

Totalitarianism, if not Inevitable, a Likely Eventuality;  
An Examination of the Early Development of the New Soviet  
State and Communist Autocracy

A Research Paper  
Submitted to the Faculty of  
Saint Meinrad College of Liberal Arts  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

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May 3, 1985  
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## Introduction

In the concluding chapter of her book, entitled A History of the Soviet Union 1917-1953 Volume Two Stalin, Order Through Terror, Hélène Carrère D'Encausse defines a modern totalitarian system as a combination of the following:

an official ideology which excludes any other ideology and removes from the citizens the freedom to think outside it; a single party which holds the monopoly of decision and action; the grip of the State on all the armed forces; a State monopoly of the media and of all the means of diffusing ideas; finally, a terroristic police control.<sup>1</sup>

All of these characteristics described above were contained within the Stalinist political system. Between the years 1929 and 1953 Stalin took this process one step further by replacing the dictatorship of the proletariat with the total power of one man, himself, supported by three apparatuses; the Party, the State, and the police, the latter serving as the instrument of authority which dominated the others. Governing his country by forcing it to endure almost constant terror, he broke down the will of the people and atomized Russian society.<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of this work is not to study Stalin's political system or career, but rather in contrast to what many devoted Leninists believe to show that terror and illegality preceded Stalin and were inherent in the very structure of the Communist regime created and nurtured by Lenin.<sup>3</sup>

This thesis is best captured in a quote from the epilogue of Paul Avrich's work entitled Kronstadt 1921. Avrich, while

examining the uprising of sailors at the Kronstadt naval base in the context of the political development of the new Soviet State, concludes the following.

It is often said," remarked Victor Serge, "that 'the germ of Stalinism was in Bolshevism at its beginning.' Well, I have no objection. Only, Bolsheviks also contained many other germs -- a mass of other germs -- and those who lived through the enthusiasm of the first years of the victorious revolution ought not to forget it... During the early twenties, in other words, a number of different paths remained open to Soviet society. Yet, as Serge himself emphasized, a pronounced authoritarian streak had always been present in Bolshevik theory and practice. Lenin's ingrained elitism, his insistence on centralized leadership and tight party discipline, his suppression of civil liberties and sanction of terror -- all this left a deep imprint on the future development of the Communist party and Soviet state. During the Civil War Lenin had sought to justify these policies as short-term expedients required by an emergency situation. But the emergency was never to end, and meanwhile the apparatus for a future totalitarian regime was being built. With the defeat of Kronstadt and the smothering of the left-wing opposition, the last effective demand for a toilers' democracy passed into history. Therefore, totalitarianism, if not inevitable, was a likely eventuality.<sup>4</sup>

In this context, therefore, it is the goal and purpose of this study, to demonstrate that Lenin's policies and beliefs, especially as exemplified by the manner in which he handled the Kronstadt uprising of March, 1921, helped to make totalitarianism in the Soviet Union, "if not inevitable, a likely eventuality."<sup>5</sup> In order to accomplish this task I will be examining Lenin's concept of the party, his dismantling of the Constitutional Assembly, his sanction of terror and suppression of civil liberties, his approval and encouragement for the creation of the Cheka, the creation of forced labor and

concentration camps, his dealings with opposition both from those inside his own party and from those outside of it, war communism, the Kronstadt uprising of 1921, the 10th Party Congress, and the adoption of the New Economic Plan.

## Chapter 1

Although Lenin had hoped to transform Russia's oligarchic society and had envisioned Soviet society, as a result of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to be a union of millions of toilers held together by the ideological union of the principles of Marxism strengthened by the material union of an organization, his concept of the party had a pronounced authoritarian streak in both theory and practice which would have a profound impact on the early development of the new Soviet State.<sup>6</sup>

After considering the long struggle of his fellow revolutionaries in the early twentieth century, Lenin had seen what he called the necessity for a highly organized, well disciplined and unified party responding to the will of a decisive leader.<sup>7</sup> He demanded that the revolution be lead by a small group of professional revolutionaries, and that this tightly-knit group be totally obedient and unquestionably committed to the will of the party's leadership as well as to its ideological program.<sup>8</sup> In addition, he contended that the party was, "to avoid the intellectual vices of continuous doctrinal dispute, indecision, humanitarian scruples, and the like".<sup>9</sup> The goal of this 'vanguard elite' as it has been termed by Lenin was, to indoctrinate, organize and lead the proletariat.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the party Lenin had in mind was to be totally centralized and authoritarian, which he claimed would be an effective means in the struggle against autocracy.<sup>11</sup> In

practice this meant the rejection of a broadly based popular party with open membership, and more importantly parliamentary democracy.<sup>12</sup> This is witnessed with the formation of the Bolshevik faction, and in the dismantling of the Constituent Assembly.

When the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets established the first Soviet Government on November 8, 1917 it was determined that the Soviet of People's Commissars, which Lenin was the head of, or the Sovnarkom as it came to be known, was to administer the country until the Constituent Assembly provided otherwise.<sup>13</sup> This had relieved much of the tensions created by the Bolsheviks' seizure of power. The fact that the Constituent Assembly was postponed as late as it had been was one of the Bolsheviks major charges against the Provisional Government. The immediate calling of the Constituent Assembly was one of Lenin's main slogans from April to November 1917. Once in power, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were faced with the responsibility of calling the assembly. In this way the Bolsheviks pledge to hold an election and to call the Assembly were plain enough. They could not flatly repudiate their promise, but nor as they feared were they guaranteed control of the Constituent Assembly once it was elected.<sup>14</sup>

When the elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on November 25-27, 1917, the Right Social Revolutionaries who enjoyed widespread support especially among Russia's largest social grouping, won a clear majority despite the fact that

Lenin had tried to neutralize the election process by having the ballots cast not for individuals but for party lists, and by empowering the Soviets to recall the delegates from the Constituent Assembly.<sup>15</sup> In addition, when this procedure failed to provide the desired results that Lenin had hoped the Soviet Government arrested many leaders of the opposition together with members of the election commission, which itself was ordered disbanded.<sup>16</sup>

Even beyond this, on the occasion of the convening of the Constituent Assembly the Constitutional Democratic Party, better known as the Cadet Party, was outlawed and arrests of its members were carried out.<sup>17</sup> The Bolsheviks also carried out a media blitz. On October 21st, for example, the Bolshevik Daily contained the following slogan, "The proletarian revolutionary party--the only consistent and uncompromising party of the revolution--the Bolsheviks must be elected to the Constituent Assembly in massed rows."<sup>18</sup>

But, even with this Bolshevik coercion and propaganda, the results of the elections were worse than Lenin and the Bolsheviks had anticipated. Of the approximate thirty-six million Russians who went to the polls nearly 58 percent voted for the Right Socialist Revolutionaries.<sup>19</sup> John M. Thompson in his book, Revolutionary Russia, 1917, reports that the results of the only democratic election in Russian history were as follows:



Parties	Votes (millions)	% of Vote	Assembly Seats
SRs	20.9	58%	410
Bolsheviks	9	25%	175
Kadets, etc.	4.6	13%	103
Mensheviks	1.7	4%	16

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Thus, the majority of Russian citizens were conferring upon the Socialist Revolutionaries and not the Bolsheviks the mandate to govern the country, and to shape its constitution despite Lenin's claim that such a government would lead Russia to destruction. The Russian people had voted in favor of a moderate democratic Socialism against Lenin.<sup>21</sup> Lenin considered this absurd, he believed contrary to the SRs, that organization, discipline, and a unified party were indispensable for the success of the working-class revolution. (26-361) Many felt that the Right SRs platform was vague and lacked concrete directives.<sup>22</sup>

When the Constituent Assembly met on January 18-19, 1918, in the Tavride Palace it did so in a tense atmosphere. In addition to the deputies, the Palace, both inside and out, was under the careful watch of armed soldiers and sailors, who were in league with the Bolsheviks. Right from the start of the Assembly, Lenin experienced opposition. Victor M. Chernov, a Socialist Revolutionary Party leader, was elected the Assembly's president by a vote of 244 to 151 over the Bolshevik sponsored candidate Maria Spiridonova, a leading left SR.<sup>23</sup> While

addressing the Constituent Assembly, amid the fire of constant interruptions, Chernov expressed his hope that the Assembly meant an end to Russia's nebulous transitional period. In reference to foreign policy he said that the Constituent Assembly would pursue a democratic peace without annexations, and would not sign a separate peace with Germany. Chernov concluded further by stating that if the Soviets would join with, "the Assembly and respected the will of the people; there would be peace and freedom in Russia; if not, civil war was inevitable."<sup>24</sup>

Next, after a debate in which the moderate socialist parties attacked the Bolsheviks' methods, namely, "concentration of power in their hands, arrest of socialist deputies--and defended the idea that socialism was a premature option for Russia", the Bolshevik-sponsored "Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People", which was a summary of the changes the Bolsheviks' had introduced in Russia since their takeover of power, was rejected by the Assembly by a vote of 237 to 138.<sup>25</sup> Thereupon the Bolsheviks and the left-wing Social Revolutionaries left the Assembly in protest. In their absence, the Assembly rejected the Bolshevik dictatorship, approved an armistice with the Germans, passed a land decree, declared Russia a republic, and called for the convocation of an international socialist conference.<sup>26</sup> Under pressure from the guards, the Assembly adjourned on the morning of the 19th at approximately five o'clock, never to open again.<sup>27</sup> The Central

Executive Committee on Lenin's orders had dissolved the Constituent Assembly, and when the deputies returned to the Palace the next morning they were turned away by armed soldiers.<sup>28</sup> An unarmed demonstration followed, but was dispersed forcibly leaving several casualties.<sup>29</sup> Thus ended the sole freely elected parliament in the history of Russia.<sup>30</sup>

Ironically, there was no major protests to speak of from the Russian people at large. Thompson addresses the issue and explains that this can be attributed to two main factors. First the country as a whole lacked any real democratic tradition. And secondly, that the Russian population, perplexed by the multiplicity of existing political parties and exhausted by three years of war, were basically more concerned with daily survival at this point than the formation of the Constituent Assembly.<sup>31</sup>

Lenin, in seeking a theoretical justification for dissolving the Assembly, argued that the Constituent Assembly was both bourgeois and parliamentary, and thus an obstacle to the October Revolution. He believed the Constituent Assembly's methods of dealing with Russia's problems would lead Russia to disaster and further argued that the Assembly represented a step backwards relinquishing the power of the Soviets, and that it would lead to the collapse of the people's revolution.<sup>32</sup> On January 19, 1918, at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet, Lenin declared that the Constituent Assembly was just another means to exploit the Russian people. Lenin stated

that, "to hand over power to the Constituent Assembly would again be compromising with the malignant bourgeoisies."<sup>33</sup> Lenin stated further that the true will and interest of the toiling and exploited classes' would best be served if the Constituent Assembly unconditionally accepted Soviet power.<sup>34</sup>

This proved to be most effective for Lenin. For by associating the will of the people with the Soviet and by maintaining that a republic of Soviets was the highest form of democracy, Lenin was able to persuade many that the Constituent Assembly was linked to either the old bourgeois system or the Provisional Government, and that it would only lead Russia to further chaos. Thus, Lenin's policies lead to the usurption of the legitimacy that once had been the Constituent Assembly's.<sup>35</sup>

Lenin and the Bolsheviks believing that they alone had the solutions to Russia's difficulties, and they would not accept upon themselves any form of democratic control.<sup>36</sup> The Constituent Assembly had no intention of relinquishing the power of the Soviets as Lenin had claimed. Nor was it simply linked to the old system or the Provisional Government as Lenin claimed. Once in power Lenin had no intention of remitting to the Constituent Assembly the power to rule, not even in some minor capacity.<sup>37</sup> This development was to have a lasting effect on the structure of the new Soviet State. In his book, Thompson states that:

In dissolving the Constituent Assembly, Lenin and the Bolsheviks simply set the seal on a policy they had already formulated--that they would establish a one-party dictatorship and brook no political

opposition.<sup>38</sup>

Lenin choose the course that would lead to a one party dictatorship despite protest from members of his own party. As early as November 17, 1917, a number of Bolshevik Commissars headed by Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov resigned in protest of Lenin's policy of refusing to form a coalition government. At the same time Leo Borisovich Kamenev, the president of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, resigned his post in protest. This group, whom for the most part were reconciled to the party at later dates, issued a revealing statement which contained insight into the future.<sup>39</sup> The statement read:

We hold that it is necessary to form a Socialist government comprising all the Soviet parties...We consider that beside this there is only one other path: the maintenance of a purely Bolshevik government by means of political terror. On this path the Council of People's Commissars has entered. We cannot and do not wish to enter it. We see it to lead to the estrangement of the mass proletarian organizations from leadership of political life, to the institution of an irresponsible regime, and<sup>40</sup> to the destruction of the Revolution and the country.

In hindsight we know the truth this statement contained, for in a few short years the new Communist government was to resort to a terror that far surpassed that of the Tsarist times.

In conclusion, even before the Constituent Assembly met, Lenin had already put together the essentials for a repressive regime.<sup>41</sup> Its dissolution, which effectively meant the destruction of representative government, the major principle for which the revolution had been fought, allowed Lenin and the Bolsheviks to consolidate their power, and left them free to

decide for themselves the form of government, and thus the future of the new Soviet state.<sup>42</sup>

## Chapter 2

Terror, in the words of Rosa Luxemburg, was an inescapable part of Lenin's, "ideological approach to the seizure and maintenance of authority, and the type of centralized state he was determined to create."<sup>43</sup> From the very beginning of his career as head of the Soviet Union, Lenin had found it necessary as he saw it, to impose political oppression upon anyone who opposed what latter came to be known as Leninism.<sup>44</sup> This process began with the above mentioned outlawing of the liberal democratic Kadet Party, and the dispersal of the Constitutional Assembly, and continued with a series of measures which included; the encouragment of an all out class war throughout the entire country, the institution of capital punishment, the creation of the CHEKA, the creation of forced labor and concentration camps, and the suppression and destruction of political opponents.

In December of 1917, Lenin launched his campaign of terror, encouraging the masses to take part in an all out class war in the name of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.<sup>45</sup> A fierce struggle, lead by the workers and the poorer peasantry against the former privileged classes followed, raging through both the country's cities and villages. Lenin deliberately had stirred up bitter antagonism against what he called the former oppressor classes.<sup>46</sup> Lenin, as a justification for the use of terror, expressed that resistance to the revolution must be

crushed by the same means by which the propertied classes had suppressed the proletariat. But, the application of terror which Lenin was to use was to far out-weigh that of the propertied classes prior to the revolution. This terror can be best described as a gross denial of civil rights which eventually lead to a denial of life itself.<sup>47</sup>

With the beginning of the Civil War in 1918, and according to Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn in his work entitled The Gulag Archipelago, An Experiment in Literary Investigation "a new era of executions was inaugurated."<sup>48</sup> Capital punishment which had been abolished by the Provisional Government in the February Revolution but reinstated in the active army and front-line area for military crimes in July, was a crucial issue for Lenin. When it was outlawed in October 1917 at the Second Congress of Soviets, Lenin missing the inactment, was outraged to no end. He exclaimed, "Nonsense, how can one make a revolution without firing squads? This is a mistake, an inadmissible weakness, a pacifist illusion."<sup>49</sup> Eventually, Lenin was persuaded that an annulment of the Congress's decree would make an unfavorable impression, so he accepted the compromise suggestion to simply wait to start executions at a more opportune time.<sup>50</sup>

This opportunity and even more was offered Lenin with the advent of the Red and White Civil War. The death penalty was restored by Lenin and the Bolsheviks on June 16, 1918. An important qualification though, with regard to the reinstatement, was its evasiveness. The announcement of the



Bolsheviks did not officially sanction the measure, rather it causistically stated that 'Revolutionary Tribunals are not bound by any limitations in their choice of measures to combat counter-revolution, sabotage, etc.'<sup>51</sup> This evasiveness to the death penalty, an aversion that was to persist under the Bolshevik regime, typified Lenin's official sanctions of terror.<sup>52</sup>

Lenin's true views on the death penalty are expressed in clear terms in a report of his before the Sovnarkom on July 5, 1918, in which he states that a revolutionary cannot dispense with the death penalty, and that there has never been a revolution, or era of civil war, without executions.<sup>53</sup> In addition, Lenin spoke of the death penalty in a speech at a CHEKA conference in February, 1920, not in terms of morality but that of convenience: 'For us this question is one of expediency.'<sup>54</sup>

The reintroduction of the death penalty gave the class war a violent new dimension which is best illustrated in a CHEKA proclamation published in Izvestia at the time of the October Revolution by Yakov Khristo Forovich Peters, a secret police official, which calls upon the working class to crush that which is counter-revolutionary by applying mass terror:

Let the enemies of the working class remember that anyone arrested when carrying arms without the necessary permits and identity papers will be subject to instant execution; anyone who dares to agitate against Soviet authority will be arrested immediately and confined in a concentration camp. The representatives of the bourgeoisie must come to feel the heavy hand of the working class. All

representatives of plundering capital, all marauders and speculators will be set to forced public labour and their properties will be confiscated; persons involved in counter-revolutionary plots will be destroyed and crushed by<sup>55</sup> the heavy hammer of the revolutionary proletariat.

The same issue of Izvestia contained a telegram from Stalin which called for "open, mass, systematic terror against the bourgeoisie and its agents."<sup>56</sup>

A brutal example of Lenin's application of terror came on the night of July 16/17, 1918, when A. G. Beloborodov, chairman of the Bolshevik Ural Regional Soviet sentenced the Imperial Family, the deposed Tsar, Tsaritsa Alexandra, their four daughters, and Tsarevich Alexei, together with four personal attendants who all had been evacuated to the Ural Region's capital (Ekaterinburg) in April, to death. P. M. Bykov, the chairman of Ekaterinburg Soviet and member of the Ural Regional Soviet, relates that there had been a public trial slated for the Romanovs in late July by the VTsIK, All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, with Trotsky as the prosecutor. But, with the mid-July threat to Ekaterinburg by advancing Czechoslovak and White forces, Beloborodov, with Moscow's consent, was prompted to kill the Imperial family secretly in mid-July. The same ruthlessness was to guide the Bolsheviks to eliminate almost all the Romanovs they could lay their hands on.<sup>57</sup>

Terror as a means of attaining and perserving power became an administrative technique for Lenin.<sup>58</sup> "To effect such a terror, to police such a regime," according to George Leggett in

his book, entitled The CHEKA, Lenin's Political Police, a suitable agency was required.<sup>59</sup> The extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-revolution and Sabotage, known by its Russian initials as the CHEKA and created on December 20, 1917, just six weeks after his October Revolution, was just such an apparatus.<sup>60</sup> Working along side with the Red Army and Internal Security Troops, it was to prove to be invaluable to the precarious Communist regime against both internal and external opposition, and was to become the precursor of a succession of Soviet political police organizations ranging from the GPV, OGPU, NKVD, etc., down to today's KGB.<sup>61</sup> The CHEKA, originally created to curb a revolutionary situation, was quickly to become a vast all-purpose instrument of ruthless political terror and repression unrestricted by any law.<sup>62</sup> Within three years its ranks grew to over 250,000 full-time agents.<sup>63</sup>

Its functions included, among other things, directing the internal security troops of the Red Army, policing railways and frontiers, uncovering profiteering, counter-revolutionary conspiracies, suppressing peasant rebellion, enforcing labor conscription, and systematically repressing other socialist parties to the point of virtual non-existence. Applying Lenin's policy of mass terror in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat the CHEKA was to sentence, arbitrarily at times, thousands of individuals from all walks of life to confinement in Bolshevik concentration camps or to execution, often without trial. Answering solely to the political authority to which it

was subordinate, namely, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the CHEKA under the leadership of Felix E. Dzerzhensky, a fanatical revolutionary completely devoted to Lenin and prepared to sacrifice countless lives in the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat, provided Lenin the means for an effective surveillance over all of Soviet society.<sup>64</sup>

In order to secure a firm handle on and to penetrate every sphere of Soviet life, an entire network of CHEKA departments was established starting in March of 1918, in every province and district throughout the country.<sup>65</sup> Departments were also attached to railroad junctions, principal ports, the frontier zone and to all major centers of transportation and communication. To maintain order and discipline among the soldiers, the CHEKA also functioned in connection with the Red Army's military units.<sup>66</sup> In this way, the CHEKA was simply a centrally controlled police system independent of the apparatuses of local government, including the soviets, which Lenin and the Bolsheviks would employ to crush the slightest sign of subversion, just as the Okhrana had, although to lesser degree, in Tsarist times.<sup>67</sup>

As the CHEKA's influence expanded so to did its role. Soon after its creation, the CHEKA's role which had been initially investigative quickly expanded to embrace in late February of 1918, summary trial and execution of sentence, which by then included the death penalty.<sup>68</sup> Between the years 1918-21 approximately 140,000 persons were killed by the CHEKAs and

their sponsored Internal Security Troops for various crimes, and in the suppression of insurrections throughout the Republic. The above figure is conjectual and that the true number of CHEKA victims, even if CHEKA records are opened to outside inspection, will probably never be known.<sup>69</sup> The most striking occasion of this sort of CHEKA terror came after the attempted assassination of Lenin and the murder of Michael S. Uritsky, the chief of the Petrograd CHEKA on August 30, 1918 when the VTsIK, adopted a resolution calling on "workers and peasants to reply to the White Terror by mass Red Terror".<sup>70</sup> In addition, Petrovsky, the Commissar of Internal Affairs, issued a statement to all Soviets commanding their CHEKAs and Militia to 'shoot unconditionally all who are engaged in White Guard activity'.<sup>71</sup> The application of mass terror that followed was barbaric. According to Robert Payne in his book, entitled The Life and Death of Lenin, the Bolsheviks struck out against their enemies in blind fury, selecting their victims often times at random. Executions numbered over 500 in both Petrograd and in Kronstadt alone following the attempted assassinations.<sup>72</sup> This butchery increased as the civil war continued with the CHEKA as the chief agent of terror.<sup>73</sup>

In the same way, so-called enemies of the revolution who weren't executed at this time or during Lenin's reign were detained in forced labor or concentration camps. This was a practice that was initiated formally on July 23, 1918, by the Central Penal Department of the People's Commissariat of

Justice, but that had been in practice in various forms since the October revolution itself. Solzhenitsyn states that the instruction of July 23, 1918, by the Central Penal Department of the People's Commissariat of Justice is where the camps officially originated and the Archipelago was born.<sup>74</sup> Solzhenitsyn reports further that decrees of the VTsIK on camps for forced labor were issued on April 15, 1919, and May 17, 1919, called for each provincial CHEKA to create camps for forced labor in each provincial capital.<sup>75</sup> An order that had been precipitated by Lenin's command in February, 1918, that the number of places of imprisonment be increased and that the suppression of criminals be intensified.<sup>76</sup> The CHEKA, the revolutionary tribunals or the people's courts all exercised the right to sentence persons to this form of punishment while the administration of the camps rested in the hands of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). Officially the NKVD operated 84 forced labor camps which in 1920 held 25,336 detainees and 24,400 Civil War prisoners. Solzhenitsyn suggested that these figures are surprisingly small and that it may have been due to the possible Soviet practice of emptying prisons by physical mass extermination, e.g. loading barges with prisoners and then sinking them.<sup>77</sup>

In addition to the forced labor camps run by the Commissariat for Internal Affairs in conjunction with the CHEKAs, concentration camps were also maintained by the CHEKAs for the purpose of isolating class enemies, e.g. Kulaks, priests

and white guards. These class enemies were thought to be beyond the possibility of reform and thus beyond redemption as defined by the concept of the Leninist doctrine of the proletarian dictatorship.<sup>78</sup> An explicit reference to concentration camps and their usefulness from Lenin came August 9, 1918, in a telegram from him to the executive committee of the Soviet of the Penza Province, which read that because of the resistance there merciless mass terror should be employed against the unreliable elements and also that they should be locked up in a concentration camp outside of the town. The Sovnarkom decree of September 5, 1918, which stated, 'It is essential to safeguard the Soviet Republic from its class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps', set the seal of state authority and approval on the new institution.<sup>79</sup> By 1922, 56 concentration camps were in existence, which had a holding capacity of 24,750 detainees.<sup>80</sup>

The most striking fact though concerning the concentration camps operated by the CHEKA was not the number of prisoners which they contained, but rather who the detained persons were. Beside the counter-revolutionaries (class enemies), the concentration camps also included political opponents. From its creation the CHEKA was active in a systematic repression by Lenin of all other political parties, including other socialist parties. This process had begun at the time of the Constitutional Assembly with the outlawing of the Kadet Party and intensified throughout Lenin's career until these other

political parties were virtually non-existent. The process was officially initiated on May 23, 1918 when Dzerzhensky was authorized to arrest members of the Kadet Parties Central Committee, as well as the Right SR's and the Menshevik's leading organs. All three groups membership was anathematized as 'enemies of the people' and as counter-revolutionary. In July of this same year the Bolsheviks had resorted to summary executions of political foes who had taken up arms against the Communist government.<sup>81</sup>

Even prior to the resolution of May 23, 1918, the CHEKA had conducted raids against the Anarchist strongholds in both Petrograd and Moscow. It was alleged that the Anarchists, who had been instrumental in the Bolsheviks seizure of power had been preparing an insurrection against the Communist Government in protest against the Bolshevik's suppression of freedom. The final assault against the Anarchists came in November of 1920 at the end of the Civil War when the CHEKA arrested leading and senior Anarchists, and in March of 1921 when the CHEKA made a similar haul of Anarchists following the outbreak of the Kronstadt Mutiny.<sup>82</sup>

The Right Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who Lenin unscrupulously denounced as counter-revolutionary instigators of strikes and insurrection, met similar fates. Both groups leadership had been placed under CHEKA surveillance with the Sovnarkom instruction of May 23, 1918. Taken separately, the Right SRs, who had made no hesitation in repudiating the



Bolshevik coup d'etat, were subjected to extensive arrests in December of 1919. While the Mensheviks, who were attracting sizable support among the industrial proletariat and who unlike the Right SRs had consistently pursued a policy of peaceful opposition to the Bolshevik regime, calling for constitutional reforms: the extension of civil rights, the abolition of the death penalty and all organs of investigation and of administrative punishment such as the CHEKA, were in mid-June of 1918 expelled from the VTsIK and from the Soviets. In addition, their press was closed down. On November 30, 1918, the expulsion decree was officially revoked, but that in practice the Mensheviks led what he calls a semi-legal existence, under continuous CHEKA harassment, from that point on.<sup>83</sup> Lenin stepped up his suppression of the Mensheviks in 1919 and 1920 when the Mensheviks demanded freely elected Soviets, freedom of the trade unions from communist control, and freedom of speech and press for all workers' parties.<sup>84</sup> The final assault against the Mensheviks, according to Leonard Schapiro in his book, entitled The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase 1917-1922, began in February, 1921, on the eve of the Kronstadt rising and continued until the New Economic Policy was put into effect. Schapiro reports that some two thousand Mensheviks, including the Central Committee were arrested during the first three months of 1921. According to Schapiro this was a blow from which the Mensheviks were never to recover.<sup>85</sup>

Ironically, even the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, who had assisted the Bolsheviks in their seizure of power and who were in coalition with the Soviet government up until March of 1918, were suppressed and decimated by Lenin and the CHEKA. The Left SRs, enraged with the Bolshevik surrender of a vast portion of vital and heavily populated (from Russian standards) areas to Germany in the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and with the Bolshevik's use of the death penalty, directed a coup on July 6, 1918 against the Communist Government, which once defeated marked the beginning of Left SR's progressive fragmentation. The participants in the July putsch were promptly sentenced to prison with hard labor, with the exceptions of Maria Spiridonova and Sablin who were amnestied. From this point on he continues that, "in theory, the LSR Party continued to function legally and LSR's who repudiated the July putsch were entitled to sit in VTsIK and in the Soviets", but in practice the LSR's were systematically eliminated as all others from the Soviets. So much so, that in November of 1918 at the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets there were only four (non-voting) delegates from the LSR Party, and none at the Seventh Congress in December of 1919.<sup>86</sup>

The final assault against the LSR's came in February of 1919, two days after Spiridonova called an All-Russian LSR Party conference, which unanimously voted to reestablish freedom of the Soviets through reelection of all Soviet officials, to abolish the death penalty, and to dismantle the CHEKA, when

Lenin alledged that the LSR's were preparing another insurrection. Some 200 LSR's, including Spiridonova and Steinberg were arrested and imprisoned.<sup>87</sup>

The result of Lenin's policies throughout this period eventually lead to political oppression, the sanction of terror, and the consolidation of his own power, as well as that of the party's. These foundations were to leave a deep imprint on the future development of the Communist Party and the Soviet State.

### Chapter 3

One of the most revealing events with regards to Lenin's use of oppression and political terror during the early development of the new Soviet State was the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising of March, 1921. Prior to the actual uprising, there existed in the country growing unrest and social upheaval. Much of the protest centered around the emergence of the centralized dictatorship during the succeeding months of the revolution. The Russian people, particularly the Kronstadt sailors, felt that the democratic principles for which the revolution had been fought had been abandoned by the Bolsheviks, who were becoming more and more to resemble a new privileged elite.<sup>88</sup>

Lenin's policy of War Communism characterized by regimentation, centralization of economic authorities and power, nationalization, bureaucratization, and forced requisition, which proved to be a cause of the economic chaos, was increasingly estranging not only the peasants but the workers as well from the Communist regime. Both groups were tired of various regulations, compulsion, military discipline and calls for additional sacrifices. Signs of disaffection toward the Soviet Government accompanied by calls for a restoration of elemental, political and civil rights occurred throughout Russia at this time.<sup>89</sup> In addition, the Communist Party itself, was far from united, a movement had developed from within the Party called the 'Workers Opposition' which openly opposed the

dictatorial methods of the regime.<sup>90</sup> Under the stress of the Civil War, Lenin had imposed upon the party, "A policy of dictatorial ruthlessness and authoritarianism originating in the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariate."<sup>91</sup> These three newly created executive organs, approved of at the Eighth Party Congress in March, 1919, and responsible solely to the Central Committee, exercised full authority over party membership, and subjected it to their rule. The question over the problem of a centralized verses decentralized decision-making process, and defining the role of the growing trade unions and who would control them were also taking their toll on the Party.<sup>92</sup> Lenin had hoped to continue using the policies of war communism, policies that were justified during the Civil War period as a temporary expedient to meet the needs of an emergency situation, even after the Civil War in an effort to prevent the resumption of free trade by the peasants in the countryside, and to further socialism in general. As a result, feelings of bitter disappointment and resentment spread throughout the country in the last months of 1920, and into the early months of 1921.<sup>93</sup> Avrich, reports that during the winter of 1920-1921, the atmosphere of violence and social unrest reached a critical point. Workers, in the capital city of Petrograd, where on February 24, martial law had been declared by Grigory Y. Zinoviev the leader of the Petrograd Soviet, were angrily denouncing the militarization and bureaucratization of industry. In addition, when the communists continued to requisition food

stuffs and renigged on their promise to the peasants concerning ownership of the land, waves of large peasant risings and insurrections swept the rural areas.<sup>94</sup>

These widespread disorders rapidly spread to the cities, and finally to the armed forces culminating in armed defiance of the Bolshevik regime. They provide the background or prelude to the Kronstadt rising of March, 1921.<sup>95</sup> The Kronstadt sailors, who had been considered "The Pride and Glory" of the October Revolution and who were well known for their revolutionary militancy during the course of the Civil War of 1918-1920, carefully had watched the events of the winter of 1920-1921 and shared the same highly-charged resentment toward Lenin and the Bolsheviks that the peasants and workers throughout the country were experiencing.<sup>96</sup> The Kronstadters solely charged Lenin's government with the ills that afflicted the country. Avrich reports that little blame was directed toward the chaos and destruction resulting from the First World War or to the fact that the Soviet Russia found herself occupied by German troops, fighting a Civil War, fighting a foreign war against the Poles, faced foreign intervention and economic disorder, and that the country was in the midst of a famine.<sup>97</sup> This resentment on the part of the Kronstadters came to a head in later February and early March of 1921 when Lenin broke up the protest movements by mass terror. Lenin had employed heavy military force to crush the peasant insurrections and to end strikes and protest from factory workers. Order had been enforced and maintained in the

streets by the Petrograd Defence Committee and by the Kadets.<sup>98</sup> The CHEKA was particularly active at this time arresting all who showed the least sign of resistance to the Communist regime, especially the remaining members of other socialist parties.<sup>99</sup> The Mensheviks and SR's were particularly suppressed at this time because of their growing popularity and support.<sup>100</sup>

In response to Lenin's mass oppression of the workers and peasants on the mainland, on February 26 the Kronstadt sailors created a revolutionary commune and held an emergency meeting where it was decided to send a delegation from the crews of the Petropavlovsk and the Sevastopol ships of Kronstadt to Petrograd to examine the situation first hand. When the delegation arrived in Petrograd it found the city under virtual military seige with factories surrounded by armed guards. On their return to Kronstadt the delegation presented their findings at the historic meeting aboard the Petropavlovsk. At the meeting a long resolution, which became the political charter of the Kronstadt rebellion, was drawn up and unanimously accepted. The fifteen point Petropavlovsk resolution, which it came to be called, echoed not only the discontents of the Baltic Fleet, but that also of the Russian masses.<sup>101</sup>

The resolution called for new elections to the Soviets, freedom of speech and press, freedom of assembly, the liberation of all political prisoners, the abolition of all political departments, the removal of all roadblock detachments, equal rations, the removal of Communist fighting detachments in all

branches of the army, the removal of Communist guards kept on duty in factories and mills, full freedom of action for the peasants in regard to the land, and the permission of free handicrafts production by one's own labor.<sup>102</sup> The majority of the fifteen points were directly aimed at the policies of Bolshevik oppression and War Communism, the justification for which according to the Kronstadt sailors and the population at large, had long since passed.<sup>103</sup>

Unsettled by the prospects of a Communist attack against them, the conference took a fateful step and established a Provisional Revolutionary Committee with Stephen M. Petrichenko as its chairman, and charged it with the administering of the Island pending the formation of a new Soviet.<sup>104</sup> The stage had been set for the impetuous acts to follow. Kronstadt had reached the breaking point. Two top-ranking Bolshevik leaders were in jail and full control of the city was in the hands of the Kronstadters. A trial of strength seemed inevitable.<sup>105</sup>

To the Communist the turbulence in Kronstadt represented a real danger given the acute discontent in Russia as a whole. It was feared that the revolt of the sailors might ignite a mass protest throughout the country.<sup>106</sup> Lenin reasoned that if the Kronstadters were allowed to have their way, it would result in an end to all authority, cohesion and the dismantling of the entire country and thus another period of chaos and atomization would be initiated. He believed that Russia could not endure in such a state of anarchy, and that it would not only lead to the



Bolshevik's loss of power, but also to a White restoration.<sup>107</sup> Thus, the course of action was clear for Lenin. The rebels must be crushed and Communism restored in Kronstadt at whatever the cost.<sup>108</sup> The Bolsheviks were faced with the gravest crisis in their history and that after seizing power and holding it through three years of bloody conflict they were in no mood for sacrifice or compromise. Lenin also feared the Poles, the emigres, the Entente, and the possibility that Kronstadt could stir a new interventionist campaign.<sup>109</sup> In addition Kronstadt strategic position, and the possibility of outside intervention were additional concerns to the Communist. Given the situation Lenin made every effort to discredit the Kronstadters, no easy task given the Kronstadter's long standing reputation for revolutionary fidelity, and to show that the revolt was nothing more than a White conspiracy.<sup>110</sup>

Lenin also made the claim that the revolt had been planned by Russian emigres in Paris. The Provisional Revolutionary Committee denied the charges of collaboration with counter-revolutionary groups and stated that their sole intention was to eliminate Bolshevik oppression and thus to return to the original course of the October Revolution.<sup>111</sup>

With the Kronstadters continued resistance, Lenin and the Bolsheviks moved quickly to eliminate them. On March 4 Zinoviev called a special session of the Petrograd Soviet at which a resolution was adopted calling upon the Kronstadters to end their protest and to restore the authority of the former

Kronstadt Soviet. This resolution was followed the next day, by a ultimatum from Trotsky demanding the immediate and unconditional capitulation of the mutinous sailors. Eventually the revolt was suppressed. By 12:00 noon on the 18th of February the forts and ships and nearly all of Kronstadt was under Communist control again. Estimates for the loses ran well into the thousands and even tens of thousands.<sup>112</sup>

Thus, the Kronstadt uprising, which only lasted for a little over two weeks, had been suppressed. The Kronstadters, who had fought with much determination and courage, were destroyed by the very government which they had helped bring to power. In their haste to eliminate traces of the rising, the Bolsheviki appointed a new commander to the fortress, and purged the city of its remaining dissident elements.<sup>113</sup> The fate of the Kronstadt survivors was representative of Communist oppression. Thirteen, who were aledged as being the ringleaders despite the fact that true leadership along with numerous others had escaped in the last hours of the assault to Finland, were condemned and executed. The remaining prisoners were removed by the CHEKA to its prisons on the mainland. Still others were taken, "to concentration camps, such as the notorious Solovki Prison in the White Sea, and condemned to forced labor, which for many meant a slow death from hunger, exhaustion, and illness."<sup>114</sup> For several months after the Kronstadt uprising there existed continued unrest on the mainland particularly among the peasants of Tambov, Siberia, and the Volga basin, but by the fall of 1921

all effective resistance had been stamped out by heavy formations of Kursanty and CHEKA troops.<sup>115</sup>

Given the failure of the Kronstadt rising, the events of the winter of 1921 were not without their own important effects. For they convinced Lenin that the time had come for a strategic retreat. The frustration which resulted was compounded further by the failure of the German Communists to seize power in March 1921. Germany had been the most important and promising of the European countries for a Communist revolution.<sup>116</sup> Thus, a new phase of Soviet rule, based on a New Economic Policy (NEP), was inaugurated.<sup>117</sup> The NEP, adopted on March 15, 1921, at the Tenth Party Congress, was characterized mainly by the abolition of War Communism and consolidation of the dictatorship.<sup>118</sup> With it Lenin recognized the social changes must be gradual and adaptable to the realities of Russian society. The NEP did not though represent an end to the revolution. Rather Lenin intended to resume his efforts towards total change as soon as internal or international conditions made it possible.<sup>119</sup> War Communism was replaced by a mixed economy, particularly a tax in kind which conceded the right to the peasant to dispose of his surpluses in the free market. Trade between the cities and villages was revived, Trotsky's labor armies were disbanded, and the trade unions were granted a measure of autonomy which included the right to elect their own officials and conduct free debate on issues affecting the interest of the Workers. In addition, private retail and consumer production were restored,

while heavy industry, foreign trade, transportation, and communications were retained under state control.<sup>120</sup>

The consolidation of the dictatorship consisted in the elimination of opposition both from within and outside of the Communist party. This consolidation included the reinforcement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which together with the party according to Lenin maintained the idea of socialism. D'encausse reports that Lenin adopted the ideas presented by Zinoviev at the Tenth Party Congress, namely that, without the iron dictatorship of the Communist Party, the Soviet government would not have lasted as long as it had and that "every conscious worker must to recognize that the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be achievedd expect through the dictatorship of its vanguard, the Communist Party."<sup>121</sup> These ideas were directly represented in two resolutions adopted by Lenin at the Tenth Party Congress. The first, based on the resolution "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in our Party", called for the absolute concentration of power in the hands of the Communist Party, and rejected the idea of granting freedom of speech, press and political activity to non-Communist parties.<sup>122</sup> In addition, it condemned the program of the Workers' Opposition, which Lenin at the Tenth Party Congress together with other members of the Central Committee termed as a compound of Menshevism, aspiring to petty bourgeois ideals.<sup>123</sup> The second, based on the resolution "On Party Unity" called for an end of all factions and groupings within the party. Lenin

told the Congress, "to put an end to opposition, to put the lid on it; we have had enough opposition."<sup>124</sup> Lenin used Kronstadt to submit oppositionists to his line, implying that their criticism of the party had encouraged the rebels of Kronstadt to take up arms against the Soviet government.<sup>125</sup> A final clause of the resolution gave the Central Committee extraordinary powers to expel dissident members from the party. Both resolutions strengthened party discipline as Lenin saw it and tightened his controls over Soviet political life.<sup>126</sup>

These measures were followed soon after with an order from Lenin to purge the party "from top to bottom" to eliminate unreliable elements. By the early autumn of 1921 nearly a quarter of the party's membership had been removed.<sup>127</sup> This type of removal included members of the Central Committee, such as Preobrazhensky and Krestinsky, who were in favor of a policy of freedom of party criticism and conciliation of opposition.<sup>128</sup> By the beginning of 1924 membership had dropped to 472,000 from 730,000 in March 1921. In this way, the New Economic Policy era entailed no relaxation of the inherent drive of communism.<sup>129</sup> Russia's economic structure was revised but no political concessions were made. In addition, all remaining elements of political opposition were ruthlessly stamped out.<sup>130</sup>

The NEP, together with the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising according to Avrich, marked the triumph of bureaucratic repression and the final defeat of the decentralized and libertarian form of socialism.<sup>131</sup> Lenin imposed ironclad

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censorship by means of the CHEKA to silence all criticism of his policies. Media became an exclusive instrument of state propaganda, trade unions lost all effective power for self regulation, and prisons and concentration camps were filled to capacity with political prisoners.<sup>132</sup> Kronstadt, according to David Shub in his book, entitled Lenin A Biography, marked the last real protest of the Russia's populace. Shub continues by stating that the Soviet Union was fastly developing into totalitarian state.<sup>133</sup> Likewise, Avrich maintains that with the Tenth Party Congress, the fatal cross roads had been traversed and the consolidation of one-party rule had been made complete.<sup>134</sup> Lenin in seeking to create a socialist society had by his methods produced a tyranny, which was to expand enormously under the direction of his successor.

## Conclusion

To conclude, when Stalin assumed power in 1929, he found a ready made structure including a privileged apparatus through which to enforce his political will.<sup>135</sup> Lenin's centralism had been transformed into absolutism.<sup>136</sup> The Soviets which he called for as free and independent during the October Revolution were progressively subordinated to party control after 1917, and became mere extension of the emerging bureaucracy.<sup>137</sup> The Central Committee and later the Politburo took the place of the party.<sup>138</sup> Lenin's political police became a ruthless instrument of unrestricted political terror and repression.<sup>139</sup> And finally, the power of the state according to Paul Johnson in his book, entitled Modern Times, became unlimited, indivisible, and absolute.<sup>140</sup>

Under the Soviet government's initial years of power, which were characterized by a myriad of difficulties, Thompson reports that the needs and desires of individuals and groups were subordinated to the total and absolute direction and authority of the state and the party. "As a result, the revolution led to increasing centralization and state control, culminating in a totalitarian dictatorship under Stalin after 1930."<sup>141</sup> Under Stalin, even the party itself became subordinate to the CHEKA.<sup>142</sup> Thus, as it has been the point of this thesis, "Stalin completed the fatal progress towards the totalitarian dictatorship inherent in Lenin's concept of the Bolshevik

party."<sup>143</sup> Lenin, while attempting to solve the Soviet Union's grave problems had forged the instruments which Stalin used to secure complete domination of the Soviet political system.<sup>144</sup>

In his book, Schapiro points to the continuity between Lenin and Stalin in the following way:

What I tried to show was the arbitrary illegality was inherent in the very nature of the regime created and maintained by Lenin--a small band of zealots, convinced of their own infallibility and of their divine right to rule alone, and ruling in defiance of their own law (or what there was of it). The fact that the scale was much smaller under Lenin is certainly important; but it does not destroy the continuity between Lenin and Stalin. Lenin's concentration camps were tiny when compared to Ezhov's or Beria's slave empires under Stalin. But the principle behind them--that you could exploit the labour of alleged or suspected enemies, without trial, under the guise of punishment--was the same.<sup>145</sup>

This is not to imply though that Lenin had intended such a structure or that it had been his goal to create absolutism. But rather, that his methods, and his concept of the party and state inevitably engendered Stalinism.<sup>146</sup>



Appendix A  
The Petropavlovsk Resolution

Having heard the report of the representatives sent by the general meeting of ships' crews to Petrograd to investigate the situation there, we resolve:

1. In view of the fact that the present soviets do not express the will of the workers and peasants, immediately to hold new elections by secret ballot, with freedom to carry on agitation beforehand for all workers and peasants;

2. To give freedom of speech and press to workers and peasants, to anarchists and left socialist parties;

3. To secure freedom of assembly for trade unions and peasant organizations;

4. To call a nonparty conference of the workers, Red Army soldiers, and sailors of Petrograd, Kronstadt, and Petrograd province, no later than March 10, 1921;

5. To liberate all political prisoners of socialist parties, as well as all workers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors imprisoned in connection with the labor and peasant movements;

6. To elect a commission to review the cases of those being held in prisons and concentration camps;

7. To abolish all political departments because no party should be given special privileges in the propagation of its ideas or receive the financial support of the state for such purposes. Instead, there should be established cultural and educational commissions, locally elected and financed by the state;

8. To remove immediately all roadblock detachments;

9. To equalize the rations of all working people, with the exception of those employed in trades detrimental to health;

10. To abolish the Communist fighting detachments in all branches of the army, as well as the Communist guards kept on duty in factories and mills. Should such guards or detachments be found necessary, they are to be appointed in the army from the ranks and in the factories and mills at the discretion of the workers;

11. To give the peasants full freedom of action in regard to the land, and also the right to keep cattle, on condition that the peasants manage with their own means, that is without employing hired labor;

12. To request all branches of the army, as well as our comrades the military cadets (kursanty), to

endorse our resolution;

13. To demand that the press give all our resolutions wide publicity;

14. To appoint an itinerant bureau of control;

15. To permit free handicrafts production by one's own labor.

PETRICHENKO, Chairman of the Squadron Meeting

PEREPELKIN, Secretary (Avrich, Paul pp. 72-74)

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 212-213.

<sup>3</sup>Schapiro, Leonard, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase 1917-1922 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. xvi-xvii.

<sup>4</sup>Avrich, Paul, Kronstadt 1921 (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1970), pp. 228-9.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 229.

<sup>6</sup>Johnson, Paul, Modern Times, The World from the Twenties to the Eighties (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1983), p. 54; Chamberlin, William Henry, 1918-1921: From the Civil War to the Consolidation of Power. Vol II. of The Russian Revolution 1917-1921. end ed. (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, The Universal Library, 1965).

<sup>7</sup>D'encausse, Hélène Carrère, Lenin, Revolution and Power. Vol. I of A History of the Soviet Union 1917-1953. trans. Valence Ionescu. (London and New York: Longman, 1982), p. 23.

<sup>8</sup>Friedrich, Carl J. and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1961), p. 27.

<sup>9</sup>Ulam, Adam B., "Founder of the Party of Discipline." In Lenin Dedicated Marxist or Revolutionary Pragmatist? Ed. Stanley W. Page. (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1970), p. 67.

<sup>10</sup>Thompson, John M., Revolutionary Russia, 1917 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981), p. 39.

<sup>11</sup>D'encausse, Vol. I. p. 23.

<sup>12</sup>Friedrich and Brzezinski, p. 27.

<sup>13</sup>Shub, David, Lenin, A Biography (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 253-253.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 277.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 277.

<sup>16</sup>Dmytryshyn, Basil, USSR, A Concise History.  
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<sup>17</sup>Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., The Gulag Archipelago. 3 Vols. trans. Thomas P. Whitney. (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974), p. 26.

<sup>18</sup>Fischer, Louis, The Life of Lenin (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 138.

<sup>19</sup>Shub, p. 278.

<sup>20</sup>Thompson, p. 176.

<sup>21</sup>Shub, p. 278.

<sup>22</sup>Chamberlin, p. 361.

<sup>23</sup>Dmytryshyn, p. 77.

<sup>24</sup>Shub, p. 286.

<sup>25</sup>D'encausse, Vol. I. p. 83. Dmytryshyn, p. 77.

<sup>26</sup>Dmytryshyn, p. 77.

<sup>27</sup>Thompson, pp. 176-177.

<sup>28</sup>Shub, p. 288.

<sup>29</sup>Johnson, p. 72.

<sup>30</sup>Legget, George, The CHEKA, Lenin's Political Police, The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (December 1917 to February 1922) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 44.

<sup>31</sup>Thompson, p. 177.

<sup>32</sup>Dmytryshyn, p. 387.

<sup>33</sup>Shub, p. 289.

<sup>34</sup>Legget, p. 42.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>36</sup>Johnson, p. 71.

<sup>37</sup>Payne, Robert, The Life and Death of Lenin  
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), p. 425.

<sup>38</sup>Thompson, p. 179.

<sup>39</sup>Payne, p. 365.

<sup>40</sup>Shub, pp. 265-266.

<sup>41</sup>Johnson, p. 71.

<sup>42</sup>D'encausse, Vol. I. p. 84.

<sup>43</sup>Johnson, p. 67.

<sup>44</sup>Legget, p. 54.

<sup>45</sup>Friedrich and Brzezinski, p. 91.

<sup>46</sup>Legget, pp. 64-65.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., pp. 54, 77.

<sup>48</sup>Solzhenitsyn, p. 339.

<sup>49</sup>Legget, p. 62.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., pp. 65-66.

<sup>58</sup>Ulam, Adam B., Lenin and the Bolsheviks, The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia (Seeker and Warburg, 1966), p. 552.

<sup>59</sup>Legget, p. xxxv.

<sup>60</sup>Shub, p. 306.

<sup>61</sup>Legget, p. xxi.

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<sup>63</sup>Johnson, p. 68.

<sup>64</sup>D'encausse, Vol. II. p. 7. Legget, p. 251.

<sup>65</sup>Legget, p. 37.

<sup>66</sup>Scott, E. J., "The Cheka." In Soviet Affairs #1 St. Anthony's Papers (London: Chatto and Windus, 1956), pp. 4-5.

<sup>67</sup>Legget, p. xxxv.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 32. Scott, p. 7.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 360.

<sup>70</sup>Dmytryshyn, p. 9.

<sup>71</sup>Scott, p. 9.

<sup>72</sup>Payne, p. 492.

<sup>73</sup>Scott, p. 11.

<sup>74</sup>Solzhenitsyn, pp. 10, 14.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., pp. 14-15.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>77</sup>Legget, p. 178.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 175.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., p. 180.

- <sup>81</sup>Ibid., pp. 59, 319.
- <sup>82</sup>Ibid., pp. 31, 35.
- <sup>83</sup>Ibid., pp. 317-320.
- <sup>84</sup>Schapiro, pp. 196-203.
- <sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 205.
- <sup>86</sup>Legget, pp. 312, 315-316.
- <sup>87</sup>Ibid., pp. 311-312.
- <sup>88</sup>Avrich, Paul. p. 160.
- <sup>89</sup>Dymtryshyn, p. 111.
- <sup>90</sup>Katkov, p. 14.
- <sup>91</sup>Dymtryshyn, p. 114.
- <sup>92</sup>Ibid., p. 114.
- <sup>93</sup>Avrich, pp. 17, 31-32.
- <sup>94</sup>Ibid., pp. 11-12.
- <sup>95</sup>Carr, p. 271.
- <sup>96</sup>Avrich, pp. 3, 21-22.
- <sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 163.
- <sup>98</sup>Katkov, p. 17.
- <sup>99</sup>Avrich, pp. 46-8, 50.
- <sup>100</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-45.
- <sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 74.
- <sup>102</sup>Ibid., pp. 72-74.
- <sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 74.
- <sup>104</sup>Ibid., pp. 84-5.
- <sup>105</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., pp. 92, 136.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 192.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., pp. 143, 148, 152-155, 202-203, 205, 210-211.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., p. 213.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., p. 215.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 223.

<sup>116</sup>Kennan, p. 178.

<sup>117</sup>Von Laue, Theodore H., Why Lenin? Why Stalin?  
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<sup>118</sup>Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>119</sup>D'encausse, Vol. I. p. 227.

<sup>120</sup>Avrich, p. 223.

<sup>121</sup>D'encausse, Vol. I. p. 137.

<sup>122</sup>Chamberlin, p. 447.

<sup>123</sup>Schapiro, p. 291.

<sup>124</sup>Avrich, p. 227.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., p. 226.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>128</sup>Schapiro, p. 295.

<sup>129</sup>Von Laue, p. 179.

<sup>130</sup>Shub, p. 364.



<sup>131</sup>Avrich, pp. 228-229.

<sup>132</sup>Shub, pp. 365-365.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid.

<sup>134</sup>Avrich, Paul. pp. 228-229.

<sup>135</sup>D'encausse, Vol. II. p. vii.

<sup>136</sup>Medvedev, Roy A., Let History Judge, The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism. trans. Colleen Tayor. Ed. David Joravsky and Georges Haupt. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 379.

<sup>137</sup>Avrich, p. 161.

<sup>138</sup>Von Laue, pp. 205-6.

<sup>139</sup>Legget, p. 67.

<sup>140</sup>Johnson, p. 78.

<sup>141</sup>Thompson, p. 186.

<sup>142</sup>D'encausse, Vol. II. p. 8.

<sup>143</sup>Von Laue, pp. 205-6.

<sup>144</sup>D'encausse, Vol. II. p. ix.

<sup>145</sup>Schapiro, p. xvii.

<sup>146</sup>Medvedev, p. 359.

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