

An Analysis of the Split in
the Republican Party of 1912.

A Research Paper
Submitted to the Faculty
Of Saint Meinrad College of Liberal Arts
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

Donald Anthony Quinn
May, 1978
Saint Meinrad College
St. Meinrad, Indiana




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The Split in the Republican Party

Thesis: The thesis of this paper is that the split in the Republican party of 1912 was partially caused by the personalities and some events in the American government which involved William Taft and Theodore Roosevelt.

Controlling Purpose: The controlling purpose of this paper is to briefly examine the differences in personality and concepts of government, and then briefly examine a few major events which showed the political differences between Taft and Roosevelt.

Introduction: During the Administration of Taft, a united Republican party became a disunified party with two factions. Each faction represented either Roosevelt or Taft. Each man was different in his philosophy and personality.

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Conclusion: The split in the Republican Party of 1912 was not solely caused by the break in the friendship. However, by examining the major events, one can see that the split was partially caused by the break. The events showed that the differences were not just political.

INTRODUCTION

During William Taft's administration, a split in the Republican party occurred. This split allowed the Democrats to win in the election of the President for 1912. The split was between a conservative faction and a progressive faction. Each faction came to be represented by one man. The conservatives were led by William Taft, and the progressives were led by Theodore Roosevelt. During the four years (1909-1912) when Taft was President, these factions fought over different reforms and issues.

This paper is only a brief analysis of the split. It will focus mainly on the leaders of the two factions. Each man had a different personality and a different concept of government, which later became the basic foundation of each faction. Both men were prominent in the party as well as close friends. But due to the personality, concept of government, advisors, families, and careers. their friendship eroded. As each man parted from the other, people surrounded each man and the factions arose.

The first chapter of this analysis is to briefly examine those differences that caused a split between these two men. The personalities are briefly described to show that their characters shaped each man differently. This can be seen also by their careers. Exhibited in these jobs and thoughts are different concepts of government. which will be

examined by the performance on major issues during the Taft administration. Following this is a brief discussion on the advisors, families and a promise that caused a breach between the two men.

Briefly treated in the second chapter is a discussion of how this breach or foundation became the backbone of each faction. By their differences, the men and factions fought and disagreed over certain issues. There are six issues which show the growing split between the two men and the factions. Finally, the reader should not expect an exhaustive explanation of this split. The reader should be aware that this paper examines a split between two men, and these two men soon became the leaders of a faction in a political party.

Chapter One

The Foundation of the Breach

Any type of contest involves two or more sides of opposition, which possess differing views and positions. It was evident even in the two Republican candidates, Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft. However, this presidential contest between these two men did not just involve issues; it consisted of an ideological conflict and a battle of personalities. The issues between Taft and Roosevelt in the election originated during Taft's administration. The different ideologies and personalities contributed to the men taking a certain position. The ideological conflicts erupted from a differing concept of the office that each man possessed. The differing personalities were evident in the men. These personalities were shaped by careers, families, and advisors. As William Henry Harbaugh states, "the controversy includes a political, ideological, and personal conflict."¹

Taft and Roosevelt each had a different personality. Roosevelt's personality widened the breach because his whole career was an inability to view competitors correctly. He could not understand the arguments of his opponents. This inability fixed a direction of his bias against people and governed the magnitude of his temper.² On the other side, Taft was a man who allowed others to do his job concerning appointments and decisions. Taft admitted that he failed due

to much love of personal ease. He had a brilliant mind and was a very scholarly man. However, he never used that mind in a positive way to get his way on governmental matters.

In his relation with others, he appeared quite different compared to Roosevelt. Taft loved to share his problems with others but never took command of the situations. Roosevelt usually had decided on an answer before he sought advice from others. Taft was not critical and could not accept criticism. When confronted by the press' or opponents' criticism, he neglected to deny the charges. He would not allow other reporters or people to present a positive image of him as he stayed in the White House. He did not address the people as Roosevelt did. Taft made himself appear tenderhearted, sensitive, and caring, but these qualities often served only Taft's position.³ Taft was conservative--instinctively, emotionally, and ideologically. He did not challenge anyone including himself. He simply disliked change.⁴

Another basis of this breach was laid in the foundation of their careers. Because of the following positions that each man held, each had experienced different encounters. Each man had performed differently in different capacities. Thus, when they finally both had achieved the presidency, their philosophies and performances were different.

In his career, Roosevelt had been brought up in urban New York where he would become a reform governor. He had been brought up in a family devoted to hard work. Thus, his hard work became a dominating characteristic when he became a Civil

Service Commissioner. Through this job, he was devoted to honesty and made some enemies among those who had been devoted to fraud. Through his progressive policies, he became well-known as a leader in progressivism. Thirdly, he had been an Assistant Secretary of the Navy where he often acted on his own accord and labored hard to succeed. After that he became a Rough Rider, a member of a troop which fought on the island of Cuba in the Spanish-American War. Through these endeavors, he gained popular support of the people while exhibiting strong nationalistic and leadership qualities, which Taft never did exhibit. Roosevelt also became stubborn and fought for what he thought was right. Following fighting in Cuba, he became the vice-president under William McKinley and found the job boring and inactive. After McKinley's death, Roosevelt was elevated to the presidency.⁵

Taft labored in his true love--the courts. He had been a lawyer and progressed in the judicial circuits. He finally agreed to an appointment as Solicitor General. Taft knew his job well. He excelled in knowledge of the law, but he would never interpret it to his advantage. He kept to the strict wording of the law. During his profession as a lawyer, he had become introverted from people. However, he had to give up his courts and his introversion when he became the administrator of the Philippines. He despised the job but worked well when the laws were written down for him. He did not have to be creative, and he gained executive experience. He broadened his knowledge in finance, sanitation, currency.

taxes, educational systems, civil service, and tariffs. From this appointment, his basic foundation of future issues was being formulated.⁶ Taft finally became Roosevelt's Secretary of War. Taft performed well under Roosevelt's guidance.⁷

During Taft's administration, Roosevelt began to administer, suggest legislation, and perform in a liberal way. The early 1900's saw a progressive faction emerging. Even years later, Roosevelt was still identified with this faction. He had tried to keep the party unified even though he had become a left-wing supporter. This alienated the conservatives but because of Roosevelt's abilities to keep the party united, the conservatives did not overpower him. After Roosevelt left office, the situation required the attention of a master politician with the ability to enforce and to encourage the government into action. Could Taft do it? That question was asked many times between 1908 and 1912. Many people doubted that he could. Taft doubted many times whether he himself could do it. Even Roosevelt, the man who got Taft nominated, shared some of that doubt. Yet, out of their friendship, he decided that Taft was the best man to carry out his policies, ideas, and purposes. Roosevelt misunderstood Taft's capabilities and thought Taft could be strong, forceful, efficient, and upright.⁹ At that time, Roosevelt thought Taft was basically well-equipped for the post.¹⁰ Yet, after Taft had been in office, Roosevelt received criticism. Thus, he found out that he had made a mistake out of

misunderstanding Taft's capabilities. Later, after Taft had been in office for a while, he wrote:

You need not be told that Taft was nominated solely in my assurance to the Western people especially, but almost as much to the people of the East, that he would carry out my work unbroken; not (as he has done) merely working for somewhat the same objects in totally different spirits, and with all his heart and strength. Of course, you know that among my heartiest supporters, especially in the West, and curiously enough, also in the Eastern states like New York and New Jersey... There has been any amount of criticism of me because I got them to take a man on my word who they now find, understood his own promise in a totally different scene from that in which both I and the men who acted on my word understood it. 11

Taft, however, did not share Roosevelt's early feelings. He had said that he lacked Roosevelt's facility for educating the public and arousing popular support. Also, Taft could not forget the power and obligation to serve that he owed to his predecessor.¹² These two things--Taft's inability and his devotion to Roosevelt--conflicted and created a difficult situation for Roosevelt. Roosevelt had begun to appear as if he had picked an incapable man for the office. This was true but this same man was also his best friend. Could Roosevelt defend an incapable man without losing a friend? Could Roosevelt continue to support his best friend even though his friend was wrong?

Taft's problem was that his pledges conflicted with Roosevelt's former wishes. He repudiated Roosevelt's policies by trying to be a harmonizer instead of a fighter with the emerging factions. He had sanctioned political methods that people denied. He supported a minimum of reform and resisted

earlier reforms. His main repudiation of Theodore Roosevelt's policies was his belief that the insurgents were powerless to affect his programs adversely.¹³ Taft would appeal to the conservatives, not his predecessor's followers. Roosevelt later felt repudiated by this action as well as Taft's insistence upon following a limited, legal concept of presidential leadership.¹⁴

The question now arose that if Taft felt he did not agree with Roosevelt's policies, then why did he run for the office? He did it out of party loyalty and personal friendship! This was the exact basis of the whole breach. In the beginning, the friendship rather than honest objectives and feelings held primary place. Decisions were made from this affection rather than realistic situations.

Taft was basically incompetent in many ways and could not equal Roosevelt's performance as president. He did not allow progressives to have free access to his office. He allowed people close to him make the decisions. Indeed, Taft had become identified as the defender of the status quo. Taft was not another Roosevelt as had been promised.¹⁵ Taft suffered because there was a different concept of the office. Taft could not equal Roosevelt's style as a president when Roosevelt wanted a strong and invincible man. To him, no other man could hold the reins of government. He had used every ounce of power that he possessed. Roosevelt exclaimed early in 1909: "He's all right. He means well and he'll do his best. But he's weak."¹⁶

For other reasons Taft failed at being a real "Roosevelt". He was irritated with the Presidency. He was too open and rigid in his sense of fairness. He had a mind which was too inflexible to meet the shifting requirements of politics. Also, the physical demands were too much for him. Finally, he was a good administrator but he lacked the ability to compromise. He was a conservative at a progressive time. He could not grasp the reins and demands of the times.¹⁷

Taft did not possess the ability to try. He tried to have quiet dignity and high ethical standards. Taft believed his record was good and that he was a good administrator. Although he never received his appointment to the Supreme Court by 1908, he had tried to give the respect to Roosevelt and his policies. He tried to live up to the expectations, not his own.¹⁸ Indeed, amongst all this, Taft made impulsive decisions and refused to enter a fight which assailed the polarization of the party.¹⁹

Other differences arose between Taft and Roosevelt. The primary one was adjustment. Taft was restless, unsure of what to do, and caught between alternatives. Roosevelt knew what he wanted.²⁰ Another major difference was Taft's lack of political ambition. He said there was too much to do and too little time to do it. He was a renovator, not an innovator. Taft missed his appointments often.²¹ He simply lacked the necessary qualities: no gift of leadership or forceful dramatic self-expression.²² Thus, he found it hard

to work with people. He did not know when to speak, to be silent, to lead the people or when to follow them. He read only favorable papers and had a bad sense of history to detect what the people of the times wanted done in order to provide a better life for themselves and those to follow.²³ Taft had a problem relating to the people. While Roosevelt was energetic, aggressive, and dynamic, Taft was obstinate and dilatory. Roosevelt pitted interest groups against each other and obtained what was politically impossible. Taft did not understand the dynamics of pressure groups. He did not know when and how to mobilize them. Also, Roosevelt had an instinctive showman's feel for publicity. Roosevelt made up his mind quickly. Taft was torn by indecision and took the path of least resistance.²⁴ Finally, Taft was ill-prepared and boring. He blundered in public and never separated the president from the private individual.²⁵

In addition to these personalities, each man possessed a different concept of the office. To Roosevelt, the central question consisted of the character of the presidency. Indeed, the executive branch was equal to the other branches but the only one that is responsible to the people. He had asked the people to believe in him and to follow him. He would act in their name as a steward. Yet, some people looked at him suspiciously as an uncooperative man. Also, other peers saw a certain glow of power around him.²⁶ Roosevelt had stated that executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or

imposed by Congress under its constitutional powers. Indeed, Roosevelt's view was that every executive officer was the steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do anything he could for the people. Roosevelt did not usurp power but broadened it.²⁷

Roosevelt took this concept and applied it to the Republican party. In relation to his party, he always felt that it was not conservative. Indeed, the Constitution which he followed was elastic and could be interpreted in other ways. He wanted to continue fundamental principles as the basis of broadening the law. The conservatives stuck to strict interpretation. Roosevelt took what the Constitution said and then he did whatever it did not mention.²⁸

It is important to examine these concepts of the office together. For example, while Taft tried to keep an balance, Roosevelt placed the executive branch above the other branches. Roosevelt saw the Presidency in a position of leadership from which he controlled the destiny of many. On the other hand, Taft thought he could make the organization of the government work.²⁹ Each man belonged to a different school of political thought. Roosevelt regarded the executive as a subject of the people. Taft took the legalistic view that the President was a servant of Congress and could only act if the Constitution explicitly said so.³⁰

Taft believed that the best method was to support and preserve the law in the judicial system. Taft had been trained in law and erred in his political judgments. He had

tried to establish a legal foundation of what Roosevelt had done. Also, Taft was marred by political ineptitude. He was conservative by instinct.³¹ Taft's basic concept was that he would limit government in order to grant full and free reign to personal and property rights. He had a judicial view where the President can exercise no power unless it comes from Congress. Taft, in his concept of the government, felt the President can exercise no power by his own initiative. The President enforces the laws that the Congress makes. Often the President is a steward of the Congress.³² Taft's function was to complete and perfect the machinery by which lawbreakers were to be promptly restrained and punished.³³

Taft had hoped to accept advice from Roosevelt, but he was dedicated to his 1908 platform. He wanted to enforce it and render reform in securing freedom from alarm in the part of pursuing proper and progressive business methods.³⁴ He wanted to do this by using his Cabinet corporation lawyers who would respect the rights of the business' interest of the country.³⁵ Finally, he tried to use this reform when dealing with customs. Taft's over-all idea was to co-ordinate the executive branch into a central purchasing system.³⁶

Roosevelt based his concept on the stewardship principle; Taft relied upon Congress and the courts. These two concepts would oppose each other. Roosevelt in the following quote decided which would be better in an air of confrontation:

The people must know better than the court what their opinion is. I ask you, here, you and others like you—you, the people can be given a chance to state your own view of justice and public morality, and not sit meekly by and have your views announced for you by well-meaning adherents of outworn philosophies, who exalt the pedantry of formulas above the vital needs of human life. Mr. Taft fairly defines the issue when he says that our government is and should be a government of all the people by a representative part of the people.³⁷

Roosevelt continued to attack Taft's concept of the government as he garbled Taft's speeches. Taft replied:

The excerpt which Mr. Roosevelt uses is from my speech in Toledo. It is garbled. I did not say this should be a Government of all the people by a representative part of the people. I said it is thus apparent that ours is a government of all the people by a representative part of the people and it is. The context shows clearly what I meant I had pointed out that the government was by popular vote that voters did not include the women and children that in number were less than one-fourth of all the people and that their action was the action of their majority, so that the government was controlled not by all the people but by a representative part of the people....I pointed out the facts that the popular government of ours is a government by the adult voting males....³⁸

In the election year itself, Roosevelt promoted his governmental positions which Taft disliked, deeming them as anti-Constitutional. Roosevelt called it the New Nationalism. It attacked the courts, especially the Supreme Court structure. It advocated referendum and the recall of judges. Roosevelt disagreed with Taft on the latter two matters and began to call Taft a statesman who broke his word. Roosevelt promoted social justice and made the courts subordinate. He wanted personal rights to take precedence over property rights. While Taft preferred the opposite view. This also irritated the conservatives.³⁹

Roosevelt's progressiveness had grown steadily stronger.

It was so strong that he allowed Gifford Pinchot, the Chief Forester under Roosevelt and beloved advocate of progressivism, to write the New Nationalism text. It outraged the Republicans, the Taft administration, and Taft himself.⁴⁰ Indeed, the two different attitudes were reflected in their policies and party constitution. Without Roosevelt's influence, Taft went to the right and his friends drifted away. Roosevelt's policy was too far to the left especially on the courts, augmentation of federal power, and property rights.⁴¹ Roosevelt felt Taft was a well-meaning man and had no concept of leadership. Taft had betrayed his associates and found himself in a bad situation.

Besides the men themselves, there was another primary force behind the breach. It was the Taft family consisting of Nellie, Charles, and Horace. Many of these members thought that Roosevelt was self-centered. Even months before 1908, the family fought Roosevelt as they tried to keep him "out" and away from William Taft. They felt Roosevelt was making Taft into a puppet and felt Roosevelt was a poor image of his successor.⁴² Indeed, Nellie had been a nemesis to Roosevelt. She felt that Roosevelt was keeping her husband in a groove toward the Supreme Court and not the Presidency, an office which she wanted for him. She tried to satisfy her own hopes and desires. She viewed Roosevelt with distaste, distrust, and suspicion.⁴³ To Mrs. Taft, the title "president" went to her husband with her ambition and drive. She vowed to keep up the social and political life of a

president in the White House. Indeed, Nellie, Charles, and Horace became his chief advisors with a conservative influence. There became an air of hatred between members of both families.⁴⁴ They let their feeling come to the surface and let each other know of their dislike of one another. Mrs. Taft never liked Roosevelt's daughter and viewed her as a show-off. Conversely, Alice, Roosevelt's daughter mocked the Tafts in public. Taft's brothers had even tried to tone down the campaign as well as leave Roosevelt's name out of everything. The Tafts became offensive when Roosevelt offered advice. Taft began to appear to his family as too dependent on Roosevelt. With all their money, the brothers tried to control Taft.⁴⁵

Another influence that may have helped Taft to become suspicious of Roosevelt was Jim Sherman, the vice-president. He had not been selected by Roosevelt; rather, he was considered a leader of the Old Guard who had not backed a single thing of value and was a great asset for the conservatives. Roosevelt was progressive and was disliked by the conservative faction. Sherman was another conservative influence on Taft which meant that it would be harder to get Taft to make progressive moves. The insurgents thus saw Taft as moving further away from them.⁴⁶

Compounded by Sherman and ill-advised associates, Taft's problem of being indecisive and dependent on his family continued. Taft needed someone to lean on for his problems. Unable to share his problems with Roosevelt, he turned to his

advisors, family, Cabinet and people who had the same views.

There were many people who were overjoyed to see an open break between the two men. One of these was Charles Norton who wanted to destroy the friendship. Taft allowed him to do a lot of the small things a president would usually do. He constantly criticized Roosevelt in Taft's presence, hoping to make Taft look better. Norton had a great influence on Taft. As a political manipulator, Norton tried to eliminate Roosevelt as a factor in national politics. His advisors tried to manipulate Taft and were successful. They tried not to offend the progressives since that would give Roosevelt more support.⁴⁷ Indeed, Taft did not have a loyal staff to back him up. His secretaries were weak, especially Norton. Norton was enthusiastic, eager, and young, and tried to build an empire for himself. He really did not seek Taft's betterment as his primary goal. Norton did not understand his job, politics, or people. He tried to change Taft's working habits and put a barrier between Taft and Roosevelt through lies, rumors, and gossip.⁴⁸

A major event after the election was the selection of the Cabinet which many historians see as a betrayal of Roosevelt. It definitely hurt the relationship. Roosevelt had promised all Cabinet members that they would stay in office. Roosevelt assumed Taft would naturally ask them all back. He never asked Taft to keep them all. Although some wanted out, four members agreed to stay. Taft however would not keep James Garfield, the Secretary of the Interior, because he

knew him well and disliked his character. The Cabinet was not notified until the last moment causing Roosevelt to become irate.⁴⁹ Roosevelt said:

I never asked Taft to retain a man in office for me; I merely pointed out certain men in office, headed by Loeb, who had been the staunchest and most efficient friend, and to whose ardent support of him--from loyalty to me-- I demand I ought to bear testimony; I merely told him the facts, leaving to him to act as he thought best, the action determined by his gratitude to the men, not me.⁵⁰

Taft had specific feelings about his decision. Taft would want the best man with the best qualifications. He said that he made the decisions and assumed responsibility. He asked some Congressional leaders for some advice. He said he made no promises to appoint them to a particular position. In fact, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge told Roosevelt that Taft had the intention to get rid of every person who might keep Taft in touch with Roosevelt's influence.⁵¹ The selection of the Cabinet was difficult. Taft wanted a new Cabinet with different perspectives to do a new job. Some partisan Republicans thought it was wrong to have Democrats in the Cabinet. Also, Taft was sincere when he thought the corporation lawyers were sympathetic to the aspirations of the people. These lawyers' philosophy matched the concept of the office and the plans for the government that Taft had for America. Taft needed them for trust-busting. In his Cabinet, seven out of nine men were corporation lawyers. They were disliked by progressives because they were reactionary.⁵²

One last item remains to be discussed to lay the foundation of the breach. It occurred in 1904 after Roosevelt had just won the Presidency. This item became a blunder and a major controversy. The following statement was the crux of this political blunder.

The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form, and under no circumstances will I be a candidate or accept another nomination.⁵³

There are various interpretations of this statement. Roosevelt tried to be exact in his meaning but there is a lot of debate over whether or not Roosevelt was amenable to another term. Supporters of Roosevelt said that he had been elected to one term since McKinley was shot. The latter term did not apply. He never stated that he would ever be a candidate because he believed the third term custom to be valid. He made it seem to other people that it was a promise given in exchange for his election. It was not a promise never to run again in the future.⁵⁵ Indeed, he not only gave way to misinterpretation but it was a major blunder because it became an issue that the reactionary leaders in the party attacked. These leaders did not want to give Roosevelt another term because they would lose what little influence that they then possessed. If he kept them guessing whether or not he was running, he would have become stronger and more aggressive. During 1904-08, he could have enhanced his third term when he had control of the party.⁵⁶ He did not have control in 1912. Finally, an important result of this pledge was that Taft's

election in 1908 was assured by the unreserved and dynamic support of Roosevelt, who felt obliged out of this promise to campaign. The misunderstanding comes when the statement refers to consecutive terms. This controversy was a major issue in the election of 1912. Taft used it to say Roosevelt was a liar and a demigod. It also showed that from 1908 there was a problem of control of the party. This was important to the foundation of the breach because both men were close friends, but they disagree to the interpretations of statements.⁵⁷

The third term presidency became a major charge. Each man took a different stand on this charge. Taft predicted it meant Roosevelt would never keep a promise. Taft said:

that promise and his treatment of it only threw an informing light on the value that ought to be attached to any promise of this kind that he may make for the future.⁵⁸

Roosevelt expressed his feelings on this matter:

The power of the presidency can be used to secure a nomination. It is for this reason that the principle of a third year term is not applicable especially if he is capable and willing. All power leaves a man when he leaves the office. An ex-President has less of a chance to get the nomination. The third term is only applicable to consecutive terms. It does not apply to an ex-President.⁵⁹

Personalities, concepts of the office, advisors, families, Cabinets, and promises all laid the foundation of the breach. The factions were emerging that would cause a split in the party. There were certain events which made those factions emerge.

MAJOR EVENTS OF THE TAFT ADMINISTRATION

Besides the items discussed in the previous chapter, there were five major events which exemplify the split in the Republican party. These five events directly dealt with Roosevelt and Taft's actions, thoughts, and programs. The other item discussed directly deals with a conflict in which Taft got involved. That conflict was the fight between insurgents and the conservatives over the role of the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

One of the major conflicts to erupt during this torrid period was the tariff. Taft's problems in dealing with this issue resulted from his promises, abilities, capabilities, and personality. He had promised in his 1908 platform to revise the tariff, and Taft was going to keep his word. However, to do this, he would be confronted with a lot of confusion. Indeed, the tariff became a complicated question because Taft and the opposing factions were unsure of what to do. Taft was innately conservative on this issue. Yet, this added confusion to the issue since the conservatives did not want the tariff reduced as Taft had promised. Taft also realized that he was a conservative and could not avoid the conservative element in Congress. Thus, he could not ally himself with the Western progressives or he would damage his relationship with the conservatives. Yet, he knew if he did ally himself with the progressives, he would split the

party, but he was more obligated to revise the tariff. So, he took the chance of splitting the party.⁶⁰

To revise the tariff downward was ambiguous since the Republicans stood for protection for industry to prevent competitive products from being imported. To do this, a high tariff was needed. Taft would become the first Republican president since 1861 to seek downward revisions. To accomplish this, he called a special session of Congress. This action meant it was the first time that Taft had taken an aggressive stand on something that Roosevelt had avoided.⁶¹

Taft hoped for a tariff bill which would result in lower provisions. In this bill, Taft wanted a permanent tariff commission which would investigate the tariff. It would report each year the facts about products whose schedules would be increased or decreased.⁶² Taft wanted this bill to pass, but he did not want the bill to make a split which would result in having pro-Roosevelt and anti-Roosevelt factions.⁶³

Taft was caught in a dilemma between these two factions. He could not follow Roosevelt's advice since Roosevelt was in Europe where he could not give any help to Taft. He could not rely on Roosevelt's followers since they were progressives. He could not look back to Roosevelt's example since Roosevelt had avoided the subject. Thus, Taft was without Roosevelt's guidance and could not agree with Roosevelt's stance of non-involvement. His stance was:

I did not take up the tariff because I was dealing with the great number of other interests which I regarded as more important...and it would have been an act of incor-

ceivable folly to plunge into an additional fight and probably lose on all issues instead of gaining on those I took up.' If you will look into the matter at all, you will see that I really took up a very large number of issues, and the criticism to which I was exposed was not that I did not take up a sufficient number of issues but I took up too many. To deal properly with the tariff meant, in my judgment, that nothing else could be talked about at the same time; and only the people who wanted me to take up the tariff were the people who ardently desired to divert attention from what I was doing about the trusts, for instance or who wished to block all the progressive movements which I had inaugurated. It would have been not merely an act of folly, but an act of wicked folly, for me, to have touched the tariff during my term.⁶⁴

Roosevelt was not his only problem in dealing with the tariff. In fact, Taft soon found himself sandwiched between the two opposing factions in Congress. Taft saw two factions fighting over a tariff bill that he wanted. He would see a bill introduced in the House of Representatives that did not have the low provisions that he wanted. This bill was supported by Congressman Payne, and after its passage in the lower house of Congress, Senator Aldrich would support its passage in the Senate. However, Aldrich, a conservative ally of Taft's, wanted to skyrocket the rates which would contradict Taft's promise. The skyrocketed rates did not meet the approval of the progressive Midwestern senators, who submitted a list of products which would be taxed. The conservatives were not in favor of a downward revision.⁶⁵

Taft's problem was that he did not know what to do or with what side to ally himself. By his concept of the office he should not interfere with the legislative procedures, at least not until it went to a joint Congressional conference.

Then, he would talk with the leaders of the opposing factions. Although he could not intrude, he threatened to use political patronage, and then, if the new proposed bill from the Congress did not meet his standards, he would veto it. Taft felt threatened and betrayed when the Senate felt no obligation to revise the tariff downward. He felt betrayed because he thought that the 1908 promise covered all Republicans. He knew the passage of this bill would mean that that he possessed leadership qualities. Failure to pass this bill would mean that he did not possess these qualities. Taft felt threatened. If the bill did not pass, the people would look to Roosevelt again. Thus, his decision was to stay out of Congressional affairs and to allow the Congress to pass the bill as it wanted. He would only talk to a few of the senators.⁶⁶

To examine the fight in detail is to see the actual problems with which Taft had to deal. After the House of Representatives passed the Payne bill, there had been seventy-five raises of duties but also four hundred decreases. In regard to this, Taft was pleased as it was passed on to the Senate. He still expected a bill that corresponded to his wishes and tried to get the senators to vote downwardly despite Aldrich's opposition. The insurgents worked hard and long hours by studying a way to defeat the bill. The progressives had renounced Aldrich and identified him as the promoter for the Eastern corporations' wealth. To this opposition, Aldrich concluded that the insurgents were not real

Republicans.⁶⁷

Taft's problem with the tariff, factions, and Congressional leaders stemmed from his decision not to push the Congress in his direction for the passage and his inabilities as President. Taft felt betrayed by Senator Aldrich, leader of the conservative faction, and Joe Cannon, Speaker of the House. Aldrich betrayed him when he said he was unaware of a party pledged to downward revision.⁶⁸ Taft also felt Cannon did not live up to the 1908 tariff promise. Cannon was out to destroy the insurgents. Thus, when the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee sent out a letter which supported the Old Guard, Cannon pledged his support. Taft denied knowledge of this letter. Yet, the insurgents would not support any of Cannon's proposals, especially the conservative ones. The insurgents were strongly against, and any reform, which bore his name or association, was avoided. Yet, Taft would not hurt Cannon and would support his proposals. Thus, Taft was behind Cannon until Cannon betrayed him. By Taft's shift to the conservatives, the insurgents, who were in favor of tariff reform, would not support Taft. Taft's mistake was the alliance with Cannon and not the insurgents. Even though, the insurgents possessed the tariff reform ideas that Taft wanted, Taft would not work with the insurgents.⁶⁹

Taft's dealings and program with the tariff reform in Congress showed his political incompetency as President. Roosevelt had dealt carefully with both factions to avoid a

a split. Taft was ill-equipped to play the role that political exigencies demanded. Taft did not possess Roosevelt's resources of astuteness that would have helped the President in this situation. Logically, Taft should have backed the insurgents to achieve his 1908 promise. But he did not. He supported the Old Guard and defeated his own program.⁷⁰

The betrayal by both Cannon and Aldrich hurt Taft deeply. Aldrich's betrayal came when he supported upward revisions which numbered about six hundred.⁷¹ This bill passed the Senate. There was a need for a compromise between the two different houses of legislature. Taft had witnessed Aldrich betray him and sacrifice party unity. He soon realized that Cannon would betray him when Cannon packed a compromise committee with high protectionists. This dismissed any chance of downward revision, as Taft had hoped. Taft was pleased with the planks creating the tariff commission and the federal income tax.⁷²

What were the effects of the tariff? First, Taft debated a veto but soon realized it would split the party. He realized a bill had to be passed to do something about the tariff situation, as well as his 1908 promise. Thus, he signed it.⁷³ Secondly, the East was pleased since it helped them keep out cheap foreign products. It supported their manufactured goods but was costly to the raw materials of the South and the West.⁷⁴ Thirdly, the progressive Republicans hated it because it did not agree with their reforms. The Demo-

crats rejoiced over the Republican civil war.⁷⁵ Fourthly, one of the greatest effects of the Payne-Aldrich bill was the income tax and a corporation tax. Naturally, corporations were against this as it blocked their growth. They had to pay great sums so the tax was a way to make up for lack of revenue.⁷⁶

Obviously, one of the main challenges that occurred in this Payne-Aldrich bill was the relationship between the insurgents and the Old Guard represented by Taft and Aldrich. The question was where would Taft stand as the insurgents tried to depose the Speaker of the House, Cannon.

Taft's problems with Cannon began before the inauguration. Roosevelt and Taft discussed the role of Cannon as the Speaker of the House. At first, Taft had wanted to get rid of the Speaker. Yet, Roosevelt told him that if Cannon was deposed, Cannon could still cause problems from the floor.⁷⁸ Thus, Taft and Cannon met to discuss the upcoming administration. Taft was assured of Cannon's support in 1909, but as seen in the tariff, he did not keep his word. After this meeting, the papers through a statement from Taft's office told the public that the President was confident of the Speaker's new faith. The insurgents interpreted this as a preliminary alliance. This interpretation was strengthened after the tariff fight.⁷⁹ These supporters of Roosevelt were suspicious of Taft and saw an alliance between the Speaker and the President. This, of course, was before the betrayal.⁸⁰

The defeat of Cannon was a very complicated and emotional. The insurgents as stated previously were suspicious of Taft and did not give him a role in the defeat of the Speaker. Taft, until the betrayal, thought Cannon was sincere in getting Taft's program and reforms through Congress. Taft also, before the betrayal, was swinging toward the direction of the Old Guard and was not continuing Roosevelt's programs. Taft thought he needed Cannon for his programs when he really did not. He could have used the insurgents and his presidential influence. That was Taft's mistake and the insurgents began a move to unseat Cannon. This move by the insurgents was prior to the Cannon betrayal of Taft. Thus, the deposition was still going on when the betrayal occurred, but it was too late for Taft to do anything.⁸¹

The insurgents challenged Cannon in the House Rules and Steering Committee. Both Roosevelt and Taft thought that the House should elect the committee. The insurgents were hurt when Cannon voted to kill any move that blocked any type of reform.⁸²

Cannon made a ruling that a certain resolution dealing with the taking of the census was privileged because the Constitution made the census mandatory. Norris, the insurgent leader, said the House should name the Rules Committee. Cannon was caught. If he ruled in order, he was stripped of his power. If he overruled it, he was denying the power, which he eventually decided to do. The House upheld Norris and elected the committee. Taft would not back Cannon here

as he was caught in the middle of Cannon anti-reform legislation and the insurgent reform.⁸³ Taft told senators not to support Cannon, thus allowing his revenge against Cannon. He called an extra session of Congress and tried to clip Cannon of his power. Taft felt betrayed by Cannon because of the incidents mentioned earlier regarding Cannon's stacking of the tariff committee.⁸⁴

After the fall from the power of Cannon, Taft saw the shifting coalitions crystallizing into progressive and conservative factions even more. He saw himself mixed up in this conflict, and he realized that he could not live up to Roosevelt's image.⁸⁵ Taft believed in the existing order and began to outlaw the insurgents from the White House. Yet, he was determined to fulfill his promises in which he was elected. Taft felt he was the party leader and was a reform president. Yet, he was realistic in realizing that he had failed to carry out Roosevelt's policies.⁸⁶ Taft allowed himself to become identified with the standpatters that opposed progressivism and human rights. He believed the function of the government was to promote material prosperity. He was interested in the machinery of government and not human welfare. He interpreted law rather than administering it.⁸⁷

Another area of confrontation that hurt the relationship between Taft and Roosevelt was the Pinchot-Ballinger affair. It involved the different policies regarding conservation which each man held. The name of the affair comes from two

men, Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester under Roosevelt and Taft and Secretary Richard Ballinger, who was Secretary of the Interior. These Four men(Roosevelt, Taft, Pinchot, and Ballinger) differed in their policies of conservation. Roosevelt and Pinchot favored federal control while Taft and Ballinger wanted state or private control. Whenever the states did not act or conserve natural resources, Roosevelt had the federal government act. He would not permit exploitation of natural resources, and he put much land under the control of the government. Roosevelt also reclaimed arid or swamp lands. Ballinger or Taft, however, took the opposite position on conservation. Taft approached the conservation policy by leasing lands to private companies to control. He allowed Congress to determine whether things were under state or federal control. He reclaimed some lands but only with Congressional approval. He interpreted conservation statutes narrowly, following his Constitutional stance.⁸⁸

This differed from Roosevelt's view of conservation which meant government management by experts in the interest of efficiency. Taft wanted no government interference, and at the same time, he desired a competitive market. Taft stuck to the law. Roosevelt used pragmatically whatever law was written down.⁸⁹ Although Taft's view was dissimilar to Roosevelt's, Taft felt he was still a friend of conservation. He criticized his predecessor's method of withdrawing millions of acres without possessing proper authority to perform that action.⁹⁰ Roosevelt had encouraged use of technology

to help preservation. He also wanted technology to avoid unnecessary programs and methods that wasted resources. To assist him in this endeavor, Roosevelt created the National Conservation Commission. Taft eliminated the organization. Indeed, even before the actual event, one can note that the policies on conservation of each man were different.⁹¹

Roosevelt became suspicious of Taft when the latter appointed Ballinger instead of Garfield as the new Secretary of the Interior. The discussion of the Cabinet has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, but Garfield's stance did not match Taft's stance on conservation. So, Garfield was replaced. This new appointment did not please Pinchot. Taft probably should have replaced Pinchot, who also disagreed with Taft's conservation stand. Yet, out of his friendship with Roosevelt, Taft kept Pinchot. Thus, whenever Ballinger and Taft did something according to their policy, it angered Pinchot since this Taft action did not match Roosevelt's policy. Pinchot thought Taft was to perform according to Roosevelt's wishes on conservation.⁹²

An example of this was the water site case. Taft wished to change Roosevelt's policy concerning water sites in navigable streams. Taft's policy was at odds with Roosevelt when Taft felt the federal government could not dictate to a state on how non-navigable waters could be used. It also seemed to repudiate Roosevelt's policy when the new administration stopped granting water power permits on public domain.⁹³ Taft did not appreciate Pinchot or his policies for Taft

did not like Pinchot. He thought Pinchot was heading a conspiracy against Taft's new policy. Taft's dislike of Pinchot increased when Pinchot leaked articles to the press which attacked Ballinger and Taft. He gave out confidential information and statistics concerning the Interior Department which were damaging to Ballinger and Taft. Pinchot became a symbol of Roosevelt's conservation techniques.⁹⁴ Everything that Taft did which Pinchot disliked the press and public interpreted as fraudulent, corrupt, and anti-Rooseveltian.⁹⁵

The whole Pinchot-Ballinger affair involved differences in conservation techniques and personalities. Ballinger seemed a threat to Pinchot. Ballinger went consistently to Taft and Taft always seemed to side with Ballinger. Taft was going to allow Ballinger to clean up the Interior Department. Taft told Pinchot that he did not have to release articles and did not have to further investigate a case that involved Ballinger when he was a lawyer.⁹⁶ Yet, Pinchot continued to criticize Ballinger for selling coal and grazing land outright to private individuals. Pinchot wanted to release them for fair royalties for limited goods.⁹⁷

Pinchot tried to make a case out of the dispute of 1908. In this dispute, companies had been charged with illegal use of the Cunningham claims in Alaska. Ballinger, in his private practice, defended these companies. This was before he was Secretary of the Interior, but Pinchot tried to make the dispute characterize Ballinger's performance in office.⁹⁸ Pinchot pursued this investigation of an issue which he

deemed dishonest. Taft did not want him to further the investigation since Taft saw no connection. Pinchot sent some of his men with evidence to Taft. Taft asked the Attorney General to investigate the matter, and then Taft decided the whole claim problem was an interdepartmental conflict. Ballinger rebutted the charges, and Pinchot continued to challenge Ballinger in detrimental speeches.⁹⁹ Taft ignored the fight.

Colliers magazine tried to guess who would resign first -- Pinchot or Ballinger. However, the resignation or dismissal of Pinchot was a major threat to Taft. However, most people viewed it as a conflict between Roosevelt and Taft. Taft said the people must decide who was right or wrong. Taft felt Pinchot was beginning the re-election bid for Roosevelt to the Presidency.¹⁰⁰

Taft knew the political dangers of a break with Roosevelt. He was behind Ballinger's conservation program and thus Pinchot and Roosevelt seemed to be the leading opponents. For Pinchot to resign would make Taft appear anti-Roosevelt. To the public it would seem as a break with Roosevelt. Pinchot wanted Taft to fire him. He kept in contact with Roosevelt as Pinchot wrote Roosevelt that Taft was not following Roosevelt's principles. His support of the investigation and his articles violated an executive order to keep quiet. Taft consulted the Cabinet and fired Pinchot.¹⁰¹

The issue of Pinchot's resignation may not be brushed aside easily. What Taft overlooked was Pinchot's desire for

matrtyrdom by his willingness to risk being discharged in order to dramatize the differences between Taft and his predecessor. The insurgents backed Pinchot and viewed Taft as a member of the Old Guard; Taft repudiated Roosevelt's policies.¹⁰² It was important to note that Pinchot was willing to be dismissed and Taft soon saw the conspiracy to drive a wedge between Roosevelt and himself by Pinchot's removal. Pinchot tried to bring about a rupture. Taft fell into the trap.¹⁰³

The Pinchot-Ballinger controversy was soon to see Taft appealing to his predecessor. He thought his friend and benefactor would soon see the truth. Taft did not cease to hope that all might be well. Even though Roosevelt had given him advice, he first tried to gratify Roosevelt through appointments of Roosevelt supporters. Taft wrote Roosevelt several times. Taft pleaded for understanding, sympathy, and appreciation. Taft pleaded and asked Roosevelt not to listen to the insurgents.¹⁰⁴

If one strips away the emotional and political aspects, the controversy still consisted of a difference in philosophy as to conservation techniques and it steemed from the ineptitude of the Taft administration. Few disputes had such a simple verdict, and Pinchot seemed to be the key to the whole matter. Newspapers and spectators wanted to develop a cause that would break up Taft and Roosevelt.¹⁰⁵

Then, a specific issue which brought Roosevelt to public life was the New York State convention where progressives

were calling for direct primary laws and an abolition of the convention system for nomination of state officials. Governor Hughes of New York persuaded Roosevelt to come to New York to assist the progressives in achieving their goals. He said he was not fully aware of what he was doing. Hughes had no idea that his style would become a scene of confrontation between the conservatives and the Roosevelt faction.¹⁰⁶ The battle began in August when Roosevelt challenged the reactionary machine for temporary chairman of the New York State convention. If Taft had interpreted these actions then, he would have thought Roosevelt was making New York a stumping ground for an election bid.¹⁰⁷ However, Roosevelt was concerned more about the control of the conservative party bosses. It seemed with the boss' control the new proposed planks of the progressives would not pass. He once wrote Lodge:

In other words, what they are concerned with is keeping control themselves, and they will help or hurt the party purely as to do so does...their ends. Griscom and others asked if I would accept the temporary chairmanship of the State Convention. I told them I would if they desired me to do so and believed I could help if they were prepared to make a clean fight, with a clean candidate facing the issues in a progressive spirit.¹⁰⁸

The problem at New York was the continuous one between the insurgents and the conservatives. Taft remained idle and could do nothing. Roosevelt agreed to chair the convention if there was a progressive platform. Then, the Old Guard, which consisted of the party bosses, opened up a conflict by wanting Vice-President Sherman as the chairman. Taft had told Sherman to avoid friction and stay away from a fight

in New York. In the end, Roosevelt was defeated as permanent chairman and was irritated. However, he had taken the fight to the floor.¹⁰⁹ He felt obligated to fight and had a certain strategy in this fight. The first maneuver was Roosevelt's listing of all of Taft's accomplishments. This action irked Norton who lied to Taft and made up false facts about Roosevelt.¹¹⁰

Taft knew the present state chairman had to be defeated. Roosevelt tried to do it by joining his followers and Taft men against the party bosses. It did not work. Taft deserted Roosevelt's plan when Taft offered Hughes the Supreme Court position, and Hughes' support fell away from Roosevelt. Taft questioned Roosevelt's sincerity to help the party.¹¹¹ Roosevelt took this defeat as a personal one and demanded vindication.¹¹²

Roosevelt had strong feelings about New York. This was a vital contest because this test and only this test would have determined the control of the Republican party. If successful in his plan, Roosevelt would turn that control over to the Republican progressives. Yet, the insurgents in the country at large had completely lost their sense of direction and proportion. They had surrendered themselves with such lack of reserve to the leadership of the extremists and to the guidance of magazine muckrakers and visionary writers.¹¹³

Indeed, the New York State convention brought out references of the growing wedge between the two men. Roosevelt

gave his feelings on the Norton performance:

The situation is very bad. I think we shall win at the Saratoga convention, but there is a new matter which has come up which really makes me angry. It appears that what Norton did without any repudiation from Taft in connection with starting stories that I had come to him for help was merely a part of a deeper scheme. I have received newspapers from over the West containing inspired accounts sent out from the presidential train in effect that in consideration of Taft's support I had promised to adopt a resolution in the New York State endorsing Taft....114

Another major issue was to win in the fall elections.

This issue was on both Roosevelt and Taft's minds. To this victory, Roosevelt committed himself by stating:

The aim must be to try to get support from the two wings of the Republican party for a common object. This cannot be done by a compromise on questions of principle, and the feeling has grown so bitter about what is past that I fear an effort to insist too much upon all features of what is past will result in a separation rather than a reunion, because each side will contend that it is concerned on a question of principle. Whether through the faults or its misfortunes I cannot say but the administration has certainly wholly failed in keeping the party in substantial unity and what I mind most is that the revolt is not merely among political leaders, but among the masses of the people. I am not prepared to say that the masses are the insurgents but large fractions of them are....115

However, each man was now beginning to represent a side of the split--insurgents(Roosevelt) and reactionaries(Taft).

Each man also placed the blame for the split on the other side.¹¹⁶

Taft had sidelined himself with the Old Guard. Roosevelt backed by the insurgents, now said of the Old Guard:

There are many voters irritated with the Republican Party because it has been under the dominion of Hale, Aldrich, and Cannon, because they do not think Taft has shown effective progressive leadership...because they think the party has been too long in power, because they believe

in temperance or against it, because they think I am a dangerous agitator, or because they think I am the natural leader and the Administration has slightened me.¹¹⁷

The important thing to note about the emerging two wings of the Republican party was that the common people were behind the insurgents. Most of the people wanted to get rid of the traditional doctrine for which the party has stood. Taft had failed to unite both wings. Roosevelt, with the people's backing, saw the need to unite both wings. He did it out of devotion to the party, and he stated that he had grave doubts about whether it could redeem itself as long as Taft stayed at the top.¹¹⁸

Taft had a bad opinion about the progressives and the fight intensified during 1910. Progressives were out to run the party. Taft would not meet them socially and the conservatives loved this. The conservatives wanted to rid the party of this progressive evil. Plans were made to defeat them at the polls. Taft also refused them patronage. Thus, Taft worked against the progressives as he used the party organization to ruin the people he disliked.¹¹⁹ This plan was a well-thought out and financed campaign to destroy the insurgents' chances of reelection in the primaries. The insurgents had to almost declare independence from the traditional Republican party.¹²⁰

The battle was bitter. Tariffs was one issue and Taft took revenge on the insurgents. Clubs for Taft soon appeared. Taft sent Cannon and Cabinet members out to stump the states

in his favor, Taft won some of the conservative places for his side but lost them later in the fall.¹²¹ The insurgents won many places and that would mean defeat for the administration's policies. The insurgents would vote against the Old Guard. Some Republicans stayed away from the polls and tried to ensure Democratic victory. Many Republican states changed hands to the new leaders.¹²²

During the Taft-insurgent war, Roosevelt felt the best he could do was to unite the party by helping at the polls. He would not totally support Taft.¹²⁴ Even Roosevelt had the problem of balancing between progressives and conservatives. The results of the election were that the insurgents became powerful in the Senate and the Republicans had a majority of eight votes. The Democrats controlled the House.¹²⁴

Now, a new area of conflict arose. It came from an area where Roosevelt had considered himself highly successful. Taft had an opportunity to pack the Supreme Court. He appointed five men through whom he had hoped to protect the Constitution from Roosevelt's New Nationalism as well as support his trust policy. Taft wanted to amend the Sherman anti-trust Act by making illegal every combination of capital in interstate commerce. He felt businessmen should be told exactly what actions to follow.¹²⁵ Indeed, when it came to big business, Taft wanted to exterminate it rather than subordinate it.¹²⁶ Taft had gone further than Roosevelt in the number of prosecution of trusts. He had broken with Roosevelt's policy by sticking to the law.¹²⁷

Most of the President's program was under the care of Attorney General Wickersham and the corporation lawyers. It was because of the excess number of lawyers in the Cabinet that so many trusts were prosecuted. They were lawyers who understood corporation methods and could best advise the meaning of the Sherman Act. Taft's trust campaign hurt Wall Street since Taft attacked big business, the backbone of Wall Street.¹²⁸

Soon the administration filed a suit against U.S. Steel that had formed a monopoly during Roosevelt's administration. The corporation lawyers felt that during Roosevelt's administration Roosevelt had not pressed hard enough and had covered up this monopoly. Roosevelt soon exploded over this issue and no longer refused to stay out of the elections. He predicted the party's defeat in the elections of 1910. He was motivated by Taft's actions and decided to strike back.

The question was how to strike back. He did not want to do it by announcing his candidacy although this would have tested it out. Roosevelt now said a third term process must be by popular demand. Roosevelt's strategy was to win in the state primaries. Whatever his revenge, there was a resurgence of Roosevelt's confidence. Taft had found the prescription for Roosevelt's despondency. Roosevelt now wrote a friend that there were strong undercurrents to come to the surface for a nomination to the Presidency.¹²⁹

The steel trust hurt Roosevelt mortally. The basic charge was that the steel trust's monopolistic strength was

augmented in the Panic of 1907. The operators of the trust deceived Roosevelt by allowing them to take over the Tennessee, Coal, and Iron and Railroad Company. They said Taft never knew about it. No records could convince Roosevelt that he was wrong or that Taft was not knowledgeable of the matter. Roosevelt thought the merger meant positive results for the economy.¹³⁰ As Taft ordered the investigation, he felt Roosevelt had been duped or was guilty of collusion. He took a personal interest when Roosevelt claimed that he had acted in the best interests of the law.¹³¹ The suit mentioned deception of Roosevelt regarding the transaction and motives. Roosevelt said Taft knew about it because Taft had discussed the merger and approved it.¹³²

Back in 1907, due to the Panic, Roosevelt had allowed J. P. Morgan to acquire a company to restore confidence in Wall Street. The company asked the Roosevelt Department of Justice about the merger and it agreed with the transaction.¹³³ In 1911, there was the investigation. Taft tried to show that the company overvalued the ownership of unmined ores. Then Roosevelt was asked to testify and he assumed full responsibility. He said that the country was in a bad financial condition at that time., and he did what he thought was right to remedy the situation. He had confidence in himself that he was correct.¹³⁴

Roosevelt wrote his feelings on the matter.

The Congressional Committee summoned me before them on the Tennessee, Coal, and Iron deal. Of course, I went; it would never have done for me to show the slightest

hesitation in going;... Every detail of the matter was public from the day of the transaction, nearly four years ago; they could find nothing new because there was nothing to find, and it does not seem to me proper for a Congressional Committee to get an ex-President before them on the matter where all they can possibly say is that they think his judgment was wrong....¹³⁵

Roosevelt was angered and kept mentioning the fact that Taft was in the Cabinet at that time. It was agreeable to Taft then but not in 1911. Roosevelt felt it was practically impossible, and if possible, it would be mischievous and undesirable to try to break up all combinations merely because of their size. It would put business back in the eighteenth century.¹³⁶

A second case of turmoil over the trusts arose in the dissolution of the International Harvester Company which had Perkins, an influential man in the Roosevelt club, as the director. The charge was that Roosevelt had done nothing in bringing the company to account.¹³⁷ Roosevelt had investigated it in 1906 but had brought no suit. Roosevelt used the Sherman Act to break up trusts because he had no authority as the ICC did. Technically, he delayed the execution of this. A struggle soon broke out between Taft and Roosevelt. He said Taft had acquiesced as a member of the Cabinet. The papers presented by Taft showed Roosevelt had been patient in giving the trust time to rectify certain practices before a suit was filed. Taft saw it was wrong and after this, he would watch trusts more carefully. Roosevelt continued to say that Taft had approved of these actions by being in the Cabinet.¹³⁸

This last conflict can be seen in articles of the New York Times.

The President tonight took an unprecedented step of issuing a personal statement from the White House in which he charges Col. Roosevelt with falsifying facts about the prosecution of the Harvester case. He denies the truth of the Colonel's assertion that it was Mr. Taft who proposed at a Cabinet meeting the holding up the prosecution....my memory is that he himself made the motion that there should be no prosecution of the Harvester case pending the investigation into the trust by the Bureau of Corporations....139

Mr. Taft explains the case this way:

Mr. Roosevelt asks why suit has not been brought in this administration against the Harvester trust. A report made to me by the Supreme Court of the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases, the attorney general was about to begin suit against the International Harvester Company, when its representatives requested an opportunity in an apparent good faith to submit a reasonable plan of reorganization or discussion which would meet every just cause of complaint. With my approval, the Attorney General delayed bringing suit pending the consideration of this proposal and during negotiations which ensured looking to the accomplishment of such result.140

CONCLUSION

To conclude this paper, it is important to remember the outcome of the Republican split. After the trusts, the candidacy of Theodore Roosevelt began to emerge. The trust cases were the last major incidents before Roosevelt announced his candidacy in early 1912. After that announcement, Roosevelt and Taft began a bitter, backstabbing campaign to win the nomination. Roosevelt won heavily in the primaries, but Taft retained control of the Republican machine and bosses. Taft won the nomination; Roosevelt formed a third party. Both candidates lost to Wilson after almost nine months of intense lying, fraud, corruption, and backstabbing. As once can see, the year 1912 put a capstone on the split that had emerged between 1909 and 1912.

In the first chapter, this paper noted primary distinct points that separated the two men. Although their ideologies, families, careers, and personalities differed, these men had become friends and were able to work out their problems.

They were able to do this since they stayed in close contact. Once the contact disappeared, the friendship vanished. The differences surfaced, causing a split between the two men.

Each man because of his ideology represented a different faction. Each different faction represented ideologies of that time. Each man thus adopted one of these ideologies and separated from each other. Two camps appeared with different

political ideologies. Issues that arose led the camps further and further apart, leading to an impossible split.

This is only a brief examination of the split. There are other issues that helped the split to occur, but the major ones have been examined. The point of this thesis was to examine two leading men in the Republican party, and by examining factors which split the two men to demonstrate that the party also split after several confrontations. Further study and more intense research, especially into the psychological aspects of the men's character, could be done in the interest of elucidating the contributing factors to the split.

FOOTNOTES

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⁶⁸Ibid., p. 66.

- ⁶⁹Mowery, p. 242.
- ⁷⁰Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 4.
- ⁷¹Pringle, p. 434.
- ⁷²Mowery, p. 248.
- ⁷³Pringle, p. 441.
- ⁷⁴Manners, p. 101.
- ⁷⁵Pringle, p. 497.
- ⁷⁶Coletta, p. 68.
- ⁷⁷Ibid, p. 124.
- ⁷⁸Pringle, p. 404.
- ⁷⁹Ibid, p. 406.
- ⁸⁰Ibid, p. 408.
- ⁸¹Coletta, p. 60.
- ⁸²Ibid.
- ⁸³Coletta, p. 22.
- ⁸⁴Mowery, p. 381.
- ⁸⁵Harbaugh, p. 381.
- ⁸⁶Coletta, p. 103.
- ⁸⁷Ibid, p. 139.
- ⁸⁸Ibid, p. 82.
- ⁸⁹Ibid, p. 100.
- ⁹⁰Pringle, p. 480.
- ⁹¹Coletta, p. 80.
- ⁹²Ibid, p. 80.
- ⁹³Ibid, p. 90.
- ⁹⁴Mowery, p. 255.

⁹⁵Mowery, p. 258.

⁹⁶Manners, p. 116.

⁹⁷Ibid, p. 109.

⁹⁸Mowery, p. 254.

⁹⁹Manners, p. 113.

¹⁰⁰Ibid, p. 118.

¹⁰¹Ibid, p. 122.

¹⁰²Coletta, p. 95.

¹⁰³Pringle, p. 516.

¹⁰⁴Ibid, p. 544.

¹⁰⁵Manners, p. 128.

¹⁰⁶Pringle, p. 359.

¹⁰⁷Harbaugh, p. 390.

¹⁰⁸Morison, p. 116.

¹⁰⁹Pringle, p. 565.

¹¹⁰Manners, p. 185.

¹¹¹Coletta, p. 108.

¹¹²Pringle, p. 561.

¹¹³Morison, p. 336.

¹¹⁴Ibid, p. 138.

¹¹⁵Ibid, p. 99.

¹¹⁶Ibid, p. 171.

¹¹⁷Ibid, p. 127.

¹¹⁸Ibid, p. 130.

¹¹⁹Mowery, p. 267.

¹²⁰Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, p.

- 121 Coletta, p. 117.
- 122 Ibid, p. 120.
- 123 Pringle, p. 572.
- 124 Manners, p. 190.
- 125 Coletta, p. 153.
- 126 Ibid, p. 162.
- 127 Ibid, p. 156.
- 128 Pringle, p. 657.
- 129 Manners, p. 203.
- 130 Pringle, p. 673.
- 131 Mowery, p. 289.
- 132 Coletta, p. 160.
- 133 Ibid, p. 157.
- 134 Ibid, p. 159.
- 135 Morison, p. 322.
- 136 Manners, p. 202.
- 137 Pringle, p. 677.
- 138 Coletta, p. 161.
- 139 New York Times 29 April 1912.
- 140 New York Times 26 April 1912.

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