

"Habitus And The Perfection Of Man"

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To The Greater Glory
Of God.....and that we may know better the
gift of His Grace.

"Habit^{us} And The Perfection Of Man"

Contents:

I) Introduction	p.1-2
II) The Background for qualitative perfections:	
A) St. Thomas and Aristotle on "Quale Quid."	p.2-4
"Quale" as an essential difference.	
"Quale" as an accidental difference.	
B) St. Thomas on:	p.6-9
"Esse simpliciter, bonum secundum quid"	
"Esse secundum quid, bonum simpliciter"	
C) The desire of man for perfection.	p.9
D) The conflux of potencies of man that call for perfection.	p.9-13
III) The qualitative perfections:	
A) Disposition, the genus of habit.	p.13-14
1) The faculties open to disposition.	p.14
a) Internal Senses.	p.15
b) Rational Powers.	p.16-19
2) The manner in which faculties are disposed.	p.19-23
B) Habit ^{us}	
1) The essential difference between habit and disposition.	p.25-30
2) The four conditions for habit ^{us} formation.	p.30-36
3) Habit ^{us} augmentation:	
a) Background.	p.36-38
b) Twofold perfectibility of a habit ^{us} .	p.38-41
IV) The supernatural habits:	
A) Analogical habits: the preamble to their study are the natural habits.	p.41-45
B) Disposition to the supernatural: grace and virtue.	p.46-47
C) Habitual Grace:	
1) The subject, the soul.	p.48-50
2) A Problem: similiarity to both "quale accidentale" and "quale substantiale."	p.50-53

1)

Introduction

No new conclusions are to be reached here in this paper. The purpose of this study is to bring together a few important texts of St. Thomas that show us the nature of habit, and how this unique mean mode of being found in the context of potency and act plays the leading role in the perfection of man. The field of investigation is vast, but the emphasis will be upon a basic and sound approach according to the "ratio" of St. Thomas. It is hardly necessary to say that the fruitfulness and fascination of such an investigation eclipses even its vastness; for here we are concerned with a mode of accidental being that embraces all true science and wisdom. The natural virtues also rest in this mode of being, and finally the scope of habit reaches beyond the natural and dips into the supernatural. For the gift of grace and the supernatural virtues find their analogous but true place here in the first species of quality. ¹⁾

Such considerations reaching into the supernatural transcend praedicamental habitus. Yet after an examination of the habitual perfections of the natural order, it will not be out of place to show the nature of the analogy between the supernatural

1) "Dicendum quod gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis." S.T.I,II,110,3,3m. Cf. I,II,110,2c. De Veritate q.27,2,2m. II Sent., dist.26,q.1,a.4,1m.

The question of grace being a member of the first species of quality will be treated in the final section of this paper on the supernatural habits.

2)

and natural habits. It is only by the recognition and use of this analogy that we can have any rational understanding of supernatural grace and virtue. In fact, any consideration of the perfectibility of man neglecting this final step would be incomplete. To those who object and say that such a procedure confuses metaphysics and psychology with theology the following consideration is directed. The two wisdoms, that is, metaphysics and theology, are formally distinct, but not departmentalized into two entirely different facets of thinking.²⁾ In reality the Christian Philosopher can offer no apology for the Gospel and the science of God that is based upon it, tradition, and the teaching authority of The Church. These sources offer us absolute conformity with reality.

* * * * *

I Aristotle and St. Thomas
on "QUALE QUID".

The consideration Aristotle gives to "quale" in V Metaphysics ²⁾ is a development that forms the foundation for any study concerning quality. Here it rightfully becomes our very first principle, upon which everything that is to follow will necessarily depend.

These excerpts from the text can serve as a summary of The Philosopher's development:

"The primary quality is the differentia of the essence."
(1020 b14.)

"Quality means the differentia of the essence, e.g., man

2) Cf. Regis, Louis-Marie, O.P., "GILSON'S BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS, Modern Schoolman. vol.28 (Jan.1951) p.111-25.

is an animal of a certain quality because he is two-footed, and the horse is so because it is four-footed - which shows that the essential differentia is a quality." (1020 a33-35)

"Secondly, there are the modifications of things that move, qua moving, and the differentiae of movements."

(1020 b18)

..."all the modifications of substances that move (e.g., heat and cold, whiteness and blackness, heaviness and lightness, and the others of the sort) in virtue of which, when they change, bodies are said to alter." (1020 b9-12)

This text is so important because it makes a lucid distinction between the "quale" that determines the genus and disposes matter, in other words the essential difference, and the "quale" which determines the accidental potency, the accidental indeterminateness, of a subject "secundum esse accidentale." 3)

St. Thomas, in commenting on this text of Aristotle, re-asserts the validity and necessity of this distinction in strong and unmistakable terms.

"Unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur differentia substantiae, idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt, qua intrat in definitionem substantiae. Et propter hoc dicitur, quod differentia praedicatur in quale quid. Ut si quaeratur, quale animal est homo? Respondemus quod bipes: et quale animal equus? Respondemus quod quadrupes: et qualis figura est circulus: respondemus quod agnion, ad est sine angulo: ac si ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas sit. Uno igitur modo ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas dicitur."

"Secundus modus principalis est, ut passiones motuum inquantum mota, et etiam differentiae motuum dicantur qualitates. Quae quidem dicuntur differentiae motuum, quia alterationes differunt secundum huiusmodi qualitates, sicut calefieri et infrigidari secundum calidum et frigidum."

"Principalissimus est primus modus, secundum quem differentia substantiae dicitur qualitas, quia per eum aliquid significatur informatum et qualificatum."

***** In Metaph. V, lect.16. *****

3) Cf. I, II, 49, 2.

4)

Cajetan clearly stresses this distinction also, saying that "quale" may be taken in these two different ways, that is, substantially and accidentally.⁴⁾

And then, at the outset of his formal treatment of habitus in the Summa, St. Thomas makes reference to the text of Aristotle quoted above and points out that substantial form is the determination of matter to act, while quality determines the potencies of a substantial subject:

"Et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subjecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per Philosophum in V Metaphys." I, II, 49, 2c.

Therefore, what the essential difference, "quale" in the first sense, does essentially, that is to actually determine the genus which is undetermined and potential, this very thing "quale" in the second sense does accidentally; that is, to determine, inform or qualify accidental potencies.⁵⁾

The essential point to be made here is that man in his quest for more esse, for perfection, is limited to the accidental field.⁶⁾ This may be an obvious point, but it is a point that must be firmly grasped if there is to be any understanding of man's perfectibility. More will be said of it shortly.

4) Cajetan, "Caput De Qualitate," In Praedicamenta Aristotelis. Editionem curavit H.M. Laurent, O.P., Roma, apud Institutum Angelicum. 1939. (R)

"Communiter prout invenitur in omnibus generibus et quando dicitur quod differentia praedicatur in quale, et quando dicitur quod omnis genera accidentium qualificant substantiam et praedicantur in quale."

5) Cf. also, John of St. Thomas, Ars Logica II, 18, 1.

6) Cf. I, 75, 5c.

5)

Before proceeding to the second basic text in this development, it would be well to make a further comment. In this study of habitus and the perfection of man we are concerned with the field of quality, and only with the first species of quality at that. For this reason it might seem that the important role the other non-qualitative accidental forms play in the perfection of man is neglected, or minimized. On the contrary, their importance is not denied, but it must be stressed that the role quality plays in the perfection of man transcends them.⁷⁾ For the highest potencies of man, his intellect and will, are brought into a mean and continual mode of actualization by disposition and habit, the first species of quality.

Also, it must be pointed out that the qualitative perfections of an individual subject cannot be suitably studied without some degree of understanding of the substances that are their subject and of other concomitant accidents, such as relation, action and passion, and above all, of the subject potencies.⁸⁾

7) Cajetan explains this usurpation in the following noteworthy text:

"In articulo secundo eiusdem quaestionis, adverte quod illa verba in corpore: Modus autem sive determinatio subjecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad naturam, etc., si sumantur universaliter absolute, insolubilis apparet quaestio quomodo sit sufficiens haec distinctio: cum quantitas ipsa determinet subjectum secundum esse accidentale, nec minus habet rationem modificantis et determinantis quam secunda species qualitatis. Si vero sumantur universaliter quidem, sed limitate sub antedictis verbis, scilicet quod qualitas importat quemdam modum substantiae, et mensuram, cessant objecta: quoniam sermo non est nisi de quodam determinatione accidentali, quae commune nomen accidentalis differentiae, qualitatem scilicet, sibi usurpavit."^{ca} Cajetan, In I, II, 49, 3c.

8) Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, c.2, 1004 b8-10.

6)

St. Thomas

and "esse simpliciter, bonum secundum quid."

"esse secundum quid, bonum simpliciter."

Our next basic text⁹⁾ has a close relationship with the consideration given to essential quale and accidental quale by Aristotle and St. Thomas. Furthermore, it is a consideration that ultimately entails reflection on other extremely important texts of St. Thomas that deal with the nature of pure act and created substances. Just why such a complete reduction to the ultimate of realities is necessary here will ^{at} least be hinted in the examination of the text. It amounts to the recognition of the distinction that exists between the Absolute and the contingent, the perfect and the limited, a distinction that is real and yet admits the causal relationship that is the key to all unity.

The text is taken from the reply to the first objection of question V, on "De Bono In Communi", in the Prima Pars. Cajetan maintains that this question is not so much the beginning of the section on "bonum" as it is a part of the tract on perfection that is begun in question four.¹⁰⁾ Certainly this text should not be taken alone without consideration of the general context in which it is found. In the immediately previous

9) I, 5, 1, 1m.

10) "Ad hoc dicitur, quod quaestio de bono dupliciter ordinari potest, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, ut est pars tractatus de perfectione, et sic in capitulo de perfectione ordinanda est; et hoc insinuavit littera tam in principio quaestionis quartae, ubi tractatus de perfectione inchoatur, et dicitur:

'Et quia unumquodque, secundum quod perfectum est, sic dicitur bonum, primo agendum est de perfectione divina, secundo de eius bonitate.'

Quasi diceret quod, propter perfectionem, de bonitate tractandum est simul; quam in principio quaestionis septimae, ubi, aperiens quod de bono per accidens, id est ratione perfectionis, tractavit, dicit:

'Post considerationem perfectionis divinae, de infinitate,

7)

questions St. Thomas has been dealing with God, pure act, with His simplicity, and with His perfection.¹¹⁾ In the text in which we are interested here St. Thomas now makes an observation that can serve as a classical distinction between the bonum, the perfection of God, and the bonum, the perfection of creation.¹²⁾

The bonum of God, pure act, is not distinct from His essence, which is, in turn, His esse. However, in the case of creation, bonum is not something essential, but rather superadded to an essence that itself is composite.¹³⁾ Now this superadded bonum is bonum precisely because it has being; we say it has being because it is something, but not because it is something substantially other.¹⁴⁾ There is always a created substance in

etc., 'nulla facta mentione de bonitate, de qua fecerat duas quaestiones. Quare autem de bonitate sub tractatu de perfectione quaeratur, in promptu causa est in littera assignata:

'quia scilicet esse perfectum est ratio quod aliquid dicatur bonum.'" Cajetan, In I, 5, 1.

11) Questions 2, 3, and 4 respectively.

12) The limitations of the bonum of creation can be seen in the articles of q. 7 and in the texts that are quoted below.

13) "Bonitas rei creatae non est ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid superadditum; vel ipsum esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio superaddita, vel ordo ad finem."

I, 6, 3, 3m.

14) "Ipsa tamen bonitas sic superaddita dicitur bona sicut et ens: hoc autem ratione dicitur ens, quia ea est aliquid, non quia ipsa aliquo alio sit. Unde hac ratione dicitur bona, quia ea est aliquid bonum: non quia ipsa habeat aliquam aliam bonitatem, qua sit bona."

I, 6, 3, 3m.

8)

which this "bonum simpliciter, esse secundum quid" inheres. And this created substance is the subject of accidental act because there is a residue of potentialities existing as potencies even after it has been given "esse simpliciter" by the substantial form. All of this is contained in the text itself; let us examine it before saying more:

"Ad primum dicendum quod, licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habet ad potentiam; secundum primum discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid: non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu. Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile: et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem in quantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid."

"Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid, idest in quantum est ens: secundum vero ultimum actum, dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter. Sic ergo quod dicit Boetius, quod

'in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona, et aliud quod sunt,'

referendum est ad esse bonum et ad esse simpliciter: quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et tamen secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum: et secundum ultimum actum est quodammodo ens." I, 5, 1, 1m.

To sum up what has been said so far: Bonum, perfection, follows being. A created thing is perfect in so far as it has act. If a being is pure act it must then follow that it is all

9) perfect and all good.¹⁵⁾ Perfection is then part of its very essence, and there is no question of accidental perfection.¹⁶⁾

However, if a being is not pure act, but rather has limited act, it is perfect in so far as it has limited act.¹⁷⁾ And even its operations are purely accidental, not belonging to its essence, which is, in turn, dependent on the causality of the First Prime Mover and Final End. Moreover, the potencies that are the direct principles of operation are sluggish and undetermined; they stand in need of actualization. The background for our study has now been established, for it is the actualization of these potencies which concern us.

***** Man's Quest for Perfection. *****

One of the most evident things in the world is the universal desire of man to actualize the accidental potencies that are his subject principles of action or operation.¹⁸⁾ He simply

15) "Quia scilicet esse perfectum est ratio quod aliquid dicatur bonum." Cajetan, In I, 5, 1.

16) "Accidens comparatur ad subjectum sicut actus ad potentiam, cum sit quaedam forma ipsius, Unde cum Deus sit actus purus absque alicuius potentiae permixtione, non potest esse accidentia subjectum."

Quaestiones Disputatae, De Potentia, c.7, a.4.

cf. I, 5, 3c.

17) "Deus dicitur bonus essentialiter, quia est ipsa bonitas; creaturae autem dicuntur bonae per participationem, quia habent bonitatem: unumquodque enim in quantum est, bonum est, secundum illum Augustus in I De Doctrina Christiana quod

'in quantum sumus, boni sumus.'

Quaestiones Quodlibetales, II, q.2, a.1.

18) Bonum est quod omnia appetunt.

"Nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, in quantum est ens: esse enim est actualitas omnis rei, ut ex superioribus patet."

I, 5, 1.

thirsts for an increase of esse, of esse that must be accidental esse, "bonum simpliciter - esse secundum quid." For man can do nothing about his substantial esse, so he must turn to the actualization of his accidental potencies. Every human action has as an end the actualization of a potency, the actualization of some particular member of the second species of quality. The end of an intellectual agent is seldom synonymous with the end of the action taken directly, which is the formal end, the actualization of a potency. The end of an intellectual agent generally looks to a final end that is distinct from and reaches beyond the formal end. Hence, the final end induces and intellectual agent to act, and this action, in turn, formalizes the potency which stands as the material cause. And so it is that by his cognitive faculties man "becomes other things" and really receives an increase of being.¹⁹⁾ The cognitive potencies stand as matter, the qualitative perfections to which these potencies are open, capable of, stand as form. As the substantial form, the essential difference, determines matter, so the qualitative perfections actualize subject potencies and bring to them an increase of accidental being. By reason of its accidents a substantial being that is "esse simpliciter" but "bonum secundum quid" is capable of further perfections that will render it "bonum simpliciter".²⁰⁾ And since the accidents that ^{are} cognitive potencies stand as matter to further formal perfection, we can apply to them the words St. Thomas applies to the need of matter for form:

19) Cf. I, 14, 1; Summa Contra Gentiles I, 44; De Veritate q. 2, a. 1.
 20) "Omne subjectum accidentis comparatur ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum: eo quod accidens quaedam forma est faciens esse actu

"Omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et bonum per suam formam; unde oportet quod sit bonum per participationem, secundum quod materia participat formam."

I,3,2c.

The rational soul is the first act, the substantial determination of the essence of man; by it man stands in the perfection of a species, substantially complete in act.²¹⁾ However, by its nature the composite that is brought into being, when the essence, the limited capacity for existence,²²⁾ is actualized by the rational form, has proper accidents; these are potencies that are indetermined to further act, that is, to operation.²³⁾ It is by the perfection, the actualization of these potencies that a created and limited being reaches his "Bonum Simpliciter."

"Diximus autem supra (I,5,1) quod bonum est omne id quod est appetibile: et sic cum omnia natura appetat suum esse et suam perfectionem, necesse est dicere quod esse et perfectio cuiuscumque naturae rationem habeat bonitatis."

I,48,1c.

****Man and His Conflux Of Potencies****

Because of man's unique place in the hierarchy of being: because, as St. Thomas says,²⁴⁾ "the human race stands at the confines of corporeal substance, and is, as it were, a horizon between time and eternity," there is in him a conflux of potencies.

secundum esse accidentale." Summa Contra Gentiles I, 23.

"Omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et bonum per suam formam." I,3,2c.

21) I,75,5c.

22) "Essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse." De Ente et Essentia, c.1.

"Esse autem participatum finitur ad capacitatem participantis." I,75,5,4m.

23) "Anima, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid de potentialitate admixtum ut supra (I,75,5,4m.) dictum est. Et ideo potest esse subjectum accidentis."

I,77,1,6m.

Cf. I,77,1; I,7,2. Also, I,II,55,2; Aristotle, Metaph., 1046a 10.
24) Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 81.

The sensitive potencies of the animal meet the potencies of the spiritual, intellectual life.²⁵⁾ The potencies of two orders are within him, both crying for actualization and perfection of direction.²⁶⁾ Thus a situation is created in which a norm of order must rule.²⁷⁾ And how are these potencies to be directed, actualized, determined? How can unity and harmony be effected in the operations of a creature of such diverse and indetermined potencies?

Both of these questions are tantamount to asking how the potencies of man can be brought into a state of directed order and actualization. And the answer to the question "How are the potencies of man to be directed, actualized and determined?" is the most important and the key to the second. Man's potencies of the rational level, and the sensitive potencies thru their influence, are directed by disposition. This disposition is a qualitative form that predisposes the potencies in such a way that we say these potencies are "actualized": not in the sense that they are in direct act, but that they are in a "mean mode"

 25) In fact, in man the highest of the sense powers, the vis cogitativa (cf. I, 81, 3; I, 4, 4m; and John of St. Thomas, Phil. Nat. 4, 8, a. 1-2.) meets the lowest of the intellectual powers. (De Ente et Essentia, c. 5, (5); I, 79, 2. The point where the two join is "intellectus principiorum," the habitus of first principles:

"Et cum cognitio principiorum in nobis sit altissimum nostrae scientiae, patet, quod in supremo nostrae naturae attingimus quodammodo infimum naturae angelicae." De Ver. 8, 15.

26) "Homo est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrunt in ipso virtutes utrarumque creaturarum." I, 77, 2.

27) "Cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias ordinem esse." I, 77, 4.

of act. They are so ready to act that they are no longer wholly indetermined, and therefore, already somewhat in act.²⁸⁾

The purpose of the study is to see the role that habitus plays in the perfection of man; therefore, a few words on the nature of disposition, which stands in relation to habit as a genus to a species, are in order here.

--- Disposition ---

"Disposition means a sort of arrangement of that which has parts, either in regard to place, potency or form." Simplicius, Commentaria in Praedicamenta, c.8.

St. Thomas²⁹⁾ in citing this text of Simplicius explains that a disposition can arrange parts in three ways. The first type of arrangement is merely corporeal, and here we have the praedicament "situs." The second type of arrangement of parts is "secundum potentiam," and here disposition orders the direction of acts of a potency in an imperfect manner. (And it is the multiplicity of possible acts toward which potencies are ordered which serve as the parts which are ordered by disposition.)

The third type of disposition is generically the same as the second; both belong to the genus of quality. However, this third

28) "Actus, etsi non semper maneat in se, semper tamen manet in sua causa, quae est potentia et habitus." I, 79, 13, 3m.

29) "Dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius habentis partes; sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem Philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem, in quo, ut Simplicius dicit, comprehendit omnes dispositiones; corporales quidem in eo quod dicit secundum locum; et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco; quod autem dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientiae et virtus inchoata; quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et virtus complete."

I, II, 49, 1, 3m.

type orders its subject potency in regard to form, or as St. Thomas clarifies, to species. This differentiates it from the second (imperfect disposition) and sets it forth as a perfect disposition, as a habit.

And so it is that disposition, which is an ordering of parts, enters into operational potencies, for:

"It is clear that "parts" has a special meaning in this place, since we are here dealing with potencies, such as the possible intellect in the case of science, the will and sense appetites participating in reason in the case of the moral virtues, all of which are without physical parts. St. Thomas understands "parts" in reference to the multiplicity of acts toward which these potencies are naturally ordered, and a plurality of agencies which eventually occur in the determination of the subject toward the one specific end. Hence, these potencies have parts in the sense that they are not by nature determined to act in one way only, but act in a variety of ways. In this lies their essential freedom; they may be used well or badly, with varying degrees of expertness and accuracy." 30)

Regarding the distinction between habit and disposition more will be added very shortly. All that can be said of disposition can be said of habit, but habit has notes over and above those belonging to disposition.

Where is disposition found? We need not examine any of the potencies of the lower sense levels; for here the potencies are by their very nature determined to one operation, and no further determination of the faculty by way of disposition is necessary or even possible. 31)

30) Vernon J. Bourke, "The Role of Habitus In The Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," Essays In Thomism: New York, Sheed & Ward, 1942. 105.

31) "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod potentiae naturales sunt determinatae ex seipsas ad unum, et ideo non indigent aliquibus habitibus determinantibus; nec facit hoc dignitas, sed indignitas earum, in quantum pauciora se extendunt." In III Sent. d. 23, 1, 1m

Disposition is also impossible in the external senses, for by nature they have but one determined operation. Therefore, the only qualitative perfection possible to them is that "passio vel patibilis qualitas" which results as the termination of the praedicament "passio". 32)

Now we next advance into the realm of the internal senses, and we ask whether disposition and habit can be found on the purely sensitive level. The question is valuable for us in so far as it proposes a problem we must realize and understand. Any real treatment of the question, however, is out of the range of this paper, for we are expressly concerned with habitus and the part it plays in the perfection of man. Although man belongs to the genus animal, yet his sensitive powers lie at the command of his rational powers, and therefore are related to them as matter is to form. 33) It would be more precise to say the the act of the inferior power is as matter to the act of the superior power which moves it. And what is being said here is a sufficient answer to the second question proposed: "How can unity

32) "Vires autem apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus imperantibus motum ipsorum."

I, II, 50, 3, 3m.

Cf. I, II, 17, 9c.

33) "Quandocumque enim duo sunt principia moventia vel agentia ad invicem ordinata, id quod in effectu est ab agente superiori est sicut formale; quod vero est ab inferiori agente, est sicut materiale. Et hoc patet tam in naturalibus quam in moralibus."

De Veritate, q. 14, a. 5c.

"Impressio enim superioris agentis manet in inferiori, et ex hoc inferius agens non solum agit actione propria sed actione superioris agentis." De Ver., 22, 13c.

Cf. Aristotle, III De Anima, 434a.12-15; I, 77, 4; I, 77, 7.

and harmony be effected in the operations of a creature of so diverse potencies?"³⁴⁾ The dispositions and the habits that are manifested in the internal sense powers must be primarily attributed to the informing powers, and only secondarily attributed to the sense powers themselves.³⁵⁾

Therefore, since there is no question of examining a sensitive potency in man of an indetermined nature that is not under the control of the rational powers, the question of habitus being found in the purely sensitive realm does not directly concern us. ^{35b.)}

We now advance into the rational powers proper. The agent intellect cannot be the subject of any habitus, for:

"It is obvious that the agent intellect is wholly active in its original state; it requires, and can have, nothing added to it to bring it to the apex of its power. There is no question of the development of a habitus here because the agent intellect is metaphysically perfect in its original state." ³⁶⁾

However, this is scarcely the case with the possible intellect; the possible or passive intellect is totally indetermined; it

34) For direction to a complete solution cf. I,77,4c.

35) "Quia vires apprehensive interiorius praeparant intellectus possibile proprium objectum; ideo ex bona dispositione harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in intellectu possibili." I,II,50,4,3m.

cf. De Ver. q.22,a.13c.....(note #33 above.)

35b) "Tota enim natura corporalis subjacet animae, et comparatur ad ipsam sicut materia et instrumentum." I,78,1c; cf. note #33.

36) Vernon J. Bourke, op.cit., p.103.

is "Possible" to all being: 37)

"Intellectus habet operationem circa ens in universale. Est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua est scriptum, ut Philo-
sophus dicit in III De Anima (429, b. 29; 430, a. 2)".

... I, 79, 2c.

The possible intellect has as a spiritual cognitive power³⁸⁾ an inclination toward all being, all that is intelligible. It is that great power that penetrates the very barriers of being, con-
stricted only by the material cobwebs of its composite subject, by the limited range of sense perception necessary for the forma-
tion of the percept, by its ever constant demand upon the body for support. The intellect is a spiritual faculty, but its nexus
with the senses, the exterior thru the interior, is so intimate that without them it would remain a tabula rasa.³⁹⁾ And so man,
as a subject actuated by his proper form but limited in finite perfection by his matter, has by nature an immanent perfectibil-
ity in that he presents potencies capable of immanent acts to the external world. The potencies thus presented, which these objects
in the external world actuate in an unique union, a real unity of identity in the intentional order, enable the subject while retaining its own substantial perfection to perfect itself thru

37) "Inter perfectiones autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo omnia, habens in se omnium perfectionem." Summa Contra Gentiles I, c. 44.

Cf. De Veritate q. 2, a. 2; Aristotle, De Anima III, ch. 4 & 5.

38) "Hoc ipsum quod virtus intellectus extendit se quodammodo ad infinita, procedit ex hoc quod intellectus est forma non in materia." I, 7, 2, 2m.

39) A knower knows more or less just so far as he has powers com-
petent to receive forms. The more material its own powers are, or the more these powers depend upon material powers, the less of form it may receive; for immateriality is the root of all cognition, of formableness." cf. Cajetan, In I, 14, 1c.

The phantasm is the material cause of intellectual cognition; (I, 84, 6) without it we cannot know. (I, 84, 7). Intellectual cognition of MAN

This is a translation of "Intellectus habet operationem circa ens in universale" as "Intellectus habet operationem circa ens in universale" into
order of efficient causality. The possible intellect is the material cause of simple knowledge.

becoming other perfections by possessing them in a qualitative manner.⁴⁰⁾

And how does an intellectual subject possess, actually become these other perfections in a qualitative manner? There are two possibilities: either by the third or first species of quality, by a "passio vel patibilis qualitas", or by disposition and habit. The first way is impossible, but it serves as the means to the ~~the~~ second way, which is the way. More of this will be shown (of this) below.

St. Thomas makes it clear that the intelligible species, the form abstracted from its material condition by the agent intellect,⁴¹⁾ is present to the possibile intellect and actualizes or perfects it in one of the following three ways:

"Species intelligibilis aliquando est in intellectu in potentia tantum: et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia.

Aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus: et tunc intelligit in actu.

Aliquando medio modo habet se inter potentiam et actum: et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu. Et secundum hunc modum intellectus conservat species, quando actu non intelligit." I, 79, 6, 3m.

In the first instance, the possibile intellect is in a state of complete potentiality, complete indetermination. In the second instance the intelligible species is actually here and now informing the possible intellect. In this case, when the intellect is brought fully into act, it is possible for only one intelligible species to fully inform it at one given time.⁴²⁾ For

40) This point is developed in such significant and fruitful texts as: I, 14, 1; Summa Contra Gentiles I, 44; De Veritate 2, 1.

41) Cf. I, 79, 3.

42) "Intellectus quidem potest multa intelligere per modum unius, non autem multa per modum multorum: dico autem per modum unius

then the intellect is really that thing from which the intelligible species is derived, only in a different mode, the intentional mode. In the third instance the intellect retains the intelligible species, though not here and now being fully actualized by them.⁴³⁾ Then the intellect is actually in a mean mode of being; it does not lapse back into its prior state of potentiality, and is not in complete "act".

And how does a substance with intellectual cognoscitive powers possess and become these other perfections in a qualitative manner? As has been shown, a quality of the second species (a potency) is the recipient of a quality of the first species in so far as it has within itself the termination of an act, of an immanent act. Note that an intellectual potency is not said to be recipient of a "passio vel patibilis" quality at any time. The perfection that the third species of quality lends to its subject potency is a sensible perfection.⁴⁴⁾ The intellect is spiritual. Since "whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver", it is impossible that the possible intellect be actualized by the third species of quality. The immanent act we call the phantasm does belong to this species, and it serves as the matter from which the agent intellect abstracts. But after the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm we then have another immanent act. This

43) For a parallel text to this development cf. I, 79, 10.

44) "In tertia specie qualitatis non sunt nisi sensibiles passionēs vel sensibiles qualitates." III, 63, 2, 2m.

Cf. I, 77, 3; ~~Id~~ I, II, 49, 2.

42) cont. vel multorum, per unam vel plures species intelligibiles, etc." I, 85, 4. Cf. I, 86, 2.

immanent act is nothing other than the actualization of the possible intellect, and it is a disposition, either an imperfect or a perfect disposition. Therefore, in even an instance of momentary actualization there is in the possible intellect a disposition, an inchoative disposition that quickly perishes. The immanent act which the intellect possesses as a qualitative perfection always belongs to the first species of quality.⁴⁵⁾ The third species is proper only to the immanent acts of sense potencies.

45) The immanent acts of the intellect are the termini of intellectual cognition which exist in the mind as qualities of the mind. These immanent acts belong to the first species because they above all, as John of St. Thomas points out in a significant text:

....."scilicet convenienter DISPONERE NATURAM, in quantum cognoscens est, et sic pertinent ad primam speciem qualitatis, et haec ratio est in illis principalior, quia propria et per se; per accidentem vero actus immanentes alterationem habent. Denique, constituere tertiam speciem qualitatis per hoc, quod sit terminus operationis seu motus, videtur conditio valde accidentalis qualitati, imo non sufficiens, quia si dicatur, quod in tertia specie solum sunt qualitates terminantes motum alterationis, sequitur, quod lux in aere, quae sine alteratione fit, non sit in tertia specie qualitatis, quod communiter negatur. Si vero sunt in ea qualitates terminantes quemcumque motum, etiam instantaneum, sequitur, quod actus immanentes et conceptus, qui illis producuntur, et species intentionales erunt in tertia qualitatis, cum tamen communiter ponantur in prima.

Deinde dicimus, quod in hoc tertia specie ponuntur qualitates, quae per se primo terminant motum seu sunt qualitates subjecti ut alterati, etiam alteratione instantanea seu mutatione, qualis est illuminatio in aere (lux). Quis, quod sit terminus alterationis non esse extraneum a qualitate. Cum enim detur per se motus ad qualitatem, scilicet alteratio, ut dicitur in 5 Phys., c.2 (226 a.26), oportet quod aliquae qualitates per se sunt qualitates subjecti ut moti et alterati.Nec tamen propterea actus immanentes vel conceptus erunt in tertia specie sicut lux, quia non habent immutare subjectum seu esse termini alterationis, (quae solum proprie invenitur in corporalibus), sed habent aliam priorem et principalior considerationem, scilicet convenienter disponere naturam, in quantum cognoscens est, et sic pertinent ad primam speciem qualitatis." Ars Logica II, 18, 2.

In contrast to an instance of actualization of such a nature that the possible intellect falls back into potentiality there are instances of actualization that so "conquer" the passivity of the possible intellect, either by their force or by force combined with repeated acts,⁴⁶⁾ that there endures a certain actualization of the passive intellect. It does not lapse back into its prior passivity as regards to ~~this~~ particular act. The use of the word "force" here leads to an extremely basic and fruitful consideration, for it implies the marvelous aptitude of the intellect to apprehend ~~first~~ truths and then to use them as the basis for the construction of a body of sure and certain knowledge, of science. When knowledge is built upon the solid foundation of first principles it acquires an amazing force, for then it is of the character of a true habitus. Such knowledge based upon absolute and unchanging principles gives the intellect stability and insight, an insight that will lead to the consideration of reality in its highest cause, to the habitus of wisdom. But this point, although it would be an excellent way of showing the part habitus plays in the perfection of man, would require a special development. For it would necessitate a study of the habitus of first principles, of the hierarchy of the sciences, in short, of St. Thomas' most fertile and thorough developments on the potency of the intellect of man to re-produce and capture the order of reality. Not only would A Thorough knowledge of many parts of the Summa ⁴⁷⁾ be required, but the totality of the Commentary on The Posterior Analytics, the Commentary on the De Trinitate or

46) Cf. I, II, 51, 3; 51, 2. 47) E.g. I, 58, 3; 79, 8 & 9; I, II, 51, 2.

48)

Boethius, and quite a few sections from De Veritate would have to be mastered. However, this paper only furnishes the groundwork for such considerations; we are more intent on presenting a general notion of what this habitus formation that plays such a prominent role in the perfection of man is and does.

Now to return to the train of development: When the actualization of the possible intellect is of such a force that it does more completely conquer that faculties' vast indetermination, then the possible intellect remains in a state of partial actualization; a state of being that amounts to a unique "mean mode" of being such as Aristotle describes in these words: 49)

/ "Once the mind has become each set of its possible objects, as a man of science has, when this phrase is used of one who is actually a man of science (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind too is then able to think itself." De Anima III, 429b 5-10.

Now as the potency is more free, more universal in object, there is greater possibility and need of the metaphysical perfections of disposition and habit. Hence it is that the most "universal of potencies," the possible intellect, "which is potential to all being," and its appetite, the will, stand as the

48) E.g. De Ver. 15,1c; q.11 (De Magistro); q.8,a.15; q.15,1; q.16,a.1.

49) "Dicitur autem intellectus possibilis fieri singula, secundum quod recipit species singulorum. Ex hoc ergo quod recipit species intelligibilium, habet quod possit operari cum voluerit, non autem quod semper operetur: quia et tunc est quodammodo in potentia, licet aliter quam ante intelligere; eo scilicet modo quo sciens in habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu."

I, 79, 6c.

50) "Inter perfectiones autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo omnia, (III De

chief subjects in need of disposition and habituation. Nothing better than St. Thomas' own analysis of this situation could be given: 51)

"Potentiae vero altiores et universaliores, cuiusmodi sunt potentiae rationales, non sunt limitate ad aliquid unum vel objectum vel modum operandi: quia secundum diversa et diversimode rectitudinem habere possunt: et ideo ex natura potentiae non potuerunt determinari ad rectum et bonum ipsarum; sed oportet quod rectificentur, rectitudinem a sua regula recipientes. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, ut recipiatur per modum passionis, sicut in hoc ipso quod regulata potentia a regulante movetur. Sed quia in hoc quod aliquid patitur et nihil ad actum conferat, violentiae definitio consistit, ut patet in III Ethic., c. 11, violentia autem et difficultatem et tristitiam habet, ut dicitur in V Metaph., text. 6; ideo praedicta receptio rectitudinis non sufficit ad perfectam rectificationem potentiae regulatae. Oportet ergo ut alio modo recipiatur, scilicet per modum qualitatis inhaerentis, ut rectitudo regulae efficiatur forma potentiae regulatae: sic enim faciliter et delectabiliter quod rectum est, operabitur sicut id quod est conveniens suae formae: et haec quidem qualitas, sive forma, dum adhuc est imperfecta, dispositio dicitur; cum autem iam consummata est, et quasi in naturam versa, habitus nominatur." In III Sent. 6. 23, 1, 1c.

To meet a situation described at the very outset, a difficult step must now be taken. Our purpose is to gain a general view of the habitual perfection of man: to approach a basic view and understanding of habitual perfections. The vastness of the subject is seen in the Summa. All sure and certain knowledge from the habitus of first principles to all the scientific knowledge

50) cont.) Anima 8, 1, 431b.), habens in se omnium perfectionem." Summa Contra Gentiles I, c. 44.

51) On the necessity of habitus:

"Dicendum quod omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad agendum indiget habitu quo bene disponatur ad suum actum." I, II, 50, 5.

Cajetan, In I, II, 50, 5. "Nam in intellectu est necessitas simpliciter: quoniam nisi determinetur aliqua specie intelligibile, nihil intelligere potest. In voluntate vero est necessitas ad bene

founded upon this "seed"⁵²⁾ of all science is habitual perfection. The three wisdoms are habits.⁵³⁾ Art and virtue are habits.⁵⁴⁾ In fact, the treatment of habitus in the Summa amounts to a careful examination of the higher potencies of man, their acts and their perfections, which is the same as saying their habituation. Further, ST. Thomas does not only examine the natural potencies and their habitual perfections, but he also penetrates into the supernatural qualitative perfections possible to man; perfections that introduce man to a new nature and a new life.

With the matter now covered serving as a background, let us try to glean out a few of the basic, universal traits of the nature of this unique mean mode of being. This aim can be realized to some degree, at least, by the following three steps: First, an examination of the distinction between habit and disposition. Second, an examination of the conditions which St. Thomas posits as necessary for habitus formation on the rational plane.⁵⁵⁾ Third, an examination of a habit's own capability for perfection and further clarification on how the perfection of a habit itself redounds to the perfection of its subject.

esse: quoniam nullum est bonum infra naturale objectum voluntatis, quod voluntas non possit velle, licet non ita prompte, absque quacumque qualitate superaddita."/

52) "In natura humana, in quantum attingit angelicam, oportet esse cognitionem veritatis sine inquisitione et in speculativis et in practicis. (Habitus principiorum et Synderisis respective) Et hanc quidem cognitionem oportet esse principium totius cognitionis sequentis, sive speculativae sive practicae, cum principia oporteat esse stabiliora et certiora." De Veritate, 16, 1.

53) Metaphysics is the sole natural wisdom, the wisdoms of Theol. and grace are analogical habits.

54) Cf. I, II, 57, 3. and, I, II, 55, 1.

55) Supposing the existence of proportionate habits. cf. below.

** The distinction between
Habit and Disposition **

The distinction between habit and disposition has undergone a beating at the hands of a typically modern disregard for the univocity of terms. It is necessary to remember that when Aristotle or St. Thomas used a term, they had in mind one definite meaning for that term, unless a relaxation of the general rule of univocity had been previously pointed out. The confusion over the possibility of habitus formation in sense potencies without any rational influence has been a result of this failure to recognize just what the Philosopher and The Angelic Doctor mean when they speak of habit and disposition; a failure to recognize clearly the nature of the relaxation of strict univocity which both St. Thomas and Aristotle allowed here.

Yet, it is upon this distinction between habit and disposition that St. Thomas built his doctrine on the nature of habitus, for it is by this final difference that habit is essentially constituted in itself and set apart from all else.⁵⁶⁾ As for the discussion that has centered on the question whether St. Thomas did actually change his opinion on the nature of the distinction between habit and disposition from the time he first treated it in his commentary on The Sentences till his final decision in the Prima Secundae about fifteen years later, the reader is referred to a complete covering of the disputed texts by P. Jac.-M. Ramirez, O.P., in the Studia Anselmiana.⁵⁷⁾ Reference can also be made to a

⁵⁶⁾ "Differentia specifica ultima est nobilissima, inquantum est maxime determinata, per modum quo actus est nobilior potentia." I, 75, 7, 2m.

previous paper touching these disputed texts, with special reference to⁵⁸⁾ the positions taken by Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.

St. Thomas' clear-cut distinction between habit and disposition entails an understanding of two terms, "modus habitus", and "essentiam habitus." This terminology was introduced by Cajetan and John of St. Thomas to correct misunderstandings that had arisen concerning the essential difference between the two members of the first species of quality. To grasp the implication of these two terms it will be best to ask the question "Can a disposition become a habit?" - and then proceed to follow Cajetan's solution. It may be pointed out beforehand that the crux of the matter is reached when Cajetan distinguishes the two ways in which "facile" and "difficile" mobile can be taken: from the angle of the disposition or habit itself (essentia habitus), or from the angle of the relation obtaining between the habit and its subject (modus habitus). The entire section of the text which answers this question is given in the note below.⁵⁹⁾

The point Cajetan establishes here is that "difficile mobile" and "facile mobile" are specific differences distinguishing habit and disposition only when these two differences per-

57) P. Jac.-M. Ramirez, O.P., "Doctrina Sancti Thomae Aquinatis De Distinctione Inter Habitum et Dispositionem," Studia Anselmiana; fasciculus 7&8, (1938) 120-142.

58) "Habitus and Dispositio, The First Species of Quality," p. 20-33. This paper seeks to uphold the theory that St. Thomas never changed his doctrine concerning the essential difference between the two members of the first species of quality.

59) "Ad hoc dubium dupliciter respondetur: Primo, secundum Boetium et Albertum, quod habitus et dispositio differunt sicut

perfectum et imperfectum IN EADEM SPECIE, ut Sortes puer et ipsi vir, ideo conjunctione copulativa junxit haec nomina Aristoteles dicens: 'habitus et dispositio', quia eandem rem important. Duplici autem vocabulo eam significavit ad insinuandum duplicem modum essendi illius, scilicet perfecte et imperfecte.

Secundo respondetur secundum S. Thomam (I, II, 49, 2, 3m) quod habitus et dispositio sunt diversae species, nec obstat Aristotelem dixisse unam esse speciem quia hoc dixit ad insinuandum genus proximum habitus et dispositionis non esse qualitatem, sed quoddam subalternum vocatum ab antiquis 'applicatio,' quae una species subalterna est, in qua uniuntur habitus et dispositio. Nec etiam impedit propositum quod facile aut difficile moveri ad passionis genus pertineat, quum ad circumloquendum proprias rerum differentias nobis ignotas oportet accidentalibus proprietatibus uti: et hoc hic observatum est.

Ad claram autem notitiam sententiae S. Thomae nosse oportet quod alicui potest esse facile et difficile mobile per se seu ex ratione speciei, quod ex natura sua vindicat sibi causas difficile variationem compatientes, ut scientia cuius causae sunt lumen intellectus agentis et intellectus passibilis, et praemissae quae se aliter habere non possunt.

Et similiter illud dicitur esse facile mobile per se seu ex ratione speciei, quo ex natura sua vindicat sibi causas facile transmutabiles, ut sanitas quae causatur ex calido et frigido, quae propter alterationes continuas facile transmutantur.

Illud autem dicitur esse facile vel difficile mobile per accidens seu ex conditione individui, cui ex eo quod est in hoc subjecto sic disposito, ut scientia, quae ex se difficile mobilis est, per accidens tamen ex eo quod est in hoc male disposito, facile mobilis est.

Illae ergo qualitates quae difficile mobiles sunt EX RATIONE SPECIEI HABITUS SUNT:

Illae autem quae ex ratione suae speciei facile mobiles sunt, dispositiones sunt, ita quod habitus et dispositio distinguuntur specificiter per differentias circumlocutas, per difficile mobile et facile mobile ex ratione speciei.

(Cajetan then proceeds to show that Aristotle actually does uphold the essential difference, and not otherwise.)

"Consentantus autem Aristoteli magis sensus iste ostenditur ex tribus: PRIMO, ex eo quod exemplariter declarans habitus et dispositiones; inter habitus non nisi ea quae per se permanentia sunt numeravit, scilicet scientias et virtutes, et inter dispositiones similiter ea tamen quae facile transmutantur, ut calidum et frigidum, sanitatem et infirmitatem. SECUNDO, ex quod dicit scientiam etiam mediocriter sumptam esse habitu quod constaret esse falsam quum scientia imperfecta dispositio esset non habitus, si dispositio non differret specificiter ab habitu. TERTIO, quum in particula sequenti expresse inducit communem modum loquendi ad probandum quod ea quae per se diuturna sunt, sunt

tain to the essence, the "modi essendi," of the disposition or habit. In this event they enter into the definition of the quality: "difficile mobile" into the definition of a habit, "facile mobile" into the definition of a disposition. If these two differences do not pertain to the essence of the quality, but rather to the relation of the quality with its subject, that is, if the cause of "sticking" is due not to the nature of the quality itself, but to the relation existing between it and the subject, then this "difficile mobile" or "facile mobile" is not an essential difference, but merely an accidental consideration. For then this "difficile mobile" or "facile mobile" is not of the species of the habit, but of the relation that exists between the habit and its subject. And, putting aside this accidental consideration, there remains a "difficile or facile mobile" that enters into the definition of the quality and determines it to either disposition or habit. Now a disposition can take on the "difficile mobile" characteristic of a habit in the accidental sense. However, in the first and essential sense a disposition can never grow into a habit, for there is an essential difference, a specific difference between the two.⁶⁰⁾ One thing is not another, and it cannot become another

without an essential change. A disposition is a disposition, and

 habitus; quae autem per se cito transmutabilia sunt, dispositiones sunt." Cajetan, Commentaria in Praedicamenta, caput "De Qualitate." p.150

60) John of St. Thomas comments on this entire development of Cajetan in his Ars Logica II, 18, 3.

a habit is a habit, although it may have the accidental characteristics of a disposition. This distinction is one of basic importance for the theologian and confessor.

St. Thomas has settled the question once and for all in his "classical" text on the essential difference between habit and disposition in the Summa. We will simply present an outline of this basic text: it can well serve us as a final authority.

"Ad tertium dicendum quod ista differentia difficile mobile non diversificat habitum ab aliis speciebus qualitatis, sed a dispositione.

Dispositio autem dupliciter accipitur:

- I) uno modo, secundum quod est genus habitus, nam in 5 Metaph., dispositio ponitur in definitione habitus.
- II) alio modo, secundum quod est aliquid contra habitum divisum: et potest intelligi dispositio proprie dicta condividi contra habitum dupliciter:

A) uno modo, sicut perfectum et imperfectum in eadem specie, ut scilicet dispositio dicatur retinens nomen commune, quando imperfecte inest, ita quod de facili amittatur; habitus autem, quando perfecte inest, ut non de facili amittatur; et sic dispositio fit habitus, sicut puer fit vir.

(Thus an accidentally perfect disposition is called, not is, a habit - while an accidentally imperfect habit is called, not is, a disposition.)

B) alio modo possunt distingui, sicut diversae species unius generis subalterni, ut dicantur:

- 1) DISPOSITIONES illae qualitates primae speciei quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem ut de facili amittantur, quia habent causas transmutabiles, ut aegritudo et sanitas;
- 2) HABITUS vero dicantur illae qualitates quae secundum suam rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur, quia habent causas immobiles, sicut scientiae et virtutes; et secundum hoc dispositio non fit habitus. ET HOC VIDETUR MAGIS CONSONUM INTENTIONI ARISTOTELIS.

Unde ad huius distinctionis probationem, inducit communem loquendi consuetudinem, secundum quam qualitates quae secundum rationem suam sunt facile mobiles, si ex aliquo difficile mobiles reddantur, habitus dicuntur.

Et e converso est de qualitatibus quae secundum suam rationem sunt difficile mobiles: nam si aliquis imperfecte habeat scientiam, ut de facili possit ipsam amittere, magis

dicatur disponi ad scientiam quam scientiam habere."

I,II,49,3m.

And so it is that St. Thomas, after most carefully explaining the terminology of Aristotle, uses it without any fears of being misunderstood and accused of denying the essential difference between habit and disposition. Following we have a text of a later date than I,II,49 in which St. Thomas speaks of a quality which is imperfect in the species of habit as disposition. And when this quality, though always essentially a habit, takes on the accidental mode of "difficile mobile", then St. Thomas calls it not a disposition, but a habit.

"Dispositio, quae fit habitus, est sicut imperfectum in EADEM SPECIEI, (id est, in speciei habitus), sicut imperfecta scientia, dum perfecitur, fit habitus. Sed veniale peccatum est dispositio alterius generis, sicut accidens ad formam substantialem, in quam numquam mutatur." I,II,88,4,4m.

**** The Conditions For
Habit Formation ****

Any consideration of the conditions necessary for habitus formation must be made with the essential difference between habit and disposition in mind. When St. Thomas sets down four definite prerequisites for habitus formation⁶¹⁾ he is not speaking of the accidental "modus habitus", the accidental influences that give a dispositive quality a permanent nature, but he is speaking of the "essentia habitus", the permanency that is part of the essence of the dispositive quality itself.

Three of the conditions necessary for habitus formation are

61) Cf. I,II,49,4. - and the texts that are cited below.

found in I,II,49,4. And for habitus formation proportionate to rational faculties⁶²⁾ St. Thomas adds a fourth condition, voluntary control. These conditions deal with the potencies that are mediate subjects of any habitual action,⁶³⁾ and before examining the four conditions it would be well to briefly reconsider why the substance of man, or of any creature, cannot act "per se" but stands in need of potencies in order to operate. This point has been developed in the first part of our study, but it is a basic and simple point that can be stressed and linked up more closely with the second species of quality here.

Operation or second act belongs properly to an operative power: just as esse is the actuality of essence. Only in the case of a Being Who is pure act can there be operations that stem immediately from the essence. As St. Thomas says:⁶⁴⁾

"Actio enim est proprie actualitas virtutis; sicut esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae;
Impossibile est autem quod aliquid quod non est purus actus, sed aliquid habet de potentia admixtum, sit sua actualitas: quia actualitas potentialitati repugnat. Solus autem Deus est actus purus. Unde in solo Deo sua substantia est suum esse et suum agere." I,54,1.

****The Four Conditions****

The first condition is that the potency, which is disposed, be distinct from that to which it is disposed; that the potency stands as matter to the disposition, which plays the part of a determining form.⁶⁵⁾ The second is that the potency be free enough

62) The mention of "proportionate" habits always calls forth the question: "Can any habit formation be found in the infra-rational sphere. The pro and con views and supporting texts are given in a previous paper entitled "Habitus in Irrational Animals?"

63) "Et nomine potentiae intelligimus illud principium proximum operandi: Potentia autem est simpliciter principium operandi vel

to be determined. In other words, that the potency be by nature determinable to diverse objects and diverse modes of action.⁶⁶⁾ There is no room for any disposition in a potency that is related to one exclusive act: the potency of sight or hearing, for example. Such a mediate subject of operation (It is a mediate subject since it is the means by which its substantial subject operates) has by its nature a necessary, a dictated, an unfree mode of determination.

The third condition is that many things in different ways and by different means play a part in disposing the potency to one of the diverse types of acts in its range -- so that we can then speak of the potency as being well or ill disposed.⁶⁷⁾

patiendi." John of St. Thomas, Ars Logica, II, 18, 2.

"Potentia animae nihil aliud sit quam proximam principium operationis animae." I, 78, 4.

64) Cf. I, 3, 4; I, 3, 6&7; I, 77, 1; I, 54, 3.

65) "Primo quidem, ut id quod disponitur, sit alterum ab eo ad quod disponitur; et sic se habeat ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum." I, II, 49, 4.

66) "Secundo requiritur quod id quod est in potentia ad alterum, possit pluribus modis determinari, et ad diversa. Unde si aliquid sit in potentia ad alterum, ita tamen quod non sit in potentia nisi ad ipsum, ibi dispositio et habitus locum non habet: quia tale subjectum ex sua natura habet debitam habitudinem ad talem actum." I, II, 49, 4.

67) "Tertio requiritur quod plura concurrant ad disponendum subjectum ad unum eorum ad quae(quae) est in potentia, quae diversis modis commensurari possunt, ut sic disponatur bene vel male ad formam vel ad operationem." I, II, 49, 4.

It seems that according to these first three conditions real disposition and even habit, in the essential sense of the term, can be found in the pure sensitive realm. But the disposition and habit fashioned by these first three conditions are in proportion to the level of their subject potencies,⁶⁸⁾ and no specific mention has thus far been made in Question 49 to rational potencies. Therefore, as was stated in the study referred to,⁶⁹⁾ it seems that St. Thomas does allow for real disposition and habit (real, but proportionate) in the infra-rational sphere: and, any examination of sensitive memory in animals seems to demand such a conclusion.⁷⁰⁾

The fourth condition of rational control is not brought up for treatment by St. Thomas until he begins the examination of the habituation of rational potencies.⁷¹⁾ Hence, the condition of voluntary control supports the idea of proportionate habit, rather than detracting from it. Certainly such a notion is well within the order of reality - for then the "super habits" of the supernatural realm would have analogous counterparts in the infra-rational realm, with the natural habits of the rational powers standing in the center. Besides, it would be hard to get around such texts as cited in note 68 even if we were "leary" of a proportionate habit theory.

68) Some texts where St. Thomas expressly mentions proportionate habits: "Praeterea, habitus sunt proportionati potentiis, sicut perfectiones perfectibilibus." I, 82, 3, 3m.
 "Quia potentia materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est utrobique." I, II, 50, 6c.

69) Cf. note 62. (70) Note such texts as: "In De Mem. et Rem., lect. 1; lect. 3; lect. 4; In I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, 5m." (71) Cf. Titulum of I, II, 49.

It should be realized that St. Thomas in the whole of I, II, 49 is concerned with habit in general, with the essence of habit itself. So there is actually no reason for bringing up the question of proportionate habitus in question 49; this problem finds its place in question 50, in the discussion of the subject potencies. So it is that the question of the possible proportions of habitus is answered in question 50, and that the specific difference of THE Habitus proportionate to the rational potencies is brought out in the articles of question 50.

Incidentally, this consideration of the possibility of a proportionate habitus seems to be generally neglected. An example of this neglect is furnished by Vernon J. Bourke in several of his articles on habitus. Mr. Bourke apparently considers all four conditions necessary for any habitus formation,⁷²⁾ whereas St. Thomas does not apply the condition of voluntary control except to habitus formations proportionate to rational potencies.

St. Thomas formulates the fourth condition, the final and specific condition for The habitus proportionate to man and in

72) "Properly speaking only the intellective potencies of the human soul, or the potencies participating in the life of reason, such as the sense appetites and some of the internal senses, can be perfected by a super-added quality of the nature of habitus."

Vernon J. Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in The Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act," Essays In Thomism, p. 109 (for further information see note 30).

"....There must be something free and elastic about the potency, which will develop into the state called habitus. Below the level of the human soul we do not find potencies of this sort."

Vernon J. Bourke, "St. Thomas and The Transfer of Intellectual Skills," Modern Schoolman, May, 1941, p. 71.

which the supernatural virtues and grace find their analogous community, in the following texts:

"Deficit tamen ratio habitus quantum ad usum voluntatis, quia non habent dominium utendi vel non utendi: quod videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere." I, II, 50, 3, 2m.

"Vero usus habitum in voluntate hominis consistit, ut ex supradictis patet." I, II, 52, 3.

"Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus apparet quod habet quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit." I, II, 50, 5.

("Ut enim Commentator dicit, in III De Anima, habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit. Sed actiones corporales non subjacent voluntati: cum sint naturales. Ergo in corpore non potest esse aliquis habitus." I, II, 50, 1, obj. 1)

.....

"Ad primam ergo dicendum quod objectio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod est dispositio ad operationem, et de actibus corporis qui sunt a natura: non autem de his qui sunt ab anima, quorum principium est voluntas." I, II, 50, 1, 1m.

And so it is that only free and indetermined potencies of the nature of rational potencies, which participate in such a degree of indetermined action because the intellect is possible to all things and the will has freedom of choice, can be the subject of the habitus that is proportionate to intellectual beings.⁷⁴⁾

73) And in creation that which is complex, such as the intellect which can become all things, is better than that which is simple, a dot, for example. Cf. I, 3, 3, 2m.

74) "In articulo 1, 2, 3 quaestionis 50, circa subjectum habitum, advertendum est quod, quia habitus finis est habitationis, et habituari assuescere quoddam est; ideo ubi non invenitur consuetudine, aut aliquid maius, ibi non invenitur proprie habitus.Propter quod, existentibus duobus principiis, scilicet natura et voluntate, ubi est pure natura, nihil est habitu proprie; si enim infinites lapis proiciatur sursum, non habitabitur ad motum sursum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ubi autem est ipsa voluntas, ibi est perfecte habitus." Cajetan, IN I, II, 50, 4.

"Habitus sumitur dupliciter. Uno modo, proprie. Et sic non videtur extra animam rationalem inveniri. Alio modo, communiter

Having examined something of the nature of the distinction between habit and disposition, and the four conditions for the habitus formation proportionate to man, we will next consider how the perfection of a habit itself redounds to the perfection of its mediate subject (the potency) and its remote subject, the substantial being that stands as the subject of the potency.

As it was pointed out in the beginning, the accidental potencies of a substantial being are sure signposts of that being's limitation; it is simply not bonum simpliciter, and it is not because of the residue of potency reflected by its indetermined powers. The highest of these powers are those which are most indetermined, the intellect and the will; in man at least all of the higher sensitive powers are at the beckon and call of these two powers. The determination, the specification of the intellect and will is accomplished at the time of the momentary predicamental passio. This actualization may persist only as long as the potency is brought into direct act by the impingement of the species impressa, or, as in the case of the will, the presence of an intelligible good persists. Then the potency lapses back into its prior indetermined state. Such an actio - passio combination that does not "conquer"⁷⁵⁾ the passivity of the possible intellect or the will to any great extent calls forth a weak and passing immanent action, which has existence as -----
pro habituali dispositione, sive ad naturam sive ad opus, in pluribus consistente; ut in littera hoc dicitur." Cajetan,
IN I, II, 49, 4.
75) Cf. above, p.19-20-21-22 and notes found there.

a very imperfect and transitory disposition.⁷⁶⁾ However, this actualization may be more effective, and then the resulting immanent action exists and continues to exist as a real disposition or habit: the faculty then does not lapse back into its prior state of indetermination. And how is the actualization made more effective?⁷⁷⁾ By close contact with first principles and by demonstration from these first principles.

In the realm of habitual perfections true science, the product of demonstration finds its place. In fact, the very seed of scientific knowledge, the habit of first principles is a natural habit of the speculative intellect, and the habit of synderesis fulfills the same function in the practical intellect.⁷⁸⁾

"Prima autem principia speculabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad aliquam specialem potentiam; sed ad quendam specialem habitum, qui dicitur intellectus principiorum, ut patet in VI Ethic. Unde et principia operabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad specialem potentiam; sed ad specialem habitum naturalem, quem dicimus synderesim. Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum, et murmurare de male, inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et judicamus inventa."

I, 72, 12.

76) Cf. p. 120 and note 45 above. other texts on immanent actions: I, 54, 2c.; I, 27, 5c.; I, 14, 2c.; I, 23, 2, 2m; I, 56, 1c.

"Duplex est actio: una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare; alia, quae manet in agente, ut ~~scilicet~~ ~~facere et~~ intelligere, sentire et velle. Quarum haec est differentia: quia prima actio non est perfectio agentis ~~mod~~ movet, sed ipsius motus; secunda autem actio est perfectio agentis."

I, 18, 3, 1m.

77) Cf. p. 21 and development there. Also, Contra Gentiles III, c. 65. (middle)

78) The habit of first principles is not a science: scientific knowledge results from demonstration, and demonstration has its sure contact with reality by looking to the "intellectus principiorum." Here there is something of the infused knowledge of the angel in man. The "intelligere" of man at its highest point touches upon the "intelligere" of the angels. De Ver. 8, 15; 15, 1; 16, 1. Cf. B. Endres, O.P. "First Principles," Reality, v. 1, n. 2 (Spring 1951).

And all virtue also finds its place in the realm of habitual perfections.⁷⁹⁾

It stands to reason that the perfection of the particular habitus would redound to the further perfection of the potency and thereby indirectly increase the measure of the substantial subject's participation in esse secundum quid and bonum simpliciter.⁸⁰⁾ We will now give some consideration to this point.

Habitus Augmentation

And how is the individual habitus formation open to perfection and augmentation? St. Thomas' answer to this question calls to mind what has already been said about the "essentiam habitus" and "modum habitus" in the discussion of the essential difference between habitus and disposition. St. Thomas clarifies that the perfection of a form can be considered in two ways: one, according to the essence of the form itself; the second, on the part of the subject's degree of participation in the form.⁸¹⁾

In the first way, the essence of the habit is augmented: there can be an intrinsic growth⁸²⁾ in the habit when it is "fed" by

79) "Similiter etiam in voluntate quantum ad illa ad quae natura non determinatur, et in irascibilibus et in concupiscibilibus, indigemus habitibus, secundum quod participant rectitudinem rationis, quae est eorum regula." IN III Sent. d.23,1,lc.

80) "Et sic habitus dicitur dari non ad agendum simpliciter, sed tale modo, scilicet convenienter vel inconvenienter, quia, licet influat in substantiam actus, non tamen sicut principium primum operandi, quod est potentia, sed ut praesupponens potentiam et illam convenienter disponens."

John of St. Thomas, Ars Logica II,18,3. cf. De Ver.20,2.

81) "Perfectio autem formae dupliciter potest considerari, secundum quod subjectum participat formam; alio modo, secundum ipsum formam.Alia est consideratio eius (forma) secundum rationem speciei suae, et alia secundum quod participatur in subjecto." I,II,52,1.

82) "Dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et dispositionibus considerari; uno modo, secundum se: prout dicitur

real, volitional study⁸³⁾ and by recourse to first principles and demonstration.

The second condition for the intrinsic growth of a habitus hinges upon the ability of the subject to receive and support the habitus. From this angle a particularly keen intellect might receive what is essentially only a disposition according to the firm and stable accidental mode that is characteristic of a real habitus. That is, the disposition would be "difficile mobile" according to its relation to a subject, but of its own nature be "facile mobile." While, on the other hand, an intellect which is hampered by recalcitrant sense powers might receive what is essentially a "high-powered" habitus in the less stable accidental mode characteristic of a disposition.⁸⁴⁾

To sum up, the "modum, aut status accidentalis" of habitus can be perfected so as to become more and more fully conformed to the accidental state of stability proper to habitus. Yet, this same habitus can also be the subject of an intrinsic growth - in so far as it receives fuller confirmation in the species⁸⁵⁾ of habit, in so far as its essence as a habitus is more fully realized in

maior vel minor sanitas, vel maior vel minor scientia, quae plura vel pauciora se extendit." I, II, 52, 1.

"Similiter etiam et scientia potest augeri secundum seipsam per additionem: sicut cum aliquis plures conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus eiusdem scientia secundum speciem." I, II, 52, 2.

⁸³⁾ Real study implies a certain proper intensity of action, since a habitus is perfected by more perfect acts:

"Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius." I, II, 52, 3; (cf 53, 1.)

... "Intense" is not to be taken in the sense of "feverish," but of "calm," and "serious:" with reference to the virtue St. Thomas has termed "studiositas." Cf. Victor White, O.P., HOW TO STUDY, a commentary on St. Thomas' De Modo Studendi, Blackfriars, London, 1951. p.19-20.

an actual way. The one and the same perfecting process and at the same time both accidentally perfect the supposite, that is, perfect the supposit⁹ indirectly by directly perfecting one of its potencies ⁸⁷⁾ and intrinsically and essentially perfect the habitus itself. Yet, as has been pointed out in reference to the distinction between habit and disposition, a disposition "proprie dicta"

84) "Intensio et remissio in habitibus et dispositionibus potest considerari alio modo, secundum participationem subjecti: prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine." I, II, 52, 1.

"Augetur nihilominus scientia in aliquo secundum participationem subjecti, per intensionem prout scilicet expeditius et cāarius unum homo se habet alio in eisdem conclusionibus considerandis." I, II, 52, 2.

85) "Similiter etiam et scientia potest augerē secundum seipsam per additionem: sicut cum aliquis plures conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus eiusdem scientia secundum speciem." I, II, 52, 2.

86) This manner of speaking of a growth within a species may seem strange: it must be remembered that we are not speaking here of a substantial difference effecting a species, but rather of a species established by an accidental difference. For a complete development of the point see I, II, 52, 1.

....."Si igitur aliqua forma, vel quaecumque res, secundum se ipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, sortiatur rationem speciei, necesse est quod, secundum se considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Illa autem quae recipiunt speciem ex aliquo ad quod ordinantur, possunt secundum se ipsa diversificari in plus vel in minus, et nihilominus sunt eadem specie, propter unitatem eius ad quod ordinantur ex quo recipiunt speciem." I, II, 52, 1.

Cf. continuation of text.

87) The following text which summarizes the need for habitus brings out the point:

"Sed intellectus possibilis qui de se est indeterminatus sicut materia prima, habitu indiget quo participet rectitudinem suae regulae: et naturali, quantum ad ea quae ex naturali lumine intellectus agentis, qui est eius regula, statim determinantur, sicut sunt principia prima; et acquisito, quantum ad ea quae ex his principiis educi possunt; et infuso, quo participat rectitudinem primae regulae in his quae intellectum agentem excedunt."

In III Sent. d. 23, 1, 1c.

Cf. I, 18, 2, 2m. & cf. note 67. cf. Ars Logica, II, 18, 3... quoted on p. 41.

cannot grow into habitus "propria dicta," for one species, even though it be accidental, simply cannot grow into another. As color does not become figure, so disposition does not become habit, although it may take on those accidental characteristics of habit.⁸⁸⁾

****THE SUPERNATURAL HABITS****

This sketchy examination of the perfection of man now arrives at the summit of habitual perfection, and therefore, at the summit of man's perfectibility. And here at the topmost crest of the habitus hierarchy there stretches forth a horizon that, while it humbles the human intellect to the dust, yet lifts it to the contemplation of divine reality. If only The Philosopher could have viewed the limitless landscape from this height! And if we could only view the supernatural with his profound insight into the essence of the natural serving as a preamble! And, we can, for such is the marvelous approach of St. Thomas. There is only one condition, and it is that we must strive to understand St. Thomas. Certainly the most wonderful discovery possible to the intellect of man is the perfect blend of the metaphysical with the sublime thoughts of supernatural revelation.

"The supernatural truths revealed by God fit within the framework of the highest metaphysical truths, although in themselves they are enthroned far above the pinnacles of metaphysics." 89)

88) St. Thomas' development on the nature of mortal and venial sin is one particular application of this distinction, for example, see: I, II, 72, 5; 51, 3; and, I, II, 72 (as a whole).

89) Dr. Martin Grabmann, The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 26.

"The distinction as well as the harmony between the rational and the supernatural, faith and reason, philosophy and theology rest, according to St. Thomas, upon the rock foundation of metaphysical convictions. God, The Absolute Being, is the First Principle and First Cause of all finite natural being, which by reason of the divine act of creation is in the nature of a participation in the divine being. God, whose infinite plenitude of being and intelligence towers above all natural knowledge in the mysterious fecundity of the intimate life of the Trinity, is also the cause of the supernatural. Thru a divine act of love and grace, the created soul is elevated to a participation in this mysterious life of God; it is raised to a sublime form and degree of union with God far exceeding all our natural expectations and abilities. The two rays of natural and supernatural truth, which are used in reason and faith, philosophy and theology, also flow from the bosom of God, the Absolute Eternal Truth. These are precisely the metaphysical convictions which bring Thomas to affirm the harmony between the natural and supernatural orders of truth." 90)

The discovery of such a key to understanding amounts to the discovery of the "ratio" of the Summa. The Prima Pars is largely a textbook of philosophical contact, a preamble and background for theology. 91) The Prima Secundae stands midway between philosophy and theology, yet being primarily a philosophical treatise. In the Secunda Secundae and Pars Tertia philosophy is blended into theological reality. 92) Hence, this discovery is nothing new to man; it is new only to the poor, aberrated creature that "modern progressive life" and "education" have so thoroughly blinded and crippled.

The supernatural habits, let us take here the habit of grace as a particular instance, in their mode of being do belong

90) *ibid.*, p.25.

91) St. Thomas, In Librum Boethii De Trinitate, q.2, a.3. (St. Thomas here clearly shows how phil. is a necessary preamble to theology.)

92) "Inter ordinem naturalem et supernaturalem vera analogia proportionalitatis viget; ideo ex ordine naturali ad ordinem

to the first species of quality, but, in an analogous way. Aristotle could not have had any knowledge of a habit that brings to the soul a whole new spiritual nature. This is a supernatural and divine habit, and its existence lies beyond the realm of the praedicaments of natural being. Therefore, we call it an analogous habitus.

Yet, grace has similarities common to the natural habitus formations proportionate to intellectual beings, the habitus formations which Aristotle studied and expounded and with which we have up to this point been concerned. This is why St. Thomas has very definitely placed grace in the first species of quality in many texts.⁹³⁾ And so, we are not at all speaking in metaphors when we place grace as a reality existing in the mode of being proper to the first species of quality; we are stating a reality in the fullest sense of the term. By terming grace as an analogous habit we are pointing up the fact that grace adds something over and above the capabilities of any natural habitual perfection. That is to say, grace is not a member of the first species of quality in an univocal sense,⁹⁴⁾ but in an analogical

 supernaturalem, ex virtutibus acquisitis ad virtutes infusas et supernaturales concludere licet. In Summa Theologia D. Thomae praedicta illustrata inveniuntur. Quaestiones ethicae et psychologica non parvum occupant spatium. Tota fere Psychologia et Ethica Aristotelis systemati Theologiae morales, quod in Secunda Parte continetur, incorporatae sunt, non ut elementa heterogenea, non a spiritu Christiana aliena, sed ut fundamentum, ex quo melius perfectio harmonica et connaturalis naturae humanae per elevationem ad ordinem supernaturalem communicata ostendi potest."

Thoma Graft O.S.B., Studia Anselmiana, v.2, INTRODUCTIO, p.7.
 93) "Dicendum quod gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis."

I, II, 110, 3, 3m. Cf. I, II, 110, 2c. De Ver. q. 27, 2, 2m.

IN II Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, 1m. cf. texts quoted below.

94) "Gratia est in prima specie qualitatis, quamvis non proprie

sense since it reaches into a higher order which is infinitely above all created nature.⁹⁵⁾

When one sets about to find just what this habitual grace, which is so basic to Christian life, posits, he ought to remember that all that philosophy teaches of natural habitus must be applied to grace and also to the supernatural virtues⁹⁶⁾ which stem from its nature. For, as St. Thomas so insistently teaches⁹⁷⁾ in his Commentary on The De Trinitate of Boethius, it is the insight into natural being that sheds light upon supernatural being which lies beyond the reach of our sense-locked cognition.

possit dici habitus, quia non immediate ordinatur ad actum, sed ad quoddam esse spirituale quod in anima facit, et est sicut dispositio quae est respectu gloriae, quae est gratia consummata. Nihil tamen simile gratiae in accidentibus animae quae Philosophi sciverunt invenitur: quia Philosophi non cognoverunt nisi illa animae accidentia quae ordinantur ad actus naturae humanae proportionatos." De Ver. 27,2,7m. (cf. corpus).
95) This text illustrates the point, although it deals with the virtues that follow grace.

"Alio modo habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea quae ordinantur: non enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas naturas ad quas ordinantur.Et per hunc etiam modum differunt specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad res humanas." I,II,63,4.
96) "Oportet quod homini detur aliquid, non solum per quod operetur ad finem, vel per quod inclinetur eius appetitus in finem illum, sed per quod ipsa natura hominis elevetur ad quamdam dignitatem, secundum quam talis finis sit ei competens: et ad hoc datur gratia; ad inclinandum autem affectum in hunc finem datur caritas; ad exequendum autem opera quibus praedictus finis acquiritur, dantur aliae virtutes." De Veritate 27,2.

97) "Impossibile est quod ea quae per fidem nobis traduntur divinitus, sint contraria his quae per naturam nobis sunt indita: oporteret enim alterum esse falsum: et cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus esset nobis auctor falsitatis, quod est impossibile. Sed magis, cum in imperfectis inveniatur aliqua imitatio perfectorum, quamvis imperfecta; in his quae per naturalem rationem cognoscuntur, sunt quaedam similitudines eorum quae per fidem tradita sunt.

....In sacra doctrina philosophia possumus tripliciter uti:

Likewise, if the notion of grace seems outlandish to an unbeliever, it would become understandable and credible if the man had some knowledge of the wonderful accord that grace has with the natural habitual perfections. Grace supposes nature, grace (just as the natural habits) cannot be conceived of as existing apart from a natural subject capable of it, for its mode of being is that of a created quality, a created habitus; the moment one posits a habitus, he posits also a subject in which that habitus exists.⁹⁸⁾ St. Thomas' beautiful and simple explanation of the supernatural reality of grace by means of the natural reality of Categorical habitus will add clarification to these most important points.

God has chosen to apply His goodness to us thru natural means.⁹⁹⁾ Just as we attain our highest possible natural perfection (wisdom, science, and virtue) by means of the first species of quality, so The All-Merciful Father has given us a share in His own life by means of a supernatural, yet accidental quality.¹⁰⁰⁾

 Primo: ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei, quae necessaria sunt in fidei scientia, ut ea quae naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et huiusmodi de Deo vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit. Secundo, ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea quae sunt fidei. Tertio, etc." In Librum Boethii De Trinitate, q.2, a.3.

98) And not only does he posit a potency, but also that potencies' substantial subject:

"Oportet autem quod proprium subjectum ponatur in definitione accidentis: quandoque quidem in aliquo, sicut cum accidens in abstracto definitur, ut cum dicimus quod simitas est curvitas nasi, quandoque vero in recto, ut cum accidens definitur in recto, ut cum dicimus quod simus est nasus curvus. Cuius quidem ratio est, quia cum definitio eius significans esse ipsius contineat in se subjectum." In Post. Analytica, liber I, lect. 10.

99) "Deus enim omnibus providet secundum quod competit eorum naturae." I, 1, 2. Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 54.

100) Also, the means of habitual grace, chiefly the sacraments

Our next question is "how and why" has this share in the divine life been given to us thru a habitus?Man according to his nature has been proportioned to an end. By the actualization of his natural potencies, especially by their habituation, he is able to work toward the attainment of this end, which is contemplation, in some degree, of divine things.¹⁰¹⁾ This kind of contemplation is within the grasp of natural faculties, and philosophers, especially THE PHILOSOPHER,¹⁰²⁾ have placed man's final happiness in the actualization of these faculties.

But there is another end prepared for man by God that surpasses the proportions of human powers, and this end is an eternal life that consists in the vision of Him Who Is. This totally transcends the proportions of any created nature, being solely connatural to God.¹⁰³⁾ Since man cannot attain such a level by his ----- and the sacrifice of the New Law, are themselves in most full accord with man's nature:

"Divina sapientia unicuique rei providet secundum suum modum, et propter hoc dicitur, Sap.8(1), quod suaviter disponit omnia." III,60,4. Cf. Contra Gentiles III,111 and 119; IV, 56.

101) "Homo autem secundum naturam suam proportionatus est ad quemdam finem, cuius habet naturalem appetitum; et secundum naturales vires operari potest ad consecutionem illius finis: qui finis est aliqua contemplatio divinorum, qualis est homini possibilis secundum facultatem naturae, in qua philosophi ultimam hominis felicitatem posuerunt." De Veritate 27,2c.

102) "Propria autem operatio hominis, in quantum est homo, est intelligere: per hanc enim omnis animalia transcendit. Unde et Aristoteles, in libro Ethic.(X,c.7: 1177a.12-19) in hac operatione, sicut in propria hominis, ultimam felicitatem constituit." I,76,1,1c.

103) "Sed est aliquis finis ad quem homo a Deo praeparatur, naturae humanae proportionem excedens, scilicet vita aeterna, quae consistit in visione Dei per essentiam, quae excedit proportionem cuiuslibet naturae creatae, soli Deo connaturalis existens."

De Veritate 27,2c. (continuation of text given in note 101.)

natural faculties, The Creator has blessed him with some habits by which he is disposed toward this final and perfect end which manifestly surpasses him. And since habits must be in proportion to that toward which they dispose a man, and the potencies disposed must be capable of the acts toward which the disposition leads,¹⁰⁴⁾ it is necessary that the habits disposing man to such an end transcend the powers of human nature. And so man can never have such habits except by divine infusion.¹⁰⁵⁾

We have just said that natural faculties cannot be habituated toward a supernatural end unless there is first a sublimation, a raising of the level of these faculties. And how could this ever be accomplished except by the sublimation of the substantial subject of these faculties? For the level of their "esse" of operation must follow the level of the substantial "esse" of their subject.¹⁰⁶⁾ This is, in fact, the precise reason for the

104) Cf. texts cited in note 68 above.

105) "Aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra (I,II,5,5) dictum est. Et quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina: sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus."

I,II,51,4c. Cf. De Veritate 27,2.

This infusion of the supernatural habits is proof of God's love for man: proof that God loves man more than the lower creatures of nature, who are disposed by nature to act con-naturally and with ease. As natural habitus affords this ease of operation to the potencies of man, so supernatural habitus does in regard to the acts directed toward man's final, theo-logical end. For a text that defies description see I,II,110,2c.

106) "Agere sequitur esse."

....."Natura enim uniuscuiusque rei ex eius operatione ostenditur." I,76,1,1c." Omnis actio est secundum modum formae qua agens agit." I,76,2,2m.

107)

priority of habitual grace. And if rational potencies are the subject of the virtues, what is the subject of habitual grace? For every habit calls for a potency.¹⁰⁸⁾ St. Thomas answers that the very essence of the soul is this subject:¹⁰⁹⁾

"Gratia, sicut est prius virtute, ita habeat subjectum prius potentiis animae; ita scilicet quod sit in essentia animae." I, II, 110, 4c.

"Sicut ab essentia animae effluunt eius potentiae, quae sunt operum principia; ita etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes in potentias animae, per quas potentiae moventur ad actus." I, II, 110, 4, 1m.

"Sicut ab essentia animae fluunt potentiae ab ipsa essentialiter differentes, sicut accidens a subjecto, et tamen omnes uniuntur in essentia animae ut in radice, ita etiam a gratia est perfectio essentiae, et ab ea fluunt virtutes, quae sunt perfectiones potentiarum, ab ipsa gratia essentialiter differentes; in gratia tamen coniunctae sicut in sua origine, per modum quo diversi radii ab eodem corpore lucente procedunt." IN II Sent. d. 26, a. 4c.

"Gratia non est neque in intellectiva, neque in affectiva, sed in essentia animae." IN IV Sent. d. 4, q. 1, a. 3, q1a. 3, 1m.

But how can there be a habitus formation in the essence of of a species, in the "passive potency" for existence? Doesn't

107) "Unde oportet quod homini detur aliquid, non solum per quod operetur ad finem, vel per quod inclinetur eius appetitus in finem illum, sed per quod ipsa natura hominis eleveetur ad quamdam dignitatem, secundum quam talis finis sit ei competens: et ad hoc datur gratia; ad inclinandum autem affectum in hunc finem datur caritas; ad exequendum autem opera quibus praedictus finis acquiritur, dantur aliae virtutes.

...Et quod haec comparatio sit recte accepta, aptet per Dionysium in cap. II Cael. Hier; ubi dicit, quod non potest aliquis habere spiritualem operationem, nisi prius esse spirituale accipiat; sicut nec operationem alicuius naturae, nisi prius habeat esse in natura illa." De Veritate 27, 2c. (for the preceding section of this text cf.

Cf. IN II Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 3c; and 2m. notes 101 & 103.)

108) cf. note 98).

109) In these texts and others that are quoted here (e.g. note 107) note carefully how St. Thomas always speaks of grace as being a habit, an accidental "quale", but yet, he makes it clear that

the substantial form fully actuate the potency for substantial esse?¹¹⁰⁾ St. Thomas replies:

"Si ergo accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic non potest esse in anima; si tamen de natura humana loquamur: quia ipsa anima est forma completa humanae naturae.

Sed, si loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse particeps, secundum illud II Petr. 1, 4, 'ut simus consortes naturae divinae:' sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam."

I, II, 50, 2c.

Beyond the natural "forma completa" there is a new level of existence, that of supernatural life, imparted in the form of a true, but not univocal habitus formation: a habitus formation which, although it resides in the very essence of the soul immediately ("sine medio"), is yet an accidental perfection.¹¹¹⁾

And Why? The species of man is potential to supernatural life!¹¹²⁾

the habit of grace gives spiritual esse, spiritual first act. In this it resembles the substantial "quale" of the essential difference. We will examine this only apparent "Gegensatz" at the close of our study.

110) "Forma, in quantum forma, est actus; id autem quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote contra actum divisa." I, 75, 5.

111) In its mode of being it is a "quale Accidentale" form. But, in operation it gives spiritual "first act." Cf. note 109).

112) "Sed intellectus noster vel angelicus, quia secundum naturam a materia aliquo modo elevatus est, potest ultra suam naturam per gratiam ad aliquid altius elevari. ... Et ideo, cum intellectus creatus per suam naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum in abstractione, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, potest per gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et esse separatam subsistens." I, 12, 4, 3m.

"Anima est subjectum gratiae secundum quod est in specie intellectualis vel rationalis naturae. Non autem constituitur anima in specie per aliquam potentiam: cum potentiae sint proprietates naturales animae speciem consequentes. Et ideo anima secundum suam essentiam differt specie ab aliis animabus, scilicet brutorum animalium et plantarum. Et propter hoc, non sequitur, si essentia animae humanae sit subjectum gratiae, quod

How do we know this is so? By all that lies in and behind the reasoning of St. Thomas: by revelation, and even apart from revelation by the insufficiency of the material and purely natural intellectual goods, of even the wisdom of metaphysics and all the habits of science, all the virtues when they are faced by the restless quest of man. The essence of man simply looks to the supernatural. And the habitus of grace fulfills, actualizes and perfects this highest "potency" of man, which strangely enough is his very being, his essence. Man is left on the same substantial level, and yet that substantial essence is elevated to a new and final degree of life. The root of man's being, his substantial intellectual form, is transplanted into the realm of the Divine, and hence, all of the acts flowing from that substantial form, and even all over which that being who has existence in virtue of this form has dominion, is transplanted into the realm of redeemed and supernatural existence!

And this habitus formation even though it resides in the very essence of the soul immediately, directly perfecting the substantial form, still is an accidental perfection! Let us

 quaelibet anima possit esse gratiae subjectum: hoc enim convenit
 essentiae animae in quantum est talis speciei." I, II, 110, 4, 3m.

Although the following text would more properly find its place in the discussion centered on p. 46, along the side of notes 101 & 103, nevertheless it offers further confirmation for that discussion here and eminently clarifies the assertion that the very essence of man is potential to grace:

"Est autem considerandum quod in anima humana, sicut in quaelibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva: una quidem per comparisonem ad agens primum, qui potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiore, in quem non reducitur per agens naturale; et haec consuevit vocari potentia obedientiae in creatura; alia vero per comparisonem ad agens naturale." S.T. III, 11, 1c.

further examine what St. Thomas has to say on this point:

"Gratia sit in essentia animae sicut in subiecto, et non in potentiis. Oportet dicere quod gratia sit in essentia animae, perficiens ipsam, in quantum dat ei quoddam esse spirituale, et facit eam per quandam assimilationem consortem divinae naturae, ut habetur II Pet. I, 4; sicut virtutes perficiunt potentias ad recte operandum."

De Veritate 27,6c.

"Quamvis gratia non sit principium esse naturalis; perficit tamen esse naturale, in quantum addit spirituale."

De Veritate, 27,6,1m.

"Primus et immediatus effectus gratiae invenitur in essentia animae, scilicet forma secundum esse spirituale."

De Veritate 27,6,4m.

"Gratuita praesupponunt naturalia, si proportionabiliter utraque accipiantur: et ideo, virtus, quae est gratuitum operationis principium praesupponit potentiam, quae est eiusdem principium naturale; et gratia, quae est principium esse spiritualis, praesupponunt essentiam animae, quae est principium esse naturalis." De Veritate 27,6,3m.

In these texts we see how St. Thomas with utmost clarity has explained supernatural reality, bringing it into our grasp by means of an understanding of natural reality. Grace and virtue are accidents; they cannot exist in the real order or in the "esse" of a proposition without reference to a subject, and ultimately, to a substantial subject.¹¹³⁾ But habitual grace, since it brings us into a new existence, has no potency, no accidental form belonging to the second species of quality, as a direct subject as do the rest of the habits and virtues. Rather, the very essence of the soul serves as the subject, and the rational form, though fully actuating the essence of the rational species

113) "Accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis. Sed quia etiam in ipsis accidentibus est ordo quidam, subiectum secundum quod est sub uno accidente intelligitur esse subiectum alterius: ut superficies coloris. Et hoc modo potest potentia esse subiectum habitus." I, II, 50, 2, 2m.

in nature, is thus brought into the supernatural sphere by an accidental quality.¹¹⁴⁾

In this light we can understand the two seemingly divergent lines of thought that appear in the above texts of St. Thomas on the nature of the habitus of grace. The one line of thought calls to mind the "quale accidentaliter" difference proper to accidental qualitative forms. For St. Thomas asserts that grace finds its place in the first species of quality as an analogous habit, as an accidental form perfecting its subject, the soul.¹¹⁵⁾ He speaks of grace as having the soul as its subject, just as a natural habit has a potency as its subject. In the other line of thought St. Thomas speaks of grace as being the "first act" of spiritual existence.¹¹⁶⁾ This manifestly corresponds to the "quale substantialiter" proper to essential forms which determine matter. Also, an analogy is made between the dependence of potencies upon an essence and the dependence of the virtues upon habitual grace,¹¹⁷⁾ thus further developing the idea of grace being "first act." But, we must carefully note that there are not two distinct classes of texts in which these two ideas are separately developed. They occur side by side in the same general texts. For St.

114) Lest there be any confusion between the habitus of grace and the infused potency termed "sacramental character" ("Ita etiam character non proprie est in genere vel specie, sed re-ducitur ad secundam speciem quali tatis." III, 64, 2c.) the following text is referred to:

"Aliter est in anima gratia, et aliter character. Nam gratia est in anima sicut quaedam forma habens esse completum in ea; character autem est in anima sicut quaedam virtus instrumentalis, ut supra (III, 63, 2.) dictum est." III, 63, 5, 1m.

The habitus of sanctifying grace is an effect totally prior to the effect of sacramental character. Character is a potency for the acts of the "Divinus Cultus" of Holy Mother Church: either the reception of divine things or the instrumental impart-

Thomas always makes it clear that while grace is an accident that inheres in the soul, yet it does give "esse spirituale." The very substantial form of man is elevated to a higher plane by this accidental form: hence, the "quale accidentale" similiarity. Yet, because the soul is put on a higher plane by this "quale accidentale" difference, this accidental form is spoken of as acting in the manner of a "quale substantiale" difference. But it is not a substantial form. It demands a substantial being to serve as a subject. It simply does not inform matter, bring natural first act, as the soul does. Rather, it demands the soul as a substantial subject. Clearly it is an accident. These texts are worthy of much more study and consideration than has been given them here. This is especially so since in regard to the study of habitual grace so many theologians ignore or prefer other sources to St. Thomas.

These reflections on "Habitus and The Perfection of Man" possess in a very liberal degree the weaknesses of a general treatment. The approach of "modern education" has not been used: no new solutions have been made, no personal creations of theory have been exhibited, no short-cuts, no easy ways, no systems of simplification whereby the whole question of man's perfectibility could be submitted to ready solution by memory. Rather, a general

 ing of divine gifts to others. (III, 63, 2c.) Habitual grace is "first act" to the sacramental characters just as it is "first act" to the virtues, and hence, is prior. Cf. De Ver. 27, 6c. et 1m, 4m.)

115) e.g. I, II, 110, 2c; 4c. I, II, 110, 4, 4m. De Ver. 27, 6c.

116) e.g. In II Sent. d. 26, a. 4c. De Ver. 27, 6, 1m; 3m; 4m.

117) "Sicut ab essentia animae effluunt eius potentiae, quae sunt operum principia; ita etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes in in potentias animae, per quas potentiae moventur ad actus."

I, II, 110, 4, 1m.

approach pointing to a degree of confused knowledge has been presented. In fact, it is hoped that the lead to a rather rich degree of confused knowledge has been presented. For a good confused knowledge is the indispensable foundation for real knowledge, for real habitual knowledge.¹¹⁸⁾ A superficial, oversimplified, and memorized type of modern "distinct Knowledge" is something like a building without a foundation; it just isn't a real building. Careful, periodical contact with the textual leads presented and the assimilation of these texts that can be effected by reflection and every-day contact with our own and others problems of perfection in both the natural and supernatural fields will advance this knowledge from a confused to a distinct stage.¹¹⁹⁾

118) "Omne autem quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit in actum incompletam." I, 85, 3c.

In this article St. Thomas applies this principle to our knowledge. Confused knowledge comes first, and the better this confused knowledge, the better the distinct knowledge that will follow. Distinct knowledge without the foundation of confused knowledge amounts to only a superficial and deceiving knowledge of facts.

119) On confused and distinct knowledge cf. I, 85, 3 and Cajetan's Commentary on DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA, Prooemium.

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(All other necessary information regarding other sources is given in the footnotes.)

