

The Political Aspects of Napoleon's Egyptian Campaign

A Research Paper


Submitted to the Faculty
Of Saint Meinrad College of Liberal Arts
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

Timothy Fredrick Presley
May, 1977
Saint Meinrad College
St. Meinrad, Indiana



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction-----	page ii
Chapter one-----	page 1
Chapter two-----	page 18
Conclusion-----	page 32
Footnotes-----	page 34
Bibliography-----	page 39



INTRODUCTION

Egypt and Napoleon are two words that can serve as an introduction to this research paper. The mysteries of Egypt and the many sided character of Napoleon have prompted many authors into much more detailed works than this one. Because this study does not deal specifically with either of these topics, some preliminary remarks are necessary. The title of this research project is The Political Aspects of Napoleon's Egyptian Campaign. It is therefore divided into two chapters. Chapter One deals with the background of the expedition and the political dealings necessary to bring it about. The second chapter discusses the campaign itself and its consequences for Europe. The conclusion of this study examines the importance of the expedition for Napoleon and Egypt.

CHAPTER I

The background for the French expedition to Egypt in 1798 is varied and complex. French interests in the area can be traced as far back as the Crusades, but this study will begin with the Duc de Choiseul who, in 1769, made the acquisition of Egypt a major goal of his ministry. Choiseul, Louis XV's foreign minister, was interested in using an Egyptian colony to replace the French North American colonies lost to England in 1763. English interests in North America caused considerable concern in Paris and climaxed during the French and Indian War (1756-1763). France suffered a serious defeat during this war, and with the Treaty of Paris, in 1763, she lost a sizeable portion of her North American empire. France was permitted to keep the West Indian islands of Haiti, St. Martin and Martinique, but was forced to cede Canada and all of North America east of the Mississippi River to England.¹ Choiseul's plans for Egypt were shelved by his successor, Vergennes, because the American Revolution seemed to secure the French position in North America. With the French Revolution in 1789 and the British occupation of Martinique the old fears were realized.²

It was not without difficulty that Vergennes held to his policy of not capturing Egypt. Government contractors, merchants and other interested parties, all tried to force Vergennes into accepting their plans for a conquest of Egypt. But domestic crises, as well as foreign difficulties, kept Vergennes from any foolish ventures in the East. In an attempt to forestall further pressures or temptations, he invited the other European powers to join with France in guaranteeing the independence of the Ottoman Empire. To parry this move, the Emperor Joseph II offered Egypt as the

price for French agreement to the partitioning of Turkey. This presented further temptations.³

The French government had further reasons for considering Egypt. In 1777, Baron de Tott, a French entrepreneur long interested in Egypt, was sent to the Levant to inspect French consular and economic establishments. Unofficially he was to examine the possibilities of a French conquest of Egypt. His report stated that the defences of Egypt were poor and that by using Crete as a base, the major ports of Alexandria, Rosetta, and Damietta could easily be taken. The main landing would best be made at Aboukir Bay. If the French were to come as a friend of the Sultan and a liberator from the Mamelukes, they would meet with little popular resistance.⁴ The Mamelukes were the de facto rulers of Egypt. In theory Egypt was a province of the Turkish Empire, but in fact it had only been nominally controlled by the Turks since 1252. In 1230, the Sultan of Egypt recruited a twelve-thousand man military force from Albania and Circassia to supplement his Egyptian army. Within the next twenty years, this group, known as the Mamelukes, conquered the land and killed the reigning Sultan, Ashraf Moussa, and established their own dynasty in 1252. The Sultan Selim I, reconquered Egypt in 1517 under terms more favorable to the Mamelukes than to Turkey. A powerless Sultan was reinstated at Cairo to whom the Mamelukes paid nominal tribute.⁵

No action was taken on de Tott's report or the other schemes concerning Egypt that were piling up in the archives of Versailles. Despite this there was a gradual evolution toward the idea of taking Egypt. If France did not take Egypt then someone else would. The larger piece France could obtain from her "ally" the "Sick Man of Europe", the less the Ottoman's enemies would get. It almost seemed an act of devotion for France to keep

Egypt from falling to "greedy" Russia or "devious" Austria or to any other power. The exaggerated reports on the conditions in Egypt and the potential for French development were further incentives to pursue an active policy against Egypt.⁶

Once the Revolution began in 1789, any consideration of Egypt had to be postponed. The Estates General was convened in May, 1789 and by the end of the year the Ancien Regime was overthrown and the Revolution was in progress.⁷ In October, 1789 a constitutional monarchy was established. This move was accepted by Louis XVI and even by the rest of Europe. The Revolution progressed smoothly until Louis made the foolish and ill-timed flight to Varennes on June 21, 1791. This attempt to flee had two important results. First, it alarmed the other European monarchs and in so doing led to an invasion scare within France. Second, it led to a questioning of the King's loyalty. Both of these led to the downfall of the monarchy and to the more radical turn of the Revolution.⁸

In September, 1791 the new French government, the Legislative Assembly, took power. On April 20, 1792 Austria declared war and the government, unable to meet the new crisis, began to disintegrate. The army was defeated on all fronts, which left the country open to invasion. Fearing invasion, the radical Sections of Paris overthrew the Municipal Government and established in its place, the Commune. The Commune quickly took control of the Police and the National Guard. With control of these groups, the Commune forced the Legislative Assembly to dissolve itself after it had convened a Constitutional Convention. On September 22, 1792, a Republic was declared.⁹

On January 21, 1793, Louis XVI was executed for treason. This act led to the formation of the First Coalition of Austria, Prussia, Britain,

Spain and Holland. The Coalition inflicted further defeats on France. In addition to this two-thirds of France was in revolt against Paris by March. These events led to the establishment of the Committee on Public Safety and to the Reign of Terror. By the end of 1793 the Committee was able to rise above the crisis. By July, 1794 the situation was stable therefore the Committee's extreme measures were no longer necessary. On July 27, 1794, (9 Thermidor of Year III) the Committee on Public Safety was overthrown. This event began the Thermidorian reaction and thus marks the end of the radical phase of the Revolution.¹⁰

After the overthrow of the Committee, the new Constitution of Year III established a less arbitrary form of government, the Directory. The electorate for the new government consisted of 20,000 electors who elected the two legislative chambers, the Council of Five-hundred and the Council of Ancients. The councils elected a five man Directory from a list of fifty candidates drawn up by the electors. Frictions developed almost at once between the Councils and the Directory. The councils, as a result of the Thermidorian reaction, were more conservative. It was natural that proven leaders be chosen for the Directory. These tended to be the leaders of the Revolution who, naturally, tended to be more liberal. On October 5, a last attempt was made by the royalist counter-revolutionaries to overthrow the revolution. The revolt of 13 Vendemiaire was important because the young Brigadier General, Napoleon Bonaparte, was instrumental in crushing the plot. His abilities were brought to the attention of the Directory, who placed him in command of the Army of Italy.¹¹

The elections of 1797 brought even more conservative elements into the Councils. These began to plot the overthrow of the more liberal Directors who discovered the plot and, on 18 Fructidor of Year V

(September 4), illegally purged the Councils of the more conservative plotters. This was the first in a series of plots and purges that weakened and eventually brought about the destruction of the government.¹²

By 1798 the war in Europe was being resolved in favor of France. In 1795 she had made peace with Spain, Holland and most importantly, with Prussia. In 1793 Prussia and Russia engaged in the Second Partition of Poland, which diverted Prussia's attention to the East, away from the First Coalition's war with France. In addition, it provoked Austria to the point that Prussia was uncertain as to what the Austrian reaction would be. France wisely kept silent on the matter which induced Prussia to seek a peace separate from the Coalition, in 1795. This broke the Coalition and left France the victor in Europe. Austria, defeated by Napoleon in Italy, was in no condition to continue the war alone and so, sued for peace. On October 17, 1797, Austria signed the Treaty of Campo Formio with Bonaparte. This left only England undefeated by the armies of the Republic. The conquest of Egypt was now possible.¹³

Many things had always attracted the French to Egypt. First, there was the ever present lure of the East. The East represented mystery, hidden wealth and adventure. There was also the thoughts of controlling the valuable overland trade routes to Arabia and India. Last, there was the possibility of a Suez canal, proposed as early as 1586. Trade, for good reasons, occupied French thoughts on Egypt. Egypt was wealthy and the French interests were better represented there than the other European powers. Despite this, trade with Egypt amounted to only an average of five and one-half million livres a year. This was believed to be far beneath the potential of the country. French officials believed that this trade could be increased by overturning the Mamelukes.¹⁴ The French consul,

Magallon, maintained that an invasion of Egypt would be a success despite the many problems that the project entailed.¹⁵

There were also formidable disadvantages to Egypt which were naturally overlooked by most French planners. Religious fanaticism, disease, Bedouin raiders and political anarchy were chronic problems. There was also the unique strangeness of Egypt, at once a lure and a formidable problem.

Egypt was a strip of green, in the middle of a dessert, which stretched from the Mediterranean into the Sudan. Therefore the only link with Egypt was across the sea--a sea controlled by England and not by France.¹⁶

In 1797 Bonaparte the victor returned from Italy. He was recieved with great popularity and was given honors as no general before him. His ambitions were still unappeased and he longed for more glory. It seemed to him that the East offered the opportunity for greater accomplishments. He had risen rapidly during the Revolution, from corporal to General of the army of Italy. This rapid rise in importance only furthered his desire for more power and glory. After his return to Paris the Directory feared his presence in the capitol lest the Councils use him to overthrow the goverment. To prevent this, and to keep him occupied, they placed him in charge of the invasion of England. Napoleon saw at once that such a project would fail. He felt that to destroy England, France should either invade Hanover or Egypt to cut the British lifeline to India.¹⁸

It was during the Italian campaign that Napoleon began to realize the importance of the Turkish Empire to France. There is no reason to assume that he had seen the dossiers collected in the French Foreign Office, but he did have contact with Raymond Verninac, the French Minister in Constantinople. Napoleon shared with him that the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse and that Egypt could be taken with little difficulty.

Verninac investigated the conditions in Egypt and upon his return to France spoke to Napoleon, who adopted his views.¹⁹ The situation is a good deal more complex than this. It is not likely that a competent general would accept the views of a few merchants who had their own interests at heart. There had to be more practical reasons for accepting such a policy.²⁰ Bonaparte was a realistic politician who knew the mood of the chronically bankrupt Directory. If the war with England was to end in a French victory or in a draw, it seemed foolish to risk all in the dangerous and expensive invasion of England. The other alternative to capture Egypt and thus create a different threat to England was cheaper and held fewer military risks. It might not bring England to her knees, but at least it would put France in a better position when peace negotiations arose.²¹

Whatever Napoleon's interests in Egypt were, it is certain that the aid of Charles Maurice Talleyrand-Perigord was indispensable to their realization.²² Talleyrand had been consecrated Bishop of Autun in 1789, on the very eve of the Revolution. Sensing that the time was ripe for some dramatic change in France, he sought election as his diocese's representative to the Estates General and was elected a representative to the First Estate. At first he took the side of the conservatives, but after the Oath of The Tennis Court (June 20, 1789), he saw which way the tide was going and joined with the revolutionaries. To further his own position he introduced a bill in the Assembly which proposed the nationalization and dissolution of the Church lands. The revenues from the sale of this land could then be used to remedy the economic crisis of the country. By introducing this bill he hoped to have himself elected minister of finance. This was prevented by the law of November 12 which declared that the King could not choose his ministers from among the National Deputies. This

was a bitter blow to Talleyrand, but he was consoled by being elected President of the Assembly on February 16, 1790. Content to play his role, he was instrumental in the formation of the new constitution.²³

In 1791 the electors of the Paris Department elected Talleyrand an Administrator in the municipal government. Upon this election he resigned his bishopric so as to better follow a political career. However, he was needed for one last function in the church. The Civil Constitution of The Clergy had forced a number of French bishops to emigrate. Their sees had to be filled with validly consecrated bishops so as to ensure Apostolic Succession. Talleyrand, the bishop, was able to consecrate new bishops and did so.²⁴

The Revolution was now becoming more radical which caused Talleyrand to fear for his own future and that of France. He began working in secret with Louis XVI in an attempt to give the King control of the situation. When this failed, he began to look for a way out of France. He correctly realized that a man of his prominence could never simply return to obscurity. Early in 1792, he contrived a mission to England for the purpose of establishing an Anglo-French alliance. The mission failed, and a disillusioned Talleyrand remained in England as an unofficial assistant to the French Ambassador, de Chauvelin. The situation in France worsened and on August 10, 1792, during an attack on the Tuilleries, secret papers were found implicating Talleyrand in a conspiracy with the King. On March 28, 1793, his name appeared on a list of Emigre' traitors. In 1793 England declared war on France. Talleyrand immediately left for America, where he was to remain until 1796.²⁵

With the Thermidorian reaction of 1794, Talleyrand's chances for returning to France were good. He wrote to the Constitutional Assembly

espousing his cause, and on September 4, 1795, his name was removed from the list of Emigrés. On June 13, 1796 he left America, and upon his return to France was elected a member of the newly formed Institute, a national academic forum. His essays on foreign policy, given before this group, again brought him into prominence as a candidate for the Foreign Office. He was content to remain on the sidelines until a victor emerged in the struggles between the Directory and the Councils. When the Directory appeared to have won he gained their favor and on July 18, 1797 was named Foreign Minister. Talleyrand did not like the expansionist policy of the Directory. He was however, content to wait for the most opportune moment to change this policy. While waiting for such an opportunity, the Directory moved into Spain, Holland, Switzerland and Italy.²⁶

The true motivations which induced Talleyrand to work for the Egyptian campaign will probably never be fully known. He had come into contact with Napoleon and was aware of his interests in the area. Bonaparte had also made known his reservations about the English invasion. The two began to prepare their own plan. Talleyrand presented an, Essay on the Advantages to Be Gained from New Colonies Under Present Circumstances.²⁷ Early in 1798 he issued an outspoken report to the Directory predicting the fall of the Turkish Empire. He urged France to seize the choicest parts either in conjunction with Austria and Russia or independently. Shortly thereafter, Talleyrand issued a detailed report solely on Egypt. In this report he discussed the manner and the advantages of the proposed expedition. He observed that once Egypt had been conquered, the Isthmus of Suez could be cut through. Trade would use this route thereby eliminating the English. England's very political empire would suffer under this blow. From Suez fifteen-thousand men could leave for India where they would meet with the

forces of Tippoo Sahib, Sultan of Mysore. Together they would end British rule in India.²⁸

Despite the importance of Talleyrand's place in the Egyptian expedition, there is still a considerable mystery as to the extent of his participation in the preparations. Why did he advocate the invasion of Egypt? The invasion of Egypt was a move designed to offend England--the one thing that he wanted the most to avoid. Indeed, he worked diligently for an Anglo-French alliance and was even suspected of double agency because of this and the time that he had spent in England, during the Revolution. There was further reason to suspect that Talleyrand had pro-British sympathies. There was the rather embarrassing affair of the Madame Grand letter. Madame Grand, Talleyrand's mistress, had written to a person in London stating that Piedcourt ("club-foot"-Talleyrand) wanted, "to help his English friends."²⁹ This letter was intercepted, but after initial concern over the matter it was dropped. Why would Talleyrand want to offend his English friends? It was obvious that England would not accept France's position in Europe. Add to this Egypt, and she would surely fight. Conquering Egypt would also risk war with Turkey and would be infringing upon Russia's Eastern interests. An invasion of Egypt entailed all of these risks and others. Was Talleyrand, in supporting the Egyptian expedition, serving Napoleon to the detriment of the nation? Is it more likely that, as he was in the habit of doing, Talleyrand was merely selling himself to the highest bidder? These are questions that cannot easily be answered.³⁰

To compound this mystery historians are not even certain as to who initiated the project, Napoleon or Talleyrand. Napoleon did write several recommendations to the Directory concerning the project and in August 1797, Talleyrand had, presumably on his own, issued several reports on Egypt.³¹

The answer to this mystery will probably never be found.

It is possible that Talleyrand initiated or supported the expedition merely because he did not trust Napoleon and wanted him out of the way. The logic to this line of reasoning is impeccable. There were advantages which ever way the project happened to go. If it failed, Napoleon was gone and was no longer a threat. If it was a success, there were advantages to the French occupation of Egypt.³² Talleyrand did agree publically to the Egyptian plan for all of the usual reasons: trade, threat to England, etc. He held back one reason that probably expresses his true motives. Talleyrand was above all a sensible statesman and as such realized that Europe could not exist for long in the chronic state of war in which she found herself. Europe could not cope with the French Revolution, therefore it was necessary for France to become settled as soon as possible, both for her own good and the good of Europe. In a letter to the Prussian minister, Sandoz Rollin, Talleyrand admitted that the European war must be ended at all cost. He stated that the Revolutionary Universal Republic was just as much a pipe dream as was the Universal Monarchy. The Egyptian expedition would thus serve a dual purpose. It would compensate France for her losses in America and at the same time would channel the revolutionary expansionism outside of Europe. It would then be possible to achieve the necessary peace in Europe.³³ Again the problematic element in Talleyrand is shown. An indispensable element of the Egyptian plan was for him to go to Constantinople so as to explain France's reasons for invading Egypt and to negotiate the terms for French occupation. He did not go. Did he ever intend to do so? Again mystery shrouds the facts.³⁴

With Austria's withdrawal from the war, in October 1797, it was necessary for the Directory to carry on the war with England. With her control

of the seas, and her large colonial empire, Britain remained a threat to French existence. The time appeared to be ripe for an invasion of England. Britain seemed to be on the verge of total collapse because of severe domestic riots, mutinies and economic problems. An invasion would be facilitated by the British evacuation of the Mediterranean in 1797. However, two factors emerged that impelled the Directory to consider attacking England in the East. A growing number of British agents and cartographers in Cairo seemed to point to British designs in the area. Also, the Directory began to fear that a resurgent Austria might seek compensation in the East for her losses to France in the West.³⁵

On February 23, 1798, Napoleon abandoned the preparation for the invasion of England. His reasons were good. France could not count on Spanish or Dutch aid, because both had been defeated by Britain. In 1797 the British fleet, commanded by Jervis, defeated the Spanish navy off Cape St. Vincent and blockaded the remainder of the Spanish fleet in Cadiz. The Dutch were defeated at Camperdown by Duncan. Also, in May 1798, the British Admiralty saw the need for a re-entry into the Mediterranean. They reinforced Jervis' blockade so as to enable him to dispatch a squadron into the Mediterranean. On May 2, Nelson set out under orders to watch the French fleet at Toulon.³⁶ Nelson's re-entry would prevent the French Mediterranean forces from participating in the invasion of England. With British naval superiority the French Admiralty could not even guarantee the crossing of the British Channel, much less the success of the invasion. With reluctance the Directory turned to Egypt for a continuation of the war with Britain.³⁷

On February 14, Talleyrand presented his plan for the invasion of Egypt. On February 23, Napoleon offered the conquest of Egypt as a possible

alternative to the abandoned invasion of England. As stated above, the Directory had reason to suspect Talleyrand's motives in this affair. The considerations of politics soon intervened, and the Directory gave up any thought of opposing Bonaparte or Talleyrand. With the elections of Year VI (1798) coming up, the Directory could hardly force Napoleon or Talleyrand into opposition. That they accepted such a rash and dangerous plan as Egypt for political reasons is a black mark on the history of the Directory.³⁸

Even had they declined the Egyptian plan, peace on the Continent was absolutely necessary for any action against Britain. Everything compelled the Directory to accept the Egyptian expedition which would compromise the peace. The influence of the generals and contractors, revolutionary ardour, the prospect of depriving England of her Eastern markets and the thought of a French monopoly over those markets all pulled the Directory into the foolish scheme which would see its demise. It soon became obvious that control of the sister Batavian and Cisalpine Republics was necessary for the continuation of the war. This was necessary for two reasons. First, the Batavian Republic, or the Netherlands, had long occupied an important place in British policy. Control of this area was needed to prevent its being used as a staging area for a war with France. The Cisalpine Republic was needed to protect France's Southern flank from an Austrian invasion. Second, it was necessary to exploit the resources of these areas for the wars of France.³⁹ On January 22, 1798, coup d'état in the Hague guaranteed a pro-French Batavian Assembly. A treaty with the Cisalpine Republic on February 21 prolonged the French occupation of that area.⁴⁰

In early March, 1798, the Directory approved the Egyptian invasion. Napoleon presented his plans on March 5, and on April 12 the final orders

were issued. Napoleon was ordered to seize Malta and Egypt and, as far as possible, to dislodge the British in the East. After securing Egypt and the Suez project (six months were estimated for these), he was to return to France and continue with the invasion of England.⁴¹

An overall consideration of the European situation is now necessary. The major problem in the last decade of the eighteenth century was the success of the wars of the French Republic and the inability of the European powers to stop them. The main reason for their success was the fact that, for the first time, Europe was experiencing a new type of warfare, the ideological war. The older and more established powers did not realize this. When they tried to fight a limited strategic war with France, they failed. The European statesmen did not realize that their orderly, systematic concepts of war could not work against a people who were fighting for something in which they believed, and not for limited concrete objectives. The Revolution, not natural boundaries, balance of power etc. was the major European problem of the time.⁴²

In 1797 England remained the sole European power not to have been defeated by France. Despite this, her position was no better than that of the other European powers. She had failed to exploit her control of the seas and the addition of the Spanish and Dutch fleets to her navy. England's greatest need to continue the war with France was allies. The First Coalition had been a dismal failure. To remake it a catalyst was needed. Ironically Egypt, which was intended to destroy England, provided that needed catalyst.⁴³

If the wars of the Republic began with the ideological reason of liberating captive peoples, they were quickly transformed into imperialism. The need for money and resources, the weakness of the Directory--the war

acting as a glue to keep things together, the desire to keep the generals out of politics and revolutionary spirit all transformed the nature of the wars. Even had the Directory desired peace on the Continent, there was still England. Invasion by way of Ireland was out of the question therefore, a direct invasion of England seemed to be the only other alternative. When this was seen to be impossible, the Southern route to India, through Egypt was the only remaining way to attack England. The British withdrawal from the Mediterranean and the French victories in Spain and Italy, gave France a new, if tenuous position of dominance in the Mediterranean. The fact that this had to be considered in choosing the less desirable Egyptian plan points out the basic strategic position between England and France. The problem was a mutual one. In 1797, there existed an impasse between England, the sea power, and France, the land power. The French folly in Egypt would at least temporarily break the impasse in favor of England. It would not be fully broken until 1812, with Napoleon's Russian campaign.⁴⁴

The threat of a French overland invasion of India was not great. However, the threat to English trade, support of the native Indian resistance and an invasion by sea of India were considerable threats. An even more ominous possibility was that English forces would have to be diverted from the Channel to counter French moves in the East. A direct invasion of England might then be possible. In light of the fact that the Directory only postponed the invasion of England, it might be assumed that, at least in part, they viewed as a diversionary move. Only in part however, as the detailed preparations and Bonaparte's orders show. There were humanitarian as well as practical reasons for colonizing Egypt. The ideals of the Revolution compelled that the oppressed peoples of Egypt

should be liberated. There were also cultural reason, for Napoleon valued the resurrection of an ancient civilization.⁴⁵

As for Napoleon, it is not likely that he viewed the invasion as an opportunity to remove himself from France. We can take him at his word that he intended to be back in France in at least six months. Had he intended to be away longer, it is not likely that he would have left his wife, the flighty Josephine, unchaperoned in Paris.⁴⁶ Napoleon had long dreamt of going to Egypt; and when he was given the opportunity, he went to considerable detail in planning the conquest. England offered more opportunity for glory; but since that was no longer possible, he would go to Egypt.⁴⁷ Talleyrand, seeking a stable Europe and seeing Napoleon as the man of the times, lent his support to the scheme.⁴⁸ Thus, to all parties involved, Egypt seemed to be the best choice. It is doubtful that the Directory saw in it the opportunity to be rid of Napoleon. Why give him the chance for more glory? It would seem that they expected him back rather quickly. They preferred a direct invasion of England and knew that ultimately this would be the only way to destroy England. For the moment this was impossible not only because of the English control of the Channel, but because most of France's resources lay in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the war must be taken to the Mediterranean and Egypt.⁴⁹

In hindsight we can conclude that the Egyptian expedition was a poor choice. For the time it did satisfy all parties involved but entailed unjustifiable risks--risks that should have been seen. France did have suitable land forces for the project, but Egypt is a far away land reached only over seas which France did not command. There was never any doubt that France could conquer Egypt, but she could not sustain or exploit her conquest without communications and supplies from France. As circumstances

were to prove, England was still mistress of the seas.⁵⁰

CHAPTER II

Despite the magnitude of the preparations at Toulon, the destination of the expedition remained a well kept secret. The British Admiralty remained in the dark as to the destination of the French Armada until it landed in Egypt. Their agent in Leghorn reported that the French fleet was preparing to sail for Alexandria. Despite this information the Admiralty clung to the idea that the preparations were part of the planned invasion of England.⁵¹ Not even the unusual actions taken by Monge, the French agent in Rome in charge of the selection of the objects of art to be taken to France, aroused suspicion. On March 16 Bonaparte ordered Monge to remove from the Vatican the Greek, Arabic and Syriac printing machinery used by the Propaganda Fide. He was also ordered to confiscate any maps, books or documents relating to the Near East.⁵²

As May 19, 1798, the date of departure, approached, an incident occurred which nearly caused the expedition to be postponed. On April 15, the French Ambassador to Vienna, General Bernadotte, was attacked by a mob of angry Viennese. The diplomatic repercussions of this incident nearly resulted in a war with Austria. Napoleon, more interested in Europe than in Egypt, offered to place himself in command of the army, should war break out. The affair was smoothed over and the Directory, wishing to see Napoleon off, ordered his departure for Egypt.⁵³

On May 19 the unwieldy convoy of four hundred transports, an escort of thirteen ships of the line, sixteen thousand sailors, over thirty-five thousand troops and a corps of over one-hundred and fifty scientists and

experts sailed for Egypt. The scientific corps included some of the best minds in France men such as Monge, Berthollet, and Fourier. The expedition also included a well stocked library and a variety of scientific and mathematical instruments.⁵⁴

It is a miracle that the ramshackle convoy escaped Admiral Nelson, who was cruising off Toulon by May 17. A strong wind carried the convoy Southward, past the coast of Sardinia, before Nelson was even aware of its departure. A gale soon developed which damaged the British ships, forcing them to dock in a Sardinian port for repairs. The chase was begun and it took Nelson the better part of the summer to catch up with the French fleet. On June 18 he learned that Bonaparte had captured Malta, on June 12.⁵⁵

Malta had been governed by the Knights of Malta since 1530, when the Emperor Charles V gave them the island as a home.⁵⁶ Many of the Knights were French and refused to fight Napoleon and their French comrades. The Grand master of the order, Hompesch, a Prussian, capitulated after a token resistance. Bonaparte spent a week on the island organizing it as a department of France.⁵⁷ Malta was essential for French designs in the Mediterranean. The island commanded the Sicilian Channel and its major harbor, Valletta, offered an excellent base for operations against the British Mediterranean fleet.⁵⁸

Nelson, searching for the French fleet, arrived at Naples on June 17 where he learned from the British minister, Sir William Hamilton, that the French had finished their work on Malta. Nelson now decided that Alexandria and finally India was Bonaparte's goal. He then quickly set sail for Egypt. On June 20 he passed the Strait of Messina and on that day was only one hundred and sixty miles from the French fleet. A cruising frigate under Bonaparte's command caught sight of the English squadron and

informed him of its whereabouts.⁵⁹

On July 1, the French expeditionary force landed at Aboukir Bay and the next day captured Alexandria. Bonaparte left General Kleber in Alexandria with six thousand men. He sent General Menon to capture Rosetta while he and General Desaix set out for Cairo. Desaix took the longer but easier route along the Nile, so as to guard the flotilla of river boats transporting the supplies to Cairo. Bonaparte took the shorter route across the desert. The conditions were especially hard on the troops because for some unknown reason they had not been outfitted for desert warfare. Their uniforms were heavy and they had not been given canteens. Stragglers were sexually assaulted and murdered by the ever present Arab raiders.⁶⁰

On July 21 Bonaparte confronted a large Mameluke force at the foot of the pyramids. The force consisted of forty-thousand troops, an army far superior to the French in numbers. Napoleon organized an innovative strategy of echeloned division squares, with artillery on the corners and between the battalions. The cavalry and trains also remained between the battalions and were thus ready to fight in any direction.⁶¹ The Mamelukes were unable to break this formation and were annihilated. Murad Bey, the Mameluke leader, fled into Upper Egypt. The way to Cairo was opened and on July 24 Bonaparte entered the Capitol.⁶²

During the first few weeks in Egypt the French had good reason to be optimistic about the future. Egypt had been taken with few French casualties and Nelson was nowhere to be seen.⁶³ The local population was friendly, or at best indifferent to the French. Presumably this was due to Napoleon's propaganda. Upon capturing Alexandria he issued a proclamation assuring the inhabitants of Egypt that the French came as friends of the Sultan. They came to fight the Mamelukes not the Egyptians,

and they were true Moslems. Did not the French depose Pius VI, (February 11, 1798) whose predecessors had consistently made war against Islam?⁶⁴

Their optimism was premature because on August 1, Nelson arrived off Alexandria, catching the French fleet unprepared, he destroyed it almost to the last ship. In a single stroke England regained control of the Mediterranean and imprisoned Bonaparte in Egypt.⁶⁵ The evidence seems to indicate that Bonaparte was ultimately responsible for the disaster at Aboukir Bay, or the Battle of The Nile. He later claimed that he had ordered Admiral Brueys, the commander of the squadron, to seek shelter in the Old Harbor (Alexandria) and if unable to do so, he was to set sail for Corfu. In reality Brueys' orders were unclear and demonstrate Bonaparte's reluctance to allow the fleet to leave Egypt. The reason for his reluctance is not known. It might have been due to the fact that he did not expect to be in Egypt much longer, or possibly because he did not feel that his position was secure enough to allow the fleet to leave. Whatever his reasons, he refused to issue the order for the fleet to leave and left its defense to Bruey's discretion. Brueys must also bear considerable responsibility for the disaster because he did not make the best of his position. His faulty defense permitted Nelson to slip through his line and deliver a destructive attack from both sides.⁶⁶

The Battle of the Nile precipitated a complex series of events. The most significant of these is that it enabled Britain to remake the Second Coalition. Unlike the First Coalition the Second included Russia and Turkey. Russia had considerable cause for hostility against France. She was upset over the French occupation of Egypt because it threatened her designs on the Ottoman Empire. The Czar, Paul I, was also enraged all the more since he had had himself elected Grand Master of the Knights of Malta

and coveted Malta as his prize. The Russians also feared that the French were desirous of placing a French candidate on the throne of a restored Poland.⁶⁷

Turkey's place in this affair is interesting. The French knew from the outset of the Egyptian campaign that they would have to appease the Turks. Despite this, problems arose almost at once. We have already examined Talleyrand's duplicity in this matter but it should be noted that he even refused to appoint an ambassador to go in his place, until it was too late. To make matters even worse, the French charge d'affairs in Constantinople, Ruffin, was not informed of the invasion until June 28. Even when he was informed, he was given the least possible information; he was told that an ambassador with full powers was being sent. The Turkish government knew of the French plans before the fleet had left Toulon (their intelligence was better than the British in this respect). When Ruffin was confronted by the Foreign Secretary all that he could do was plead ignorance and to assure the Porte that the French held no hostile intentions toward Turkey.⁶⁸

Turkey was somewhat understanding in regard to France's position. The destruction of the order of Malta, traditionally hostile toward Turkey, was welcomed. But it was also a traditional policy to fight whenever infidels took territory belonging to Islam. The Porte felt that it would be discredited among its Moslem subjects if it did not fight France. Other problems quickly arose. If the French were still friendly, why after conquering Egypt did Bonaparte enter into negotiations with Ali Pasha of Janina and other local Turkish rulers? Why did he send messages to Greece promising her people liberation from Turkey? It was becoming more apparent to the Turks that the French desired the dismemberment of their

empire. Also, the promised French envoy failed to arrive. On August 6 the news of the Battle of The Nile reached Constantinople. The French nationals were confined for their protection while the government continued to wait for a French amassador. On September 2, 1798, after giving France every opportunity to disavow herself from her rebellious general in Egypt, Turkey declared war. On that same day Talleyrand at last appointed an envoy for the mission to Constantinople. He was unable to leave before the French recieved the news of Turkey's declaration of war.⁶⁹

Russia followed Turkey with a declaration of war and negotiated an alliance with Turkey that allowed the Russian Black Sea fleet to pass through the Straits into the Mediterranean, where they proceeded to attack the Ionian islands (Corfu was the last to fall on March 3, 1799). This provided the Russians with an excellent position in the Mediterranean, one which she would never again see. In addition to Malta she was interested in the Kingdom of The Two Sicilies. Britain blessed this alliance and joined with Russia on December 29, 1798, to plan combined landings in Italy and Holland.⁷⁰

Despite the British naval superiority and the addition of Russia and Turkey, there was very little that could be done against France in the Mediterranean. England simply lacked the land forces needed to fight France. To rectify this situation Admiral Nelson began to court the friendship of Naples. Nelson's involvement in Naples was a disaster from the very beginning. The army of Naples was worthless and her fleet was not in any better condition than her army. The peace treaty of 1796 with France dictated Neapolitan neutrality was violated by Nelson's presence. The Neapolitans had suffered considerable losses to France and were ready to fight whenever the opportunity arose. Nelson convinced them to ally with

England and to attack the Roman Republic, which they did in November 1798.⁷¹

The Neapolitan army briefly occupied Rome but was quickly expelled by a French army, commanded by Championnet. After recapturing Rome the French were ordered to take Naples, which fell on January 23, 1799. The Kingdom was plundered, the King exiled, and the Parthenopian Republic was established.⁷² Nelson's error at Naples deprived England of whatever aid the Kingdom was able to provide and committed his squadron to the defence of Sicily and the remains of the Kingdom of The Two Sicilies.⁷³

The Second Coalition still needed the support of Austria or Prussia so as to mount an attack along the Adige (a river in Northeastern Italy), in Switzerland and along the Rhine. Prussia refused outright and Austria allowed herself to be courted without giving a definite commitment. The Austrian Chancellor, Thugut, was uninterested in what he realized were the English and Russian ambitions. The Russians were interested in re-establishing the Italian Kingdoms for their plunder and England wanted to recover the Netherlands. Thugut allowed the war to break out with Austria remaining neutral; but nevertheless, knowing that she could not remain neutral for long, he began military preparations. In March he permitted the Russian troops to pass through Austria on their way West. The Directory used this as a casus belli and declared war on Austria on March 12.⁷⁴

The French defeat in the Battle of The Nile caused considerable concern in Paris but no one seemed to feel that it doomed the expeditionary force. However with the situation in Europe there was little that the Directory could do to help Bonaparte. In December they wrote to inform him that he could expect no reinforcements or supplies from France so long as the British, Russian and Turkish fleets were in the Mediterranean. They sug-

gested that his best hope was to wait for a partition of Turkey (the Ottoman Empire seemed always on the verge of partition), but offered three other possibilities. He could remain in Egypt and continue its organization as a viable colony, attack Constantinople, or march to India. In actuality none of these courses was practical, but of the three the Directory felt that only the invasion of India was impossible.⁷⁵

In early 1799 the Directory found itself in a difficult strategic situation. France was involved in operations from Ireland to Egypt. To do so successfully required stability at home, well timed plans and good communications. The Directory had none of these and consequently problems developed. The Directory lent its support to the Irish Revolution led by Wolf Tone. This move was calculated to occupy the British at home thus bettering the chances for France's success in the East. The rebellion was supposed to have begun in September 1798, after the French had secured Egypt. Instead the revolutionaries rose in May, only a few days after the French fleet had left Toulon. The Irish were ill prepared and despite continued French aid the rebellion was crushed. On November 11, Wolfe Tone committed suicide and thus ended the uprising. The French failure to divert Britain in Ireland was only part of the total disruption of the Directory's plans. The failure in Ireland secured England from invasion while the Battle of The Nile destroyed France's hopes for the East and thus placed her in a perilous position within Europe itself. The French defeat at the mouth of the Nile enabled Britain to form the Second Coalition and thus to regain the initiative against France.⁷⁶

In the spring of 1799 the Second Coalition had taken to the field, and by summer France was again in danger of invasion. The French army was very inadequate and its leadership bungled the early stages of the war.

Instead of using Switzerland to establish a central striking force, the army struck out along a wide front and was pushed back everywhere. Italy quickly fell to the Austrian and Russian troops, and England made a successful landing in Holland.⁷⁷ The international situation sparked the already familiar domestic problems in France: riots, royalist plots, and governmental insecurity. The new elections again went against the Directory, but this time the Directory could not afford to arouse political hostilities by repeating the Coup of 22 Floreal, Year VI (May 11, 1798). The new left majority in the Councils took advantage of the situation, and revenged Floreal by forcing three of the Directors out of office. This has been labeled the Coup of 30 Prairial Year VII (June 18, 1799). Both branches of the government had now violated the constitution, and with the appointment of the old revolutionary, Sieyès, to the Directory, its days were numbered.⁷⁸

Napoleon had to bear the immediate consequences of the Battle of The Nile. In addition to trapping him in Egypt and breaking communications with France, valuable supplies and the treasury went down with the battle ships. He was very anxious about the situation but rightly believed that the battle did not doom his expedition. The transports, docked at Alexandria, were not destroyed and three of the eleven battleships lost were in poor condition anyway. The Directory also had at its disposal the Brest squadron and the Atlantic fleet, both of which could be brought into the Mediterranean if necessary.⁷⁹

Napoleon showed little of his concern about the situation to his associates. He quickly settled in and began to organize the colony. His first care was for the health of his troops. Hospitals and laboratories were established for the study of the new tropical diseases.

Sanitation and quarantine measures were instituted for the control of these plagues. The problem of security was dealt with by providing patrols and street lighting, a novelty for Egypt. The most critical problem was the lack of money. With the treasury at the bottom of Aboukir Bay there was no money to pay the troops or to buy the supplies that they required. All available public funds were seized, the mint was reorganized and the bullion that was left was coined. This eased the situation temporarily so that long term fiscal measures could be instituted. The Mameluke's property was sequestered and guilds, corporations and wealthy individuals were forced to give contributions to the government. The local system of taxation was reorganized and revenues from agriculture were increased by improving farming methods. An accurate land survey allowed the taxation of the land.⁸⁰

The English blockade following the Battle of The Nile threatened the economic development of the new colony. Bonaparte therefore turned to the scientific and technological corps for the production of the essentials for the army and local population. Internal trade was stimulated by the more efficient tax system, the re-opening of internal canals and a government better able to provide for the protection of business.⁸¹

A new representative government was established under French patronage. A Diwan of nine prominent Egyptians was established for the governing of Cairo. Similar Diwans were established for the provinces. A general Diwan was called for the governing of the entire colony. These institutions should not be taken lightly, because Bonaparte took them seriously as long as they were in control.⁸²

There was little popular concern over the presence of the French in Egypt. The rule of the French was not as cruel as that of the Mamelukes

and the French seemed to be very respectful of Islam. Bonaparte had also recieved a declaration from the Muffis of the Mosque of El Azhar in Cairo stating that the faithful could swear allegiance to the new goverment. He also wrote to the Sherif of Mecca, the Bey of Tripoli and the Pashas of Aleppo and Acre to assure them that the French were friends of Islam.⁸³ Despite these precautions, uncertainty began to develop over the innovations imposed by the French. No major problems developed until word reached Cairo that the Sultan had declared war against France. This made nonsense of the propaganda that the French came as friends of the Sultan. On October 21 an insurrection broke out in Cairo. The revolt took two days to crush and cost two hundred and fifty French and seven hundred Egyptian dead. This marked the end to any peaceful coexistence between the French and Egyptians.⁸⁴

Bonaparte realized that with Turkey's declaration of war and her alliance with Russia and Britain, it was essential for France to regain control of the Mediterranean. On October 7 he sent a message urging the Directory to send the Brest and Atlantic fleets into the Mediterranean. This would force the British to fight at a greater distance from her bases and in so doing would give the French a better opportunity to regain their control over the Mediterranean.⁸⁵ This reasoning was perfect but was not the only reason for considering such an operation. The allied positions in the Mediterranean were widely dispersed, making it unlikely that St. Vincent, the British commander, would be able to bring them together in time to prevent a French entry into the Mediterranean. In March 1799, the Directory sent a combined French and Spanish fleet into the Mediterranean. This fleet, commanded by Bruix, was numerically superior to the allied forces but Bruix, a fatalist at heart, refused to exploit his

advantage. He procrastinated, the Spanish refused to cooperate and together they let the chance for victory slip by. By the end of the year the two had gone their own separate ways, with Bruix returning to the Atlantic. The cruise was a failure.⁸⁶

Bruix's cruise was the only substantial effort, by the Directory, to re-establish control over the Mediterranean. There is a slight mystery as to why this is so. The British blockade of Egypt was not strong, as is witnessed by Bonaparte's ability to send messages to France. Napoleon, on the other hand, received few couriers from France and when he did so their messages were too out of date to be of any use.⁸⁷ The situation in Europe was serious but the Directory could have spared the small force needed to break the blockade. Was the Directory honestly concerned over the European situation--sincerely believing that no forces could be spared? Or were they playing the waiting game? If Bonaparte could succeed all the better; For France had Egypt. If he did not, the Directory would be rid of a trouble maker.⁸⁷

By early 1799 the situation in Egypt was becoming desperate. The army was becoming depleted and supplies were growing short. News of the Turkish military preparations in Syria and on Rhodes caused Bonaparte to have serious doubts as to how much longer he could hold out. The only remaining hope was for him to move swiftly into Syria and defeat the forces there, and then return to Egypt and defeat the sea born invasion from Rhodes.⁸⁸ Two other reasons supported this move. First, on February 10 Napoleon received a message informing him of the current situation in Europe. Since Austria had not yet entered the war, and it was apparent that Egypt would have to be abandoned anyway, why not control the entire coastlines of Egypt and Syria so as to use them as the trump cards during

peace negotiations. Also, the British blockading squadron was taking its supplies out of Syria. An attack on this area would divert the force and give an opportunity to break the blockade. A message regarding these plans was sent to the Directory urging them to make the best use of the opportunity. Nothing was done.⁸⁹

On February 6, 1799, Bonaparte invaded Syria and advanced through the country rapidly, defeating all military forces in his way. By March 18 he reached Acre, a fortified port city, surrounded on three sides by water. Bonaparte laid siege to the city but with Smith's squadron he could effect little damage. In addition, Napoleon's siege equipment sent by sea had been captured by Sidney Smith, who Nelson had appointed commander of the British Levant fleet. Field artillery proved all but useless against the heavy fortifications, also the plague began decimating the troops.⁹⁰ On May 29 Bonaparte lifted the siege and returned to Egypt. Despite the failure at Acre the campaign was a marginal success. It did stop the Turkish military preparations but it cost Bonaparte more men and supplies than he could afford to lose. Two thousand two hundred men were lost as well as most of the siege equipment and other valuable supplies.⁹¹ At the end of June he wrote the Directory requesting six thousand reinforcements. If he did not receive these before the end of the year, his effective force would be reduced to the dangerously low level of twelve thousand.⁹²

On July 15 Bonaparte received word that the expected seaborne invasion had occurred at Aboukir Bay. He rushed up from Cairo and destroyed almost the entire Turkish force. On August 2, in the process of negotiating an exchange of prisoners, Smith gave Napoleon some newspapers covering the month of June, 1799. From these Napoleon received his first news of

Europe in months. He learned that Italy was lost and that the Second Coalition was on the Rhine and in Switzerland preparing for the invasion of France. He realized that it was now time for his return to France so as to gain control of the situation there. What he did not know was that since June the situation in Europe had improved dramatically and that the Directory had already ordered his return.⁹³ After the Russians and Austrians took Italy, the two separated. The Austrians remained in Italy while the Russians, under Suvarov, advanced into Switzerland to meet the other wing of the Russian army under Korsakov. The Austrians also had an army in Switzerland commanded by the Archduke Charles. When Charles was ordered to advance on Mainz a gap was left between the two Russian armies in Switzerland. The French General Massena siezed this opportunity to drive between them and defeated the Russians, who quickly returned home. Austria was left in Italy but the Coalition was broken and France was again saved from invasion. By mid-October Brune had defeated the Anglo-Russian forces in Holland, forcing them to evacuate the Batavian Republic. The situation there was again under French control.⁹⁴

Not knowing of these events Bonaparte began preparations to leave Egypt. He ordered two frigates and two smaller vessals prepared for the journey. On August 24 he set sail with a few generals and scientists. By letter he gave command of the army to a bitter and disappointed Kleber. He instructed Kleber to hold Egypt until general negotiations with the Coalition began. If he recieved no reinforcements before May, 1800, he was to negotiate peace with Turkey at the price of evacuating Egypt. Napoleon's departure effectively ended the Egyptian adventure. The army held out until 1801 but without supplies and reinforcements it was a slow death.⁹⁵

CONCLUSION

The campaign in Egypt and Syria had little strategic value but its impact on European history, as well as world history is inestimable. The impact of the Egyptian adventure is three-fold. First, it is a unique and interesting interlude in the career of Napoleon Bonaparte. In the planning and execution of the campaign we are shown a facet of Napoleon's character that was hardly ever shown elsewhere. He carried out his plans with great insight and imagination. Napoleon set out for Egypt not only to conquer her but to change and transform her into a new world. The most lasting contributions of the Egyptian campaign are a tribute to Bonaparte's genius and imagination. Because he had the foresight to include in his plans scholars and men whose ambition equaled his own, we are now aware of the mysteries and beauty of ancient Egypt. That we have such knowledge is due to Napoleon and his scientific corps who discovered the Rosetta Stone and gave birth to modern Egyptology. Also important is the fact that there is a direct link between the birth of Egyptology and the birth of modern archeology, which is an indispensable tool in the search for man's past. A second important result of the Egyptian campaign was its influence on Napoleon himself. The campaign gave Napoleon valuable experience in desert warfare. This experience added to and helped perfect Napoleon's military skills. The campaign also gave him experience in the governing and organizing of an entire nation. Both of these experiences would be important in the very near future.

The last but not insignificant result of the Egyptian campaign was

its influence on Egypt herself. In addition to the cultural impact of the opening of Egypt's past, there was also a very crucial political impact:

In July 1798, Napoleon landed an army in Egypt in a move designed to sever Britain's link to India. As imperial strategy it was well conceived but the execution was faulty, and the French were gone in less than three years, forced out by British arms and the complexities of governing a prostrate and backward people. For France and Britain it was but an incident in their protracted struggle for the domination of the seas. For Egypt it was the cannon shot that ended her weary centuries of stagnation and torpor. To be shure, it did not put an end to Egypt's ordeal of tyranny and oppression at the hands of foreign masters, for practical independence was not to come for another century and a half. It did, however, introduce an age of political stability during which peasant productivity was reestablished; more than that, it forced the Egyptians out of the medieval into the modern world.⁹⁶

Therefore, despite its immediate failure, Napoleon's Egyptian campaign was, in the long term, a success.

FOOTNOTES

¹Edward R. Tannenbaum, European Civilization Since The Middle Ages (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1971) pp. 240-244.

²J. Christopher Herold, Bonaparte In Egypt (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) p. 11.

³Herold, p. 13.

⁴Herold, p. 6.

⁵This information may be found in two sources: F. Charles Roux, Bonaparte Governor of Egypt (London: Methuen and Co., 1937) pp. 18-19 and J. Herold, Bonaparte In Egypt, already cited.

⁶Herold, pp. 11-12.

⁷Tannenbaum, pp. 328-329.

⁸Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher, Robert Lee Wolf, Civilization In The West (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1969) pp. 440-444.

⁹Tannenbaum, pp. 332-335.

¹⁰Tannenbaum, pp. 334, 335, 346.

¹¹David J. Brandenburg, Shepard B. Clough, Nina G. Garsoian, Peter Gay, David L. Hicks, Stanley G. Payne, Otto R. Pflanze, A History of The Western World (Chicago: D. C. Heath and Co., 1964) pp. 774-775.

¹²A History of The Western World, P. 777.

¹³Tannenbaum, pp. 346-347.

¹⁴Herold, pp. 9-10.

¹⁵Georges Lefebvre, The Directory, Trans. Robert Baldick (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p. 118.

¹⁶Herold, p. 10.

¹⁷Leo Gershoy, The French Revolution and Napoleon (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1964) pp. 334-335.

¹⁸Herold, pp. 2-3.

¹⁹Herold, p. 14.

²⁰Herold, p. 14.

²¹Herold, p. 14.

²²Louis Madelin, Talleyrand, Trans. Rosalie Feltenstein (New York: Roy Publishers, 1948) p. 53

²³Madelin, pp. 27-33.

²⁴Madelin, p. 26.

²⁵Madelin, p. 39-45.

²⁶Madelin, p. 46-56.

²⁷Gershoy, p. 335.

²⁸Gershoy, p. 335-336.

²⁹Lefebvre, pp. 118-119.

³⁰Lefebvre, pp. 118-119.

³¹Herold, p. 17.

³²Herold, p. 18.

³³Madelin, p. 63-34.

³⁴Madelin, p. 65.

³⁵Herold, pp. 11, 12, 13, 19.

³⁶Lefebvre, p. 117.

³⁷Herold pp. 36-37.

³⁸Lefebvre, p. 119.

³⁹Lefebvre, p. 119.

⁴⁰Lefebvre, p. 120.

⁴¹Herold, p. 20.

⁴²A. B. Rodger, The War of The Second Coalition (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 2.

⁴³Rodger, 6-7.

⁴⁴Rodger, pp. 8-14.

⁴⁵Rodger, pp. 8-14.

⁴⁶Rodger, p. 20.

⁴⁷Rodger, p. 20.

⁴⁸Rodger, p. 18.

⁴⁹Rodger, pp. 21-22.

⁵⁰Rodger, pp. 26-27.

⁵¹Felix Markham, Napoleon (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963) pp. 44-45.

⁵²Charles-Roux, p. 5.

⁵³Lefebvre, p. 166

⁵⁴Markham, pp. 44-45.

⁵⁵Markham, p. 45.

⁵⁶Herold, p. 40-41.

⁵⁷Markham, p. 46.

⁵⁸James Marshall-Cornwall, Napoleon (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1967) p. 32.

⁵⁹Herold, p. 50,

⁶⁰Vincent J. Esposito, A Military History and Atlas of The Napoleonic Wars (Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) p. 32.

⁶¹Esposito, p. 32.

⁶²Esposito, p. 32.

⁶³Gershoy, p. 336.

⁶⁴Herold, p. 69.

⁶⁵Gershoy, p. 336.

⁶⁶Herold, p. 103.

⁶⁷Gershoy, p. 339.

⁶⁸Herold, pp. 129-130.

⁶⁹Herold, pp. 130-134.

⁷⁰Lefebvre, p. 169.

⁷¹Rodger, pp. 73-75, 76-77.

⁷²Lefebvre, pp. 169-170.

⁷³Rodger, p. 80.

⁷⁴Lefebvre, pp. 171-173.

⁷⁵Rodger, pp. 67-68.

⁷⁶Herold, pp. 128-129.

⁷⁷Lefebvre, pp. 171-175.

⁷⁸Gershoy, p. 341.

⁷⁹Herold, p. 126.

⁸⁰Rodger, pp. 124-125, 127.

⁸¹Rodger, p. 125.

⁸²Markham, pp. 47-48.

⁸³Markham, pp. 47-48.

⁸⁴Markham, p. 49.

⁸⁵Herold, pp. 216-217.

⁸⁶Rodger, pp. 93, 96-100.

⁸⁷Herold, pp. 219-220.

⁸⁸Esposito, p. 34.

⁸⁹Herold, pp. 215-217.

⁹⁰Esposito, p. 34.

⁹¹Rodger, pp. 128-130.

⁹²Markham, p. 52.

⁹³Markham, p. 52.

⁹⁴Gershoy, p. 342.

⁹⁵Markham, pp. 52-53.

⁹⁶Robert W. July, A History of The African People (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974) P.225.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brandenburg, David J., Shepard B. Clough, Nina G. Garsoian, Peter Gay, David L. Hicks, Stanley G. Payne, Otto R. Pflanze. A History of The Western World. Chicago: D. C. Heath and Co., 1964.

Brinton, Crane, John B. Christopher, Robert Lee Wolf, Civilization In The West. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969.

Charles-Roux, F. Bonaparte Governor of Egypt. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1937.

Esposito, Vincent J. A Military History and Atlas of The Napoleonic Wars. Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.

Gershoy, Leo. The French Revolution and Napoleon. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1964.

Herold, J. Christopher. Bonaparte In Egypt. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

July, Robert W. A History of The African People. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974.

Lefebvre, Georges. The Directory. Trans. Robert Baldick. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.

Madelin, Louis, Talleyrand. Trans. Rosalie Feltenstein. New York: Roy Publishers, 1948.

Markham, Felix. Napoleon. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963

Marshall-Cornwall. Napoleon. Princeton: D. Van. Nostrand Co. Inc., 1967.

Rodger, A. B. The War of The Second Coalition. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Tannenbaum, Edward R. European Civilization Since The Middle Ages. New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1971.

