

TRAINING THE WILL

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the College Department  
of St. Meinrad Seminary in Partial Fulfillment of  
the Requirements for a Degree of  
Bachelor of Arts..

John R. Blaser

May 1, 1960

Saint Meinrad College

St. Meinrad, Indiana



## CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. Introduction	1-2
II. Psychology of the Will	
A. Nature of the will	2-4
B. Freedom of the will	4-5
C. Interaction of will and intellect	5-7
D. Non-rational factors influencing	8-9
E. Graphic description of the will	9
F. Influence of sin	9-10
III. Training the Will	
A. Aim of will training	10
B. Ineffectiveness of purely external training	10-12
C. Use of self-denial	12-13
D. Use of habits	13-14
E. Nature of motives	14-16
F. Effective motives	16-18
IV. Conclusion	18-19

## INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is: first to present the Thomistic position on the psychology of the will and secondly to use this Thomistic background for formulating the correct tenets for training the will. It is important that we discuss the psychology of the will before the tenets for training the will are set down. For a false psychological position may result in some absurd practical conclusion.

The so-called systems of will training, which are still to be found in paper-backs and in the Sunday paper magazine sections, are often a good example of a system that lacks a solid foundation.<sup>1</sup> These sure-fire methods of developing the will are not always the direct results of some psychological misconceptions, but grow up in an intellectual vacuum. This intellectual vacuum is caused by those modern psychologists who evade, to a great extent, the admission of volition in the sense of the ability to decide how one shall act in any given case. For them, the act of volition is merely a caused event, and man is but a mechanical model. This concept of man is equally mechanical whether one encounters it in the dim beginnings of psychology with Descartes, in the more explicit mental chemistry of Wundt's introspective method in the last century, or in Foring's more sophisticated statement of a few years ago. This mechanism, in its broad sense, is the view that the ultimate explanation of all action, movement, or change is to be found in the interplay of

matter and local motion. Such a view is rigorously deterministic because it excludes the possibility of self-initiating and self-sustaining action. Such a position practically reduces man to a mere robot. <sup>2</sup>

This review of the sources of opposition to volition in modern thought could proceed at some length, but that is not necessary. Already, this brief survey has shown what an absurd position a weak formulated psychology can lead to. Thus, with this in mind, our immediate task is to set forth a psychology of the will which represents a correct analysis of human behavior.

#### PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WILL

In the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas says, "The will is a rational appetite." <sup>3</sup> This statement, simple as it may be, is the keystone for understanding the will. As an appetite the will is an inclination of being toward what is good or suitable for it. This appetite is not the mere tendency of a power to perform its operation. Sight naturally tends to see, but it is not this tending which is called appetite. By appetite we mean the tendency of the whole animal or man, and its object is not what is good for one power of the animal or man, but what is good for the animal or man as such. <sup>4</sup> But the will is not merely a blind desire. It is a rational appetite in distinction to a natural appetite (e.g. certain elements unite to form compounds) or sensitive appetite (e.g. sheep fear wolves). The will needs the direction of the intellect. The intellect can contribute to the movement of the will by recognizing good and presenting it to the will. These two powers,

appetite and cognition, co-operate together to produce an act which is distinctive of man alone. However, we must be sure to make the proper distinction between appetite and cognition. St. Thomas makes the distinction in this manner:

What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect; for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers. 5

The apprehended good presented to the will by the intellect cannot, of itself, reduce the will from potency to act. In the first place, this apprehended good makes the will actual as a power or inclination, for the will is defined as the inclination for the good apprehended by reason; so that before the apprehension of the good the will is not actual even as an inclination. The apprehended good makes it actual in that respect, but something more is required to make it actual as operation. There is one good which, if directly apprehended, would actualize the will as both power and operation at once. This is the absolute good. But this good is never correctly presented to us in this life. Consequently, the object presented to the will by the will by the intellect never moves it necessarily to will, but simply gives it an inclination to will. This means that the object or end leaves the will in potency in respect to the operation of willing. So, the will still needs to be moved, since nothing moves itself from potency to act in the same respect. Therefore, God moves the will. God does not destroy its own freedom of movement. To begin with, He moves it to act, that is to say, to act voluntarily. Secondly, He

moves it according to the nature which He has first given it (free act). It is true that He moves the will to will necessarily the absolute good, but no particular will-act in this life directly concerns the absolute good. The particular will-act is a choice of some particular good, chosen as a means to the absolute good. By moving the will according to its own nature, God moves it to the absolute good necessarily and particular good indeterminately so that His movement leaves it free to choose or not choose, and free to choose one or another particular good.<sup>6</sup> Therefore will's movement of intellect and intellect's movement of will belong to different genera or orders of causation and both orders of causation are required for the complete free act. Intellect moves will by specifying its act. The will is efficient cause or agent in respect both to intellect and itself for it moves intellect to judge and itself to choose.

We saw above that the only good which moves the will necessarily is the absolute good. When a person judges some particular thing or act to be good, he can hold this judgment itself up for judgment. This power which men have of determining their own actions according to the judgment of their reason is known to us as freedom of the will. Free will is not a spontaneous, uncaused, non-rational choice. To be free means to be self-determining. If a man's will were not directed by judgment, he would not determine his own actions. He would be at the mercy of this uncontrollable inner determinant and liable to do anything at anytime. St. Thomas says:

The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the

deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either. 7

Therefore, man can perform free acts because his intellect is capable of reflecting upon itself and upon the reasons for these acts. These considerations of reason leave man's intellect free to pronounce a contrary judgment, and since these considerations are within his power whenever his judgment concerns a particular good, all such judgments remain in man's power to accept or reject. St. Thomas gives the following argument in favor of free will:

Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment: a stone moves downwards; ... (or) the sheep seeing the wolf ... But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will. 8

The complete interaction between intellect and will is not always easily observed in a deliberate will act. The Thomist teach that this complete process is composed of twelve partial acts, of which six are acts of the intellect and six are acts of the will. Henre Grenier presents this description in the following manner:

Acts of the intellect

Acts of the will

I

Order of intention

1. Concerned with the end

- |                                |                            |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Simple apprehension of good | 2. Simple volition of good |
| 3. Judgment proposing the end  | 4. Intention of the end    |

2. Concerned with the means

- |                            |             |
|----------------------------|-------------|
| 5. Counsel                 | 6. Consent  |
| 7. Last practical judgment | 8. Election |

II

Order of execution

- |                 |                                    |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|
| 9. Command      | 10. Active use                     |
| 11. Passive use | 12. Enjoyment (as regards the end) |

Since the will is the inclination to a known good, first there is required the apprehension of good in the intellect. Immediately there arises in the will indeliberate complacency in the good presented, or simple volition. In virtue of its simple volition, the will determines the intellect to judge whether the good is capable of attainment. If it judges in the affirmative, we have the judgment proposing the end. This judgment is followed by the intention of the end in the will. As a result of the intention of the end, the will determines the intellect to inquire into or deliberate concerning the means to the end, i.e. determines it to counsel. The counsel is a practical syllogism whose conclusion is a practical (indifferent) judgment, proposing not one means, but several. Corresponding to the counsel of the intellect is the consent of will i.e. approbation of the utility of the means. In virtue of this consent, the intellect is determined to its last practical judgment concerning the one determinate means that must here and now be chosen. This is followed by the election of the will. When the election has taken place, the intellect moves to the command by which the execution of the means chosen is intimated: do this. Corresponding to the command of the intellect is the active use of the will, i.e., the act by which the will determines the other powers to make use of the means. The passive use, in the powers subject to the will (in the intellect, senses, and motive power), corresponds to the active use. The application of all the means is followed by the enjoyment of the will, which is the happy possession of and delight in the end.<sup>9</sup>

This description is very limited and requires additional explanation all of which can not be presented in this paper. But there are some



important aspects of this process that we should consider a little more thoroughly. In the intentional order, there is the last practical judgment. For without the final practical judgment of the intellect, the will remains without sufficient reason for one act rather than another. Benignus has this to say about the last practical judgment:

By a practical judgment is meant an order from reason to act or not act, to do this or that. Practical judgments concern individual acts to be actually exercised by the person making the judgment. They are not merely speculative judgments about the character of some action but are directives of reason determining what is actually to be done. The last practical judgment which determines the will to its choice is a free judgment, made because the will moves the intellect to pronounce it. 10

In the order of execution, the command holds a very important position. Father Farrell explains this action accordingly:

It is an act of the intellect, sandwiched in between the will's choice and the will's movement to execution or use, keeping intact that invariable succession of acts of intellect and will. But the very efficacy of command tells us that it is not merely an act of the intellect; it smacks of power, of effective movement, and that is the work of the will. In command, then, there is an element of intellect and an element of will; and at that, it is only right and just that such a responsible officeholder in the control-room of human activity should combine the two essential elements of all human activity i.e. control and movement. 11

In some ways all this is fairly obvious from observing man's operations. Personally, we have experienced the power to accept or reject, to embrace or repel. All of this indicates that man has control over his actions. This deliberate control is the result of self-movement with a knowledge of the relation of means to end. For man can look beyond his action, he can control it because he knows the connection between the job to be done and the tools at hand.

So far we have considered only the interaction of will and intellect. However, non-rational factors also play an extremely important part in influencing our acts of will. In making decisions, the will is not only guided by reason but it is influenced by habits, sensitive passions, by dispositions of temperament and even by external physical forces of the world. First, there are certain natural internal dispositions which definitely influence the will's action. For example the desire to live and to know. Such natural disposition incline the will of necessity. Rooted in the very nature of the will, they are not under its force or control.

In regard to external physical forces man has control over them only insofar as he is able to make the necessary provisions to control them or lessen their effect. But in some cases man's voluntary operation is overwhelmed. For example, a man is dragged into the forest by an ape. Certainly, he does not wish this to happen, but his wish to be free can not be put into effect.

The external and internal senses both play an indirect role in influencing the will. The dispositions of the senses can and do color an object and so persuade the will into action. Such dispositions and forces affect sensitive appetite directly rather than will, but the will is moved through sensitive appetites. Though all these factors influence the will, none of them determine it to act necessarily. St. Thomas affirms these facts by stating, "Irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part in which are intellect and will." 12

Of all the internal dispositions that affect the will, save the

intellect, habits have the greatest power. For habits affects the soul so intimately as to become virtually a second nature. Habits furnish the element of unity in our actions. Father Farrell says, "They are the record of the past, the force of the present and the prediction of the future." <sup>13</sup> However, just as with the passions and senses, men retain command of will over their habits as long as they retain the use of reason. For example, it is hard for a drunkard to stop drinking, but he can do so just as long as drink has not yet driven him quite mad.

To sum up all that has been stated about the psychology of the will, let us avert to Johann Lindworsky's graphic description of the will as "field marshal".

According to this conception, the will, to use another metaphor, is rather to be compared to a modern field marshal. On the whole, the thinking for the field marshal is done by his general staff. The staff submits its plans and points out the advantages and dangers of each course of action, but it is the marshal who decides, who initiates one of the plans submitted, and who takes the responsibility for its execution. When this is done, the necessary detail orders are wired to the subordinate staffs, and from there to the troops. Finally, the spoken commands of the captains and lieutenants translate the orders into muscular activity of the private soldiers. The order of the field marshal has set into motion the whole widespread activity along the lines. <sup>14</sup>

From what has been stated so far one might wonder why the will needs to be trained at all. For we have seen that the will is the chief commander of man's actions. But from our own experience we know that the will does not always have the firm control that it should. There is a disorder in man's nature and at times the senses, emotions and external forces and dispositions exert undue influence. The main

reason for this disorder is sin. St. Thomas says:

As a result of original justice the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God and subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through sin of our first parent, ... so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature. <sup>15</sup>

Now that we have considered the basic principles of St. Thomas's teaching on the will, let us consider its training and re-education.

### TRAINING THE WILL

The essential aim of training the will consists in securing self-control. So training of the will must be essentially self-training. Father Farrell points up this fact by saying:

Whatever contributes to that command, whether it be discipline, energetic use of our power to command, builds up our power for living. It may very well be that outside the kingdom of ourselves, our command is entirely disregarded; but that does not make a great deal of difference. The important thing for successful living is that within our own kingdom, within ourselves, that command be supreme. <sup>16</sup>

To have a strong will means to have control over the will, to be able direct it despite all contrary impulses in the path of duty and virtue. The more frequently man restrains impulse, checks inclination, persists against temptation, and steadily aims at virtuous living, the more does he increase his self-control. The will must be self-trained, and effort must enter into all will training. Training of the will should result in its acting with uprightness and energy.

Johann Lindworsky gives the following advice on training the will:

Purely external training must be rejected. This is

particularly true if this training presumes that pupils can be led haphazardly to an act of self-control. They will thereby have gained some small quantity of will power for self-control in later life. For example, silence, even if it is imposed by the ordinary supervision of the classroom, has no value as a means of self-control in later life. From our point of view, it may be asserted that training of this particular kind may be considered pedagogically valuable only if the pupil has availed himself of some motive for the exercise of the will. And only insofar as a special mode of behavior which is required of a pupil is based on motives which will outlast the school years and remain as motives of action in later life of the pupil. 17

Taking this statement as a basis, let us proceed to discuss the "do's and don'ts" of will training.

The first thing that Father Lindworsky warns us against is the ineffectiveness of a purely external training of the will. Such a system would stress purely formal exercises. These so-called systems follow a very stereotyped pattern. They begin with exaggerated claims for the value of a strong will and insist that once this power has been developed, it will automatically carry over into all fields of endeavor. This system proposes that a number of trivial tasks be set up to call for the frequent exercise of the resolution and if they are faithfully repeated, the result will be a strong will. The feature of all such systems have in common is the emphasize upon exercise and repetition. The will is regarded as a separate department of the mind that can be developed by simple exercises. In other words, the will is compared to an organ of the body and can be developed like our muscles. Timothy Gannon gives the following reason for the disappointing results of such a system:

The failure here is a failure of transfer. Those who put faith in will training systems are invariably chagrined

to find that the strength of resolution acquired in one sphere does not carry over into other life situations. Good control of the desire for intoxicants, for example, is no guarantee of equal moderation in one's eating habits. <sup>18</sup>

Moreover, strength of will alone is not a particularly desirable trait. Strong willed people can be very stubborn and unsocial. They are impetuous. They often act without sufficient knowledge just for the self-conscious satisfaction that one feels in such action.

What about self-denial as a means of strengthening the will? Lindworsky points out that such practices are valuable for strengthening the will only insofar as they develop useful motives and helpful dispositions which will guide the person's actions correctly in the future. For example the person who has the fault of curiosity which often causes him to neglect his duties will learn that loss of news does not mean a painful sacrifice and does no particular harm to him. Such a person will learn the positive value of concentration and will see the good that results in his life. However, self-denial could become harmful if practiced too rigidly. Given the previous example, curiosity is desirable if it is controlled. After all a person would be quite eccentric if he had no curiosity. Where would the world be today if men were not curious about the world they live in? Also Lindworsky points out that self-denial has no value if it is practised just for the purpose of educating the will by means of a constant denial of all possible wishes. For if there is no motive, such self-denial will become unbearable so that at some time the person will fail.

But Lindworsky does not make a blanket condemnation of merely external exercises. For he says:

However, in considering this matter scientifically, let us be fair and search for little good that may be found in such a practice. Poise, glance, and gesture act in the same way. They contribute a little to the increase of self-consciousness, and thus favor the execution of plans once determined upon, and lend encouragement to new decisions. But they cannot give strength of will in a moral sense, because they do not furnish sufficient motives for the moral struggle. <sup>19</sup>

This training does not immediately produce will power or valuable motives for the normal person, but they do prove valuable in cases of therapeutic education.

Next let us consider the role of habits. As we have seen earlier, habits have a real influence on our will. Man would be greatly impeded without them. Henri Renard has this to say about their efficacy:

The reason, therefore, why habits are needed is simply that the faculties of man, his operative potencies, are not able to perform the action needed for his development and perfection, constantly, easily and with pleasure, unless they are informed and determined by acquired dispositions which prepare them for actuation and action. This need is readily perceived when we realize that the operations which are produced by some of his faculties while not exceeding the power of the whole man, do surpass the capacity of that particular operative potency. <sup>20</sup>

Habits are relatively stable and permanent dispositions to action that have been acquired through consciously permitted or directed repetition. The result of habit is a tendency or disposition towards a given action whenever the opportunity arises. Once formed, it tends to appear without conscious effort whenever the circumstances are appropriate. Thus, they gradually come to take the place of impulses, and certain tendencies are made over according to the mode of action that have

been desired by deliberate choice. As Gannon says, "This is the domain of volition, the sphere of goals objectively evaluated and chosen by the will." 21

However, if these habits are to have an effective influence on our acts, they have to be more than a quality merely based on repetition.

A habit is not a furrow or groove in the cortex, or a breaking down of resistance as the synapse, or the strengthening of a set of muscles; it is a quality of a person, a change in the personality resulting from a new insight, and a decision of the will made more effective by repetition. 22

So it seems that the power of the will is affected very little by the mere repetition of acts whether they appear in the form of habits, self-denials, or acts of the will. More important than repetition is the attractiveness of the goal - the motive. Lindworsky makes this comment about the usefulness of motives:

The total strength of will might depend on the placing in readiness of valuable goals, and in a skillful diversion of the attention. In this way, many facts may be explained satisfactorily: for example, the circumstances that the strength of will is not reserved for any age or sex alone, and that men who in one domain have great strength of will may lack it completely in others. It is not the existence of the lack of strength of will, but the readiness or the lack of motives, that furnishes the key to the understanding of such contradictory behavior. 23

In another work Lindworsky makes will power and motive to be practically correlative terms. For he says, " ... wherever there is a aim, a value, a motive, will power is found at work." 24

What do these motives consist in? A motive is a value. It is something that has worth and that is capable of eliciting desire. It implies that if things are within reach people will usually be



found doing things they want to do, provided they want to do them badly enough. Lindworsky notes this in the following manner:

Wherever an object appears to me that promises advantage or a growth toward it, a desire for this object arises in me, and the resolution is made to acquire it, unless some obstacle comes in the way. <sup>25</sup>

These motives are derived from the whole content of man's thoughts, emotions, memory, imagination and sense experience. This whole content of experience is gathered from earliest infancy and is added to by example and instruction. From the complexity of this experience, man will derive his motives for future action.

As we know from the psychology of the cognitive process each power evaluates the object desired according to its nature and hierarchical position. And of course this method of training makes full use of the close interaction of intellect and will which was explained earlier in the paper. However, as we well know, value building powers must in themselves be properly ordered, if correct values are to be obtained. Imagination should be used to make real creations so as to stimulate one to action and not to fabricate a dreamland in which one finds escape from life. Memory should be a stimulant to action or warning for the present instead of a deterrent to further action because of complacency or some exaggerated experience in the past. And then there are the passions which are to co-operate with our intellect for our own well being. Emotions are valuable, but they can give an exaggerated value to a motive if they are not under the control of reason. Of course, our thoughts are extremely important in making correct values. The aphorism, "We

are what we think", best describes the importance of this power. For the intellect is one of man's most distinctive powers and controls his cognitive process. That is why our thoughts are able to overcome some emotional state or past experience. So it is in this manner that our motives are formed.

These values will range from mere sense impressions, for example the pleasure of tasting sugar, to general idea of happiness or perfection. Lindworsky points out that we arrive at the conception of value in sense experience in our earliest youth. For he says, " ... we learn certain sense impression make us happy ... Thus sense feeling communicates to us the first idea of a value." 26 We can conceive higher values by means of reason based on the comprehension of facts.. These may be accompanied by sense feelings, but these secondary feelings are not necessary for conceiving the higher value. However, whatever kind of value acts as a motive whether sensitive or rational, it does not follow that every value will make the necessary impression upon every will. Therefore, what must be the nature of a motive that will influence the will?

One of the fundamental laws in picking effective motives is to choose those which are subjectively possible for execution. One should know his intellectual and physical capacities and live within them. It is frustrating if one does not accomplish what he sets out to attain. Instead of progressively acquiring better motives such a person will become apathetic and discouraged.. Taste of success and a feeling of accomplishment are good aids to motivation. This feeling will impel the person to acquire this value more thoroughly and to

seek better values.

Besides being subjectively possible for execution, these motives must have subjective value. For the personal appeal of any value depends upon the appetitive experience of the subject, the interests developed, and the goals now exerting their influence. Lindworsky points out that the knowledge of these subjective values is extremely important in teaching:

Not every value that stands high in the scale of objective values can be immediately experienced by any given individual. The first hard work required of a teacher who wants to influence his pupil is to investigate the range of subjective values in the mind of his pupil. Subjective values differ greatly in a child, in an adolescent, in an adult, and in an old man. They are different for a boy, and for a girl. They differ for the child of a small wage earner, and for the child of a wealthy family. Within every social class they are different for every individual. <sup>27</sup>

Another aspect that must be considered is the permanence of the motives. For the motive must be permanent in order to remain a valuable aim for every age. Otherwise, the motive will have little influence on the will because it will soon pass away. However, less permanent motives can have a definite function in helping build up permanent motives. Permanent motives are, as a rule, only the higher rational values and they are of such a nature as not to be easily acquired. Father Thomas V. Moore gives the following practical advice concerning the need for permanent motives:

... the development of a high, noble unit plan of life. is by far the most important thing in volitional activity. It is the intellectual basis of the normal management of our whole life. One who has no plan of life, nothing that he wishes to accomplish, cannot hope to manage himself with ordinary prudence. It is here that religion

enters and becomes a most powerful factor in the actual training of the will. Besides one's general plan of life, he must have ideals and principles, of lofty conception of the virtues, truth, honesty, pruity, and the like, principles of conduct ... 28

Permanence of a motive is not secured sufficiently by merely providing thoughts which are less likely to be forgotten. Lindworsky points out that research in memory has shown that the isolated unit of thought is far less permanent than the unit of thought which is part of an extensive thought complex. Therefore motives must not remain unsupported in the mind, but must be woven into an extended train of thought. 29

So it is that the strength of the will lies in motives which are subjective thought complexes acquired from the whole composite of our human experience.

### CONCLUSION

Before we conclude, one question that could be asked about this whole process of training the will by means of motives is; What kind of motives should they be? Desire for honor, to acquire wealth, to serve God are just a few of the many goals which man's activity can be directed towards. Of course, this presents a whole new field of thought which we can not treat here. However, in the course of this paper, we have seen that there is a definite psychological hierarchy of powers each having its particular duty and each its end and all functioning for the overall end of man. In addition to this we find ourselves plunged into an order of nature of which we are

finite members wounded by sin but helped by the word and grace of God. <sup>30</sup> As men, we have been created for a definite end. We feel ourselves naturally striving for it in our daily actions. To reach this end we must take into account our heredity, environment, and human powers. Our heredity and environment are more or less set. They are the stage on which man comes to play his part. The interaction of man's powers, especially cognitive and appetitive, allows man to choose the part he is to play. So it is that man's powers must be guided and trained so that with this human drama completed, we will find him at his final end. For every man has the responsibility to make sufficient use of his own powers and all the other aids offered to him in order to reach the end he was made for.

It is important that we understand this entire process and means of perfecting it as far as possible. Even though this paper did not set down a definite plan for the systematic training of the will, it did demonstrate a system that was based on sound philosophical principles which are often lacking in modern will training.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. For a more adequate description of these so-called systems of will training see page 11 and 12 of this thesis. An example of one of these exercises proceeds in this manner: ... trace in the air giant capital letters and whole words in which there was no break in the continuity, always watching his finger with tranquil attention. Additional examples can be found in: Narciso Irala, S.J., Achieving Peace of Heart, trans. Lewis Delmage, S.J. (New York, 1954) pp. 37, 43, 59-60.
2. In the previous discussion I am indebted to: Timothy J. Gannon, Psychology - the Unity of Human Behavior (New York, 1954), pp. 384-395.
3. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. English Dominican Fathers. (New York, 1947), I-II, q. 8, a. 1..
4. Ibid., I, q. 80, a. 1, ad. 3.
5. Ibid., I, q. 80, a. 1, ad. 2..
6. The previous discussion on the will and its end is taken from: Ibid., I, q. 82, a. 2, ad. 1,2,3. Ibid., I-II, q. 9, a. 4. Brother Benignus, F.S.C., Nature Knowledge and God (Milwaukee, 1947), pp. 252-253.
7. Ibid., I-II, q. 6, a. 2, ad. 2.
8. Ibid., I, q. 83, a. 1..
9. Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, trans. J.P.E. O'Hanley (Charlottetown, Canada, 1950), IV, pp. 67-68. Ibid., II, pp. 265-267.
10. Brother Benignus, op. cit., p. 280.
11. Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa (New York, 1939), II, p. 55.
12. St. Thomas, op. cit., I, q. 81, a. 3.
13. Walter Farrell, op. cit., p. 173.
14. Johann Lindworsky, S.J., The Training of the Will, trans. A. Steiner and E.A. Fitzpatrick (Milwaukee, 1929), pp. 42-43.

#### FOOTNOTES

15. St. Thomas, op. cit., I-II, q. 85, a. 3.
16. Walter Farrell, op. cit., p. 61.
17. Johann Lindworsky, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
18. Timothy J. Gannon, op. cit., p. 404.
19. Johann Lindworsky, op. cit., p. 111.
20. Henri Renard, S.J., The Philosophy of Man (Milwaukee, 1951), pp. 199-200.
21. Timothy J. Gannon, op. cit., p. 423.
22. Ibid., p. 424.
23. Johann Lindworsky, S.J., Experimental Psychology, trans. Harry R. De Silba (New York, 1931), p. 315.
24. Johann Lindworsky, S.J., The Training of the Will, trans. A. Steiner and E.A. Fitzpatrick (Milwaukee, 1929), p. 57.
25. Ibid., p. 64.
26. Ibid., p. 65.
27. Ibid., p. 68.
28. T.V. Morre, Dynamic Psychology (Philadelphia, 1924), p. 389.
29. Johann Lindworsky, S.J., The Training of the Will, trans. A. Steiner and E.A. Fitzpatrick (Milwaukee, 1929), p. 72.
30. We have only touched slightly the influence of the supernatural on the will. First, in regard to the will and its end (pp. 3-4) and secondly in regard to the effect of sin on the will (pp. 9-10). For this is more of a theological consideration than a philosophical one. However, it should be noted that God's graces do influence our will-act (will, intellect, habits). Lindworsky says this, "Hence, our theory of the will shows that we must expect as a grace, from the Hand which directs our life destinies, those effective experiences which lift us above ourselves. The natural formation of the will automatically passes over into the supernatural."

#### FOOTNOTES

Our faith makes us acquainted, in prayer and in the sacraments, with means of grace which, used to advantage, insure victory in the moral fight, without relieving us in the least of our own efforts. Of course, anything in excess of these gifts, necessary for winning the moral fight, we cannot obtain with infallible certainty even through the means of grace. That is left to God's free choice of grace. Using those natural and supernatural means most faithfully, we can merely place ourselves at the disposal of those extraordinary graces; but we must leave it to the Source of and graces whether we shall ever be numbered among the very great in the realm of those who are ever striving upward. " The preceding passage was taken from Ibid., pp. 175-176.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica. trans. English Dominican Fathers. New York: Benziger Brothers Inc., 1947. 3 vols.

Benignus, Brother, F.S.C. Nature Knowledge and God. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1947.

Grenier, Henri. Thomistic Philosophy. trans. J.P.E. O'Hanley. Charlottetown, Canada: St. Dunstan's University, 1950. 4 vols.

Farrell, Walter, O.P. A Companion to the Summa. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939. 4vols.

Gannon, Timothy, J.. Psychology the Unity of Human Behavior. Boston: Grim, 1954.

Lindworsky, Johann. The Training of the Will. trans. A. Steiner and E.A. Fitzpatrick. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1929.

Moore, Thomas Verner, O.S.B. Dynamic Psychology. New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1939.

Renard, Henri, S.J. The Philosophy of Man. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1951.

ARCHABEY LIBRARY



3 0764 1002 8846 8