the Democratic organization found itself rivaled, in terms of money and workers, and exceeded in alertness and enthusiasm by the PAC.

Everywhere the professionals are in profound collapse.

Hague and Kelley admit publicly they are through as political bosses of the first magnitude. They have left no one in their places; their organizations are shot through with incompetence. There are a few signs of revival in New York under Mayor O'Dwyer but hardly enough to justify any optimism. In Ohio the regular organization wars with former Covernor Lausche. Jim Curley, still Boston's great vote getter, fills his cell with threats of smashing the party in Massachusetts — and no one doubts for a ninute that he can do it. Pennsylvania is torn between Lawrence and Joe Guffey and every time Lawrence gets some Federal patronage to dispense, Guffey sings the praises of Henry Wallace as publicly as possible. The California quarrel is so dramatic it needs no comment. In worse or less degree, the situation is the same in most of the states.

The present "organization" pours out reams of publicity; it is dispatched by mail, by press and by radio but there seems to be hardly anyone out "beating the bushes" to harmonize where possible and desirable, to reconstruct where necessary, the leadership in the states and the cities, the towns and the counties.

The one essential is to have the new Chairman of the National Democratic Committee, as soon as possible--working to rebuild the Party organization from the ground up and trying to harmonize such appalling feuds as that in California. The practice of today's Democratic organization in spending almost all its time in raising money and doing favors for "the faithful" may be useful but it does little to rebuild the Democratic Party -and that is what it needs.

(b) Lizisons with Labor and Independents. Just as vital

to eventual political success is the renewal of the Administration's working relationship with progressive and labor leaders. Whatever may be the reasons, these seem to have entirely ceased except on a perfunctory basis in the part year. No moment will ever be better for the President to make political capital out of the present frustration of the labor movement.

The leaders of labor must be given the impression that they are once more welcome in the councils of the Administration. Much of this cultivation can be done only by President Truman himself. Immersed in the staggering burden of his work and preoccupied with his day-to-day problems, it is easy for the incumbent of the White House to forget the "magic" of his office. The more extension of an invitation to William Green, Dan Tobin, Philip Eurray, Dubinsky or any of the prominent leaders to "come in and talk with me" has a stupendous effect on them and their followers.

One by one they should be asked to "come by" and the President should ask them for their advice on matters in general. (This is a question of delicate "timing" — it is dangerous to ask a labor leader for advice on a <u>specific</u> matter and then ignore that advice). No human being — as every President from Washington on has ruefully learned — can resist the glamour, the self-important feeling of "advising" a President on anything.

Thus the relationship looking toward 1948, which is after all a common goal for Democrats and organized Labor, can begin to function. But more than that is needed. The President should select a lieutenant, or lieutenants, whom he personally trusts who would continue to "make hay" for him. A fresh "face" is desirable. He should have, besides the President's ear, the confidence of the labor leaders. There are several such men already in the Administration who have the ability to handle such a complicated political operation. This Presidential agent should be instructed to begin general conversations with the CIO, AFL, and the Railroad Brotherhoods. If he is successful, well and good; if he fails, no great harm has been done and someone else can be selected to plow this field. But a man with vijor and intelligence -- and a good sense of how far to go and when -- should start immediately.

In this way perhaps the mistakes of the Pennsylvania Congressional by-election on September 19th, which proved so disastrous to Labor, might be avoided in the future. Experienced politicians saw the pitfalls of such a test and disapproved the amateur methods of the CIO, including "outside interference", emphasis on the labor issue in the worst kind of district for it, and so on, almost through the Book.

But, if the Administration's labor lieutenant (never appearing publicly in the campaign) could have worked out the general strategy in concert with the AFL, the CIO and the progressives, and coordinated them with the local Democratic machine, the harmful effect of the Pennsylvania election could have been avoided. It <u>must</u> be avoided in the pre-convention tests remaining.

A program of cultivation should also be carried on with the progressive and independent leaders around the country. Again some one lieutenant — personally selected by the President — should be entrusted with this campaign.

By such mechanisms as these, the complaints, the attitudes and the points of view of these two vote-getting groups can be funneled into the White House so it will be really informed about just what is going on. These regular reports added to those made by a revitalized party organization -will increase the Administration's political intelligence, today sadly atrophied.

And by election time, the Administration, Labor and the progressives will have built a mechanism of coordination with one another equipped to function throughout the storm and stress of a Presidential campaign.

(c) The Insulation of Henry Wallace. Wallace should be put under attack whenever the moment is psychologically correct. If it is clear that organizational work is being undertaken by his men in the West, either for a third party or for delegates to the Democratic Convention -- and that work seems to be taking effect — the Administration must persuade prominent liberals and progressives — and no one else — to move publicly into the fray. They must point out that the core of the Wallace backing is node up of Communists and the fellow-travelers. At the same time, some lines should be kept out so that if the unpredictable Henry finally sees the light and can be talked into supporting the administration, he will have a handy rope to climb back on the bandwagon — if he is wanted.

But there is only futility in the delusion that Wallace can be insulated merely by yelling at him. As his own lieutenants say, and accurately, in their private conversation, "Henry can be stopped quite easily; all President Truman has to do is move to the left and our ground is cut out from under us; but we are quite sure he won't do it." How the Administration can move "left" belongs in the discussion of the "program" (below).

But along with programs there are the men who execute these programs. And here is the strong weapon of the President's arsenal -- his <u>appointing power</u>. Politicians, like most other people, think of issues in terms of men, not statistics. When the President moves "left" in his appointments, he is putting political money in his bank.

The September 11th speech by Wallace was his first really adroit one. It was a bid to the discontented liberals wavering behing Precident Truman. What he said publicly they have been saying privately with increasing bitterness — even those who support the President. Henry Wallace appealed to the atavistic fear of all progressives — the fear of "Wall Street". This fear is not the sole property of the progressives. It belongs traditionally to the Democratic Party. It began with the agrarian Jefferson's battle against Hamilton, it continued with Jackson's fight against Nicholas Biddle's bank, it found its śilver tongue in the crusales of William Jennings Bryan, and it came to full flower under Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. In a very important sense, it is the reason for the Democratic Party — because the only way to explain the lasting alliance between the South and the West is their mutual fear of domination by the industrial East. Today the South can agree on no issue with the Nest - except "Wall Street."

Wallace's men went to Eachiavelli and to American history then they put his September 11th speech together. Its appeal is devastating. In effect, all he had to do was call the roll -; Harriman, Forrestal and Lovett, Wall Street investment bankers; William Draper and Saltzman, investment bankers; Jack McCloy, Wall Street lawyer, and so forth. And to cap his climax, Wallace reminded his listeners of the White House visits by Herbert Hoover, the man against whom Roosevelt ran four times no matter whom the Republicans nominated.

The Wallace plan is simplicity itself. It should be - because it has been used before. He merely borrowed it from Fighting Bob LaFollette who received five million votes in 1924 by attacking Goolidge and John W. Davis as "Tweedledum and Tweedledee, the messenger boys of Wall Street." And the significance of the LaFollette third party was not its total vote but that the Progressives ram ahead of the Democrats in eleven Western states. The combined Democratic-Progressive vote was larger than the hepublican vote in thirteen states, including President Truman's own state of Missouri. Democrats who voted for Davis would have voted for any Democrat and the LaFollette Progressives would have voted for any liberal Democrat. In effect, then, this was a present of 86 electoral votes to the Republicans, not enough to change the 1924 election (382 minus 86 equals 292 votes; 136 plus 86 equals 222); but it is more than enough to raise havoe for a close election. Henry Wallace may be fuzzy-minded on many matters, but his nathematics is all right.

President Truman must carry the West to win. To carry the West, he must be "liberal"; he cannot afford to be shackled with the Wall Street label by any so-called progressive movement. And Wallace recalls only too well that the spiritual father of the New Deal was not John W. Davis but Bob LEFollette, and that the New Deal came only eight years later.

A President - harapsed by the mounting problems of Europe and by

the numerous resignations of men who can no longer afford to work for the Government, and also by the desirability of selecting men who can be confirmed -- may justifiably be strongly tempted to reply: "Demagoguery!" to the Wall Street charge. True as this may be, and unfair as such labelling is to the persons attacked, who are doing what they can for their country, the charge is nonetheless filled with too much political dynamite. In politics many things are unfair.

The man-in-the-street understands little and cares less about the personnel difficulties of public administration. These difficulties have no glamour, they are too complex — and so they just don't get across. The Wallace attack does. In the blunt words of the ILGWU (Dubinsky) Union Convention:

"Foreign policy is not the private property of.... retired financiers. Foreign policy is the burning concern of the great mass of the people."

And that is all that the working man will remember of that issue. It is imperative that the President make some top.level appointments from the ranks of the progressives — in foreign as well as domestic affairs. His fight for Lilienthal made him the hero of the independent voter. His refusal to withdraw the name of Francis Biddle as American delegate to the Economic and Social Council until Biddle requested it made him many friends among the liberals. Top ranking appointments of men like young Bob LaFollette are needed. The pattern must be repeated even if some of them are not confirmed. Under their impact, Wallace will fade away.

(d) <u>Portrait of a President</u>. A crucial -- but easy -- step forward to November 1948 is to create in the public mind a vote-getting picture of President Truman. From as objective a perspective as possible, I submit that the present public attitude toward the President is about as follows:

Both the original "honeymoon" and the later violently critical period of public opinion toward the President seem to be over. Emerging instead is the picture of a man the previous people like. They know now that he is a sincerc, courageous and able man and, in the clicke so often heard, that he is a man "trying to do his best."

icmbers of the President's Cabinet can render valuable service to the Party by pointing out these qualities of the President as they observe them in their working contacts with the President. They can help give a varied picture to the people.

It is said invariably, and always without analysis, that the President is the Chief of the State, the Symbol of Government. What the theorists as well as the politicians do not observe is that the public gets its impression of its President mostly from the actions he takes when performing as Chief of State -- as the Head of Government. The masses of the people rarely if ever think of him in his role of Government administrator, or as the responsible policy maker on our national economic problems.

They really form their lasting impressions from watching his incidental gestures -- when he appears as the representative of all the American people.

An apt illustration is the contrast between his Mexican trip and later Canadian trip. The Canadian trip might have been, so far as anyone knows, more important for the United States than his visit to Mexico. It is a reasonable guess, however, that today few American citizens even remember he went to Canada. But almost everyone remembers his graceful gesture about the Mexican cadets. Whether it was planned deliberately or was a lastminute improvisation is unimportant. In the future, such gestures should be more numerous and should be planned deliberately; that is the way the public should remember its President.

The trip to the Rio Conference will be recalled not because of the success of the conference but because of the Brazilian ovation to "our" President, because he went orchid hunting and was changed from a pollywog into a shellback. He is at his best when an Ambassador of Good Will. And he gets more newspaper attention and much more interest from the American people than do the transparent journeyings of Messrs. Dewey and Taft. But at home the American people are daily forced to think of their President as a politician for the good reason that the news stories deal only with his activities as a politician -- because that is what he is engaged in doing. His calling lists, week in and week out, are filled almost entirely with Government and Congressmen with whom he consults on problems that are important to the nation, but appear to the average reader complicated and dull.

The public has a tremendous interest in its Chief Executive and is invariably hungry for news about him. It does not want those stereotyped gestures, so done to death in past years that they are routine. No one really cares any more about a round-the-world flyer, or the little girl with the first poppy of the Disabled Veterans, or the Eagle Scout from Idaho. Granted that such appointments often cannot be avoided and must be borne with fortitude, they have long since reached the stage of diminishing returns.

The kind of gestures desired are those which, taken altogether and repeated again and again, will form a carefully drawn picture of the President as a broad-gauged citizen with tremendously varied interests. If well done, there will be countless variations on this theme. This does not mean he should do anything which puts him in a false or unnatural light. These artificialities contain within themselves too much political canger (viz, Calvin Coolidge wearing his Indian bonnet or Senator Taft catching his fish).

But there are many gestures of substance to be made. <u>Solely</u> for purposes of illustration, several are here suggested (these particular ones revolve around the most superb of all backdrops — the White House itself!):

(i) The President could lunch with Albert Einstein. It will be remembered he was the man who prevailed upon Roosevelt to start the atomic bomb project. At his next press conference, he can explain that they talked, in general, about the peacetime uses of atomic energy and its potentialities for our civilization. He can then casually mention that he has been spending some of his leisure time getting caught up on atomic energy; he has been having "briefing sessions" with the atomic Energy Commission; and has also been doing some reading purely from the layman's point of view. He suggests to the newsmen that it would do them no harm at all to read such and such a book (as long as he picks the right one) which he has just read. In another connection (The "Winning of the West"), this memorandum suggests later that he visit Los Alamos and Oak Ridge, but in point of "timing", the Einstein visit and the New Mexico visit could be done together.

(ii) Henry Ford II is often in Washington these days. The President should casually invite him to lunch just to talk over matters "generally". This picture of the American President and the Young Business Man together has appeal for the average reader. Many other business leaders should be called in occasionally.

The press <u>must</u> print news of the President - so he controls his publicity by his own whim. One or two non-political personages a week should be the target. The need for conferences with labor leaders has already been emphasized for other reasons. This technique of summons to the white House has the added virtue, besides publicity, of building good will. An organization is flattered that its leader is considered important enough to be consulted. This takes that most important of commodities -- Presidential Time -- but it is well worth its expenditure. It is worth it because of the American's inordinate curiosity -- he will watch that lunch with a new interest, even a sense of personal participation, if the other participant is someone other than a Government administrator or Congressman.

The President will have more than enough on his mind in the coming months; he cannot be expected to think much about this sort of thing. But it is intrinsically important. Someone with imagination should be delegated to draw up this type of agenda and present several alternatives weekly to him. His own good sense of political judgment will accept or reject these suggestions if all he is required to do is check the ones he prefers.

Eut he will need to do something of this nature for an entirely extrandous -- and much more valid -- reason: Since he is President, he <u>cannot be politically active</u> until well after the July Convention. The people are inconsistent and capricious but there is no argument that they feel deeply on this --: He must be President of all the people and not merely the leader of a party, until the very last minute. Therefore, he must act as a President almost up to Election Day. Lincoln set the pattern by remaining "judiciously aloof" (to use his own phrase) in Illinois while his henchmen carried on the political war for him. Dewey, Taft, Stassen and Wallace are free as birds to attack him but once he stoops to answer them on their level, he has done himself severe damage. Only Wilson broke this rule of being President of <u>all</u> the people -- in 1916 by asking for a Democratic Congress -- and the people punished him for it by returning a Republican one.

So a President who is also a candidate must resort to subteringe for he cannot sit silent. He must be in the limelight. He must do the kind of thing suggested above to stay in the limelight and he must also resort to the kind of trip which Roosevelt made famous in the 1940 campaign the "inspection tour." No matter how much the opposition and the press pointed out the political overtones of those trips, the people paid little attention because what they saw was the Head of State performing his duties.

(e) Foreign Policy. Since the general strategy of the opposition in the field of foreign affairs is their claim that "what is good

is varshall, what is bad is Truman", the portrait the public sees must also undergo alterations. President Truman must assume before the cycs of the people the leadership on foreign policy. Today the American people identify Secretary Marshall, and not the President, as our spokesman. This may have substantive advantages because of its non-partisan aura -- but unhappily it is bad politics for 1948. For example, one of the reasons privately circulated by the men promoting today's tentative boomlet for Eisenhower is that the General knows foreign policy much more than theoretically; that he is accustomed to dealing directly with British, Russians, French and Germans. Unless clumsier than usual, the Republicans will be cautious that they do not provoke Marshall into such a defensive attitude that he will be forced to attack their obstructionism. Indeed Governor Dewey may go so far as to say that if elected he will keep Marshell as Secretary of State.

But if the President is to be attacked on what his opponents believe are the vulnerable aspects of our conduct on foreign policy, he must allow himself to be in a position where he can take credit for those aspects the public regards as the virtues of that policy. He cannot afford to continue allowing them to go by default to Marshall.

Marshall is a soldier and trained to be loyal to his Commanderin-Chief. In the American Republic, the President is responsible for foreign policy. He cannot be responsible in fact if he cannot use his authority. It is on his record, not that of Marshall, that the people will make their judgment in 1948, and he must be given the credit if he is subject to the blame. Democratic Government means no less and no more than that.

In terms of technique, this means he must use his authority publicly (as well as the private way he does exercise it); that he must speak out more often on specific matters of foreign policy, with prepared statements at press conferences — his great and useful sounding board. The dangers of speaking "off the cuff" on foreign policy are obvious. But there is no reason why, after a detailed "briefing", many announcoments today being made constantly in the State Department (and many of those by subordinate officials) should not come from the White House.

American people something they too easily forget -- our President is also the Commander-in-Chief. They are forgetting it again, and ironically cnough, one of the reasons is a pet project of the President -- Unification. There is now a "Super-Cabinet Officer", -- the Secretary of Defense.

(f) The Commander-in-Chief. World War II taught the

It is a commonplace that one of the great difficulties of our Government is that Cabinet Officers, in contrast with the British system, are not as amenable to Presidential discipline as they ought to be. Lincoln suffered as greatly as any President from the vagaries and personal ambitions of his Cabinet, and even Franklin Roosevelt, never inclined to take too high a view of Cabinet Officers, suffered the disloyalty of Jessie Jones far longer than any President should have. There are some indications today that several of the incumbent Cabinet Officers tend to regard themselves as the rulers of independent baronies. This is always true in some measure but there is no good reason why it should be so (except that the Presidency has never properly been staffed). There is serious danger -- <u>irrespective</u> of the personality or talents of whoever happens to have the job at any moment -- that this tendency will become really exaggerated in the Department of National Defense. This is particularly so in the world we live in today.

Military affairs, whether we like it or not, will be a leading preoccupation of the average American citizen for the next year. If nothing else, he feels it in his pocketbook -- 74 cents of the Budget Dollar. Again the White House can be the scene of many announcements on military affairs; and the Commander-in-Chief, not the Secretary of Defense, should make them. The President, as soon as he can arrange a schedule, should appear on the scenes of important military projects. 2. The Program Level.

The suggestions made on the political level go almost wholly to "form", the manner and method with which things that need doing are to be done. But it is the things that are to be done -- the "substance" -- that determines the outcome of elections.

The issues are there for anyone to see. What remains is only the decision how and when they are to be handled, so their advantages are politically exploited to the utmost, their disadvantages politically minimized as much as possible.

How does the opposition plan to handle them? It is hardly a secret.

Having performed yeoman service for those interests (e.g., the "Real Estate Lobby") which provide the financial sinews for political warfare, the Republican strategists proclaimed their intentions to swing "left" in the next session.

Senator Taft, their leader on domestic policy, has three strings to his bow: Housing, Education (relief for teachers) and Health. The people, including the veterans, are stirred up about housing and rents, and the teachers have votes. The Republicans plan to raise the minimum wage level, do what they can for the DP's, and give the Negro his FEPC and civil rights legislation, or try to.

All this means they are chasing votes in earnest. And it emphasizes the only tenable Democratic strategy, which is to continue to stay to the "left" of them.

The Democrats hold the Presidency. The Presidency is vastly more flexible than the Congress, which means merely that a President can always act much faster — and more often — than can any group of Senators or Congressmen.

The President has a great opportunity of presenting his program to the American people in his message on the State of the Union. He can present his recommendations simply and clearly to the Congress so that the people will know what the President is asking the Congress to do. There is little possibility that he will get much cooperation from the Congress but we want the President to be in position to receive the credit for whatever they do accomplish while also being in position to criticize the Congress for being obstructionists in failing to comply with other recommendations. This will be a fertile field for the -development of campaign issues.

There are certain issues that already stand out as the major points of conflict in 1948. They are: (1) High Prices; (2) Housing; (3) The Marshall Plan; (4) Tax Revision; (5) Conservation of Natural Resources in the West; and (6) Civil Rights.

(1) High Prices:

We are off to a good start on the exceedingly important issue of High Prices. The President has recommended a bold program that should present increasingly great appeal to the American people. At present it appears that the Congress will not give the President price control, rationing, or wage control. They will attempt to build up the importance of the other seven points of his program, add some minor triamings of their own, give it to the American people under some fancy name, and hope it will get them by. We must expect to receive a good deal of criticiam now on the program. The farm organizations, labor leaders and industrial organizations will find much to object to in the program. From the standpoint of the long-range view, however, the prophecy could well be made that the few people who will be attacking the President's program today are those who, in April 1948, will be condemning the Congress for failure to pass this program .: Because of the probability of increasingly high prices in 1948, it is possible that this issue will reach a climax in the summer of 1948. This would come at a highly propitious time for the President and the Democratic Administration.

(2) Housing.

Senator Taft, despite the well-organized lobby fighting iny governmental action on Housing, knows his party must make a real effort next year to pass his bill. He understands that, with the exception of food prices, Housing has a more direct impact on "the greatest mumber" than any other of today's issues. The latest mismamed Rent Control Act has made the man-in-the-street conscious of the economic and political power of the real estate interests which, unlike most lobbles, takes the money directly out of the people's pockets. Although the public reaction has been slow in starting, it is now steadily building up. For instance, there are persistent signs of a revolt by the young veterans against the conservative American Legion policy on Housing which has been dictated in toto by the Real Estate Lobby.

Another example was the success of the President's attack on the Real Estate Lobby in his message approving the Rent Control Bill. It has already had effect in the spontaneous manner it was taken up by different groups. It is the essence of politics to wage an attack against a personal devil; the Real Estate Lobby should be built into the dramatic equivalent of the Public Utility Lobby of 1935. Purely on the merits, the performance of the real estate interests in their post-war gouging fully deserves everything they get in the way of retaliation. There can be no possible computcion about using such a tactic against them. If there is any way of doing it, the Congress should be

made to investigate the lobby. But it is hard to see how a Republicancontrolled Congress will touch it. Even if the pressure of public opinion forces them to go through the motions and there is an alert and aggressive Democratic minority appointed, the cloak-room maneuvers will stifle any cffective expose.

Nor has the Department of Justice investigation any real possibilities. And it should not be relied on too extensively. First of all, there is already a widespread suspicion that the Department's motivation was purely political. And since it is an anti-trust investigation, probably nothing new will be found in the housing field that is not already known. The Administration cannot afford to lose a housing case before the campaign is over. However, the useful material already gathered by the Department's investigators should be made available to those who can make propagenda use of that material.

Attack on the Lobby is negative. The other approach must be affirmative. The Administration is itself vulnerable on Housing. It is vulnerable because it has fallen over the same stumbling block for the past fifteen years.

The Administration must take an affirmative position on Housing. Valuable time has already been lost because of the difficulty in the problem and the disinclination on the part of persons having responsibility in this field to come up with a program that the President could recommend. Housing should be stressed in the State of the Union Lessage but its importance is such that a special message should go to the Congress on Housing shortly after the State of the Union Lessage has been delivered.

If the President offers a sound, strong Housing program, then he will be in position to share the credit for Housing legislation with the Republican Congress. If he sends up such a message on Housing and the Congress fails to take action, we can point the finger of blame toward the Republicans for failure to solve this pressing problem. If, on the other hand, the President fails to send up a message on Housing, and the Republicans pass a Housing bill, then the President will be in the exceedingly unfortunate position of having done nothing about Housing and the Republicans will get the credit for meeting the issue head on.

(3) The Marshall Plan.

The best estimate of the present situation is that the

Congress will go along with the President on the Marshall Plan. There is likely to be lengthy debate on the subject but the need for i. is so obvious and the fear of Communism in this country is such that Congress will probably have to heed the wish of the people.

One of the important points of controversy will center around the type of organization that is set up to administer the program. There is a great deal of merit to the recommendation of the Budget Bureau that the responsibility for implementing the Plan be given to the Secretary of State and that the work be carried on by an organization operating within the State Department. In all probability this would be the most successful operation because the State Department experts are available and more experienced people can take part in the planning and operation.

This suggestion has an element of political benefit also. If the President recommends that the Plan be administered by the Secretary of State and the Congress refuses this recommendation and sets up a separate corporation or a commission to implement the Plan, and should the job be done poorly, the President can point out that the Congress refused to follow his recommendation and confusion, inefficiency and waste followed.

(4) Tax Revision.

Although not as inevitable as death and taxes, it is elmost certain that in the election year of 1948 - whether the Administration likes it or not - taxes will be reduced. The Republicans plan to cut them, and Democratic Congressmen in sufficient numbers simply cannot stand up in a campaign year against the pressure to support tax reduction and to override the President's third yeto if it comes.

His two vetoes of the first session have enhanced his prestige in the cycs of the disinterested and thoughtful few. If the huge surplus now estimated is correct, however, there is no possibility of stemming the tide in the next Congress despite the foreign aid requirements. The inflationary pressures on the people will make them think they need more "take home" money in their pockets; the quickest way to put it there is a tax cut.

So if there is to be one, the Administration might as well get the credit for it and save what it can of its taxation principles. But whatever compromise is made must be done without obvious political intent. The Republicans have cleverly publicized their suspicions that there were vetoes in 1947 only so a Bemocratic President could reap the credit in 1948.

These cries for tax reduction can be turned to an economically sound and useful purpose and remove the political suspicion at the same time. The perennial outcries for revision of our entire tax structure are even more strident than usual. Such requests are always with us, are invariably justified, yet nothing is ever done about them. To revise the entire federal structure is not the appallingly difficult matter so many "experts" pretend it to be, because the necessary studies have been made time and time again. In fact, the Treasury is revising its studies right now. Only the areas of disagreement on policy are causing the trouble that goes on year after year. Discussions with the Secretary of the Treasury indicate that revision of the tax structure could be accomplished in such a manner as to eliminate many of the eristing inequities. The elimination of such inequities, however, will cut into "the tax revenue.

It should be perfectly possible, and could be exceedingly helpful politically, for the President to deliver a message to the Congress sometime in January, 1948 setting forth his recommendations as to the revision of our tax structure. Such a message could recommend elimination of obvious inequities in our tax system and an increase in personal exemptions so as to benefit those in the lowest income brackets. If such a program resulted in a loss of revenue of approximately two billion collars, it could be easily justified because of the tramendous surplus that is anticipated for the next fiscal year. If the Congress accepted the President's recommendations and passed such a tax bill, than there would be a division of credit. If the Congress refused to head the President's suggestions and passed a bill allowing a much larger tax reduction, particularly for the higher income groups, then the administration would have another valuable issue to present in November of 1948.

(5) Conservation of Natural Resources in the West.

In the Land of Electoral Votes, the West is the "Number One Pricrity" for the Democrats: Its people are more liberal because they need the economic help of government and in the years of the New Deal-have come to understand how it functions. Even the Chambers of Commerce of the West rarely prate of governmental economy; they learned better long ago.

There is no need for an extended discussion here about what should be done politically for the Western States. They know their needs --less discrimination in freight rates, reclamation projects and lots of them, better roads (their road system suffered from lack of maintenance in the war years), public power, help in the development and protection of their resources, and so forth. Their needs are not hard to understand. The Administration, which in the last year or two has at least budgetwise not shown much sympathy (although far more than the Republicans), must display a constant and increasing interest in these Western needs. Although it would be inadvisable for the President to make

a political tour at any time in the reasonably near future, yet he could find occasion to visit the West on business. There are two large atomic energy plants in the West and these could be used as an excuse.

But he can go much farther and demonstrate again that he is an imaginative leader. In a world of fear and of acceleration despair, the people need a strong voice talking about the America of the Future. The appeal of Wallace to the young voters during his western swing several months ago was because he dared to talk in an idealistic strain. No other american figure (not even Stassen, who leads President Truman almost 2-1 among the independent and western voters, according to the Fortune poll) has had the imagination to "pitch" his arguments at that level.

Yet it is just that level, other things being equal, that has always had more appeal to the American people than any other. A planning program for the United States, with 1960 as the target-date, may well have that kind of political glamour. It might catch on.

If there is a world in 1960, the United States will unquestionably be the leader of its age. And our domestic economy -- what it has done for our own people in every field of endeavor, security, recreation and worldly goods -- will be the measure of our greatness for all the world. Twelve years before the event is just about right to start estimating those needs and expanding our resources, all within the framework of free enterprise. A recent Twentieth Century Fund study, "America's Needs and Resources", could be taken as a convenient starting place. If the Administration will have the imagination to talk and act in such terms, despite the screams of the conservative part of the press and the "practical men", (who are all Republicans anyway) it can effectively kill off the Wallaces and the demagogues who will come after him. More practically, it will mean money in the political bank in November 1948.

(6) Civil Rights.

The Republicans know how vulnerable the Democratic Party is insofar as the negro vote is concerned. They have been bending every effort to woo the negroes away from the Administration's fold. In all probability, Republican strategy at the next session will be to offer an FFFC, an anti-poll tax bill, and an anti-lynching bill. This will be accompanied by a flourish of oratory devoted to the Civil Rights of various groups of our citizens. mitted the Republicans to get away with this. It would appear to be sound strategy to have the President go as far as he feels he possibly could go in recommending measures to protect the rights of minority groups. This course of action would obviously cause difficulty with our Southern friends but that is the lesser of two evils.

C. The Mechanics for 1948.

This memorandum has made two points: (A) It is "probable" certain things will happen in 1948; and (B) A certain "course of action" must be followed to shape those probabilities to bring about the President's cloction.

The question remains how to create the necessary machinery. For without intelligent, and even devoted, execution of such a program as outlined here is nothing more than a conversation picce a pleasant finger-exercise. Much of the Democratic "politicking" is just that. The Chairman of the Illinois Democratic Committee may brag that his committee has no financial worries and in fact has more money in the till than ever in its history, and the Democratic National Committee may have relaxed in the assurance it can get sufficient funds to finance the 1948 campaign. Both organizations seem to have forgotten that the moneyraising is after all only the means for a desirable end.

What kind of a mechanism will work?

Some sort of a small "working committee" (or "think" group) should be set up. Its function would be to coordinate the political program in and out of the Administration. (This does not mean it would it would run all over the departments; indeed, if it works right, no one in any of the agencies will ever hear of it).

The members of such a committee would be imaginative men with understanding of and experience in government, and with some knowledge, even if only a theoretical one of the followays, the give-and-take of politics. To put it bluntly (although it is poor semantics to do so) they would be the counterpart of "The Team" of Dewey. They would be close-mouthed (the hardest requisite of all!) Although its makeup must be flexible, in general they should not be active government administrators. This is so for two reasons: (1) The administrator is too overworked already and procesupied with his own problems; and (2) he is invariably cursed with "the Departmental view"; his problems are vital, the most important of all, and no one else's are. The curse of our government is that with flow exceptions only the President has the overall Administration point of view. The men on the committee must be "Truman men", thinking for the President and how the President can take political advantage of this or that program. The head of X Agency invariably tries to get everyone else immersed in X. Consideration will have to be given us to the menner in which

within the frame-work of the National Democratic Committee but it is doubtful if the professional politicians could recognize the absolute need that exists for the performance of such a function. It could be set up quietly, given space in the old State Department Building and put to work. The question of financing the operation would, of course, have to be discussed with the Chairman of the National Democratic Committee.

What sort of work would the "working Committee" do? It would, even at this early date, start the preparation of memoranda looking toward the drafting of the 1948 Platform. It would begin assembling. material for approximately ten major political speeches -- the campaign

speechs after the Convention.

It would present to the President a "Monthly Estimate of the Situation," (somethat similar to this memorandum, but based scientifically on reports, statistics and polls), informing him of recent political trends, the rise or fall of the leading Republican candidates, the attitudes of the large social groups existing in the country, political weaknesses in certain geographical areas, and similar matters. The "Estimate" could include suggestions as to topics that the President Light refer to for the coming months. In short, it could well replace the present haphaard, hit or miss system with a functioning political intelligence method which could enable the President to stay out in front and anticipate political problems.

It would do research on the various personalities to be involved in the campaign. There would be a <u>Devey</u> expert. Everything that <u>Devey</u> ever said or did, beginning with his college speeches, and continuing through his career as prosecutor, as Governor and as Presidential candidate, would be carefully reviewed to determine his inconsistencies, his mistakes and his bad guesses, as weighed in unfriendly fashion by the hindsight of 1948. There should also be a <u>Taft</u> expert. The President is running against the Taft record no matter who his opponent is. To play safe there must also be a <u>Truman</u> expert -- a Devil's Advocate. The President was a Senator for a long time and he has been in the White House for two and a half years.

Another badly neglected function the "working committee" would take on is preparing answers to Republican charges. Its performance must be <u>efficient</u> enough so the answer will be carried in newspaper stories the same day, and not on the back pages a week or so later. This requires a precise coordination, long absent, between the government agencies which have the information, the Democratic Committee, the White House, and such Mainistration congressional lieutenants as Leslie Biffle, Senator Barkley and former Speaker Rayburn.

When, for instance, the Administration is attacked on the floor, a Democratic Congressman should be able to answer with facts and figures within the next few hours. And when the Republican leaders put their foot in their mouth, as they often enough did in the last session, they should be "put on the spot" within the hour.

These are illustrative of what a good "working committee" can do. Someone must do them if there is to be success in 1948. The Presidential The Campaign of 1940 will be a coach, bittery found burger. The issues will be close and the ultimate determination of the winner may very well depend upon the type of staff work furnished to the two contenders.


No effort must be overlooked or left undone to furnish Fresident Truman with the greatest possible assistance because the future of this country and the future of the world are linked inextricably with his reelection.


In national politics, the American people normally make up their minds definitely about the two Presidential candidates by the end of July.

If the program discussed here can be put into operation soon -and executed properly, it can help in persuading the American people to make up their minds the <u>right</u> way.

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

November 19, 1947





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