

Aporia P of Aristotle's Metaphysics:

WHETHER PRINCIPLES ARE LIMITED  
IN NUMBER OR IN KIND,

BOTH THOSE  
IN DEFINITIONS AND IN THE UNDERLYING SUBSTRATUM?

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Edward J. Schleiter

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St. Meinrad Seminary College

St. Meinrad, Indiana



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## Part I

## THE CONTEXT

That science is called first philosophy which considers the first causes of things. Moreover, the science which deals with the most 'universal' principles is on the highest level of intellectuality. The most "universal" principles are those of the most "universal" subject: being. Some knowledge must be had of these principles so that a more complete knowledge may be had of the principles which are proper to any genus or species of being. That is, these principles are demanded for a knowledge of each class of beings.

Accordingly, these principles are treated in one common science. While other sciences study the causes of some genus of things, metaphysics considers causes and principles only in so far as they are related to being in general, or to being as being.<sup>1</sup>

This universal science examines things or the principles of things which are beyond the realm of each particular science. These are the common attributes of being in general which belong to all of the sciences, and separate substances (if there are such), which are outside of the scope of the particular sciences which all deal with sensible substances.<sup>2</sup>

A wise man knows the causes of the being and reasons for the truth. So, it is he who arrives at metaphysics with its consideration of first causes. One arrives at the knowledge of a difficult truth through its elements and principles, since something is as its causes makes it to be.

Metaphysics or wisdom, therefore, seeks truth in the first causes of being. In every series of causes there is a first and a last, so all causes must be able to be numbered as individuals or as kinds.<sup>3</sup>

A consideration of the unity of metaphysics must deal with its causes

and its subject. A consideration of its parts takes up substances and accidents.

Since the goal of a science is to learn about the principles and causes involved, one must study what sort of things the principles are, and in what manner they exist. In the context of "in what manner" do principles exist, one finds the aporia of whether they are "limited in number or in kind." Finally, one must consider the principles of substance which others have proposed. This, then, is the context in which Aporia P occurs.<sup>4</sup>

## Part II

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE TYPES OF CAUSES AND THE NUMBER OF CAUSES

A man must take into account what others have done before him persuing a science. An historical knowledge will provide him with a basis from which he can make corrections, expansions, and illucidations. He will know what questions remain to be answered and which ones have already been satisfactorily concluded. To come to a fuller grasp of Aristotle's viewpoint one must see how his doctrine of causality compared to that of his predecessors.

Now causes are spoken of in four ways. Of these we say that one is the substance or quiddity of a thing, for the first "why" of a thing is reduced to its ultimate intelligible structure, and the first "why" of a thing is a cause or principle; another is the matter or subject; a third is the source of motion; and a fourth is the cause which is opposite to this, namely, that for the sake of which, or the good, for this is the goal of every generation and motion.<sup>5</sup>

A formal cause is the very substance of a thing, by which one knows what it is. A thing does not have a nature until it has received a form. The formal cause provides the ultimate explanation why something is so.

One proceeds to explain, beginning with the proximate forms and going to the ultimate forms. Since the "why" asks about a cause, the form must be a cause. This was the principle which Plato stressed or overstressed the most.

The material and efficient causes were considered by the ancient philosophers.

The fourth cause, the final cause, is opposite to the efficient cause as a goal is to a starting point. Motion begins with the efficient cause

and terminates with the final cause. That is, the final cause is the goal of every process of generation and motion whose starting point is the efficient cause. The final cause, besides being taken as that for the sake of which something comes to be, is also taken as the good of each nature. The final cause may be last in realization and first in intention.<sup>6</sup>

Aristotle notes that in some way the ancient philosophers have arrived at these four causes. And where they have failed to reach these four, at least, they have also named no additional causes, so that this list of four must be correct.<sup>7</sup>

Many have not stated to what class of causes the principles they posit belong. However, all the principles they give can be placed in one or the other of the four classes of causes.

Some held one material cause, and others held many material causes. Some held a body and others, as Plato, held something incorporeal as the material cause. Anaxagoras held it to be an infinite number of like parts or elements.

Some posited a cause for the beginning of motion, although they were not always correct in the things which they considered to be moving causes.

No one clearly posited the formal cause, the cause through which a thing's substance is known. Some touched on it, but not as a cause. Those positing "Forms" came closest to giving a formal cause. However, their "Forms" are a means to immobility, and are not like the formal causes, which provide the quiddity of particular things.

Although the ancients are not consistent in calling it a cause, the goal for which motion and activity occur, is a cause. They speak of it in different ways, but never in the way in which it is a true cause.

Since the ancients were not able to add any other causes to these four causes, they must be correct as the number of causes or kinds of causes.<sup>8</sup>

Most of the ancients tried to explain the world in terms of material causes. Moreover, they had many misconceptions about the nature of matter. Empedocles, who held the four bodies (earth, air, fire, and water) as the material elements, conceived them as some sort of moving causes, one being generated from another.

Anaxagoras came close to the true material cause, prime matter, in his notion of the world being originally a great mix-up, in that both this and prime matter have great potential or breadth. But he erred in thinking that the complex preceded the simple.

Further the principles were aimed to account only for corruptible substances.<sup>9</sup> If, however, there be other substances and hence another science beyond physics (metaphysics), then their principles are incorrect and insufficient for an explanation of the whole of causality in the world.

Aristotle believed that principles can be numbered and that there had to be a first principle in every series of causes.

Further, it is evident that there is a first principle, and that the causes of existing things are not infinite either in series or in species. For it is impossible that one thing should come from something else as from matter in an infinite regress.... Nor can the causes from which motion originates proceed to infinity as though man were moved by... [something, that something by something else,] and so on to infinity. Again neither can there be an infinite regress in the case of the reason for which something is done, as though [everything was] done for the sake of something else. The same is true in the case of quiddity [or formal cause].<sup>10</sup>

Thus, there are first causes; so it is possible that metaphysics has first principles as its subject matter.

The causes are limited in number because one can not proceed to infinity in a series of causes belonging to one and the same class. In a series of causes, if the first was not a cause, none of the "causes" would be a cause. So the first cause is the main cause.

The principles are limited in species because one cannot cause a result completely by means of an infinite number of classes of causes.<sup>11</sup> If "the classes of causes were infinite in number, it would also be impossible to know anything, for we think we have scientific knowledge when we know the causes themselves of things; but what is infinite by addition cannot be traversed in a finite period of time."<sup>12</sup>

## Part III

## DIALECTIC OF DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED

In regarding the modes of existence for the different principles, Aristotle asks how they are in potency and in act, and how they are one and many. Concerning how they are one or many, he wants to know if they are universal or singular, and if they are the same for corruptible and incorruptible things. But the first aspect of how they are one or many is whether the principles are limited in number or in kind.

This, then, is the Aporia P: "Whether the principles of things are limited in number or in kind, both those in the intelligible structure of things and those in the underlying subject (or both those in the definition and those in the substratum)." 13

The proposal that the principles are limited in number, means that there is numerically just one single principle or perhaps several single principles: a single form, a single matter, and a single privation, for all of nature.

The statement that the principles are limited in kind means that there are many material principles which have in common the specific nature of material principle, and similarly for the other kinds of principles. If the principles are limited in kind they are only specifically the same for all and numerically distinct.

Some of the philosophers, such as the Platonists attributed formal causes to things, while others, such as the ancient natural philosophers, attributed material causes to things. So Aristotle says this question of how the principles are limited is applicable both in the intelligible

structure (in rationibus or in definition), that is in the formal causes, and in the underlying subject (in subjecto or in the substratum), that is in the material causes.<sup>14</sup> Thus we must consider the numbering of the principles of a thing's intelligible essence or of its specific form, and the immediate principles of the existing singular.

However, there are certain difficulties which accrue respectively to the first principles being one in kind and to their being one in number.

If the first principles are only one in kind, there will be no numerically one, not even unity-itself and being-itself; and how will there be scientific knowing if there is not some unity in all things?<sup>15</sup>

It seems that unity and being are each, one in number, but if the first principles are one only in kind this would be impossible. Being could not be the same in two things, but the being of one would only be of the same kind as the being of another. The highest genera or broadest universal could not be a singular, since it would have to be numerically distinct in any two instances.

This seems to follow logically, since things composed of principles merely contain what they receive from these principles. Hence if the principles are not numerically one, the things composed of the principles will not be numerically one.

Unity-itself or being itself must be numerically one. So, if the principles of things are never numerically one, but only specifically one, unity-itself or being-itself will neither one subsist of itself.<sup>16</sup>

If there is not something common in a whole set of individuals, it seems scientific knowledge is impossible. For this is what follows from a lack of numerical unity in principles of things. Science is not of singular things, but of the unity or common attributes found in the singulars. Sci-

ence about things composed of principles depends on a knowledge of these principles. All things come from principles. So, if principles are never numerically one, it follows there will be no science of beings.<sup>17</sup>

Yet we know there is science of many beings, and there is being-itself and unity-itself, each singular actualities. Now, it would appear that the principles are numerically one, but Aristotle also has difficulties to pose against this position.

But, on the other hand if... [the elements] are numerically one, each of the principles is also one, and not as in the case of sensible things, different for different things; for example if the syllable "ba" is taken as a species, its elements in every case are specifically the same, for they are numerically different. However if this is not so, but the things which are principles of beings are numerically one, there will be nothing else besides the elements. For it makes no difference whether we say "numerically one" or "singular," because it is in this way that we say each thing is numerically one. But the universal is what exists in these. For example if the elements of a word were limited in number, there would have to be as many letters as there are elements. Indeed, no two of them would be the same, nor would more than two.<sup>18</sup>

If letters were limited in number, literature would be confined to the alphabet. Similarly, if elements or principles were limited in number, reality would not go beyond the simple elements.

The principles of different sensible things are only specifically the same. But the principles of beings would have to exist in a way contrary to this if the elements were numerically one. Yet it is certain that the elements or principles of sensible things are numerically different, just as the things of which they are principles, are numerically different. Aristotle compares this to the fact that the letters of syllables are the same in kind, just as syllables are the same in kind in their various instances.

If the elements of all beings were numerically the same, nothing be-

sides elements would exist in the world, because what is numerically one is a singular thing. Aristotle compares this to the fact that if each syllable was numerically the same in every instance, there could only be one (a singular) of each letter. Neither two elements nor two letters could be the same in beings and in syllables, respectively.<sup>19</sup>

If each principle was numerically one, it could exist only in one place. So nothing could exist but a simple set of combinations of all the principles, in which each principle could be used only once. The only species here would have to be a principle prior to the first principles, but no scientific knowledge is possible concerning such individual principles. One might be pressed to wonder whether there is some principle, such as form, which is an individual and yet is knowable; which is somehow individual and somehow universal?<sup>20</sup>

Aristotle, it seems, has legitimately arrived at the fact that principles must be limited. For it seems there must be a first and a last principle. This applies especially in efficient and final causes, but also in formal and material causes.

He seems to have shown how the causes are limited in kind to four, since these are the ones he has arrived at, and beyond which his predecessors have posited no others. At any rate, whether four is the number or not, it seems that they are limited in kind.

Yet, he has just brought up objections to their being limited in kind. There would be no scientific knowledge. Being-itself would not be singular.

However, he has also objected to their being numerically one. For this would lead to the fact that there could be nothing in the world beside singular instances of each element or principle of beings.

This dual difficulty will be answered, shortly. But first, I want to follow Aristotle's clarification of some terms.

## Part IV

## CLARIFICATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

## PRINCIPLE:

A principle is the first in an order of being, coming to be, or knowing. Principles may reside, intrinsic or extrinsic to the thing of which they are principles. A principle is that part of a thing which is first generated, and from which the generation of that thing begins. A principle can also be that from which a thing's process of generation begins, but which is outside of the thing.

A principle implies order or sequence (with continuous quantity, motion or time). The term "cause" implies some influence on the being of the thing caused.

## CAUSE:

Although it is not designated as a cause and a principle from the same point of view, the motion that terminates in the being of something, begins from a cause which is a type of principle. For the notion of principle includes all causes.<sup>21</sup>

In one sense cause means that intrinsic thing from which something comes to be. It also means the intelligible expression of a thing's quiddity or the form of the thing and of the parts which are included in its intelligible structure.

A cause can also be that from which the first beginning of change or rest comes. A thing, inasmuch as it is an end, provides a fourth notion of cause. Many of these causes can function in one thing. Thus, Aristotle has

arrived back at his four causes from his different ways in which the word "cause" can be taken.<sup>22</sup>

The modes of causes are divided into three sets: singular or generic; proper or accidental; and prior or subsequent. Further, any of these six may be either actual or potential.

The final cause is prior in causality to the other three causes. That is, it is the goal toward which the efficient cause tends. And the efficient cause causes matter to be receptive of form, and makes form to exist in matter.

This division of the four causes is a division into species, since it is based on the different formal aspects of their causality. Thus, this is a division which is based on essential differences, which constitute the species.<sup>23</sup>

#### ELEMENT:

An element is the first part in a thing's generation. "The inherent principle of which a thing is first composed and which is not divisible into another species is called an element."<sup>24</sup> The elements, if divisible, have parts which are alike. They are the primary components of each thing. "Element" is not the same as "proximate matter," since proximate matter has no species.<sup>25</sup>

The notion of element is not as broad as the notion of principle, because moving causes are principles, but being extrinsic, cannot be elements.

#### PRIVATION:

Privation consists in the disposition to having something and yet not possessing it. It is in the realm of formal cause as being the negation of

a true form. In another sense there are as many kinds of privations as there are words with negative prefixes.<sup>26</sup>

#### POTENCY:

Potency in the sense of power or active potency is a source of motion or change, which is in another thing, or in the moved thing as "other." Potency as something passive is the source or capability of a thing's being moved or changed by another or by itself as "other."<sup>27</sup>

#### ONE-- NUMERIC, SPECIFIC, GENERIC AND ANALOGICAL UNITY:

Those things in which the notion of their essence is indivisible are one. Two things are called one when their definitions are indivisible from each other. Those things are one whose concept of essence is indivisible. If two things are indistinguishable as to species, they are of one species. Things are primarily called one whose substance is one. Things are more than one that are not continuous, or do not have one form, or do not have one definition.<sup>28</sup>

Further, some things are one in number, some in species, some in genus, and some analogically or proportionally. Those things are one in number, which have one matter; in species, which have one intelligible structure; in genus, which have the same figure of predication; and proportionally, which are related to each other as some third thing is to a fourth. And the latter types of unity always follow the former. Thus things which are one in number are one in species, but not all which are one in species are one in number; and all which are one in species are one in genus, but not all which are one in genus are one in species, although they are all one proportionally. And not all which are one proportionally are one in genus.<sup>29</sup>

This division into four ways of being one is from a logical viewpoint. Thus, matter signed by quantity, or as it has designated dimensions, is the principle of numerical individuation.

Those things are one in species which have one intelligible structure or definition. Properly, only a species may have a definition, since a definition is composed of a genus and a difference. A genus can be defined only insofar as it is a species of a higher genus.

Those things are one in genus which have in common one of the figures of predication or classification (that is, the same category or predicament). In other words, they have one way of being predicated. All the things in each category are predicated in one way, which is a way different from all of the other categories.<sup>30</sup> And things may "be" only in as many ways as there are categories.

The analogical oneness of two things which are related to each other as a third thing is to a fourth, may be taken in two ways.

Two things may be related in different ways to a third thing. Thus, healthy is predicated of both urine (a sign) and of medicine (a cause) as they are related to a healthy body.

Or the oneness may be in that the proportion of two things to two other things is the same. Accordingly, tranquility is for the sea what serenity is for the air.

There lies a major key for the solution my problem in the former way of analogical predication, where many things are related to one which precedes all of them.<sup>31</sup>

In any analogical predication the idea is not the same in all the instances, nor is it totally diverse in all of them.

In regard to all four ways in which things are one, the former types of unity demand the latter types. But the latter types may be present without any of the former types. So, numerical oneness demands the other three types

of unity, but there may be proportional oneness where generic, specific and numerical oneness are absent.<sup>32</sup>

## Part V

## THE SOLUTION

My whole problem is answered in Book XIII of Aristotle's Metaphysics.<sup>33</sup>

The principles must not be limited only to a certain number of kinds. And neither can the principles be only numerically one. For mere numerical unity of principles leads to a world of simple elements and mere unity by kinds cuts out scientific knowledge and being-itself. So, I want to show how the principles of all things are truly limited, that is, by an analogical unity or oneness.

It seems that the causes and principles of different things are in a sense numerically different, though in a universal and analogical sense, they are the same for all.<sup>34</sup>

Metaphysics is concerned with substance in that it studies the principles and causes of substances. Substance is at least rationally prior to accidents. Further, accidents are not unqualified beings, but qualities and motions of being.<sup>35</sup>

Having considered the principles of sensible substances in the previous aporiae ("L," "M," "N" and "O"), Aristotle here determines whether the principles of substances and other classes of beings are the same or different. If they are the same, it is evident that the principles of substances are also the principles of the other categories.<sup>36</sup>

There are arguments which immediately present themselves to show that the principles of substances and of the other categories are not the same. For it is paradoxical to think that the same principles produce substances and accidents.

First, if the principles were the same for all of the categories, they would have to exist either outside of all the categories, or belong to substance or to one of the other categories. However, there is nothing common to, and yet existing apart from, substance and the other categories. For a principle is prior to the things which come from it, and so, there would have to be some sort of principle prior to substance and accidents -- which is impossible.<sup>37</sup>

Moreover, a common principle could not exist in only one of them for substance is not an element of any of the categories, nor is any of the categories an element of substance. So it seems principles common to substance and to the other categories have no way in which to exist.<sup>38</sup>

Secondly, how can all things have the same elements while there is a distinction of "element" and "a composite of elements"? "For none of the elements can be the same as that which is composed of elements, for example neither 'b' nor 'a' is the same as 'ba'."<sup>39</sup> So, if the elements of substances and of the other categories were the same, none of these elements could belong to substance or to any of the other categories. But everything which exists (including elements) must belong to some category, so all things cannot have the same principles.<sup>40</sup>

Yet, there are ways in which principles are the same for all of the categories. However, this is not a univocal type of sameness. It is a sameness with diversity. That is, the principles for all things are proportionally the same and numerically diverse.

There are two ways in which principles are proportionally the same for all. In regard to the first way where the same causes function for the multitude, one can consider the intrinsic causes alone, and the intrinsic with

the extrinsic.<sup>41</sup>

In a proportional way the intrinsic principles of all things are the same. The intrinsic principles are properly called elements. The elements of perceptible bodies are: form, privation and matter, which of itself potentially has, or is susceptible of, both form and privation. Substances are composed of these, as unities produced from principles and as products different from their principles.

All things, then, have the same elements or principles (matter, form and privation), though the elements of different things are different. That is, all things have these same elements only analogically or proportionally. There are these same three elements for all things, but they differ in each different category of things.

Thus, colour has whiteness, blackness and surface for its form, privation and matter. Further, visibility has light, darkness and air for its elements.<sup>42</sup> (Of course, the privation and the form are not actualized at the same time in the same matter.)

Although all things have the same principles analogically, they always have their different proximate principles. Matter, form and privation are present in the generation every sensible substance. Analogously, in the generation of every other category there are three elements which have the character of matter, form and privation. Yet, these elements differ in the different categories; in the different things.<sup>43</sup>

Proportion names the relation in the same manner of two things to a third thing. Accordingly, matter, form and privation are predicated of all the diverse proximate elements of all things as they are related to a sameness of function.

Besides the elements, which are principles intrinsic to a being, there are external principles. So it is evident that "principle" and "element" differ, although both act as causes. Principles, then, can be divided into those which are elements, and those which are not. In fact, principle in the strict sense of "that from which motion proceeds," could be confined to a moving cause (an extrinsic cause). That which acts to produce movement, or makes it cease, is a principle.<sup>44</sup>

So, in a sense one divides principles into intrinsic and extrinsic causes. As intrinsic, principle is that part of a thing which is the first generated and from which generation of the thing begins.<sup>45</sup> However, it has just been stated that a moving cause is an extrinsic principle and not an element. Therefore, there are three elements and four causes or principles -- taking "principle" in an analogous sense. The final cause is not mentioned here, because a goal is a principle only insofar as it is the intention of the moving cause.<sup>46</sup>

Moreover, these four are the principles of all things only in a proportional or analogous sense, since the elements differ in different things, and the proximate moving cause is different for different things.

There are many different types of secondary matter which are analogously called the material cause (for example: bricks, body, wood, steel). There are many different forms which are analogously called the formal cause (for example: shape of a building, health, spherical shape, tubular shape). There are many different things which are analogously given the name "privation" (for example: a kind of disorder, sickness, saw dust, molten liquid). Finally, there are many things which have the character of a mover, and are analogously called the moving cause (for example: the art of build-

ing, the art of medicine, the art of wood carving, the technique of pipe molding).<sup>47</sup>

These four kinds of causes are reduced in a sense to three due to the fact that in the case of artifacts and in the case of natural things, the moving cause and the form are specifically the same. Man is mover to the extent that he has a form. The form which the mind conceives, is the moving cause of a thing made by an intellectual being. So, in one sense the moving cause as a generator has a form in the same species as the form of the generated. Thus, it is that a man begets a man. And in another sense the moving cause or art involved is itself a kind of likeness or intelligible representation of the form for this matter.

It must be kept in mind that the identification of form is with the proximate, not with the ultimate, efficient cause. Moreover, when one is speaking numerically, and not specifically, of the number of causes, they may not be reduced to three.<sup>48</sup>

Now it can also be shown that there are instances where the first principles are simply, or without qualifications, the same for all things. There is that (principle) which as the first of all things moves all things. For in efficient causes one must proceed to a first mover or all "movers" would be proximate or intermediate movers and none would begin the movement. That is there would be no movers or movement at all without a first mover.

Secondly, all things have the same causes in that the beings of the other categories cannot exist without substance, and so the causes of substances are the causes of all things.<sup>49</sup> All the other categories of being refer to and depend upon substance, the primary type of being.<sup>50</sup> This causality applies not only to the first moving cause, but also to the intrinsic

causes.

Now that which is one in itself and in being is God; and from Him is derived the numerical unity which is found in all things. He is the one ultimate goal toward which all beings are directed and, as will be seen next, the first agent or moving cause of all things.<sup>51</sup>

The moving cause is the first of the four causes since it makes the form or the privation to exist in matter, and makes the matter disposed to receive the form or privation. And in the class of movers it is possible to reach a first single mover which is a first principle for all things.<sup>52</sup> This mover must be an eternal, separated, intellectual substance whose essence is actuality. It moves by way of understanding, willing and being the highest appetible and intellectual good.<sup>53</sup>

Having considered how principles are proportionally the same for all things in one way, and how they are simply the same for all things, we now come back to consider how they are proportionally the same in another way. The second way in which principles are proportionally the same for all things is to the extent that actuality and potentiality are the principles of all things.<sup>54</sup>

However, potentiality and actuality are different for different things and apply to them in different ways. That they apply to different things in different ways is shown in that the same thing exists at one time actually and at another time potentially (for example: grapes to wine, seed to tree, man to cadaver).<sup>55</sup> Thus, they are not present in all things in the same way. What was potentially a cadaver is now actually a cadaver.

Nevertheless, the principles here can be proportionally the same for all things, since potentiality and actuality can be reduced to the kinds of

causes mentioned above, which are the same proportionally for all things. Form (or even privation in the sense of a type of form) is an actuality. Moreover, matter is in potentiality because of itself it is capable of receiving both form and privation.<sup>56</sup>

As was stated, not only do actuality and potentiality apply to things in different ways, but they also are different for different things. That is, the distinction of actuality and potentiality applies in a different way to those things of which the matter is not the same, and the form is not the same, but different.

The principles of a man are: his elements (matter and form), an external cause from the same species, his father, and external moving causes which are neither of the matter nor of the form or privation of his species.<sup>57</sup>

These extrinsic moving causes are specifically different from a man and have different proper matter.<sup>58</sup> That is, both actuality and potentiality differ in them and in men. So, it seems potentiality and actuality are different for different things as potentiality can be applied to different proper matters, and actuality applies both to proximate and remote moving causes and to different forms, while both forms and moving causes can be reduced to actuality.

Although potentiality and actuality are different for different things, all things have as their principles the actual and the potential, so that actuality and potentiality are analogously the principles of all things.

The other way besides proportionally or analogously in which the principles of all things are the same, is universally. Some causes are expressed in universal terms and some are not.

Since they divide being as being, potentiality and actuality are the most universal first principles. But actuality is a first principle which actually causes this certain thing or individual, and potentiality is a first principle which potentially causes this certain thing or individual. And only the singular thing may be the originative principle of the singular thing, so it seems, no universal principle may exist (including actuality and potentiality).

However, man may be the originative principle of man universally, although this man is the principle of this man. Similarly, this particular "b" and "a" are the principles of this particular "ba," though a universal "b" and a universal "a" are the principles of a universal "ba."<sup>59</sup>

The principles are universal, however, only in the manner in which they are conceived. Thus, although no universal is a subsisting principle, principles like actuality and potentiality can be universal in the manner of their being conceived -- that is, they can be conceived universally. Only a universal effect has a universal principle. So, actuality and potentiality are universally the same for all only as they are universally signified or conceived.<sup>60</sup>

There are different causes and elements for different things, and the causes of things which do not belong to the same category (such as: colors, sounds, quantities, and substance) are different, except in a proportional way. However, to the extent that the other categories are caused by substances, the principles of substances are universally the principles of all things.<sup>61</sup>

Although Aporiae "L," "M," "N" and "O" consider how matter and form are the principles of all things, it seems, that a few points should be

made here for the sake of clarification in regard to their universal aspects.

Matter is the principle of individuation. Form is the principle of specification. Moreover, prime matter is potentially the principle of all things.<sup>62</sup>

One genus (one matter) and one difference (one form) are predicated of many things in one species, not of one thing only, so it can be seen that the two make up the quiddity of the species.<sup>63</sup> The parts of a definition are derived from the parts of a thing. The genus and difference are not parts of the individual, but of the definition, although these parts are taken from the parts of the individual. Thus, genus is taken from matter and difference from form, and species from both matter and form, together.<sup>64</sup>

"A" and "b," not this "a" and "b," are given in a definition, since the definitive expression is applied only universally. A definition gives the essence or intelligible expression in a universal way. There is no definition for composed singulars. There is knowledge of the existing singular only while the senses are engaged, but definition or knowledge of the universal formula is lasting.<sup>65</sup>

Thus, one can know many individuals of the same species, with the individual matter of each adding nothing to knowability. The form is the same in the many individuals of the same species. A form is actually individual and definite, but potentially universal and indefinite in extension.<sup>66</sup> Form may be a principle for all things only in definition, not in reality.

The causes of things of the same species are different, not specifically, but in the sense that the causes of different individuals are different. One individual's matter, form and moving cause differ from another's,

although these causes in their universal intelligibility are the same.<sup>67</sup>

Thus, the matter, form and moving cause is predicated analogously of each individual.<sup>68</sup>

In summary, it can be seen that when one asks whether principles of substances and of the other categories are the same or different, "same" and "different" are used in various senses, since the principles of different things are different, and yet, in three respects are not different, but the same.

In one respect, the first principles; matter, form and moving cause, are proportionally or analogously common to all things.

The first principles are also the same for all things in the sense that the causes of substances are the causes of all, because when substances are removed, so is everything else.

Thirdly, that which is first in complete reality is the cause of all things.<sup>69</sup> And the principles, actuality and potentiality, initially cover "complete reality." So, actuality and potentiality are the principles for all things.<sup>70</sup>

Nevertheless, the proximate causes of things are different for different things. All the contraries (the forms and their privations) are different for different things, except when they are predicated as universals or as terms with analogous meanings. Further, the proximate matter in which the contraries reside is different in different things, except when it is predicated or taken analogously. So, this sameness for all things can never be reduced beyond an analogous or proportional sameness of principles -- that is, a sameness with diversity.<sup>71</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

1. In Meta., Prologue.

2. In Meta., 2146. (Taken up in Aporiae E and F.)

3. William H. Kane, O.P., "Introduction to Metaphysics," The Thomist.

The Thomist Press: Washington D. C., April, 1957. pp. 125-131.

4. Ibid. pp. 137-139.

|                                |  |                        |                                       |             |
|--------------------------------|--|------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| Problems<br>of<br>Metaphysics: |  | of method              | -relating to the unity of the science | -causes     |
|                                |  |                        | -relating to the parts of the science | -subject    |
|                                |  |                        |                                       | -substances |
|                                |  |                        |                                       | -accidents  |
|                                |  | of the principles      | -whether they are                     | -universal  |
|                                |  |                        | -separate                             |             |
|                                |  | -how they are          | -one or many                          |             |
|                                |  |                        | -potency or act                       |             |
|                                |  | as mathematical things | -----as substances                    |             |
|                                |  |                        | -----as separate.                     |             |

5. Meta., 983<sup>a</sup> 24-32.

6. In Meta., 70-71.

7. Meta., 988<sup>a</sup> 18 - 988<sup>o</sup> 21.

8. In Meta., 172-180.

9. In Meta., 181-200.

10. Meta., 994<sup>a</sup> 1-10.

11. Meta., 994<sup>a</sup> 11-18.

12. Meta., 994<sup>b</sup> 27-30.

13. Meta., 996<sup>a</sup> 1-2. (The phrase in parenthesis is an alternate translation.)

14. In Meta., 361.

15. Meta., 999<sup>b</sup> 24-27.

16. In Meta., 461-462.

17. In Meta., 464.

18. Meta., 999<sup>b</sup> 27 - 1000<sup>a</sup> 4.
19. In Meta., 464.
20. Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Meta-physics. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: Toronto, 1951. pp. 135-136.
21. In Meta., 755-756, 760-761.
22. Meta., 1013<sup>a</sup> 24-35.
23. In Meta., 782-783.
24. Meta., 1014<sup>a</sup> 25-26.
25. In Meta., 198, 802-804.
26. Meta., 1022<sup>b</sup> 27-34.
27. Meta., 1019<sup>a</sup> 15-20.
28. Meta., 1016<sup>a</sup> 33 - 1016<sup>b</sup> 10.
29. Meta., 1016<sup>b</sup> 32 - 1017<sup>a</sup> 2.
30. In Meta., 876-878.
31. In Meta., 879.
32. In Meta., 880.
33. Meta., 1070<sup>a</sup> 31 - 1071<sup>b</sup> 2.
34. Meta., 1070<sup>a</sup> 31-33.
35. Meta., 1069<sup>a</sup> 18-23.
36. In Meta., 2455.
37. Meta., 1070<sup>b</sup> 1-3.
38. Meta., 1070<sup>b</sup> 4.
39. Meta., 1070<sup>b</sup> 5.
40. In Meta., 2463.
41. In Meta., 2464.

42. Meta., 1070<sup>b</sup> 10-21.
43. In Meta., 2467.
44. Meta., 1070<sup>b</sup> 21-25.
45. In Meta., 755.
46. In Meta., 2470.
47. In Meta., 2471-2472.
48. In Meta., 2473.
49. Meta., 1070<sup>b</sup> 35 - 1071<sup>a</sup> 3.
50. In Meta., 1768.
51. In Meta., 465.
52. In Meta., 2474.
53. In Meta., 2519-2522.
54. Meta., 1071<sup>a</sup> 5.
55. Meta., 1071<sup>a</sup> 5-8.
56. In Meta., 2480.
57. Meta., 1071<sup>a</sup> 11-15.
58. In Meta., 2481.
59. Meta., 1071<sup>a</sup> 17-23.
60. In Meta., 2482.
61. Meta., 1071<sup>a</sup> 23-27.
62. In Meta., 1729.
63. In Meta., 1623.
64. In Meta., 1463.
65. In Meta., 1492-1500.
66. Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., Op. Cit. pp. 271-276.
67. Meta., 1071<sup>a</sup> 27-29.

68. In Meta., 2483.

69. Meta., 1071<sup>a</sup> 30-36.

70. In Meta., 2485.

71. Meta., 1071<sup>a</sup> 37-39.

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