

"WHETHER THE WILL DESIRES OF NECESSITY"

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OUTLINE

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In the Summa Theologica, the first two questions St. Thomas poses when talking about the will, are; "Whether The Will Desires Something Of Necessity" and, "Whether The Will Desires Of Necessity Whatever It Desires."¹ These two questions are basic in understanding the action of the will. There are some who would answer the first question negatively. They would say that man is absolutely free. As regards their way of thinking, man would never be compelled by necessity in the movements of his will. Carrying this statement to its natural conclusion, they would have to agree that man, when a number of objects are proposed to him, would desire anyone at random, since the will has no norm as a reason for desiring any particular one. If this were the case, a starving man might choose a rusty nail in preference to a hot meal. Hence also, when the soul is confronted with God in His very essence, it does not necessarily desire Him. Turning to the other opinion, namely that the will desires everything of necessity, we find ourselves face to face with absolute determinism. When confronted with a number of particular goods, this latter group maintains that the will is forced to choose a certain predetermined object. Following their opinions, we come to the conclusion that man is not responsible for any of his acts, since he is forced by some agent outside of himself in choosing his acts. In the first two articles of Pars I, Question 82, St. Thomas proves that although the will desires something of necessity, it does not desire everything that it desires of necessity.

This paper proposes to show whether the will acts of necessity in any of its acts, and whether the will acts freely in any of its acts. In the *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Question 82, Article 2, St. Thomas offers the proof concerning the necessity of the will. The will inheres in the end and in those things which are for an end proportionally as the intellect inheres in principles and conclusions. But the intellect necessarily assents to principles and demonstrated conclusions; it does not necessarily assent to contingent and undemonstrated conclusions. Therefore, the will necessarily inheres in the end and in those things connected with the end, but not in those things connected with the end contingently or uncertainly. In this article, St. Thomas names four things on the part of the intellect; first principles, demonstrated conclusions, conclusions that are not yet demonstrated, and contingent propositions. Corresponding to these on the part of the will are; beatitude as the end, necessities as demonstrated, Divine things as necessarily demonstrable, and those things that are electable by someone as contingent. These are the four different headings under which the intellect and the will are to be compared in the overall analogy.

In any syllogism, the major premise should be the most evident. In article two, when St. Thomas says that the will inheres in the last end just as the intellect adheres to first principles, he merely refers to the previous article. This comparison is based on the fact that the end holds itself in operative things just as the principle holds itself in

speculative things.

. . . for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters.²

In the the second book of the Physics, Aristotle states that there is an a-priori necessity in the demonstrative sciences.

He goes on to explain, "The conclusion comes of necessity from a prior notion which is presumed as a principle."³

Thus when we say that man is a rational animal, the conclusion must necessarily fit this prior notion. Aristotle continues to contrast the speculative and operative orders;

In nature, if the end actually exists, then it is necessary that that exist which is before the end. It is plain that in those things which come to be because of an end, the end holds the same order as the principle holds in the demonstrative sciences.⁴

In operative things, the end is the basis or principle of motion toward that same end. That which comes last in actual execution, is first in intention. The child who runs an errand for a dime does so for the ice cream that the money will buy. This end of ice cream therefore caused him to run the errand. However he must first complete his work and collect the dime before he can actually purchase and enjoy the ice cream. Hence the intellect and the will are compared together because of their mutual necessity. This necessity is due to their immobility as regards their proper ends. St. Thomas goes on to say;

For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a

thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.⁵

Thus it is that the intellect knows first principles, and that the will naturally tends to the last end which is beatitude.

The minor premise states that the intellect necessarily assents to first principles and demonstrated conclusions. However it does not necessarily assent to undemonstrated and contingent conclusions. To understand this statement, an investigation of the twofold division is in order.

First of all, the intellect assents of necessity to first principles. For an example of this, no one with the use of reason would deny that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts. Man is naturally equipped with reason which can apprehend the whole, its parts, and then compare them in their interrelation to each other. Since this is natural to man, we say it cannot be otherwise, and hence it is necessary, Man also necessarily assents to those conclusions whose necessary connection to first principles has been pointed out. When we examine the example that an automobile is equal to the sum of its parts, we readily see that this car is a whole, and it does not function properly unless its totality of parts are functioning. The necessary connection here, is that of car and whole.

The intellect does not necessarily assent to undemonstrated conclusions or contingent propositions. As regards the undemonstrated conclusions, although there may be

necessary connection to a first principle, this connection has not been pointed out. The proposition, "God exists." is not evident until it is seen in relation to the principle of causality. Unless this connection is pointed out, the intellect may not regard the proposition as being necessarily true, and hence not assent to it. In contingent propositions, there is no necessary connection with first principles. Hence the will does not necessarily assent to them. If a person would tell me that it takes him two hours and three minutes to walk eight miles, I would know that this is not absolutely and universally true because of the various conditions and circumstances of terrain, weather conditions and the speed of the walker differ in each instance. In fact, it is these contingent circumstances that prevent this from being a self-evident truth.

The conclusion follows from this. The will, just as the intellect adheres to principles, desires some things of necessity, and not necessarily other things.

If the will inheres in the end as the intellect adheres to the principle, it is evident that there is some relation between the intellect and will. St. Thomas bases this analogy between the intellect and will on their very natures. The nature of anything is its essence with the added note that it have some inclination, which is called natural appetite or love. Because the intellect and will are both natures, it can readily be granted that they have natural operations.

As distinct powers which have been ordered to their proper operations, they are, then, certain specific things in the genus of nature for they are intrinsic principles of operation. St. Thomas says that since each power of the soul is a certain form or nature and has a natural inclination towards something, each of these powers desires by its own natural appetite that object suitable to itself.

In De Veritate, St. Thomas gives a detailed argument for comparing the intellect and the will on a parallel basis. He establishes his major premise by laying down a general principle;

For evidence of this, it must be considered that in ordered things, the mode of the first thing must be included in the second, and there must be found in the second not only what belongs to it according to its own proper notion, but also what belongs to it according to the notion of the first mode . . .

St. Thomas proves this major premise by two examples;

. . . just as it belongs to man not only to use reason, which belongs to him according to his proper difference, which is rational, but also to use sense of food, which belongs to him according to his genus, which is animal or living. And we see likewise in sensible things that since the sense of touch is the basis, as it were, of the other senses, there is found in the organ of each sense not only the property of that sense whose proper organ it is, but also the property of touch; just as the organ of the sense of sight not only senses white and black, inasmuch as it is the organ of sight, but also senses hot and cold, and is corrupted by excesses of them, according as it is an organ of touch:

His minor premise follows with its proof and obvious conclusion;

Now nature and the will are ordered in this way, that the will itself is a certain nature, for everything which is found in beings is a certain nature. And therefore, one must find in the will not only what is of the will but also what is of nature.

In order to reason to the desired conclusion concerning natural appetite, St. Thomas proposes another minor premise to the conclusion. However, he is quick to distinguish this natural appetite from free will:

But this belongs to every created nature, that it be ordered by God to good naturally desiring it. Wherefore there is in the will itself a certain natural appetite for the good suitable to it: and besides this, it has the ability to desire something according to its own determination not of necessity; this belongs to it according as it is will.⁶

Another variation for this proof of paralleling the intellect and the will because of the fact that being natures, they both have natural appetites or natural inclinations is proposed thus:

There is in the angels a certain natural love and a certain elective love; and the natural love is the principle of the elective love, because what belongs to what is prior always has the notion of a principle. Since, therefore, the nature is the first thing in every being, what belongs to the nature must be the principle in every being. This is evident in man, both as to the intellect and as to the will. For the intellect knows principles naturally, and from such knowledge in man is caused the knowledge of conclusions, which are not naturally known by man, but through discovery or through teaching. In like manner, the end is related to the will in the same way as a principle is to the intellect.⁷

Nature is said in many ways. For sometimes it denotes the intrinsic principle in movable things, and such a nature is either matter or material form . . . In another way, any substance or any being is called a nature; and according to this,

that it is said to be natural to a being which belongs to it according to its substance; and this is what is essentially in a thing. But, in all beings, those things which are not essentially in them are reduced to some thing which is essentially in them, as to a first principle. And therefore it is necessary that, taking nature in this way, the principle, in those things which belong to a being, always be natural. And this is manifestly apparent in the intellect, for the principles of intellectual knowledge are known naturally. In like manner, too, the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.⁸

These texts then, give an ample foundation on which St. Thomas can make the comparison between intellect and will which he does in his major premise in Pars III, Question 82, Article 2.

Nevertheless, the Angelic Doctor offers a third proof as was indicated above. This proof rests on the fact that the principle of all movements must be something immobile. Reason verifies this fact as regards the First or Prime Mover. . . . Whatever is moved is moved by another. If God, Whom we call the Prime Mover, were mobile in any way, He would have to be moved by another. Therefore, He would not be the First Mover because the other mover would be prior. Hence it is concluded that the First Mover must be absolutely immobile. However, St. Thomas does not mean that the will is the absolute principle of all its movements since he distinguishes between necessary and free movements of the will. Nevertheless, in the nature of things throughout the world, it is observed that the subject of movement may be called immobile insofar as it remains the same throughout the movement, although the terms of the movement do not. This can be seen in the example

of the billiard balls. When one ball strikes another, it is readily granted that the motion of the one is transferred to the other, but not the substance of "billiard ballness". From the metaphysical point of view, the substance remains immobile in itself, while the former accident disappears and the new accidental term is introduced. Hence it is said that the subject of movement is immobile. "Every movement presupposes something immobile. For when a change as to quality is made, the substance remains immobile;"⁹

Local motion cannot be fittingly applied to the will as a sufficient interpretation. Although the will is the immobile subject of both its necessary and free movements, these movements of the will are distinct. St. Thomas explains that the will considered as having been necessarily moved in that it is a nature, constitutes the immobile principle of the free movements. This third interpretation of immobility suffices in regards to the necessary and free movements of the will. The necessary must exist because there can be no free choice about means to the end unless there already exists, as its immobile principle, necessitation, at least to the end in general. In so far as the will inheres in the last end in general, it can be called immobile because its movement toward that end has been irrevocably finished. It adheres to the end in such a way that it is unable not to will it or to will its opposite. Hence all potency along that line has been exhausted. Once a man has definitely made up his mind to go to

New York, he does not concern himself any longer with the actual end of his journey because that has been decided. The will has been definitely inclined or affixed to happiness. Hence it no longer concerns itself with this as such, but to the means whereby it is attained. However, in willing a means, the potency of the will is subject to different acts. Therefore the will thus necessarily willing the end is the principle of the elective towards a means, because there can be no willing of means until the end is willed. Hence St. Thomas says:

The principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.¹⁰

Now just as is the order of the nature to will, so is the order of those things which the will naturally wills to those things with respect to which it is determined by itself, not by nature. And therefore, just as the nature is the foundation of the will, so the appetible object which is naturally desired, is the principle and foundation of other appetible things.¹¹

This then, is the interpretation proper for the premise that the principle of all movements must be immobile.

However, for a reiteration of the general proofs for the necessitation of the will, St. Thomas summarizes what has gone before very nicely in the following texts:

A thing is said to be necessary from this, that it is immutably determined to one thing. Hence, since the will is indeterminately related to many things, it does not have necessity with respect of all, but with respect of those things only to which it is determined by natural inclination . . . And because every mobile thing must be reduced to something immobile, and every undetermined thing to which the will is determined, must be the principle of desiring those things to which it is not

determined; and this is the last end.¹²

In like manner, neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, just as the intellect of necessity, adheres to the first principles, so the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness. For the end is in practical matters what the intellect is in speculative matters. For what pertains naturally to a being and immovably, must be the foundation and principle of all the other things, since the nature of the being is the first thing in every being, and every movement arises from something immovable.¹³

Having seen that the movements of the will are necessitated in some respect, the next step will be to ascertain in what way, more specifically, the will is determined. However, before delving into this immediately, it is wise to know exactly what is meant by the word "necessary". Then it can more easily be understood as applied to the movement of the will.

"Necessary is that which cannot not be."¹⁴ St. Thomas goes on to say that necessity can be from an intrinsic principle or from an extrinsic principle. Things are said to be necessary from extrinsic principles either in the manner of efficient or final causality. Intrinsically, something can be necessary from material cause, such as corruption, or from formal cause, such as the definition of a triangle, which prescribes that it be such. The will being composed of matter and form, is necessitated intrinsically. However, in its operation, the will could be necessitated or determined in two ways.

"The will is an operative potency which needs to be operated both in the efficient and formal line."¹⁵ The will

is a potency because it is not always in act, nor is it always performing one definite act. As a potency, the will can be moved in two ways, on the part of the subject and on the part of the object. "The will is moved in two ways: first as to the exercise of its act; secondly as to the specification of its act derived from its object."¹⁶ The first pertains to the exercise of the act; whether an action is done or not, or whether it is done well or badly.

If the will were determined in the exercise of its act, it would mean that some outside agent causes the will to act or not to act. This is called the necessity of compulsion. The will cannot be forced by a higher agent in this way. That which is contrary to the inclination of a thing is called violence. A rock has an inclination to fall, but man as an efficient cause, can compel the rock to rise into the air. When the force of the compulsion ceases, the rock, always possessing its proper inclination, falls once more. And so it is with the will. "As regards the exercise of act, it is clear that the will is moved by itself. Just as it moves other potencies, thus it moves itself."¹⁷ The will, like the rock has a natural inclination, namely beatitude. Thus something is voluntary as it follows the inclination of the will.

Since the same will is a certain inclination in so far as it is a certain appetite, it cannot happen that the will wishes something coactively or violently if it wishes something by natural inclination.¹⁸

"The will is moved just as from that which produces the same action of the will."¹⁹ Since the will is responsible

for its actions, the will moves itself. However, since God in creating the will, naturally determined it to beatitude, He alone operates in the will and is always inclining it to beatitude. In this way, He may be called a first cause and the will a second cause. We may say then, "that just as it is impossible that something be both violent and natural, so is it impossible that something be violent and voluntary."²⁰ In this way, God cannot force the will because He has created it as voluntary, and hence any compulsion is contradictory to the voluntary.

The second way in which the will could be necessarily moved is on the part of the object or as regards the specification of act. We have seen that the will is a nature.

In those things that are ordered to each other, the first mode is included in the second and the second mode includes the first. In the same way, the will is included in nature. Therefore, in the will, it is necessary to find not that which is of the will but that which is of nature. This of one's created nature, as from God, it has been ordered in good naturally seeking that.²¹

Hence that which is naturally sought, is sought of necessity.

Because the will is a nature, it is likewise ordered to a certain end by its creator, namely the good in general.

"Just as the object of the intellect is truth, so the object of the will is good."²² Because of the necessity of natural inclination, the will of necessity desires something.

Just as color in act is the object of sight, so is the good the object of the will. Whence if some object is proposed to the will which is universally good according to every consideration, the will naturally tends to that if it desires any-

thing; for it cannot wish the opposite.²³

By the good here mentioned is meant the universal good. It is true that God is universally good in so far as every other good flows from Him. However the connection between good and God is not realized in this life. The good here is the universal concretized good, that which is good on every side and in every respect. If something were proposed to the will which has this reason of good completely, the will cannot not wish it, because it holds the reason of the last end on account of which all things are sought.

Every nature is definitely determined to one definite end. Sight is determined to color, hearing is determined to sound, and the intellect is determined to truth. The rational appetite being a certain nature, is also determined to an end which is good. In this way, the will is moved of necessity by an object.

Up until now, we have considered the two ways in which the human will could possibly be determined. We saw that the very nature of the will prevented it from being actively determined by a higher exterior agent in the exercise of its act. The will, as an operative potency, has the capability of not only moving other things but itself. Any force on this part would be contradictory to its power. But as regards the final cause, in the specification of its act, we have seen that the will, as a nature, is ordered to a definite end which is the universal good. Now it is left to examine the will in

regards to the means toward the end. In our major syllogism, this would correspond to those contingent propositions to which the intellect does not necessarily assent.

In all things, there is some principle for their proper acts. This active or motive principle of action differs somewhat in natural things, in brute animals and in man. In natural things, there is the form which is the principle of action, and there is also an inclination or natural appetite following this form. From this, the action follows. In brute animals, the form apprehended by the senses is singular, and hence, an inclination follows this form just as in natural things. However, brutes differ from things of nature in so far as there can be many different forms apprehended in the senses, whereas there is only one form in natural things. The inclination in a brute may be to eat as it perceives food or to run when it hears strange noises. Intellect and will comprise the motive potency of man. In the natural thing, the form is individuated through matter, whence the inclination is determined to one. Intellectual form is universal because it is observed that many particular things can be apprehended under it. Since human acts are also in singular things which cannot adequate the potency of the universal, the inclination, faced with many possibilities, is not determined to any one of them. Provided a man desires to take a trip, he is able to choose freely the mode of transportation and the route to the destination.

As has been said before, something is said to be necessary when it is determined to one thing. But the will, although it has a natural inclination to the universally good, holds itself indifferently as it were to those particular goods. If this were not true, all men would have to live and act in the very same way if they hoped to attain the one beatitude. If then beatitude were attainable at all, only one person could reach that state, because no two persons can do the same thing at the same time at the same place in the same way. Thus we say that the will does not hold itself necessarily in respect to all things, but only in respect to those to which it is determined by a natural inclination.

God is the first mover of the will. Just as He moves all things by reason of mobile things, so also does He move the will according to its condition, not as from necessity but as holding itself indeterminately to many. As all things are reduced to God Who is the unmoved mover and first principle, so are the mobile things reduced to the immobile, and the indeterminate to the determined as to a principle. Therefore, it is necessary that that to which the will is determined is the principle of the will seeking those things that are not determined. Hence the proper object of the will, namely the common good would be the principle to which the particular goods or the means are ordered. The will must necessarily will the last end, but there are a number of means leading to the end. Among these, the will is not necessarily

determined. To prove this St. Thomas says:

The rational powers, according to the Philosopher, are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.²⁴

In all those individual things that the will desires, there is some good. We know that nothing evil comes from God. In so far as God, the Supreme Good, has created all these things, and in so far as they are all ordered to Him, they are good. However, considering the concretized idea of the universal good, it is readily seen that any one of these particular goods does not fully complete the idea of the universal good. Hence, we may say that some good is lacking in a particular. That which is lacking in a good is called evil in that capacity where the good is not found. St. Thomas in speaking of this good and evil says:

In those things which are ordered to the last end nothing is found evil, but it has some mixture of good; nor therefore is it some good which suffices in all things. Whence whatever is shown to be good or bad can always adhere or flee in contraries, by reason of the other which is in itself; from which it is received, if it is evil simply, as appearing good, and if good simply, as appearing evil. And whence it is that in all things which fall under choice, the will remains free in this alone having determination which naturally seeks happiness and not determining in this or that.²⁵

Thus the particular good does not determine the will.

Although the will is naturally inclined to the good in general, a particular, in so far as it is not good in every respect, is evil in some respect. If the intellect sees the evil primarily, the will of necessity cannot will the object.

However, since particulars are not absolutely good or evil, the will may not desire them for their evil aspect, or it may desire them for their good aspect. Concerning this St. Thomas says:

Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.²⁶

The reason for this is that just as the determined serves as the principle for the indetermined, so does the universal good determining the will serve as a principle for the particular good which is the indeterminating factor. In order that the will be determined by the universal good, there must be some faculty in man that can apprehend this universal and absolute for we will what we have first known. This power of apprehending the universal is the intellect. This determination then is the basis for freedom with regard to the particular good. That which has an intellect can be free according to the particular. In the Contra Gentiles, St. Thomas says:

Beings which have a judgment that is not naturally determined to one thing possess a free will. These are intellectual beings. For the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but the universal good. It follows . . . that the will of an intellectual substance cannot be determined naturally

except to the universal good. Hence whatever be offered to it under the aspect of the good, it is possible for the will to be inclined thereto, since there is no natural determination to the contrary to prevent it. Therefore in all intellectual beings, the will's act resulting from the judgment of the intellect is free; and this is to have liberty of judgment and of choice (*liberum arbitrium*) which is defined as the free judgment of reason. ²⁷

The good in general is the principle for desiring particular goods. The will is confronted with the object of universal good in every act. This happens in so far as the intellect compares the individual or particular good with a certain relation to the universal. If it did not do this, the ultimate practical judgment would have no norm for suggesting to the will that a certain object was a particular good and one to be desired. Hence, every particular good that is desired by the will is not desired as an end but because of the end which is beatitude. Particular goods, then, are means to an end in so far as they go to make up the concretized idea of universal good. As regards this means to the end, the will is not determined, for as we have seen, the will can be brought to something by diverse considerations. The indetermination of the will can be found as regards the exercise of act, the specification of act, and the relation of the means to the last end. Thus three types of freedom of the will are distinguished.

On the part of the object, the will is not determined. In considering this statement, the word, object, must be explained. Here, object is taken to be that which is the means itself. The means most properly speaking, is that which is

for the last end, beatitude. However, it is also seen how the means could be considered as the end when there is some necessary progression towards the means. For instance, our life here on earth is really a means to heaven and beatitude. It can be considered as an end in so far as we must do certain things to maintain this existence.

St. Thomas says that since the will necessarily seeks its last end, it must necessarily seek the means to this end. However, he continues that since the end can be attained in diverse ways, a particular means does not determine the will.

The will is indetermined as regards those things which are to an end, not in regards to the same last end; this happens since the last end can be arrived at in many ways and in diverse things, diverse ways of arriving at it happen. And therefore, the appetite of the will cannot be determined in those things which are for an end just as it is in natural things which do not hold to a certain end, and determined, unless in a certain and determined way. And thus it is evident that natural things, just as they seek an end of necessity, thus also those things which are for an end; as there is nothing in them to receive that which they can seek or not seek. But the will of necessity seeks a last end, as it could not not seek the last end; but it does not seek of necessity some of those things which are for an end. Whence in respect of this, it is in its power to seek this or that.²⁸

There may be some doubt as to freedom of choosing the means when St. Thomas says, "But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way."²⁹ From this it would seem that the will does not exercise freedom in specifying the means to an end. A hundred years ago, if a man wanted to cross the ocean, he had to take a boat. This was the only means possible for him.

It was out of the question to even consider riding a horse, walking, or flying across, because these means were not capable of attaining the end. As it has been seen, this example belongs to the proposition that when the will desires the end, it necessarily desires a means. For all practical purposes, freedom of choosing the means does not come into play here, but nevertheless man still has the freedom although he is not given the occasion to use it. Since the will is not held in respect to many in this instance, but in respect to one, the freedom concerned here is not according to the specification of act but whether it is to act or not. This is called the exercise of act.

This brings us to the second type of freedom of the will, freedom of exercise. We have seen before how the will being an operative potency, can not only move other things, but it can also move itself. Since the exercise of the will is controlled by efficient causality, the object is not taken directly in consideration as a cause. Although the will is determined by the universal good, the acts of the intellect and will are particular. In this regard, the will is able not to desire happiness.

I say of necessity as regards the determination of acts, that it cannot desire the opposite; not as regards the exercise of acts since then someone can wish not to think of happiness since the same acts of intellect and will are particular.³⁰

If this freedom exists when the object is universal, it surely is present when the object is a means. Then the object is not that to which the will is naturally inclined, but only

as a convenient good is it sought. Thus the final causality is less dominant. St. Thomas says as regards the exercise of act:

Concerning the determined object, the will can use its act when it wishes or not use it. This does not happen in natural things . . . It happens that inanimate things are moved not by themselves but by others, whence it is not in themselves to be moved or not moved. However animate things are moved by themselves, and hence it is that the will can will or not will.³¹

The third type of freedom man enjoys is regarding the relation of the means to the end. Here we must again clarify that by end we refer not to the abstract but to the concrete. Beatitude implies a possession of God, and this beatitude is perfect happiness. Hence it would surely have a necessary connection to the good in general (bonum in commune). Both God and those things whereby we inhere in God have a necessary connection to beatitude.

God has a necessary connection with the beatitude of man, but this is not manifestly apparent to man in this life, since he does not see God through His essence. Therefore the will does not of necessity adhere to God in this life. But if man could know God through the essence and beatitude of man, the will could not not desire Him.³²

Eventhough God is the Supreme Good, the will does not of necessity adhere to God and the things that are of God because this connection is not clearly pointed out. In order to explain this, Cardinal Cajetan names the four appetibles.³³ These are; God, beatitude in common, those things whereby we inhere in God, and those things which are of God. These appetibles are ordered as they are in themselves, and also as

they stand in importance as regards ourselves. In their own importance, they are; God, those things whereby we inhere in God (virtues), beatitude in common, and those things which are of God (to live, to be, etc.). These things are appetible, not as ends in themselves, but as means to an end. As far as we are concerned, the appetibles are ordered; beatitude in common, God, those things whereby we inhere in God, and those things which are of God.

Although God is more imminently universally good than beatitude in common, He does not appear to be so to us. We seek God, not directly, but through the created objects which are about us. In this way, we seek God through investigation. The object of the will is that which has been first apprehended by the intellect. Now the intellect knows what it knows through the senses which perceive the particular. Hence the object of the will contains an aspect of goodness and of appearance. The object has been apprehended and assented to by the intellect under an aspect of truth which is a certain good. And since it is perceived by the senses, it has some external form and appearance.

Although those who see God in His essence are moved toward His essence necessarily (they cannot not desire Him), this only applies to those in Heaven. We who are on earth see the effects of God. Since these are particular goods, they do not fulfill the "bonum in commune". Whatever is lacking in a good is called evil. In so far as this particular

good lacks some of the sum total of all possible good, the will may not find some especially sought good in it, and thus not will it. In this way, one may hate God. A man walking in the desert finds a huge rock. He should see this as an effect of God's creation, and admire the goodness of its shape and size. However he is frightfully hungry, and because this object does not possess the goodness of a well baked beef-steak, he hates it and consequently its creator.

We also see God through the reason of beatitude or happiness. This happiness is twofold; imperfect, that which can be lost, and perfect, that which cannot be lost. Man tries to keep the happiness he has, but he is always afflicted with the fear of losing it. Every acquired good that man desires to lack is either insufficient, and something more sufficient is sought in its place, or it has some inconvenience attached to it on account of which it comes to weariness. Man's notion of true happiness would be one that cannot be lost, and one that is the perfect good and sufficient, so that the desire of man would rest in it and exclude all evil.

. . . man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see it. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness;³⁴

And hence, since we of necessity wish to be happy, we necessarily desire God and those things whereby we inhere in God,

once it is made evident that His substance and the common good are one and the same. This is made evident after death.

In this third mode of indetermination, the will does not necessarily adhere to those things which have a necessary connection to beatitude because this connection has not been pointed out or made clear to the will through the intellect. This can happen in two ways; "From indetermination concerning the object in those things which are for an end," and "From indetermination of apprehension which can be right or not right."³⁵ The first of these regards the means available. As has been seen, the will, although its object is the universal good, for all practical purposes, actually desires or rejects particulars. In so far as the means in itself does not partake of the full universality of beatitude, the will is indetermined as regards both the exercise and the specification of act. The second pertains to apprehensive ability of the intellect. Although the will can guide the intellect in so far as it allows it to investigate or not to investigate a certain object, the intellect presents the object it does apprehend as a particular good and one to be desired, or one that is not to be desired. Hence, if the intellect apprehended an object in such a way that it saw the little convenient good and not necessarily the overpowering lack of good, it would present it to the will to be desired. If fornication is apprehended in its complete context the will does not desire it. However when the intellect apprehends it as a

convenient good, or when the will does not allow the intellect to investigate fully, then fornication may be desired. And thus, in the second mode, the intellect does not apprehend the necessary good in its full connection with beatitude. Hence the object may be set before the will as one not to be desired.

Because of these two indeterminations, the will is not determined as regards the moral good or evil. This freedom is called freedom of contrariety. This is really not a mode of freedom, but rather a lack of freedom because it involves ignorance or error. God and the angels have freedom; however they cannot desire evil or sin because there is no possibility of error or ignorance in them. Hence it is better to say that this is not freedom strictly speaking but rather a manifestation of freedom. St. Thomas says:

The third (freedom of relation of means to an end) is not in respect to of all objects but of those certain ones namely which are to an end; nor in respect of a certain state of nature, but of this only in which nature can be deficient. For where there is a defect in apprehending and conferring, there cannot be will of evil in those things which are to an end, just as is clear in the blessed. Thus it is said to wish evil is neither liberty nor a part of liberty.³⁶

To sum up the contents of this paper, nothing better could be done than to go to the master's own words on this subject. St. Thomas gives a very clear and concise treatment on the necessity of the will in the Summa Pars I, Question 82, Article 2:

The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it

desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already. Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy; and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.³⁷

FOOTNOTES

1. Summa Theol. I, 82, 1 and 2.
2. Ibid article 1.
3. In Physica, II, L 15, N 5. Invenitur enim in scientiis demonstrativis necessarium a priori; ... priori quod assumitur ut principium provenit ex necessitate conclusio.
4. ibid (In natura) Si finis est, necesse est quod est ante finem esse... Sic igitur patet quod in iis quae fiunt propter finem eundem ordinem tenet finis, quem tenet principium in demonstrativis.
5. Summa Theol. I, 82, 1.
6. De Ver. 22, 5. (translation by Sullivan. Thomist, 1951, pp. 353, 354.)
7. Summa Theol. I, 60, 1. (ibid p 355)
8. Ibid I, 60, 2 (ibid)
9. ibid I, 84, 1, 3m. (ibid p 356)
10. ibid I-II, 10, 1 (ibid p 357)
11. De Ver. 22, 5. (ibid)
12. Ibid 22, 6. (ibid p 358)
13. Summa Theol. I, 82, 1. (ibid)
14. Ibid
15. Renard, Philosophy of Man, p 177.
16. Summa Theol. I-II, 10, 2. (Sullivan, op. cit. p 359)
17. De Malo, 6. Quantum ergo ad exercitium actus, primo quidem manifestum est quod voluntas movetur a seipsa; sicut enim movet alias potentias, ita et se ipsam movet.
18. De Ver. 22, 5. Sed cum ipsa voluntas sit quaedam inclinatio, eo quod est appetitus quidam, non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid velit, et inclinatio eius non sit in illud; et ita non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid coacte vel violenter velit, si aliquid naturali inclinatione velit.
19. De Malo, 3, 3. Ab interiori autem movetur voluntas, sicut ab eo quod producit ipsum voluntatis actum.
20. Summa Theol. I, 82, 2.
21. De Ver. 22, 5. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod in rebus ordinatis oportet primum modum includi in secundo, et in secundo inveniri non solum id quod sibi competit secundum rationem propriam, sed quod competit secundum rationem primi... Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt, ut ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit; quia omne quod in rebus invenitur, natura quaedam dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est. Hoc autem est cuiuslibet naturae creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illud.
22. II Sent. dist. 25, q^{II}, 2. ... quia objectum intellectus est verum, objectum autem voluntatis est bonum.
23. Summa Theol. I-II, 10, 2.
24. Ibid.

25. II Sent. dist. 25, q. I, 2. In his autem quae ad finem ordinantur, nihil invenitur adeo malum quin aliquod bonum admixtum habeat; nec aliquod adeo bonum quod in omnibus sufficiat; unde quantumcumque ostendatur bonum vel malum semper potest adhaerere, id fugere in contrarium, ratione alterius quod in ipso est; ex quo accipitur si malum est simpliciter, ut apparens bonum; et si bonum est simpliciter, ut apparens malum; et inde est quod in omnibus quae sub electione cadunt, voluntas libera manet, in hoc solo determinationem habens quod felicitatem naturaliter appetit et non determinate in hoc vel illo.
26. Summa Theol. I-II, 10, 2.
27. Contra Gentiles, II, 48. (Renard, op. cit. p. 180.)
28. De Ver. 22, 6. Respectu objecti quidem est indeterminata voluntas quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem, non quantum ad ipsum finem ultimum, ut dictum est, art. praeced.; quod ideo contingit, quia ad finem ultimum multis viis perveniri potest, et diversis diversae viae competunt perveniendi in ipsum. Et ideo non potuit esse appetitus voluntatis determinatus in ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quae ad certum finem it determinatum non habent nisi certam et determinatam viam. Et sic patet quod res naturales, sicut de necessitate appetunt finem, ita et ea quae sunt ad finem; ut nihil sit in eis accipere quod possint appetere vel non appetere. Sed voluntas de necessitate appetit finem ultimum, ut non possit ipsum non appetere; sed non de necessitate appetit aliquid eorum quae sunt ad finem. Unde respectu huius est in potestate eius appetere hoc vel illud.
29. Summa Theol. I, 82, 1.
30. De Malo, 6. Dico autem ex necessitate quantum ad determinationem actus, quia non potest velle oppositum: non autem quantum ad exercitium actus, quia potest aliquis non velle tunc cogitare de beatitudine: quia etiam ipsi actus intellectus it voluntatis particulares sunt.
31. De Ver. 22, 6. Circa objectum determinatum potest uti actu suo cum voluerit, vel non uti; potest enim exire in actum volendi respectu cuiuslibet, et non exire. Quod in rebus naturalibus non contingit: ... Quod exinde contingit, quod res inanimatae non sunt motae a seipsis, sed ab aliis; unde non est in eis moveri vel non moveri: res autem animatae moventur a seipsis; et inde est quod voluntas potest velle it non velle.
32. De Malo, 3, 3. Bonum autem perfectum, quod est Deus, necessarium quidem connexionem habet cum beatitudine hominis, quia sine eo non potest homo esse beatus: verumtamen necessitas huius connexionis non manifeste apparet homine in hac vita, quia Deum per essentiam non videt; et ideo etiam voluntas hominis in hac vita

non ex necessitate Deo adhaeret; sed voluntas eorum qui Deum per essentiam videntes, manifeste cognoscunt ipsum esse essentiam bonitatis et beatitudinem hominis non potest Deo non inhaerere, sicut nec voluntas nostra potest nunc beatitudinem non velle.

33. Cajetan, Commentary of Summa Theol. I, 82, 2.

34. Summa Theol. I-II, 5, 4.

35. De Ver. 22, 6. Et haec indeterminatio ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex indeterminatione circa objectum in his quae sunt ad finem, et iterum ex indeterminatione apprehensionis, quae potest esse recta et non recta;

36. ibid. Tertium vero non est respectu omnium objectorum, sed quorundam eorum, scilicet quae sunt ad finem; nec respectu cuiuslibet status naturae, sed illius tantum in quo natura deficere potest. Nam ubi non est defectus in apprehendendo et conferendo, non potest esse voluntas mali in his quae sunt ad finem, sicut patet in beatis. Et pro tanto dicitur, quod velle malum nec est libertas, nec pars libertatis, quamvis sit quoddam libertatis signum.

37. Summa Theol. I, 82, 2.

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