

Why did President Woodrow Wilson
Send American Troops into Russia in 1918?

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Introduction

On 1 June 1918 President Woodrow Wilson authorized the transfer of six-thousand American troops from France to Archangel and Murmansk in Northern Russia. A month later, 2 July, he made the decision to send an additional seven-thousand troops to Vladivostok, a town in Eastern Siberia. Thus, during the course of the summer President Wilson had dispatched a total of thirteen-thousand American soldiers onto Russian soil.

The causes of the intervention has created many problems for historians. The whole episode is so complex and ideologically loaded that historians cannot agree as to the causes.

There are three main interpretations that attempt to explain this intervention. Soviet historians have held that it was the goal of the western imperialists to destroy the Bolshevik Government of Vladimir Lenin.¹ For the Russians, the western powers (United States, Great Britain, and France) felt threatened by the November Revolution and decided to crush it. The American revisionist historians, William A. Williams² and Robert J. Maddox,³ see the intervention as an attempt to rid the world of the evils of Bolshevism. According to the revisionist school, saving Russia from Bolshevism meant making her like America.

Other historians, such as John White⁴ and Betty Unterber-

ger⁵ see the American presence in Siberia as an effort to keep a watchful eye on the imperialistic aims of the Japanese. This theory states the fear America had towards the Empire of Japan. The United States did not want Japan to use the problems in Russia as a way to expand on her empire. Thus, the United States intervened in Russia to contain Japan.

And yet other historians, George F. Kennan⁶ and Christopher Lasch⁷, hold that the cause of the intervention was motivated by the existence of World War I. For Kennan, only intervention could save the Allies from being defeated by the German Empire. Lasch presents that this was not the case at all. He says that Wilson believed in a series of misconceptions which resulted in his move to intervene. This move, which flowed out of Wilson's idealistic foreign policy, ended in catastrophe.

As the reader can already see--there is no clear cut answer to the question. The move to intervene was one of the hardest decision's Wilson had to make. Wilson told Secretary of State Robert Lansing that "I am sweating blood over the question what is right and feasible to do in Russia."⁸ Why did President Wilson send American forces to Russia? What factors motivated him in making this decision? It is our purpose in this presentation, by looking at the facts and theories, to show that America's presence in Siberia (we will only deal with the Northern Russian intervention when it applies to Siberia) resulted from Wilson's misconception of the situation.

I

The first interpretation we would like to look at is that of the official Soviet one. Pravda was published on September 15, 1957 to help celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the November Revolution.⁹ This document presented the official view of the Soviet Communist Party concerning the allied intervention. The Soviet thesis has two points. First, the intervention took place because the western capitalist were enraged by the results of the November Revolution. "They saw the victory of the socialist revolution as a threat to their own parasitical existence, to their profits and their capital, to all their privileges."¹⁰ Pravda continues: "In the effort to throttle the young republic of the Soviets, the imperialists, led by the leading circles of England, the United States and France, organized military campaigns against our country."¹¹ The second point states that the Bolsheviks, even though they were greatly out numbered, defeated the interventionists in what they called "the most tremendous military and political defeat of world imperialism"¹² and a "demonstration of great vitality and unconquerableness of the young Soviet State."¹³

The Soviets get so wrapped up in their propanganda that they fail to mention the existence of the world war that was still raging. Many believe that the "Cold War" of the 1950's and 1960's actually began with the intervention of 1918. For this reason, it is important for the Soviets to prove that the

United States Government was the aggressor in 1918; and thus, the initiator of the struggle between the two nations which lasted nearly fifty years.

Several American historians also subscribe to an anti-Bolshevik theory in regard to the intervention. One such historian is William Appleman Williams. In his book American-Russian Relations: 1781-1947, Williams presents his interpretation on the intervention in Russia. His view states that the American Government saw Bolshevism as a threat to world peace. Furthermore, he writes, "as long as the Bolsheviks remained in power the U.S. would refuse to establish normal intercourse and would under no circumstance recognize Lenin's government."¹⁴ Wilson's policy towards Russia, which was formed in the winter of 1917-1918, was one of non-support for the newly established Soviet State. Bolshevism stood for everything Wilson hated.¹⁵ Wilson believed that the American way was the only way; holding dearly the principles of democracy and capitalism. He also believed in a "slow process of reform" and considered revolution as a "purile doctrine."¹⁶ The Soviet State was none of these. Thus American policy became one of antagonism which in turn led to intervention. The intervention unified the Bolsheviks to rally behind their government which "deepened the enmity of American policy makers and heightened their determination to outlast the Soviet State."¹⁷

The American policy towards Russia, as stated by Williams,

was that "Washington would do all in its power to aid any serious and conservative leader or group whose aim was the destruction of the Soviet Government."¹⁸ The American Government was looking for a Russian to support, according to Williams, who was anti-Bolshevik. He attributes this fact as the cause for America's delay in intervening. America finally found someone to support in July 1918--Admiral Aleksander Kolchak--and it was only then that Wilson authorized intervention as America's policy towards Russia.¹⁹

In his article Woodrow Wilson, The Russian Embassy and Siberian Intervention, Robert James Maddox states that Wilson's ultimate goal in Russia was to "destroy" the Moscow regime.²⁰ Maddox says that Wilson "refused to recognize the Soviet regime on the grounds it had seized power illegally and did not represent the majority of the Russian people."²¹ It is Maddox's opinion that Wilson strongly believed that the Soviet regime would not last long.²² The United States, therefore, adopted "benevolent patience" as its policy towards the Bolsheviks.²³ The U.S. Government continued to collaborate with leaders of the old Provisional Government with the desire that they would rise to power again. As time passed, Wilson began to realize that only military force could bust the Bolsheviks. Thus, he gave financial and material aid to the "white" armies in the hope that they could defeat the "red" armies of Lenin.²⁴

Each of these theories are different; yet they have one common theme--Wilson was motivated by the desire to "wipe out" Bolshevism. In order to see if these theories are valid we must look at the historical events in Russia and Wilson's attitude towards them.

On March 16, 1917, Nicholas II, the Tsar of the Russian Empire, was deposed by a spontaneous revolution and then replaced by a democratic provisional government under the leadership of Prince Lvov. A week later the Government of the United States became the first nation to begin official diplomatic relations with the new government of Russia. On March 22, 1917, the American Ambassador to Russia, David Francis, in his address to the Council of Ministers delivered the State Department's message of recognition. He concluded by saying: "May they (U.S.-Russian relations) prove mutually satisfactory and beneficial."²⁵

The March Revolution was seen by Americans as a bright moment in history. President Wilson, in his address to Congress on April 2, 1917 asking for the declaration of war on Germany, showed the admiration the United States had towards the Provisional government. Concerning Russia the President said:

Does not every American feel that assurance
has been added to our hope for the future
peace of the world by the wonderful and
hearting things that have been happening
within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia

was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitudes towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great generous Russian people have been added in all their naive majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honor.²⁶

This quotation, even though it reflected America's attitude towards the Provisional Government, showed the naiveness of Wilson's view towards the new government. It was naive for Wilson to believe that the Tsar and his government was not Russian in "origin, character or purpose." The Romanov dynasty was Russia for nearly three centuries. Russia had never been democratic. This unrealistic view of Wilson stemmed from his desire to make Russia like America--to make her a democracy.

This new government, which sparked a ray of hope for the U.S., lasted only eight months. On November 7, 1917, the Bolshevik Party under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky carried out their coup d' etat and took control of Russia. Wilson did not approve of this new Soviet State. Wilson saw the new regime as a minority government that was "Just as autocratic and just as cruelly unmerciful as the government of the Tsar ever was."²⁷

The fact that President Wilson did not approve of the Bol-

shevik government does not prove that he sent American forces to destroy it. Wilson tried to make it clear that the United States planned to stay out of Russia's internal affairs. Early in 1918 during a meeting with General Tusker H. Bliss, American Military representative to the Supreme War Council, Wilson made it clear that the U.S. policy "should not have as its ultimate objective any restoration of the ancient regime or any other interference with the political liberty of the Russian people."²⁸ In his official statement explaining the reasons for intervention, Wilson states the interference in the internal affairs of Russia by the use of military force would "add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia; rather than help her out of her distresses."²⁹ Once again we see Wilson speaking out against intervention for the purpose of ousting the Bolsheviks.

There are facts that go against this. Wilson did furnish Admiral Kolchak's forces with supplies; and the United States did give economic aid to the "white" armies. This came about, however, in late 1918, after U.S. forces were already in Russia. We will speak of this later on.

If we look at the situation during the time Wilson was formulating his decision we can assume that he did not have as his ultimate goal the destruction of the Bolshevik regime by the use of direct American military force.

II

Another theory, held by American historians, is the Anti-Japanese one. The father of this theory, John Albert White, presents this theory in his book The Siberian Intervention. In this book he tells of the selfish aims of the Japanese Empire; and the American motive for intervention as a means to keep them from taking Siberia. White writes that "the conflict of policy between the United States and Japan seems very clear-cut. Japan wanted Eastern Siberia; the United States was determined to prevent her from acquiring it."³⁰ It is true, the Japanese and American purposes for intervention were incompatible. The United States did not become aware of this, however, until after the decision had been made and the troops were in Russia.

During the time Wilson was making his decision--the Japanese appeared to be sincere with regard to the intervention. The Empire of Japan, in March 1918, promised to respect the territorial integrity of Russia; they promised that they would take no side in the internal struggles of Russia; and they promised to advance no farther than what was needed for the "purpose of encountering the Germans."³¹

It appears that, during the early months of 1918, Wilson trusted the Japanese. On March 1, Wilson agreed to let Japan go into Siberia alone. Wilson withdrew this endorsement, however, two days later when anti-Soviets (among them, the Provisional government's Ambassador to the United States) warned that

the Russian people would regard a Japanese unilateral "armed intervention as invasion and would defend themselves, with German arms if need be."³²

George F. Kennan says that if the United States did go to Siberia to keep an eye on the Japanese--then the U.S. "indulged in a paradoxical policy."³³ Japan could not have undertaken her ambitious program without U.S. economic support; which the United States did give her.³⁴

The United States trusted Japan; but this trust was misplaced.³⁵ Once Japan started sending forces into Siberia she made it clear that her purpose for being there was for imperial expansion.³⁶ The United States and Japan had agreed to send seven-thousand troops a piece into Siberia. Japan decided, however, to send more; and so instead of sending seven-thousand she sent seventy-thousand and placed them at all the strategical points in Eastern Siberia (as far as Irkutsk).³⁷ Her motives were clearly for expansion.

When the anti-Japanese theory was being formulated (late 1940's) historians knew what had taken place in Siberia. Their theories were "purely retrospective."³⁸ These theories placed American views towards Japan after the intervention (which was one of anger and fear due to Japan's betrayal of U.S. trust) into the decision making period itself.³⁹ This theory had a propagandistic purpose and must be discarded.⁴⁰ Prior to the intervention, President Wilson had great confidence in the

good faith of the Japanese, who were allies in the war against Germany.

III

Thus far we have presented two theories to explain U.S. intervention in Russia in 1918 (the anti-Bolshevik and the anti-Japanese). The evidence, however, shows that the intervention was launched not at the Bolsheviks nor the Japanese but at the Germans. On April 6, 1917 the United States declared war on the Empire of Germany. During the time Wilson was forming his decision about what to do in Russia, the United States had only one enemy--Germany. Wilson's top priority was winning the war; and he knew that all American resources had to be used to achieve this end.⁴¹ During the first half of 1918 Wilson was not worried about ousting the Bolsheviks or containing the Japanese; he was worried about Germany. Peter Filene writes in his book Americans and the Soviet Experiment that Wilson perceived "the fate of the U.S. and the whole world depended on defeating Germany."⁴² An end to the war was of upmost importance; and Wilson saw Russia as the key to peace.⁴³

The Allies needed Russia to remain on their side. If the Allies could keep Russia in the War, then the German troops would remain divided between the Eastern and Western fronts. The Bolsheviks, however, when they rose to power in November of 1917 demanded an "immediate, general, and democratic peace with the central powers."⁴⁴ They saw the war as an imperialistic war and immediately published all of Russia's secret allied treaties to try and prove it.⁴⁵

On November 29, 1917 Ambassador Francis reported that "military operation on the Russian front had ceased and that preliminary peace negotiations between Russia and Germany would begin on December 2."⁴⁶ All the allies were invited to attend these meetings; none accepted.

On January 8, 1918 Wilson delivered his fourteen point speech before a joint session of Congress. Point six dealt with Russia:

The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing. . ."⁴⁷

Richard Goldhurst sees point six as a bribe.⁴⁸ According to Goldhurst, "Wilson was promising that Russia could go her own way with Allied help and American loans if the Bolsheviks would keep Russia in the War."⁴⁹

In late February 1918, Trotsky asked the Allies what help Russia would receive if she stayed in the war. Ambassador Francis promised them moral and material cooperation "provided organized resistance (against the Germans) was sincerely established."⁵⁰ At a later date Francis said that the United States was "willing to swallow pride, sacrifice dignity, and with discretion do all that is necessary to prevent Russia from

becoming an ally of Germany."⁵¹

The United States tried to keep Russia in the war. She even sent William C. Bullet to Moscow to conduct secret negotiations with the Bolsheviks; but it was not to be. On March 3, 1918 Leon Trotsky left Brest-Litovsk with a treaty that ended the war on the Eastern Front.⁵² Russia had signed a separate peace with Germany.

George F. Kennan holds that it was a gross misconception on the part of Wilson to believe that Russia could be kept in the war.⁵³ She had suffered much from World War I and two revolutions. Germany was presenting a big threat on the eastern front. Russia was fighting for her very existence when she signed the peace with Germany. Wilson nor the Allies could see this point.

The day Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk became a dark day for the Allies. With the Eastern front closed, General Erich Ludendorff was free to transfer forty divisions (of the German army) to the Western front in France.⁵⁴ This move gave the Germans a numerical superiority in the trenches. The treaty also enabled the Germans (if she so desired) to exploit the minerals, resources, wheat, oil, etc., of Russia.⁵⁵

The Allies had a lot to lose should Germany advance farther into Russia. During the period when Russia was an ally in the war, America, Britain, and France had placed a vast amount of war supplies in Russia. Thousands of tons of supplies

lined the waterfronts of the Northern Russian ports of Archangel and Murmansk. After Russia left the war the Bolsheviks began to move these supplies from the waterfront to warehouses; and they renounced all responsibility for payment.⁵⁶ The Allies needed these supplies and could not allow them to get into German hands.

The situation was similar in the Eastern Siberian town of Vladivostok--750,000 tons of supplies estimated at one billion dollars had been stored there.⁵⁷ It was imperative for the Allies to gain control of these supplies before the Germans did.

The Northern Russia situation presented another problem for the Allies. The Germans could move across the Finnish border and seize the ports of Archangel and Murmansk in order to establish submarine bases there.⁵⁸ These ports were important for the Allies for shipping supplies out of Russia.

The Trans-Siberian Railroad was another concern for the Allies. It was vital to have control of it for the purpose of moving supplies across Russia. The Americans had pumped a great amount of money and energy in developing it for use in the war effort. The Trans-Siberian Railroad was important for another reason also--control of Manchuria. Manchuria was rich in minerals, coal, iron ore, etc. Who ever controlled the railroad controlled Manchuria; it was vital to keep this in ally hands.⁵⁹ *One of the main reasons for the war was to control the Trans-Siberian Railroad.*

As the reader can see, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk created many problems for the Allies. It is for that reason that the Allies felt betrayed when Russia left the war. The Allies needed Russia and it appeared to them that she had abandoned them. On September 15, 1914 Russia had signed the Pact of London.⁶⁰ One important stipulation of the treaty was the assurance that no allied government would make a separate peace with the central powers.⁶¹ The Allies saw Brest-Litovsk as breaking the Pact of London.

The reaction to the Treaty by the Allies was one of anger. General Berthelot, French head of the Military mission on the Eastern front, said on November 25, 1917 that "we will not recognize any government in Russia capable of entering into an agreement with the enemy."⁶² The British also were provoked by the treaty. They wanted to send a military force into Russia; but lacked the manpower to assemble a strong intervening force (she did land a small force in Russia four days after Brest-Litovsk had been signed in order to protect British interests in Russia). They had, as their motive for wanting intervention, the destruction of Lenin's government. They needed, however, U.S. help. England and France decided that they would have to "coax, persuade or hoodwink Wilson to supply troops"⁶³ for the intervention. They needed Wilson to get involved and they realized that they could only do that by convincing him that it was a vital part of the war effort. They began to make plans.⁶⁴

The British and French tried to get Wilson involved by

saying intervention in Russia could open the Eastern front again. Wilson knew, however, that this would be impractical; thus, he refused to help.⁶⁵ They began to place enormous pressure on President Wilson.⁶⁶ The pressure by the English and French plus the strains of the war began to take a toll on Wilson. He began to become so disillusioned that he could not see the situation clearly.⁶⁷

Wilson began to believe in several misconceptions. One was that the Bolsheviks were German agents--an extension of Kaiserism.⁶⁸ This belief was based on several facts. When the February Revolution failed to achieve Bolshevism, Lenin watched the events from Switzerland where he was in exile. When he was ready to return to Russia, the Germans transported him through their lines and freed him at the Finland Station.⁶⁹ There he was reunited with his comrades who would help him overthrow the Provisional Government. During this time the Bolshevik Party had received significant amounts of money from the Germans. These facts plus the signing of Brest-Litovsk gave many the idea that Lenin was a German puppet. Edgar Sisson was an American who was sent to Russia to investigate this situation. He concluded in his work The Sisson Documents that the Bolsheviks were indeed German agents.⁷⁰ Eventhough The Sisson Documents proved to be false, Wilson placed his trust in them.⁷¹

Another misconception was the presence of Germans in Russia. After the treaty of Brest-Litovsk Russia released all her prisoners of war. It was a common belief that Russia supplied

the German-Austrian P.O.W.'s with weapons and military supplies.⁷² Their presence in Russia was seen as a threat to the Allies. It was believed that these soldiers had the manpower to take control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and munition storehouses of the Allies. The fact was that these former prisoners did not present a threat; yet once again Wilson was misinformed.⁷³

One final situation that was decisive for Wilson to act was that of the Czech army. During the early stages of World War I a group of Czechs were reluctant soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian army. They were captured by the Russians and placed for several years in a prison camp. When the Tzar's regime was toppled they were released. Once freed, they decided to fight on the side of the Allies; so they organized themselves into a well disciplined army (40,000 men strong) and in 1917 began to fight gallantly on the Russian front for the Russian Provisional Government.⁷⁴

After the Bolsheviks came to power the Czech Legion found themselves surrounded by enemies; so they decided to go to France and fight the Germans on the Western front. The route they were to take was a difficult task. They had to travel eastward, 5,000 miles across Siberia to Vladivostok. From there they had to cross the Pacific Ocean, the continental United States, the Atlantic Ocean, and on to France.⁷⁵

In March 1918(at the time of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty) the Soviets gave the Czech Legion permission to cross Russia in

order to get to Vladivostok; so they began their journey. On April 5, the Russian Government told the Czechs to halt and to go no farther. The Bolsheviks had a fear of the Czechs leading counterrevolutionary actions and thus tried to disarm them. When the Soviets demanded the Czech Legion's weapons--fighting broke out between the two sides. The fighting broke out in May and by June the Czechs had taken control of Vladivostok.⁷⁶

Wilson had a great emotional appeal for the Czech Legion. They were a small group who had suffered greatly under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Czechs wanted to be free and Wilson saw this as a part of the war--to help the Czechs become a free people. By July 2, 1918, Wilson realized that the Czechs in Vladivostok were in trouble and had to be saved. As much as he wanted to stay out of Russia, he could no longer stand by and watch. He wanted the war with Germany to end and it appeared to him that Russia was a vital step towards that goal. On July 3, 1918, President Wilson decided to join Japan and launch a military expedition into Russia for the purposes of aiding the Czechs in their fight against the Germans P.O.W.'s (Wilson did not know the Czechs were fighting Bolsheviks), to guard the munition storehouses, and to take control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.⁷⁷

IV

The American involvement in the Russian intervention of 1918-1920 is summed up quite well by Richard Goldhurst. He writes:

If nothing else, the Russian intervention is one of the classic examples of where war starts; in war rooms all over the world; warm, well-appointed rooms where men can play politics and dwell on the certainty of results rather than the magnitude of catastrophe.⁷⁸

In his executive order of August 3, 1918, President Wilson stated the reason for launching the Russian intervention:

As the Government of the United States see the present circumstances, Military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present objectives for which American troops will be employed will be to guard the military stores which may be subsequently needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.⁷⁹

This is the reason Wilson decided to send troops to Russia and for no other reason. As we said before, however, Wilson was so tensely involved with defeating Germany that he could not see the events clearly. When the Americans arrived in Russia they found a quite different situation.

It was not Austrian-German prisoners fighting the Czechs-- but the Bolsheviks. In fact, the U.S. quickly realized after entering Russia that the German prisoners presented no real threat. The United States also realized, after the intervention had begun, that the Japanese aims were imperialistic. They had sent 70,000 troops for the sole purpose of taking Eastern Siberia and gaining control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Since the situation was different, the American policy towards Russia had to change. In order to help the Czechs the U.S. found herself fighting not Germans but Bolsheviks. The U.S. had intervened into Russia to work with the Japanese; but because of her imperialistic aims the U.S. found herself trying to contain Japan. To help her in this difficult task the United States began to support the "white" armies (during the course of the Intervention the United States gave Kolchak's forces close to ten million dollars to be used in the civil war).

Wilson quickly learned that it was going to be "harder to get out than it was to go in."⁸⁰ The problem was how to get out, after the war had ended in November 1918, without leaving Russia in total ruins, torn by the civil war and threatened by Japan. Because of Wilson's principles he could do only one thing, use military force to try and bring the situation to some kind of a conclusion.

The American forces left Archangel and Murmansk in July

1919 and the last American force's left Vladivostok on April 1, 1920--the Allied intervention in Russia had ended.

Many American soldiers died in Russia during the year and a half they were there. After the "pull out" President Wilson said that America had achieved all of her goals for being in Russia. This was not the case at all. America had walked into a catastrophe, as a result of Wilson's mistakes, and it took a struggle for her to bring the intervention to a conclusion.

NOTES

¹George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), p. 66.

²William A. Williams, American Russian Relations 1781-1947 (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1952),.

³Robert J. Maddox, "Woodrow Wilson, the Russian Embassy and Siberian Intervention," Pacific Historical Review, 36, No. 4 (1967).

⁴John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950).

⁵Betty Miller Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920: A Study of National Policy(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1956).

⁶Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, pp. 64-119.

⁷Christopher Lasch, "American Intervention in Siberia: Reinterpretation," Political Science Quarterly, 77, No. 2 (1962), 205-223.

⁸Lasch, p. 214.

⁹Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, p. 64.

¹⁰Ibid., p.65.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Williams, American Russian Relations, p.105.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 107.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Williams, American Russian Relations, p. 106.

²⁰Maddox, p. 448.

²¹Ibid., p. 438.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p.440.

²⁵Stanley S. Jados, Documents on Russian-American Relations (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965), p. 218.

²⁶Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, p. 19.

²⁷Jados, p. 43.

²⁸Goldhurst, p. 13.

²⁹Jados, p. 44.

³⁰White, pp. 261-262.

³¹Kennan, The Decision to Intervene(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p.384.

³²Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 42.

³³Goldhurst, p. 78.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Lasch, p. 216.

³⁶Goldhurst, p. 78.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Lasch, p. 208.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 217.

⁴²Edward B. Parsons, Wilsonian Diplomacy: Allied-American Rivalries in War and Peace (St. Louis: Forum Press, 1978), p. 43.

⁴³Kennan, The Decision to Intervene, p. 35.

⁴⁴Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, p. 10.

⁴⁵Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, p. 33.

⁴⁶Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, p. 10.

⁴⁷Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. III (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1927), p. 159.

⁴⁸Goldhurst, p. 18.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, p. 36.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 11.

⁵²Goldhurst, p. 1.

⁵³Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, p. 60.

⁵⁴Goldhurst, p. 1.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin,
p. 68.

⁵⁷White, p. 137.

⁵⁸Goldhurst, p.3.

⁵⁹Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin,
p. 91.

⁶⁰John Bradley, Allied Intervention in Russia 1917-1920
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), p.1.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²White, p. 214.

⁶³Goldhurst, p. 7.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Unterberger, "President Wilson and the Decision to
Send American Troops to Siberia," Pacific Historical Review,
22 (1) (1955), p. 67.

⁶⁶Kennan, Russia and the West, p. 95.

⁶⁷Lasch, p. 223.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Goldhurst, p. 2.

⁷⁰Parsons, p. 47.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, p. 46.

⁷³Lasch, p. 218.

⁷⁴Baker, p. 553.

⁷⁵Goldhurst, p.8.

⁷⁶White, p. 421.

⁷⁷Kennan, The Decision to Intervene, p. 207.

⁷⁸Goldhurst, p. 267.

⁷⁹Jados, p. 44.

⁸⁰Lasch, p. 216.

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APPENDIX I

Chronology

1917

March 14	Establishment of the Russian Provisional Government
March 16	Abdication of the Tsar
March 22	United States recognizes the Provisional Government
April 2	President Wilson sends war message to Congress
November 7	Petrograd Soviets assume power in Russia
December 3	Brest-Litovsk talks began between Russia and Germany
December 14	Public French demand for a Siberian intervention.

1918

January 12	Japanese cruiser arrives at Vladivostok
February 18	Start of German advances into Russia
March 3	Soviets sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
March 5	Lenin and Trotsky request American aid
March 7	British land at Murmansk
March 26	Soviets agree to permit Czech to return to Europe via Vladivostok
March 30	Report on prisoners in Siberia
April 4	First Czech forces arrive at Vladivostok
April 4-5	Japanese landing party at Vladivostok

May 3	Order of Gaidai to the Czechs regarding movement to Vladivostok
May 14	First major Czech-Soviet incident
May 25	Trotsky order to disarm all Czechs
	Beginning of Czech uprising
June 1	Wilson authorized diverting troops from France to Murmansk and Archangel
June 7	First establishment of White Government under Czech auspices
June 20	Official allied decision to use Czech legion as a temporary interventionary force
June 29	Czech seizure of Vladivostok
July 2	Supreme War Council appeals to Wilson to reconsider an urgent intervention in Siberia to help save the Czechs. Wilson's answer is yes.
July 6	Establishment of temporary allied protectorate over Vladivostok.
July 17	<u>The Aid Memoire</u>
July 29	Lenin declares a state of war with Anglo-French capitalism
August 3	British and Japanese forces land at Vladivostok
August 16	First American Expeditionary Force lands in Siberia
November 5	America organizes the Russian Bureau to stimulate trade in Siberia
November 11	Armistice signed bringing World War I to an end
November 18	Admiral Kolchak becomes Supreme Ruler
<u>1919</u>	
Feburary	Wilson calls off the Northern intervention.

Due to weather, however, it is months before troops are able to leave.

August 8	Official American refusal to participate in the allied blockade of Soviet Russia
September	British withdrawal from Siberia
December 29	General Graves receives notice of American withdrawal from Siberia
 <u>1920</u>	
January 9	Official announcement to Japan of American intention to withdraw from Siberia
January	Kolchak surrenders to the Soviets
January 16	Allies declare opening of trade relations with Soviet Russia
January 31	Establishment of Provisional Government in Vladivostok
February 7	Execution of Admiral Kolchak
February 27	Japan's official announcement of a qualified withdrawal from part of Siberia
April 1	Last American forces leave Vladivostok End of allied intervention of Russia
April 1-- October 25, 1922	Japanese phase of intervention

APPENDIX II

Executive Order
August 3, 1918

To American Diplomatic Representatives:

. . .This Government is in receipt of information from reliable sources that the peaceable Russian citizens of Moscow, Petrograd, and other cities are suffering from an openly avowed campaign of mass terrorism and are subject to wholesale executions. Thousands of persons had been shot without even a form of a trial; ill-administered prisons are filled beyond capacity, and every night scores of Russian citizens are recklessly put to death; and irresponsible bands are wetting their brutal passions in the daily massacres of untold innocents. In view of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to befriend the Russian people and lend them all that is possible of assistance in their struggle to reconstruct their nation upon principles of democracy and self-government, and acting therefore solely in the interest of the Russian people themselves, this Government feels that it cannot be silent or refrain from expressing its horror at this state of terrorism. Furthermore, it believes that in order to check the further increase of the indiscriminate slaughter of Russian citizens all civilized nations should register their abhorrence of such barbarism.

You will inquire, therefore, whether the Government to which you are accredited will be disposed to take some immediate action, which is entirely divorced from the atmosphere of belligerency and the conduct of war, to impress upon the perpetrators of these crimes the aversion with which civilization regards their present wanton acts.

In the judgement of the Government of the United States-- a judgement arrived at after repeated and very searching considerations of the whole situation--military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia, rather than help her out of her distresses. Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would, in its judgement, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own or to feed their own men, women, and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, of winning on the western front, and it would, in the judgement of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any effort at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard the military stores which may be subsequently needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

With such objects in view, the Government of the United States is now cooperating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, as far as it may, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and the Japanese Government has con-

sented.

In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia--not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military forces may be obliged to occupy--and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.

These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Government of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgement of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war.

It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity

to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisors, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will now be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks.

It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Governments with which it is associated will, wherever necessary or possible, lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.

--Woodrow Wilson
President of the United States of America.

