

AN ANALYSIS OF JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPTION OF MORALITY

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of
the College Department of St. Meinrad Seminary
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for a Bachelor of Arts Degree.

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May, 1959

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Table of Contents

Background and Early Life of John Dewey.....	p. 1.
A Summary of the Philosophy of John Dewey.....	p. 4.
Dewey's Criticism of Moral Systems.....	p. 7.
A refutation of Dewey's criticism.....	p. 11.
Presentation of Dewey's Conception of Morality.....	p. 12.
A criticism of Dewey's proposals.....	p. 17.
The Place of Habit in Morality.....	p. 19.
A refutation of Dewey's use of Habit.....	p. 23.
The Intellect and the Will in Morality.....	p. 24.
A refutation of Dewey's use of the Intellect & Will.....	p. 27.
Footnotes.....	p. 31.
Bibliography.....	p. 35.

(1.)

Shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century -- in 1859, to be exact, -- John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont. A child of his time and his place, he was marked by these circumstances. His Congregationalist background awakened no striking interest in God or the problems of religion. He grew up much as any other boy, attended public school and the University of Vermont.

In his junior year at college Dewey was introduced to Darwinian evolution and to T. H. Huxley's physiological work. Here begins his interest, and his formation, in philosophical problems. German idealism and Comte's positivism next engaged his attention and allegiance, the former reinforced by his associations and his years at Johns Hopkins and Ann Arbor. In both places he owed much of this to George S. Mead; and at Johns Hopkins he wrote his doctoral dissertation on Kant's psychology. Dewey acknowledges the permanent deposit which Hegel has left on his thinking,¹ and his description of that deposit, as recorded in 1939, is this:

"Hegel's idea of cultural institutions as "objective mind" upon which individuals were dependent in the formation of their mental life fell in with the influence of Comte and of Condorcet and Bacon. The metaphysical idea that an absolute mind is manifested in the social institutions dropped out; the idea, upon an empirical basis, of the power exercised by cultural environment in shaping the ideas, beliefs, and intellectual attitudes of individuals remained. It was a factor in producing my belief that the not uncommon assumption in both psychology and philosophy of a ready-made mind over against a physical world as an object has no empirical support. It was a factor in producing my belief that the only possible psychology, as distinct from a biological account of the behavior, is a social psychology. With respect to more technically philosophical matters, the Hegelian emphasis upon continuity and the function of conflict persisted on empirical grounds after my earlier confidence in dialectic had given way to scepticism. There was a period extending into my earlier years at

(2)

Chicago when, in connection with a seminar in Hegel's Logic, I tried reinterpreting his categories in terms of 'readjustment' and 'reconstruction'. Gradually I came to realize that what the principles actually stood for could be better understood and stated when completely emancipated from the Hegelian garb."²

To return to Dewey's formative years, his association with Mead at Ann Arbor gives his interest in logical theory a new turn, and the term, instrumental logic appears for the first time. The work of T. H. Green³ then turns his attention to ethics, which he teaches.

Experimental psychology as consciously opposed to philosophical or rational psychology has occupied much of his attention since the days at Johns Hopkins, and James's Principles of Psychology and his Pragmatism, together with the physiological psychology -- later behaviorism -- which he met at Chicago mark another definite turning point in Dewey's thinking. It was at Chicago too, that Dewey began his earnest flight from Hegel, which continued until his death.

It is important to observe that developments in Dewey's thought nearly always spring from the soil on which he is standing, in an almost physical sense, and at the time he is standing on it. It is not surprising then, that his ethics course at Ann Arbor, in the words of the biography by his daughters, "developed moral theory in terms of an interplay of impulses, habits, desires, emotions, and ideas,"⁴ nor that after his lengthy identification with practical educational work he can define philosophy as "the general theory of education."⁵

Dewey's empirical naturalism was fostered by his association at Columbia with Woodbridge, an Aristotelian naturalist. This association "made Dewey aware of the possibility and value of a type of metaphysical

(3)

theory which did not profess to rest upon principles not empirically verifiable.... Woodbridge and Dewey agree in acceptance of pluralism, in opposition to absolutism, and to a theory of knowing which made subject and object its end-terms; and they had a common disbelief in theories of immediate knowledge."⁶ (Immediate knowledge refers to self-evident first principles.)

The immediate environment consistently played an important role in Dewey's formation. The following quotation serves to illustrate this assertion as well as provide an authoritative summary of the whole temper of his philosophy. The words are those of John Dewey:

"I have usually if not always, held an idea first in its abstract form, often as a matter chiefly of logical or dialectic consistency or of the power of words to suggest ideas. Some personal experience through contact with individuals, groups, or (as in visits to foreign countries), peoples, was necessary to give the idea concrete significance. There are no ideas which are original in substance, but a common substance is given a new expression when it operates through the medium of individual temperament and the peculiar, unique incidents of an individual life. When, to take an example, I formed the idea that the 'mind' of an individual, the set of beliefs expressed in his behavior, is due to interaction of social conditions with his native constitution, my share in the life of family and other groups gave the idea concrete personal significance. Again, the idea that lay back of my educational undertaking was a rather abstract one of the relation of knowledge and action. My school work translated this into a much more vital form. It reaches fairly early in the growth of my ideas a belief in the intimate and indissoluble connection of means used and ends reached. I doubt if the force of the idea in the theory of social action would have come home to me without my experience in social and political movements, culminating in events associated with my membership in the Trotsky Inquiry Commission. My theories of mind-body, of the coordination of the active elements of the self and of the place of ideas in inhibition and control of overt action required contact with the work of F.M. Alexander and in later years with his brother, A.R., to transform them into realities. My ideas tend, because of my temperament, to take a schematic form in which logical consistency is a dominant consideration, but I have been fortunate

(4)

in a variety of contacts that has put substance into these ideas. My belief in the office of intelligence as a continuously reconstructive agency is at least a faithful report of my own life and experience."⁷

Dewey's main thesis is that philosophy is method, it is called Logic, the Theory of Inquiry,⁸ and it concerns Experience and Nature.⁹ These are titles of books he has written. Philosophy not only needs, but is reconstruction. In his new preface to Reconstruction in Philosophy he says that "the basic postulate of the text is that the distinctive office, problems and subject-matter of philosophy grow out of stresses and strains in the community life in which a given form of philosophy arises, and that accordingly, its specific problems vary with the changes in human life that are always going on and that at times constitute a crisis and a turning point in human life."¹⁰ We need "a philosophy that will do for our time and place what the great doctrines of the past did in and for the cultural media out of which they arose."¹¹ These philosophies of the past, described as pre-scientific, were adequate to their own cultural needs. But "the very things which made the great systems objects of esteem and admiration in their own socio-cultural contexts are in large measure the very things that deprive them of 'actuality' in a world whose main features are different to an extent indicated by our speaking of the 'scientific revolution', the 'industrial revolution' and the 'political revolution' of the last few hundred years."¹²

The great defect of all pre-scientific philosophies is that they pretended to deal with something they called "Being, Nature, the Universe, the Cosmos, Reality or Truth. Whatever names were used, they had one

(5)

thing in common: they were used to designate something taken to be fixed, immutable, and therefore out of time; that is, eternal. In being also conceived to be something universal or all-inclusive, this eternal being was taken to be above and beyond all variations in space. In this matter, philosophers reflected in generalized form the popular beliefs which were current when events were thought of as something taking place in space and time as their all-comprehensive envelopes."¹³ .. "Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Marcus Aurelius, St. Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza and Hegel all taught that Ultimate reality is either perfectly Ideal and Rational in nature, or else has absolute ideality and rationality as its necessary attribute."^{14,15}

Dewey complains that this state of affairs has introduced a split between the findings of the new science and the "vested interests" which maintain the old fixed standards. To eliminate this conflict, "all that is needed is acceptance of the view that moral subject-matter is also spatially and temporally qualified."^{16,17}

The keywords of Dewey's philosophy are evolution, instrumentalism, experimentation, and democracy. Its essence can be expressed in answer to four questions:

"What is Man? In Dewey's view man is only a biological organism responding as a totality to his environment. He is kin to all other forms of life and differs from them only in his physio-chemical composition, the complexity of his neural hook-up, and the superior way in which he can adapt himself to his environment and can control and re-shape it. He is a superior kind of animal but not a different kind. Man is not a creature composed of a body and soul because there is no discontinuity either in man or nature. He has no mind or intellect in the traditional meanings of these words, for there is no such thing as immaterial substance. Spiritual substance and supernatural bodies are figments of the imagination.

"What is Reality?" Nothing exists except that which can be experienced by the senses. Only sensible entities and processes are real.

The Greeks committed the primal philosophical error when they posited the existence of supernatural as well as natural being. From this ontological dualism man has been unable to extricate himself for centuries.

The simplicity and surface practicality of materialistic monism appealed to the rustic practicality of John Dewey. By predicating the existence of only one substance, he could dismiss the stubborn questions relating to the coexistence of spirit and matter as idle speculation and dismiss proposed solutions as unreal since they were not subject to scientific verification. On this basis he bypassed most of the great problems that have confronted men through the ages; the existence of God, immortality of the soul, nature of the union between soul and body and free will.

Dewey's philosophy became popular despite the gnarled prose in which he set it forth because (among other reasons), a monistic world is relatively simple to understand, satisfies a characteristic American distrust of the abstract and appeals to our national preference for the "real" rather than the metaphysical.

"What is Truth?" Since the physical and mental are indistinguishable, Dewey rejects nominalism, realism, and what he calls "the spectator theory of knowledge," the scholastic theory that ideas are abstracted from sense data by the active intellect. (*Nihil in intellectu nisi prius in sensu*).

Thinking is an organic response to stimuli, and involvement by an organism with its environment, just as sight, taste, touch, smelling, and hearing are forms of environmental involvement. Knowledge results from this interaction. Real knowledge is functional rather than abstract. In Dewey's lexicon, mind is a verb.

An idea or judgment is true if its consequences are workable. If a belief helps in the clarification of experience or the achievement of desire, it is true. The only test of truth lies in its consequences, and the only way of testing these consequences is the scientific method. Truth is identical with verifiability.

Truth is relative because the consequences of an idea may change, according to Dewey, as the environment changes. What is true at present may be false an hour from now. There are no eternal truths. The best that can be said of an idea or hypothesis is that for the time being it has warranted assertability.

"What is Good?" The pragmatic sanction which applies to ideas and judgments applies also to overt behavior. An act is good

if its consequences are satisfying. Circumstances of time, person, and place affect the morality of an act. There are no absolute moral laws. The scientific method applied to human behavior is the only means of ascertaining the morality of human acts.

There is no summum bonum other than growth. Growth is the universal good - not growth towards some predetermined end but growth per se. Nothing is relative to growth except more growth."¹⁸

Dewey's Criticism of Moral Systems

This thesis then is an attempt to explain the process Dewey employed in developing a system of morality totally separated from any reference to an ultimate or absolute being. The author proposes to achieve this explanation in terms of Dewey's book devoted specifically to morality and entitled Human-Nature and Conduct.¹⁹

These pages are a discussion of some phases of the ethical change involved in positive respect for human nature when the latter is associated with scientific knowledge. We may anticipate the general nature of this change through considering the evils which have resulted from severing morals from the actualities of human physiology and psychology.²⁰

The history and the common faults of past systems of morality find their origin in the Greek civilization. This common error has persisted through the centuries:

"Ethical theory began among the Greeks as an attempt to find a regulation for the conduct of life which should have a rational basis and purpose instead of being derived from custom. But reason as a substitute for custom was under the obligation of supplying objects and laws as fixed as those of custom had been. Ethical theory ever since has been singularly hypnotized by the notion that its business is to discover some final end or good or some ultimate and supreme law. This is the common element among the diversity of theories. Some have held that the end is loyalty or obedience to a higher power or authority; and they have variously found this higher principle in Divine Will, the will of the secular ruler, the maintenance of institutions in which the purpose of superiors is embodied, and the rational consciousness of duty. But they have differed from one another

because there was one point in which they were agreed: single and final source of law. Others have asserted that it is impossible to locate morality in conformity to law-giving power, and that it must be sought in ends that are goods. And some have sought the good in self-realization, some in holiness, some in happiness, some in the greatest possible aggregate of pleasures. And yet these schools have agreed in the assumption that there is a single, fixed and final good. They have been able to dispute with one another because of the common premise."²¹

Dewey outlined the necessity for such a treatment of human nature and conduct by saying that the present system of morality is a negative system. Negative morals result because of a separation from the positive roots of morality. These roots are found in nature and nature alone. The present moral system as practiced by the 'good people' in civilized society is to Dewey's mind a perversion of nature, which beats down the minds and spirits of the masses forced to conform.

Quoted below are several examples, or supporting arguments, that Dewey uses in proof of his thesis that morals are separated from nature. Since the present moral system is unnatural, it is only natural that men should revolt and rebel against it. The following examples show, that morality in its present form, has had its adverse effects upon human character:

There are always ruder forceful natures who cannot tame themselves to the required level of colorless conformity. To them conventional morality appears as an organized futility; though they are usually unconscious of their own attitude since they are heartily in favor of morality for the mass, making it easier to manage them. Their only standard is success, putting things over, getting things done.²²

Another reaction to the separation of morals from human nature is a romantic glorification of natural impulse as something superior to all moral claims. There are those who lack the persistent force of the executive will to break through conventions and to use them for their own purposes, but who unite sensitiveness with intensity

of desire. Fastening upon the conventional element in morality they hold that all morality is a conventionality hampering to the development of individuality.²³

Dewey cites other examples of abnormality which result from a frustrated, unnatural morality. The abstract spiritualist, far removed from reality, and the frustrated idealist, annoyed by reality, are to Dewey's mind, direct, concrete results of an absolute-seeking morality.²⁴

The following passage will serve to show, in part at least, some of the social norms and standards that Dewey is opposing in this book. In his rejection of any absolute pertaining to morals or to philosophy in general, Dewey opposed any and every moral code, system, or religion conducted with an essential reference to an absolute being:

The Puritan is never popular, not even in a society of Puritans. In case of a pinch, the mass prefer to be good fellows rather than to be good men. Polite vice is preferable to eccentricity and ceases to be vice. Morals that professedly neglect human nature end by emphasizing those qualities of human nature that are most commonplace and average; they exaggerate the herd instinct to conformity. Professional guardians of morality who have been exacting with respect to themselves have accepted avoidance of conspicuous evil as enough for the masses. One of the most instructive things in all human history is the system of concessions, tolerances, mitigations and reprieves which the Catholic Church with its official supernatural morality has devised for the multitude. Elevation of the spirit above everything natural is tempered by organized leniency for the frailties of the flesh. To uphold an aloof realm of strictly ideal realities is admitted to be possible only for a few. Protestantism, except in its most zealous forms, has accomplished the same result by a sharp separation between religion and morality in which a higher justification by faith disposes at one stroke of daily lapses into gregarious morals of average conduct.²⁵

No matter how much men in authority have turned morals into an agency of class supremacy, any theory which²⁶ attributes the origin of rule to deliberate design is false.

Dewey's next step in his criticism of moral system delves into the

realm of theory. The major theoretical issue affected by separating morals from human nature is found in the problem of free will. Dewey envisions the question of free will as containing within itself what he terms the most practical of all moral questions, the nature of freedom and the means of achieving it:

The significance of the traditional discussion of free will is that it reflects precisely a separation of moral activity from nature and the public life of men.²⁷

This question of free will is developed by distinguishing two schools of social reform. One school bases itself upon the notion of a morality which springs from an inner freedom, or something mysteriously cooped up within personality. The other school denies the existence of any such inner power and in so doing conceives that it has denied all moral freedom. The first school, concerned with inner freedom asserts that the only way to change institutions is for men to purify their own hearts, and that when this has been accomplished change of institutions will follow of itself. The second school opposes the first in saying that men are made what they are by the forces of the environment, that nature is purely malleable, and that nothing can be done until institutions are reformed.

Hence we must decline to admit theories which identify morals with the purification of motives, edifying character, pursuing remote and elusive perfection, obeying supernatural command, acknowledging the authority of duty. Such notions have a dual bad effect. First they get in the way of observation of conditions and consequences. They divert thought into side issues. Secondly, while they confer a morbid exaggerated quality upon things which are viewed under the aspect of morality, they release the large part of the acts of life from serious, that is, moral, survey.²⁸

"..no systematic efforts have as yet been made to subject the 'morals' underlying the old institutional customs to scientific

inquiry and criticism. Here then, lies the reconstructive work to be done by philosophy. It must undertake to do for...morals what the philosophers of the last few centuries did for promotion of scientific inquiry in physical and physiological conditions and aspects of human life."²⁹

Criticism

Before embarking upon an account of Dewey's positive conception of morality, perhaps it would be well, now that his criticism of present-day and past moralities have been expounded, to investigate some of the causes of Dewey's opposition to Christianity and its essential reference to the absolute being: God.

John Blewett, S.J., in an article in the Catholic World,³⁰ placed the initial phase in Dewey's opposition to Christianity in his Vermont Background. To understand his virulence against Christianity, Blewett suggests that its origins be placed in Dewey's bitter resentment toward his mother's evangelism and toward the spiritual philosophy of T. M. Green. Given below are a few of the more salient points in this article:

"As a boy, Dewey learned of Christianity largely from an overly zealous, evangelical mother. In a rare mood of reminiscence he confided once to Sidney Hook that his mother combined an intense anxiety that her children be "right with Jesus" with an irritating persistence in grilling them on the state of their souls. Even in the presence of guests she would ask John and his brother if they had prayed for forgiveness."³¹

"If as we read Dewey's anti-Christian screeds, we mentally seat ourselves in the Vermont living room where young John was being admonished to be "right with Jesus" and to beg His forgiveness for innocent pranks, we are but following his advice to look for the "facts" to explain a man's thoughts."³²

"This "spiritual philosophy" was a river fed by many tributaries. Chief among them was the turgid, churing thought of Thomas Hill Gree; the idealistic moralist who largely succeeded in supplanting J. S. Mill as the center of attention at Oxford. Central to Green's involved system was a dissection of reality into the

"natural" or the world of "facts" and the "spiritual" or the world of "meaning" and "purposiveness." The two realms, though distinct, are not separate. They interpenetrate. Facts imply purposiveness as this series of letters carries or implies a meaning. Since the "facts" as such are disparate, unconnected, lifeless things, they must be unified by something "spiritual" or "unnatural." If the cosmos of my experience is in question, the unity I find therein must come from my spirit. The unity of meaning of the entire cosmos must come from Absolute Spirit."³³

"With this "spiritual philosophy" young Dewey tried to slay Goliath, Dewey was badly wounded in the fray, for how can you prove the existence of the soul if you pooh-pooh true causality? How can you speak meaningfully about God if spirit is identified with meaning? It is a fearful thing to have wrong reasons for right answers.

It is tolerably clear from an 1887 essay on "Ethics and Physical science" that Dewey identified his "spiritual interpretation" of reality with the theological teachings of Christianity. As he became increasingly frustrated with the small dividends from his original investment and saw that the cultural market offered little prospect for a rise in value, he repudiated both the philosophy and its theological counterpart."³⁴

"I do not recall reading in the thousands of pages of Dewey's writings after 1894 a word of praise or a genuinely kind reference to contemporary Christianity. During Dewey's lifetime no more discerning pleas for justice in industrial relations were written than those of Leo XIII and Pius XI. The efforts of Benedict XV and Pius XII for world peace transcended religious questions. Yet Dewey has scarcely a word on them. It is hard to explain this silence of one revered by his friends as humble, encouraging, open to good from every quarter."³⁵

Presentation of Dewey's Conception of Morality.

The author intends to present an unbiased factual account of Dewey's solution of present moral standards. The reader has observed in the previous section of this work what morals should not be and are. It would be well now to observe what morals should be and are not:

A moral situation is one in which judgment and choice are required antecedently to overt action. The practical meaning of the situation, that is to say, the action needed to satisfy it - is not

self-evident. It has to be searched for. There are conflicting desires and alternative apparent goods.³⁶

Morals is not a catalogue of acts nor a set of rules to be applied like drugstore prescriptions or cook-book recipes. The need in morals is for specific methods of inquiry and of contrivance: Methods of inquiry to locate difficulties and evils; methods of contrivance to form plans to be used as working hypotheses in dealing with them. And the pragmatic import of the logic of individualized situations, each having its own irreplaceable good and principle, is to transfer the conceptions of theory from preoccupation with general conceptions to the problem of developing effective methods of inquiry.³⁷

As it has been stated previously (page 4), Dewey's main thesis is Method, which he calls Logic, the Theory of Inquiry. Since he has stated directly above that morals need specific methods of inquiry, a digression is in order. It would be well here to delve into the basic tenets of Dewey's method of inquiry in order to foster a deeper understanding of Dewey's analysis of a pragmatic morality. The following list comprises the basic tenets of Dewey's book Logic, the Theory of Inquiry.³⁸ The method of inquiry:

- a) The source of thinking is doubt, defined objectively.
- b) The inquiry is evoked and regulated by the problematic situation.
- c) The idea functions as a suggestion, as a plan of action.
- d) The status of facts and ideas is defined operationally.
- e) Reasoning as science is concerned with relations.
- f) Since the facts and meanings are operational in character, experiment is indispensable.
- g) The term of inquiry as cognitional is warranted assertability; as had, is consummatory experiences.³⁹

(14)

"When all is said and done in criticism of present moral deficiencies, one may well wonder whether the root difficulty does not lie in the separation of natural and moral science. When physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, contribute to the detection of concrete human woes and to the development of plans for remedying them and relieving the human estate, they become moral; they become part of the apparatus of moral inquiry or science."⁴⁰

Thus far the concept of morality observed and taught by John Dewey has been mostly on a negative basis. Although no exact definition could be found, the following statement will lend much to the clarification of Dewey's conception of a positive morality:

"When we observe that morals is at home wherever considerations of the worse and better are involved we are committed to noting that morality is a continuing process, not a fixed achievement. Morals means growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct. It is all one with growing. Growing and growth are the same fact expanded in actuality or telescoped in thought. In the largest sense of the word, morals is education. It is learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action. The good, satisfaction, "end" of growth of present action in shades and scopes of meaning is the only good within our control, and the only one accordingly for which responsibility exists. The rest is luck, fortune, and the tragedy of the moral notions most insisted upon by the morally self-conscious is the relegation of the only good which can fully engage thought, namely present meaning of action, to the rank of an incident of a remote good, whether that future good be defined as pleasure, or perfection, or salvation, or attainment of virtuous character."⁴¹

The criterion or standard of morality is good taste. This of course varies with circumstances, and thus for any group at any particular time the good is constructed. Once again wisdom becomes the end of philosophy and morality. Dewey defines wisdom like this: "Wisdom differs from knowledge in being the application of what is known to intelligent conduct of the affairs of life."⁴² In other words, and in our terms, wisdom is reduced to prudence, -- or perhaps cleverness. Philosophy tends to forget, contin-

ues Dewey, that the immediate alone is real, and that to be is to be in process. It is always trying to make an absolute out of wisdom, calling it The philosophy.

The purpose of morality as Dewey describes it, is to provide a means for men to live in harmony with one another. The basic postulates in his proposal could be summed up in the following manner: Morals are dependent on nature. Nature is dependent on habit. Habits depend on objective conditions. Objective conditions force themselves upon us and are instinctively accepted.

In effect, Dewey is saying that all human actions are influenced and affected by forces exterior to us. Thus he proposes a moral theory based upon the realities of human nature and a study of the specific connections of these realities with those of physical science. The development of this solution, namely the recognition that all conduct is interaction between human nature and the environment, will be treated later. The following assertion envisions the results of such a solution if it were to be actually accepted:

"But morals based upon concern with facts and deriving guidance from knowledge of them would at least locate the points of effective endeavor and would focus available resources upon them. It would put an end to the impossible attempt to live in two unrelated worlds. It would destroy the fixed distinction between the human and the physical as well as that between the moral and the industrial and the political....It would find the nature and activities of one person coterminous with those of other human beings, and therefore link ethics with the study of history, sociology, law and economics."⁴³

Man's memory distinguishes him from brute animals, and enables him to foresee events as ends. He can also foresee possible solutions to problems, and each of these is a means. The choice of the correct means becomes

correct only in the act of solving the problem. Only then does it become knowledge; and only then is it of value. The problem solved, adjustment follows, and no further knowing goes on until a new problem arises. Then what had been knowledge becomes in its turn a means to the new end, and the process is repeated. Thus there is an endless continuum of means and ends in experience. But there can be no talk of means and ends except when something is foreseeable as a problem. Order is something created as we go along; there are no antecedent fixities in our experience or in nature. The material universe and our knowledge of it together form a moving continuum: a mass of interacting patterns evolving for the better, always coming and always going, but never really quite getting anywhere.

Of all moral acts, the most important act is the next one. Until one takes intermediate acts seriously enough to treat them as ends, one wastes one's time in any effort at change of habits. Of the intermediate acts, it is always the next one that holds priority in importance. The first or earliest means is the most important end to discover. To attain a remote end means on the other hand to treat the end as a series of means. To say that an end is remote or distant, to say in fact that it is an end at all, is to John Dewey the equivalent of saying that obstacles intervene between us and it. The end thus appears as a series of "what nexts" and the what next of chief importance is the one nearest to the present state of acting.

"Means and end are two names for the same reality. The terms denote not a distinction in judgment. Without understanding this fact we cannot understand the nature of habits nor can we pass beyond the usual separation of the moral and non-moral in conduct. "End" is a name for a series of acts taken collectively - like the term army."¹¹⁴

"The theory of fixed ends inevitably leads thought into the bog of disputes that cannot be settled. If there is one summum bonum, one supreme end, what is it? To consider this problem is to place ourselves in the midst of controversies that are as acute now as they were two thousand years ago. Suppose we take a seemingly more empirical view, and say that while there is not a single end, there also are not as many as there are specific situations that require amelioration; but there are a number of such natural goods as health, wealth, honor or good name, friendship, esthetic appreciation, learning and such moral goods as justice, temperance, benevolence, etc."⁴⁵

To know when to leave acts without distinctive moral judgement and when to subject them to it, is itself a large factor in morality.

The serious matter is that this relative pragmatic, or intellectual distinction between the moral and non-moral has been solidified into an fixed and absolute distinction, so that some acts are popularly regarded as forever within and others forever without the moral domain. From this fatal error recognition of the relations of one habit to another preserves us. For it makes us see that character is the name given to the working interaction of habits, and that the cumulative effect of insensible modifications worked by a particular habit in the body of preferences may at any moment require attention.⁴⁶

Criticism

"The contrast between the thought of Dewey and that of St. Thomas is radical in nature. They are opposed as a philosophy of becoming to a philosophy of being and hence in the positions defended with regard to essence and existence, matter and form, body and soul, substance and accidents, causality at its every phase. Philosophically the worlds of Dewey and St. Thomas are worlds apart. The sole ground common to both is the practical. Yet even here the meeting is but a fleeting one and more of words than of minds. Restricted to the narrow forms and shackling method of exclusive practicalism, Dewey cannot account for Thomism, but only seek to explain it away, and this rhetorically, perhaps sophistically, never philosophically. Thomism on the other hand, not only can enlarge on the minimum of truth found in instrumentalism but account for its errors."⁴⁷

"In morals the exclusive adoption of the practical has led to contradictory conclusions. That this should be so follows from the limitations of the practical reason. Practical reason is concerned with means. It does not establish nor propose the objects which are the ends of the appetites but is concerned

with them solely as goods to be effected or attained. It cannot demonstrate the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul nor that soul's immortality. Thus, if left to its own devices, it cannot be concerned with goods that are, but the elimination of speculative reason excluded from its horizon. Only sensible goods remain upon which to focus its power. Since the securing of these is already sufficiently a superfluous appendage adding only a new dimension to the possibilities of the abuse of sensible goods. The grotesque result is a brute animal gratuitously endowed with a power of self-destruction. Moral science is an impossibility and the procedures termed moral are but the extension of the instinct of self-preservation dictated by the threat of suicide."⁴⁸

"So do the incapacity of the practical to establish ends and its potentiality to realize ends otherwise provided account for the contradictory tendencies within the moral system of John Dewey. The only ends he can account for cognitively are those of the sensible order; hence, he is under compulsion to reduce what spiritual goods he adopts to that order. From this derives his persistent efforts to define anew the ideals he proposes that he may account for them in his own terms. More than the reasons alleged this necessity impelled the definition of sensation itself as a "having"; as by so erasing any essential discrimination between the affectional and cognitional welcome could be extended to any object of the appetites. Such an object once admitted can be, by subsequent "knowledge" couched in terms of means of realization, be defined. Ends, of course, not within the practical powers of man to effect must perforce be denied. Even this has the propagandizing advantage of making the denial of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul seem consequents of the "sciences" espoused, rather than its presuppositions."⁴⁹

Here the futility of Dewey's philosophy again becomes evident and the scales of pragmatism that weigh Dewey's entire philosophy become over-balanced. If morals are merely situations requiring prudent judgment for favorable future results, then why is there a necessity for a moral code or an objective system of conduct at all? If good morals have reference only to another human being, if the only evil resulting from bad moral conduct (conduct conducive to social evils), is social disapproval, then what force is there existing in society to enforce this code of conduct? Surely not civil authority and civil law, since the authorities themselves are equally

subject to deviation from the prescribed pattern of conduct. In the final analysis, why should individuals worry whether or not "good people" approve of them? Public approval is not an end in itself. There is no end in itself. All of this and more could logically follow from Dewey's conception of morality and its inferences. Without the true concept of morality as a means (on this point Dewey agrees), to an ultimate end, (here Dewey disagrees), whatever that end may be held to be, there can be no real reason for men to adhere to a rigid morality demanded by society.

If a moral system is to be based purely on the natural causes found in the environment, it is obvious that many individuals will continue to see their way clear to forego such a code of conduct.

"In the scientific culture of a large state university Dewey came to the conclusion that he had reaped precious from his theological fields, and through the rest of his life he steamed and stormed against an "Absolute" which he mistakenly identified with the God of Abraham and of Isaac. His constant complaint that no one can explain why an Absolute would want to "give rise" to finite things sounds tinny to a Christian who knows that God is Love and that no cosmic law forbids Love to share. Loving persons do and make. They can invite others to share their joy. The scientists who refused to consider the cosmic sterility of objective idealism were right. Dewey was the one who had been bilked into buying "intellectual somnambulism," as he called objective idealism in 1919, in Reconstruction in Philosophy. Dispossessed, uprooted, he unfurled the banner of revolt and carried it through the decades."⁵⁰

The Place of Habit in Morality

If morals are dependent on nature, then nature is ruled by habit:

"Natural operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like speech and honesty, are functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person."⁵¹

"To get a rational basis for moral discussion, we must begin with recognizing that function and habits are ways of using and incorporating the environment in which the latter has its say as surely as the former."⁵²

Thus Dewey envisions morals as the product of habit. For him all virtues and vices are no more than habits which incorporate objective forces. They are interactions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual with elements supplied by the out-of-door world. They can be studied as objectively as physiological functions, and they can be modified by change of either personal or social elements. The proposition that habits determine conduct will follow later in the paper. Realizing then the immense importance which Dewey ascribes to habits it would be well to inject at this point some of Dewey's positive statements concerning the nature of habit:

"The word habit may seem twisted somewhat from its customary use when employed as we have been using it. But we need a word to express that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering of systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity."⁵³

"The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habits means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilection and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts." It means will."⁵⁴

Habits both control and are controlled. They control in that they are will and govern our actions. They are controlled in that habits may be changed by changing the objective conditions on which they fundamentally depend. (The intelligent altering of the objective conditions to produce a designed future result is called moral action or moral conduct.)

The notion of character may be educed from the concept of habit:

"Character is the interpenetration of habits. If each habit existed in an insulated compartment and operated without affecting or being affected by others, character would not exist. That is conduct would lack unity being only a juxtaposition of disconnected reactions to separated situations. But since environments overlap, since situations are continuous and those remote from one another contain like elements, a continuous modification of habits by one another is constantly going on. A man gives himself away in a look or a gesture. Character can be read through the medium of individual acts." ²⁵

In reviewing the above, then, one may notice the constant recurrence and the ultimate identification of the following: morals, habit, objective conditions, and will. Morals are a product of habit; habit the result of objective conditions; habit is will. The ticklish question of means and ends finds place here also. There are no ends really - all are means. As is the case with all conspicuous elements in Dewey's philosophy, there is also an identification of habit with means:

"Now the thing which is closest to us, the means within our power, is a habit. Some habit impeded by circumstances is the source of the projection of the end. It is also the primary means in its realization. The habit is propulsive and moves anyway toward some end, or result whether it is projected as an end-in-view or not. The man who can walk does walk; the man who can talk does converse - if only with himself." ²⁶

The identification of Habit with Morals:

"The mutual modification of habits by one another enables us to define the nature of the moral situation. It is not necessary nor advisable to be always considering the interaction of habits with one another, that is to say the effect of a particular habit upon character - which is the name for the total interaction. Such consideration distracts attention from the problem of building up an effective habit. ... At any given time, certain habits must be taken for granted as a matter of course. Their operation is not a matter of moral judgment. They are treated as technical, recreational, professional, hygienic, or economic, or esthetic rather than moral. To lug in morals or ulterior effect on character at every point, is to cultivate moral valetudinarianism or priggish posing. Nevertheless, any act, even that one which passes ordinarily as trivial, may entail such consequences for habit

and character as upon occasion to require judgment from the standpoint of the whole body of conduct. It then comes under moral scrutiny."⁵⁷

Certainly the above should serve to give the reader some indication of the vast importance which Dewey grants to habits. It remains now to inquire further into the implications and applications of this concept of habit as dealing specifically with morality.

Morals can't be individual since the origin of morals is not to be found in the individual. It is objective conditions that make up habits, and habits compose the essentials of morality. Here the purpose of Dewey's moral system becomes evident. If habits spring from objective forces around us and compose morality, then habits (or their collective groupings called conduct), must be social:

Some activity proceeds from a man; then it sets up reactions in the surroundings. Others approve, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and resist. Even letting a man alone is a definite response. Envy, admiration, and imitation are complicities. Naturally neutrality is non-existent. Conduct is always shared; this is the difference between it and a physiological process. It is not an ethical "ought" that conduct should be social. It is social, whether good or bad."⁵⁸

In developing this idea of a social conduct, Dewey points out that all conduct is a type of causality whose effect will be found in the individuals, things, and institutions with which we are dealing. Past actions are seen to count for nothing in morals or moral action. Thus the distinction between physical causation and moral causation:

Causes for an act always exist, but causes are not excuses. Questions of causation are physical, not moral except when they concern future consequences.⁵⁹

The meaning here is that moral issues concern the future. Morals are essentially concerned with acts still within our control, acts still to

be performed. Effective moral action demands knowledge of conditions. In short, any moral action demands a knowledge of the objective conditions that have brought about the need for taking moral action. In the words of John Dewey:

"The moral problem is that of modifying the factors now influencing future events. To change the working conditions which enter into his habits."⁶⁰

Thus if objective conditions form habits and are physical causes of all habits, then habits must be changed by changing objective conditions:

"We can't change habits directly: that notion is magic. But we can change it indirectly by modifying conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighing of the objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfillment of desires."⁶¹

For John Dewey, habits have a definite role to play in determining a correct morality. Habits are to be considered as absolutely dependent upon objective forces. The next step is to associate ourselves with habit - or rather to realize our association with habit to a point where we see that habit and personality are identified. We do not have habits, we are habits. Habits have power over the person since they comprise such an intimate part of the personality:

A bad habit suggests an inherent tendency to action and also a hold, command over us. It makes us do things we are ashamed of, things which we tell ourselves we prefer not to do. It overrides our formal resolutions, our conscious decisions. When we are honest with ourselves we acknowledge that a habit has this power because it is so intimately a part of ourselves. It has a hold upon us, because we are the habit."⁶²

Criticism

"The gloriously agonizing intellectual doubt of Descartes has here its most humiliating devolution to the equivalence with a stubbed toe. But only apparently. The real tension giving birth to thought is not at all objective. Actually the situ-

ation becomes unsettled when appetite enters in, when the inquirer-to-be decides that the situation needs reconstruction. By throwing the emphasis upon the possible conditions giving rise to this volition, the necessary willful act remains a not too hidden secret."⁶³

The implication here, of course, is that it is rather an uncertain and contradictory course to pursue in associating habit with will as Dewey has done. This position is in complete conformity with the rest of Dewey's philosophy and its tenets. If Dewey is to admit will at all, and he must, then he must deny that the will is to be associated with its scholastic connection, the mind, since Dewey has denied, and completely denied, any reference to the immaterial. Reference will be made to this problem of a practical, physical will in the Criticism following in the next section of this paper.

The Intellect and the Will in Morality

If habits are will, and will is that which causes us to act in this or that manner, then it is obvious that habits and will must be controlled by a still higher principle, since Dewey himself has admitted that it is possible to change habit. This principle is understood as the intellect. In this connection Dewey holds a separation between the body and the will:

"Control of the body is physical and hence is external to the mind and the will."⁶⁴

"This split of the practical function of the mind from its speculative power was John Dewey's contribution to the history of man's search for wisdom. He dedicated his philosophic life, an unusually long one, to the implementation and exploitation of the practical and obstructionist chimeras resultant upon any affirmation of the speculative. The result was the abundant literature of pragmatism, instrumentalism, and experimentalism, as his thought was at various times called."⁶⁵

A man learns to stand correctly, or to quit drinking or smoking only by altering the objective conditions directly causing and influencing the habit. The presupposition here is that there exists a separation between the physical realm and the realm of the mind and the will. The simple matter of physical posture is used to illustrate Dewey's point:

"Recently a friend remarked to me that there was one superstition current among even cultivated persons. They suppose that if one is told what to do, if the right end is pointed out, then all that is required in order to bring about the right act is will or wish on the part of the one who is to act. He used as an illustration the matter of physical posture; the assumption that if a man is told to stand up straight, all that is further needed is wish and effort on his part, and the deed is done. He pointed out that this belief is on a par with primitive magic in its neglect of attention to the means which are involved in reaching an end. And he went on to say that the prevalence of this belief starting with false notions about the control of the body and extending to control of mind and character, is the greatest bar to intelligent social progress. It bars the way because it makes us neglect intelligent inquiry to discover the means which will produce a desired result, and intelligent invention to procure the means. In short, it leaves out the importance of intelligently controlled habit."⁶⁶

To recapitulate, mind or will cannot of itself cause a rectification of posture. A man must learn to stand correctly, not by an act of the will in resolving, "I will stand straight," but by controlling the habits directly concerned with the bad posture. Here is the proper means as Dewey describes it:

"A man who has a bad habitual posture tells himself, or is told, to stand up straight. If he is interested and responds, he braces himself, goes through certain movements, and it is assumed that the desired result is substantially attained; and that the position is retained at least as long as the man keeps up the idea or order in his mind. Consider the assumptions which are here made. It is implied that the means or effective realizations of a purpose exist independently of established habit and even that they may be set in motion in opposition to habit. It is assumed that means are there so that failure to stand

correctly is wholly a matter of failure of purpose and desire. It needs paralysis or a broken leg or some other equally gross phenomenon to make us appreciate the importance of objective conditions."⁶⁷

"One might as well suppose that the man who is a slave of whiskey-drinking is merely one who fails to drink water. Conditions have been formed for producing a bad result, and the bad result will occur as long as those conditions exist. They can no more be dismissed by a direct effort of the will than the conditions which create drought can be dispelled by whistling for wind."⁶⁸

"Of course something happens when a man acts upon his idea of standing straight. For a little while he stands differently, but only a different kind of badly. He then takes the unaccustomed feeling which accompanies his unusual stand as evidence that he is not standing right. But there are many ways of standing badly, and he has simply shifted his usual way to a compensatory bad way at some opposite extreme."⁶⁹

Admitting then the fact that there is such a thing as will, Dewey reverts to his familiar pragmatic trend and again associates habit and will with the statement:

"But in fact, formation of ideas as well as their execution depends upon habit. If we could form a correct idea without a correct habit, then possibly we could carry it out irrespective of habit. But a wish gets shape and consistence only when it has a habit back of it. Only when a man can already perform an act of standing straight does he know what it is like to have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required for proper execution. The act must come before the thought, and a habit before the ability to evoke the thought at will. Ordinary psychology reverses the actual state of affairs."⁷⁰

The progression in Dewey's train of thought can now be reviewed to reveal the following: Morals are separated from nature. Nature is dependent on habit. Habit is the cause of all our subjective states, determining all actions. Habits in their turn are dependent on objective conditions and can be changed only by changing the objective conditions themselves. In this way all human nature is explained on purely natural terms.

Criticism

It is true that objective conditions play a large role in intentionally altering a habit such as drinking, smoking or bad posture. However it is the will that chooses to alter the habit. Dewey has claimed that present modern standards hold that the means for the realizations of a purpose oppose the established habit. The will opposes an unwanted habit in that it seeks its destruction, but the will does not oppose habit as Dewey presumes. The will chooses the conditions necessary for the actual alteration of the habit. In so choosing, the will (a faculty of the mind), actually controls habit. This statement would undoubtedly receive an emphatic denial from John Dewey. However the fact remains, that even if Dewey's presumption that habits can't be altered by a direct motion of the will were taken at its face value, he still needs to cope with the ever-apparent fact that no habits are changed unless the person possessing them wants them changed.

In saying that objective conditons are the actual physical hinges that are both potentially and actually the determiners and alterers of habit, Dewey is undoubtedly correct. If objective donditions change habit (and they do), it must be remembered that the will has the capability to govern objective conditions. Dewey realizes this fact to a degree. It is too pressing to ignore.

We realize from experience that no one ever performs any deliberate action directly opposed to his will. Even the unpleasant tasks of daily living, though grudgingly performed, are performed, without exception, in harmony with the will. A student in the classroom studies to know, yet

he may prefer to be elsewhere. But in order to retain his status as a student, and progress toward graduation, the student prefers to bear the chore of attending class, rather than accept the joys of other more pleasant occupations which would result in expulsion or punishment. In short, the student doesn't want the rigors of the classroom, but he does want the classroom's regard of knowledge. The same student wants the pleasure of less restricting occupations, but he doesn't want their disastrous consequences. He chooses then, what to him is the lesser of two evils. The same analysis can be applied to any action deliberately performed. All this of course, is in direct opposition with Dewey's assertion that the will cannot direct bodily habits and actions. It is realized that the will can be destroyed, as is evident in some forms of alcoholism or drug addiction, however an action performed under these circumstances is no longer an action of the will.

The following series of quotations will serve to show the futility of a purely pragmatic philosophy diametrically opposed to any reference or acknowledgement of the speculative powers of the intellect:

"Speculative truth consists in the conformity of the intellect to things. Practical truth, on the other hand, consists in the conformity of the intellect to right appetite. Thus the objects of speculation are true or false, either as corresponding to the things known or not. Ontologic Being, things in reality, constituted the measure. The end of the practical is the good which is determined as such by its order to the appetite. Hence the measure is constituted by the appetite, for the practical intellect performs its task by producing the good which the appetite desires. The truth, then, of the practical reason is achieved by attaining the good which the appetite desires; it achieves the true good if the appetite is rightly ordered to that good."⁷¹

"The two orders of intellectual knowledge are distinct in terms of their respective ends, objects, and in the mode proper to each. In recapitulation, the nature and the differences of the practical and the speculative can be thus delineated: for the latter, the end is knowledge, truth as the good of the mind; for the former, the end is a work to be done or made, good as good, as ordered to the appetite. The speculative remains within the intellect itself entirely; the practical even the formally and not perfectly practical, has an order to that which is outside the mind, to the good of the appetite. The object of the speculative is measured by reality, its truth consists in conformity to the things; the object of the practical is measured by the appetite, its truth depends ultimately on that appetite being rectified to the order of God. The practical depends upon the speculative in principle and end; all necessarily to the speculative as defending and terminating them. The speculative is concerned with the universal, increases in dignity and certitude as it grows more abstract and advances in degree of immateriality. The practical consists ultimately in application to the individual, is resolved by operation in the particular, finds more room for exercise as matter enters into the object considered. So, absolutely, the knowledge of the particular adds nothing to the speculative penetration of the universal and necessary. The practical, on the other hand, is under constant compulsion to the particular since it is concerned with the possible and the contingent."⁷²

"The identity of the Thomistic analysis of the practical with that made by John Dewey is striking despite differences in vocabulary. It is the more striking in the face of Dewey's denial of the speculative, since this left room for the introduction of the arbitrary features that might have obscured or even completely hidden the basic elements of the practical. Paradoxically, these considerations thus constitute the nearly unique example in Dewey's thought of speculation properly so-called, attaining to and, in fact, tenaciously maintaining a reality in terms of its proper nature. Unfortunately, although perhaps to be expected, the speculative function of the mind does not fare as well in Dewey's hands and his criticism are in major part rendered inept by the initial distortion."⁷³

"Nevertheless, practicalism is not a complete nihilism. To split the mind, as Dewey has, and take but one facet as the whole is to place in the beginning an obstacle insuperable and thus necessarily to reap many inconveniences in the end. Yet, the intellect is practical as well as speculative. Because he has taken that veritable practical function as his guiding idea, Dewey has crippled rather than destroyed himself. A forthright sensationalism eliminates all intelligence; it cannot

account for its seeking to account for anything. Rather than acknowledge any idea, it should at least, logically deny itself. Even by the elaboration of complicated associative processes it cannot extricate itself from its initial isolation in the singular. Dewey is, eventually, a sensationalist, but sensationalism is not his primary or regulative category. So sensationalism is not for his thinking a foundation but an adaptation. He admits a mind not only in name but in fact, even though he develops a theory negating all that justifies the name or explains the fact. This perceived, it is not difficult to understand his own difficulties in fitting his position with either nominalism or conceptualism and his readers' confusion and conclusion of innate, though mysterious, contradiction."⁷⁴

Finis

Notes

1. Cf. Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," (original source unknown) cited from: Aquinas and Dewey: Men of their Times. An unpublished address delivered by Eric McCormack to St. Meinrad Abbey, 1952. "I should never think of ignoring, much less denying... that acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking."
2. Quoted in 'Biography of John Dewey,' pp. 17-18. Cited from: Acquinas and Dewey. - Supra.
3. Cf. Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, New York: Scribners, 1937, pp. 280 ff.
4. Biography of John Dewey,' p. 32. Supra note 1.
5. Ibid., p. 33. Supra note 1.
6. Ibid., p. 36. Supra note 1.
7. Ibid., pp. 44-45
8. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, New York: Henry Holt, 1938.
9. John Dewey, Experience and Nature, 2nd ed., New York: Norton, 1929.
10. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged edition, Boston: Beacon Press, 1948. p. 5.
11. Ibid., p. 9.
12. Ibid., p. 9.
13. Ibid., p. 12.
14. Ibid., p, 96.
15. Ibid., p. 12.
16. Ibid., p. 13.
17. Ibid., p. 13-14.
18. Griffith, Frances, "John Dewey: Theory and Practice," Commonweal, vol. 60 (September 24, 1954).
19. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, New York: Random House, 1930. The quotations from this work, since they are many and lengthy, will be indicated by the abbreviation H.N. and the page number.

20. H.N. p. 4.
21. Quoted from Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 161. Supra note 10.
22. H.N., p. 6.
23. H.N. p. 7.
24. H.N., p. 7.
25. H.N., p. 5.
26. H.N. p. 3.
27. H.N., p. 9.
28. H.N., p. 280.
29. Quoted from Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 18. Supra note 10.
30. John Blewett, "John Dewey's Case against Religion," The Catholic World vol. 160, (April 1959).
31. Ibid., p. 18
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Reconstruction, P. 163. Supra note 10.
37. Reconstruction, p. 166-167
38. Supra note 8.
39. Smith, Ferrer, "Thomistic Appraisal of the Philosophy of John Dewey," Thomist vol. 18 (April 1955), 143.
40. Reconstruction, p. 173.
41. H.N., p. 280
42. John Dewey, Problems of Men, New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. Introduction, p. 7. Requoted from Aquinas and Dewey. Supra note 1.

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43. H.N., p. 12.
44. H.N., P. 36.
45. Reconstruction, p. 166.
46. H.N., p. 40.
47. Supra note 39. p. 179.
48. Ibid., p. 183.
49. Ibid., pp. 183-184.
50. The Catholic World, Supra note 30. p. 20.
51. H.N. p. 14.
52. H.N., p. 15.
53. H.N., p. 53.
54. H.N., p. 42.
55. H.N., p. 38.
56. H.N., p. 37.
57. H.N., p. 39.
58. H.N., p. 17.
59. H.N., p. 18.
60. H.N., p. 19.
61. H.N., p. 20.
62. H.N., p. 24.
63. The Thomist, Supra note 39. p. 145.
64. H.N., p. 30.
65. The Thomist, Supra note 39, p. 128.
66. H.N., p. 27.

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67. H.N. p. 28.

68. H.N., p. 29.

69. H.N., p. 29.

70..H.N., p. 30.

71. The Thomist, Supra note 39, p. 139.

72. Ibid., pp. 140-141.

73. Ibid., p. 141.

74. Ibid., p. 181.

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