

United States Involvement in Guatemala 1954

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In May and June of 1944 a body of school teachers, shopkeepers, skilled workers and students started to protest the severe fourteen-year dictatorship of General Jorge Ubico. These non-violent demonstrations jolted the regime because Ubico's advisors had told him for years that he was loved by all of his subjects. Ubico had strong ties with the landed aristocracy, who were the traditional class that controlled the country's politics. The landed aristocracy wanted Ubico to suppress dissent against the government, and to prevent social change, which he did ruthlessly. It was because of his actions that the protests of 1944 came into being. Ubico massacred rebellious Indians and killed labor leaders, intellectuals, to keep the support of the landed aristocracy. However, because of the strength of the protest against him, on 1 July 1944 Ubico resigned his office, which left General Federico Ponce in power (Schlesinger 25,27,28).

When he took power, Ponce was not fully aware nor did he completely understand what was taking place in the country. He merely thought that the people were tired of the leadership of Ubico rather than that they might possibly be tired of a dictatorship instead. Ponce turned out to be just as rigid a leader as was Ubico. Ponce instituted some modest reforms in the teachers' salaries as well as in the universities themselves. However these actions were not enough to satisfy the reforms which the public demanded. Hoping to present a facade of democracy, Ponce decreed that he would allow free elections which would let the people

Virus 2

vote for whomever they wanted to lead them. Ponce's opposition, the school teachers and others, started to look for a person who could challenge Ponce by running against him in the next election. The people wanted, as well as hoped for, a democratic government. The opposition chose Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo, a teacher, who taught at the University of Tucuman and at the time was living in exile in Argentina. He wrote books on history, geography and civics which were used in Guatemala by the school teachers who formed the backbone of the opposition. The teachers cabled Arevalo to ask him to run as a candidate in the upcoming election. Arevalo agreed. He said that he would be a candidate, but he could not buy a plane ticket to Guatemala because he did not have the money, so the teachers sent him a plane ticket to return to Guatemala. Arevalo returned to his former home on 2 September 1944 (Schlesinger 25, 27, 28).

The elections never took place because on 22 October 1944 a revolt started. It began when two army officers, who had left Guatemala earlier, went to El Salvador to plan the revolt. The soldiers returned to Guatemala and started a revolt against Ponce by capturing Fort Matamos. They then distributed the arms that they captured to the students. Thus, they were able to overthrow the Ponce dictatorship.

Virus 3

The two army officers were Major Francisco Arana and Captain Jacobo Arbenz. The revolution was won very quickly and only 100 people were killed. Major Arana and Captain Arbenz formed an interim junta with businessman Jorge Toriello until free elections under a democratic constitution were held. Arevalo in his campaign speeches spoke of the virtues of democracy and social justice. On March 15, 1945, Juan Jose Arevalo took the oath of office and became the first elected president of Guatemala (Schlesinger 31,35).

Arevalo was elected for a six-year term as president of Guatemala. Arevalo set four priorities to guide him during his term. They were agrarian reform, protection of labor, a better educational system, and the consolidation of political democracy. In October 1946, the Guatemalan Congress passed a Social Security Law which gave workers the right to safe working conditions, compensation for injuries, maternity benefits, and basic education. Also included was health care. In 1947, the Guatemalan Congress passed a labor code that was modeled after the Wagner Act. Arevalo only took modest agrarian reform measures. He formed a national production institute to give credit expertise and supplies to small farmers. He also tried to register all land, owned by the peasants, which would help to legalize the obscure titles they had for their land (Schlesinger 37,38,41).

Virus 4

Major Francisco Arana, who was a conservative and who had helped to overthrow the Ponce dictatorship, was the leader of the opposition to Arevalo and the leftists. The constitution required all political candidates to resign any military or government offices they had when they ran for the presidential office. When Arana said he was going to run for president he refused to resign his army office, so the congress of Guatemala said it would investigate him. Major Arana then told Congress that if it investigated him he would order the armed forces to dissolve Congress. The leftists were afraid of Arana's strength in the army, his conservatism and his opposition to labor unions. The leftists believed they needed a candidate for the 1950 presidential election who would not be seen as anti-military. The leftists chose Defense Minister Jacobo Arbenz. Arbenz, who worked with Arana in the 1944 revolt against the Ponce dictatorship, had the support of the young and more liberal members of the army (Schlesinger 43).

Arana and Arbenz were never friends. These two men were rivals after the Ubico-Ponce Dictatorship was defeated. When he was the Chairman of the junta that ruled Guatemala from 1944-45, Arana tried to seize leadership of the country but failed. Arana was as popular with the voters as was Arbenz. The leftists believed that Arana would try to lead a coup

Virus 5

before the 1950 election, or at the very least would use the military to get himself elected to the presidency. These leftists decided that Arana had to be eliminated. They decided to do this either by charging him with planning a revolution against the government or by capturing him and taking him out of the country on a plane. They decided to capture him because they thought that if Arana was arrested the army would revolt (Schlesinger 43,44).

On July 18, 1949 Arana was in the town of Amatitlan checking on a supply of weapons that had been found there. When he left to return to the capital on the narrow bridge called Puente de la Gloria, his car was stopped by armed men. Major Arana pulled out his pistol and demanded to be let across the bridge. After Arana pulled his pistol a battle took place in which he was killed along with a companion and his chauffeur was wounded. The killing of Arana caused an uprising in Guatemala which lasted three days and was led by army officers loyal to Major Arana. President Arevalo gave arms to some union workers to help put down the uprising, along with a general strike. The Arevalo administration survived the rebellion. After this a short rebellion led by Colonel Castillo Armas failed. After the ending of these rebellions Jacobo Arbenz was seen as the person to take over after Arevalo. So with the death of

Arana, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, became the second elected president of Guatemala in March 1951 (Schlesinger 44,45,49).

Arbenz's goal was to turn Guatemala into a modern capitalist state. In other words, he wanted to free Guatemala economically from the control of the United States corporations. Arbenz's greatest dream was an agrarian reform law. It took him a year of hard work to make his dream come true. His agrarian reform law was passed on June 27, 1952. The law gave the government the authority to expropriate only uncultivated portions of large plantations. Farms that were smaller than 223 acres were not affected by the law. Farms that were 223-670 acres in size and that were two-thirds cultivated were also not affected by the law. All the land taken would then be paid for in twenty-five year bonds issued by the government, holding a three percent interest rate. The government determined the value of the land according to the price of the land that the owners placed on their tax forms. Under this law some 100,000 families recieved a total of 1.5 million acres, which the government paid a total of \$8,345,545 in bonds (Schlesinger 53-54).

Arbenz also started other programs to help develop the economy of Guatemala. Arbenz built a publicly owned port on Guatemala's Atlantic coast to compete with the other Atlantic port, Puerto Barrios. Puerto Barrios was owned by

Virus 7

the United Fruit Company. Arbenz also built a highway to the Atlantic coast that would be used as an alternative to the railroad, which was also owned by the United Fruit Company. A government-run hydroelectric plant was built to create a cheaper source of energy that would be able to compete with the electricity monopoly that the United Fruit Company had in Guatemala. Arbenz's idea was to reduce the power of foreign companies by giving them competition instead of nationalizing their companies. These reforms would later cause the eventual fall of Arbenz and his government. After three years of congressional debate, Arbenz was able to pass a weakened form of an income tax. This income tax was the first in the history of Guatemala. If it had been passed seven years later, Arbenz's agrarian reform bill would have been acceptable in the American Alliance for Progress program. This reform would have been acceptable to the Kennedy Administration because such reform was required as part of the Alliance for Progress program (Schlesinger 53,54).

When the agrarian reform law was implemented it was seen to be a problem. Peasants who wanted land, and others who wanted more land, and some who were hostile to landowners, began to take over farms that they were not legally allowed to take. Communist leaders and other

Virus 8

leftists who wanted to speed up the revolution encouraged the peasants to take over these lands. From December 1953 to April 1954 thirty private farms were illegally taken over by the peasants. Arbenz tried to stop this from taking place by meting out fines and other punishments to the local agrarian committees that broke the law (Schlesinger 54).

The Communist Party was never very successful in Guatemala. The constitution of 1945 gave local Communists their first opportunity to organize. In 1945 the Communists opened a small school whose purpose was to discuss and further the spread of Marxism. This school was closed by President Arevalo. The constitution under Article 32 "prohibited political organizations of a foreign international character". Some small Communist study groups were still in existence after President Arevalo took this action. Some Communists who were members of Arevalo's political party, the Revolutionary Action Party, wanted to turn this party into a peasant and worker Communist Party. During the party convention of 1946, these radicals were able to take control of party leadership positions. Jose Manuel Fortuny was made the general secretary of the party. On 28, September 1947, Fortuny and other young Communists formed an organization within the party called the Democratic Vanguard (Schlesinger 56).

Virus 9

Fortuny, before he worked in the Revolutionary Action Party, had different jobs. At different times Fortuny was a law student, radio broadcaster, and he worked for the British legation in the capital city. Fortuny became a confidant of President Arbenz. Fortuny was respected for his intelligence and energy. Fortuny was never popular in Guatemala because of his personality. Fortuny's personal arrogance and brusque manner offended many people in Guatemala, including his own followers. He was never able to get the Guatemalan people to believe that he was a real leader of the working class people. Because of his personal faults he was defeated in 1952 when he ran for Congress. He also lost the election because the voters thought he was a "Russia-firster". In other words the people believed he was concerned with the development of Communism in the world and not conditions in Guatemala. Fortuny and his Democratic Vanguard left the Revolutionary Action Party because he was unable to take control of the party. Fortuny and his Democratic Vanguard now formed the first Communist Party in Guatemala, called the Communist Party of Guatemala (Schlesinger 57).

Victor Manuel Gutierrez was the leader of the second Communist Party in Guatemala. The name of this third party was the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers.

Virus 10

Gutierrez was a school teacher before he joined the Communist Party. He was given the nickname "the Franciscan" because he did not wear imported clothing. He refused because he wanted to show his support for Guatemalan industry. He was also given this name because of his simple life style. This man was different from Fortuny in every way but ideology (Schlesinger 57).

In 1952 Gutierrez ran for Congress and easily won. He won because the workers of Guatemala revered him. The good will that existed between him and the workers was an important reason why the workers were supporting the Communist cause. In the beginning the two Communist Parties were not united. Other Communist leaders in Latin America tried to get these men to form one party but they failed. The rivalry between these two men in 1950 almost caused much damage to the Communist cause. In November of 1950 Gutierrez went to a world meeting of the international congress of the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions, of which his party was a member. After this meeting he went to visit Moscow and other Eastern European Communist countries. When Gutierrez returned to Guatemala he disbanded his party and told its members they were free to follow any political conviction they wanted. He did tell his people the Soviet Central Committee recommended they join the Communist Party

of Guatemala. The effect of Gutierrez's action was the merger of these two Communist parties. Fortuny renamed Gutierrez's party the Guatemalan Labor Party because the word Communist caused the poor people to alienate themselves from this party. From this moment, Fortuny became the leader of Guatemalan Communists. Gutierrez remained the main labor organizer but was now in a secondary role in Communist political matters (Schlesinger 57,58).

How much influence the Communists had on President Arbenz is unknown. Arbenz himself was not a member of any political party. Arbenz did turn for support to the Communists who helped him with his election. These Communists were "the smallest component of his four-party coalition in congress because, with their control of some urban-based unions, they could mobilize popular support for his programs". Some Communists were also a part of the land reform program because they helped to pass it. There were only 26 Communists in the 350-member staff in the government department which controlled land reform. President Arbenz accepted the Guatemalan Labor Party as the group in his coalition that would represent the working people. The Communist party had only four deputies in the congress from 1953 to 1954. The other twenty-four coalition deputies came from the Revolutionary Action Party. Sixteen deputies came

from the party of Guatemalan Revolution. Seven deputies were from the National Renovation Party. These deputies for the most part were moderates and liberals. Only seven to eight Communists ever held important sub-cabinet positions. Presidents Arevalo and Arbenz never had any Communists as part of their Presidential cabinet. The Communist Party never had more than 4,000 members in a country with a population of about three million. There is no strong evidence that the Communists had control of the Guatemalan government. Historian Cole Blasier confirms this with the following statement:

All the evidence leaves no doubt that Guatemalan Communists had made substantial political gains in a half dozen years. They dominated the Guatemalan labor movement and had relatively free access to and influence with the president. Influence is one thing; control is another. It would be difficult to determine by quantitative methods whether the Communists "controlled" or "dominated" the Guatemalan government. As events so dramatically showed later, the Communists emphatically did not control the most powerful organization in the country--the armed forces. And the weight of evidence would seem to show that, lacking a single cabinet post, they could scarcely have controlled Guatemala as a whole. What would, no doubt, be fairer to say is that the groups which controlled Guatemala under Arbenz had interests and policies established independently of the Communists which the Communists supported. As a result of domestic and foreign developments, the government's and the Communists' policies overlapped in many areas. President Arbenz found Communist support useful. As he grew weaker, he needed that support even more (Schlesinger 58,59).

The United Fruit Company, a United States corporation, was Arbenz's greatest threat to what he was trying to do for Guatemala. The United Fruit Company was the largest land owner, employer, and exporter in Guatemala. The company had a total exemption from internal taxation, duty-free importation of all necessary goods, and a guarantee of low wages. United Fruit paid a daily wage of no more than fifty cents. The company, through its ownership of the International Railways of Central America, owned every mile of railroad in Guatemala. It also owned the only Atlantic port the country had, Puerto Barrios. In March 1953, the government of Guatemala, in two separate decrees, took a total of 209,842 acres of uncultivated land from the United Fruit Company. The government of Guatemala paid for the land with \$627,572 in bonds based on the company's declared tax value of the land. The United Fruit Company wanted more money because it placed a false value of the land on its tax forms so it would have less taxes to pay. Guatemala offered to pay an extra \$2.99 per acre, for which United Fruit wanted another \$75.00 per acre. What was even worse was that the company originally bought the land at \$1.48 per acre, also the United States State Department was negotiating for the company. Guatemala refused to pay the \$75.00 extra per acre. In February 1954, the government took another 386,901

acres and paid the United Fruit Company \$500,000 in government bonds for the land. The United Fruit Company saw the government of Guatemala as a threat to its special privileges. Because of this the company decided the current government should be overthrown (Schlesinger 70,75-77).

The United Fruit Company decided the best way to get rid of the Guatemalan government was to convince the United States government that the Guatemalan government was Communist. The United Fruit Company decided to do this through lobbying. This company started a public relations campaign in connection with the lobbying to reach their objective. The company hired Thomas C. Concoran to lead their group of lobbyists on capital hill. This staff of lobbyists was made up of Spruille Braden, who was a former Assistant Secretary of State and Robert La Follette, Jr., who was the son of Senator Robert La Follette from Wisconsin. Robert La Follette, Jr., was a onetime senator from Wisconsin until he was defeated by Joseph Mc Carthy in the election of 1947. It is believed that the United States government would have been partial to the United Fruit Company's position in Guatemala without the lobbying. The above statement is supported by this letter from the United States Ambassador Patterson to Zemurray who was the chairman of the United Fruit Company:

With the present severe political instability in this country and the persecution of American interests, my suggestion is that there be an all-out barrage in the U.S. Senate on the bad treatment of American capital in Guatemala. This takes the onus off the UFCO, and puts it on the basis of a demand by our Senators that all American interests be given a fair deal (Immerman 116).

This company made Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Representative John Mc Cormack the objects of their lobbying. Both of these Senators were from Massachusetts. The reason these men were chosen is because the company was from Massachusetts and these men knew how important the company was to the state's economy. It is interesting to note that Senator Lodge's family owned United Fruit Company stock for many years (Immerman 116).

Lodge and Mc Cormack had shown in the past that they believed in the cold war doctrine of preventing the spread of Communism in the world. Because of this, the company's position in the state economy cannot be shown to have had an undue amount of influence on these men. The lobbyists presented the facts of the Guatemalan reforms to these two men through the press, and thus allowed their belief in cold war doctrine to cause them to believe that the government in Guatemala was Communist. The lobbying was successful. This can be seen in the actions of Lodge and Mc Cormack. Lodge claimed that the Guatemalan labor code discriminated against

the United Fruit Company and was used by the Communists to cause the breakdown of the United Fruit Company's operation in Guatemala. Mc Cormack claimed that the Guatemalan confiscation of land owned by the United Fruit Company showed that the Guatemalan government was Communist and because of this the Soviets would be able to have influence in Central America (Immerman 116,117).

The United Fruit Company was also talking with different United States government authorities about their situation in Guatemala. The company was able to do this through the help of Braden and Thomas Dudley Cabot. Braden at one time was an assistant secretary for Latin American affairs under Truman and still had connections in the United States government. Cabot at one time was a director and president of the United Fruit Company and its bank, the First National Bank of Boston, before he worked for the State Department's Office of International Security Affairs. Because of this, Cabot also had influence in Washington D.C.. Edward Miller, who was Braden's replacement, worked for the Wall Street law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, which represented the United Fruit Company in its business with Guatemala. (Immerman 117,118)

It is also important to note that John Foster Dulles, who was Secretary of State under Eisenhower, at one time was

the legal representative of the United Fruit Company. His brother Allen Dulles, who was Director of the CIA, was a stockholder in the company. General Robert Cutler, who was the head of Eisenhower's National Security Council, was a onetime director of the company. Thomas G. Concoran, who was working as a consultant to the company, also worked for the CIA at the same time (Mosley 347).

I believe the United Fruit Company, through its lobbying and government connections, had much influence on the United States government. A possible reason for the fruit company's success in its efforts to convince the United States government that Guatemala had a communist government, was the lobbying and many different government connections enjoyed by United Fruit.

When the problem with Guatemala happened in early 1954, Eisenhower did not yet have a fully developed foreign policy for Latin America. Eisenhower unofficially wanted to use private American investment as the means of economic and social help instead of relying on United States government funding for Latin American. Because of this policy United States Corporations became the arms and legs of the United States State Department and had much political influence in Latin America (Richardson 74).

Once President Eisenhower became convinced that the Guatemalan economic and social reforms were Communist-inspired, intervention became a possibility. When these social and economic reforms, which Eisenhower believed were a result of Communist influence, started to hurt the United Fruit Company, United States intervention was guaranteed. This would happen because Eisenhower would see these reforms as a Communist attack on the United Fruit Company and United States foreign policy, which was tied to United States corporations.

In January 1954 the Guatemalan government declared that Castillo Armas and General Ydigoras Fuentes had agreed to work together to overthrow the Arbenz government. Armas and Ydigoras planned to overthrow the Guatemalan government, by organizing and launching an invasion from the countries of Honduras and Nicaragua into Guatemala. The Guatemalan government was able to show documents as evidence that the United States was financing this attack by Armas and Ydigoras. The Arbenz government also claimed that Carl Struder, a former Colonel in the United States Army, was working for the United Fruit Company by training soldiers who were to form an invasion force. When he wrote his memoirs, General Ydigoras said that he and Armas did have an

agreement to work together to overthrow the Arbenz government (Gordon 56,57).

In August 1953, John Foster Dulles tried to get the Organization of American States to declare Guatemala an agent of the Soviet Union. Dulles wanted the Organization of American States to do this so that the organization would take collective action against Guatemala according to the Rio Treaty of 1947. Dulles did not succeed in his efforts for collective action. At a meeting in early 1954 at Caracas, the Organization of American States only passed a declaration saying "that Communist domination of a member government would cause concern and should in theory lead to collective action but with no specific mention of Guatemala". Because the Eisenhower Administration did not get the Organization of American States' support for intervention in Guatemala, the United States decided to use covert action. I believe the reason the United States failed at Caracas was that the OAS believed this call for collective action was an act of intervention by the United States. (Skidmore 318).

A month after the meeting at Caracas, the United States State Department told Guatemala it wanted \$15,854,899 for the property on the Pacific Coast that had been taken from the United Fruit Company. "Guatemala denied Washington's

right to intervene, charging violation of its sovereignty" (Gordon 57).

In May 1954, the State Department learned that some Czech weapons were sent and had reached Guatemala. The United States government now claimed that Soviet intervention had taken place and that there was a danger of invasion into Honduras and Nicaragua. Eisenhower used this claim as an excuse to give weapons to Nicaragua and Honduras to use in the planned invasion of Guatemala. Arbenz tried for years with no success to buy weapons from the United States and other countries in Western Europe. The reason Guatemala could not get the weapons was that the United States started a boycott against them. The boycott worked so well that Guatemala could not even buy pistols for its police force or "small caliber" ammunition for its Hunting and Fishing Club (Gordon 57, 58).

Arbenz made an offer to try to negotiate with the United Fruit Company over their differences. He also said that he would be willing to sign a nonaggression agreement with Honduras. Arbenz also requested a personal meeting with President Eisenhower. The United States government turned down these different proposals made by President Arbenz (Gordon 59).

On 18 June 1954, Castillo Armas attacked Guatemala from Honduras with a small army of a few hundred men. Armas was able to capture a few towns while being driven from some others. The main attack was from aircraft. These airplanes attacked Guatemala City, the capital, and other key points such as military bases. These planes' mode of attack was by bombing and strafing their targets. The planes used in this invasion were United States planes that used United States pilots who were hired by the Central Intelligence Agency and based in Nicaragua. The planes had little or no opposition because the chief of Guatemala's small air force deserted. After his desertion the chief was seen with the ex-deputy chief of the United States Air Force mission who was in Guatemala at the time. The circumstances of the desertion indicate that this United States officer might have been a Central Intelligence Agency agent residing in Guatemala since 1952 (Gordon 59).

Paramilitary groups were created in different parts of the country before the invasion. Arbenz told the military to give these groups weapons with which to fight the invasion force. The Guatemalan military refused to give the paramilitary groups weapons. On 27 June 1954 members of the Guatemalan army corps demanded that Arbenz resign as president. Arbenz resigned because he did not have army

support and also because he did not want a large-scale civil war in Guatemala (Gordon 59).

Colonel Enrique Diaz was Arbenz's replacement. The transfer of power was arranged by the United States Ambassador to Guatemala, who was John Peurifoy. After Colonel Diaz said that he would continue to fight Castillo Armas, Ambassador Peurifoy persuaded Diaz to resign at gunpoint. After complex negotiations Peurifoy was able to get Castillo Armas made president of Guatemala (Gordon 59).

In 1956 Arbenz said in an interview that Ambassador Peurifoy put pressure on army officers to get his resignation. Arbenz said he gave control of the government to Colonel Diaz, who was Army Chief of Staff, because Diaz said he would fight against the invasion to save the gains of the Guatemalan Revolution. Arbenz also said that Peurifoy's action against Diaz showed him that his resignation was a mistake (Gordon 60).

The United States overthrow of Arbenz's government caused shock throughout Latin America and Europe. In October 1954, the delegates from Ecuador and Uruguay in the United Nations General Assembly expressed angry protests over the United States coup of the Guatemalan government. The Argentina and Uruguay national legislatures condemned the United States action against Guatemala. The Chilean Chamber

of Deputies called for all Latin American legislatures to object to the United States coup against the Guatemalan government. The United States government was also criticized by non-leftist political elements, students, intellectuals, and labor leaders in Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Colombia, Argentina, and Mexico because of their action against Guatemala. There were violent anti-United States demonstrations all over Latin America because of Eisenhower's action. Clement Attlee, who was the British Labor Party Chief, said in Parliament that the United States intervention was an act of aggression. Attlee also said the principles of the United Nations were made secondary to hatred of Communism. At this time there was doubt that the Arbenz government was Communist. People also believed that the Eisenhower administration used the charge that the Arbenz government was Communist as an excuse for helping the United Fruit Company (Gordon 60).

When Castillo Armas took control of the Guatemalan government, he returned to the United Fruit Company all of the land it had lost when the Arbenz government was in power. Armas destroyed all elements of Communism along with the democratic system and reform. Armas returned all the land taken because of the Agrarian Reform Law and gave it back to the former landowners. Armas returned about 1.5

million acres of land, which was the only time that a very major reversal of land redistribution took place in Latin America (Burns 219).

Under Armas and the leaders that followed, Guatemala returned to its pattern of pre-revolutionary government life. The government of Guatemala no longer tried to end the illiteracy, social injustice, and unemployment problems of the Guatemalan people. Guatemala also now had an economy based on only one agricultural crop (Burns 219,220).

The coup of the Guatemalan government in 1954 was a major turning point in the history of Guatemala. This coup eliminated the members and groups that formed the political center in Guatemala. The country was left with only a right wing and a left wing. The right wing, which was made up of coffee planters, other landowners, foreign investors and those elements of the economy which they controlled, was in control of the government. The right wing was able to gain control of the government because of the protection given to them by the conservative military. The right wing has remained in control even though different rulers have come and gone since 1954 (Skidmore 319).

The worst part of this whole period since 1954, especially the middle 1960's, was the violation of human rights. Different paramilitary death squads have killed many

political opponents of the right wing government. From 1966 to 1982 these death squads killed at least 30,000 people no less than this probably three times this number. The government is indirectly responsible for the deaths of these people. During this period worldwide protest did not end the killings. In Guatemalan politics there are no winners, only victims (Skidmore 319,320).

Presently the government of Guatemala has a civilian as president. The government is closely watched by the military and the right wing political group. Hopefully the civilian president will be able to help improve the political and social life of the country. I believe, in time if more civilian government leaders can continue to be in some control of the government, the situation in Guatemala has a chance of improving. The United States government should and must help Guatemala to end its history of dictatorship, murder, and social injustice, a situation which our government helped to create through the Eisenhower Administration's coup against the Arbenz government in 1954.

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10

The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the
theoretical aspects of the problem. It is shown that the
problem is equivalent to a problem in the theory of
differential equations. The second part of the paper is
devoted to a discussion of the numerical aspects of the
problem. It is shown that the problem can be solved
numerically by using the method of finite differences.
The third part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of
the results of the numerical calculations. It is shown that
the results are in good agreement with the theoretical
results. The fourth part of the paper is devoted to a
discussion of the conclusions of the paper. It is shown
that the problem can be solved numerically by using the
method of finite differences.

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