

THE DERIVATION OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

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We of the twentieth century find that one of our greatest problems lies in the failure on the part of so many people to realize the significance of the fact that God exists. While it is very true that there are very many atheists who even deny that He does exist, there are also millions of indifferentists who grant His existence but never any consequences flowing from that admission.

The eighteenth century atheistic, deistic and rationalistic doctrines have provided us with a sound basis for such an attitude, particularly Deism, and later Agnosticism. So well have they done their work, that today a broken-down concept of God as an old man who simply may have made the world and forgotten about it, is hardly sufficient to induce people to live a moral life, and rightly so. The moral inducement of a correct concept of heaven has also been lost.

Besides proving to the world that God exists, we must show the world what He is to the best of human ability. Love follows upon knowledge. Therefore some take up the study of Theodicy and investigate the question of God's attributes in these times with perhaps a little extra impetus and realization of its importance.

Having proved the existence of God then, we pass on to a discussion of what attributes can be predicated of Him and how. It is interesting and important to note that in regard to this particular question, students of theodicy often go to one or the other extreme, that is, either to agnosticism, or anthropomorphism. This danger exists because some men, seeing that strict positive knowledge of God is unattainable, declare that we cannot attain to any positive knowledge of God, while on the other hand, some are

misled to conclude that God can be known directly and positively by us in this state and therefore they fall into anthropomorphism, predicating perfections of man to God in a univocal sense. The fact is, that we can attain to a certain positive knowledge of God's attributes, but as to how those attributes exist in Him, we must remain ignorant.<sup>1</sup> This is the Thomistic teaching. St. Thomas brings out the fact that positive knowledge of God's nature in the strict sense would be the same as positive knowledge of creatures and thus this knowledge would be univocal. On the other hand, if predicates are applied to God and creature in an equivocal sense, then we can know nothing of God's nature; our knowledge would be simply equivocal. Therefore we say that we know God's nature analogically, because the perfections which we can predicate of creatures and God we know we cannot predicate simply speaking in both cases. It is obvious that these perfections are found in God in a way proportional to that in which they are found in creatures. How they are all identified in the perfect unity of God's nature, we do not know.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless there are two things we do know for sure. We cannot attribute imperfections to God; neither can we attribute any pure perfections to Him unless in an infinite degree---Via Remotionis and Via Eminentiae respectively. And thus we proceed in our investigation, imperfectly it is true, but legitimate and certainly necessary if we are to learn anything at all.

Logically one of the first questions confronting us would be that of the formal constituent of this Divine Nature or what attribute formally constitutes that nature. To this question the Nominalists naturally reply that it is the sum of

all perfections. This view is simply an assertion that we ought not to think of God in terms of differentiated concepts, which means not thinking of Him at all, or Agnosticism. Scotus would regard infinity as primary. Some Thomists argue in favor of subsisting intelligence while the majority of the same hold that it is Subsisting Existence. Whatever other opinions might be forwarded, it is quite evident in accordance with the Thomistic concept of potency and act and from the proofs for God's existence, that Subsisting Existence formally constitutes the Divine Nature, because it distinguishes God primarily from whatever is not God. Essence and existence are identified in no other being. God lacks any potency or imperfections because He is pure act because His essence is existence. All creatures have potency and act. As mentioned above the "Quinque Viae" lead us to the conception of God also, for: a) the first mover must be its own activity, pure act in the orders of activity and being; its essence cannot have a potentiality for existence, it must be existence. b) First cause cannot receive existence. c) Essence of a necessary being is existence. d) An absolutely perfect being cannot share existence, it must be existence. e) The first intelligence must be plenitude of being or Subsisting Existence. It cannot be related to being distinct from itself.<sup>3</sup> Thus we find that there is no attribute but Subsisting Existence which can be primary. Even Subsisting Intelligence depends upon God's immateriality which is in turn based upon God's pure act or Subsisting Existence. Likewise radical infinity is only conceivable if God's essence contains a requirement for all infinite perfections, and the very reason

God's essence actually does so is because it is existence. Therefore we begin with this fundamental conception of God in deducing the Divine Attributes.

Now a Divine Attribute is "an absolutely simple perfection which exists necessarily and formally in God, and which, according to our imperfect mode of knowing it, is deduced from what we conceive as constituting the divine essence".<sup>4</sup> The literal meaning of attribute is not a perfection which is one with an essence and wholly inseparable from it, but in this case we mean just that, for the Divine Attributes are not accidents but are God Himself.<sup>5</sup> Obviously such is not the case with creatures. We say that infallibility is an attribute of the Church but the Church is not infallibility. Man has the use of reason by nature, but he is not himself the actual use of reason, and so on. However God is simple. His essence and attributes must be one. Therefore have we stated above that we predicate attributes of God only in an analogous sense.

Naturally the question of mixed perfections arises. As we well know, there are perfections which include absolutely no imperfections, while on the other hand there are those which do include some imperfection. Gredt designates these as "simpliciter simplex" and "mixta", respectively. The former is a perfection which in every case it is better for a thing to have than not to have, while the latter involves an imperfection by its very nature, as the process of reasoning.<sup>6</sup> Now there being no notion of imperfection in God, we must predicate nothing but pure perfections of God.

The attributes are commonly divided into two main classes; the entitative and the operative. The former are those which refer to the being of God, such as unity and truth, while the latter are those which refer to His operations, such as providence and omnipotence. Under these two classes a distinction is made between positive and negative perfections, the positive being such attributes as truth or goodness, and the negative being such attributes as immutability and indivisibility which are negations of some imperfection. But at any rate we shall take up in order a discussion of the derivation of the various attributes in these two classes.

The entitative attributes are those properties of being in general that are found in God in the maximum degree, namely: unity, truth, goodness, infinity, immensity, immutability, eternity, invisibility, incomprehensibility, and knowableness.

First of all, this Self-subsisting Being is one, absolutely one and simple. Every being is undivided or one, or else it would not be one being but two. Moreover, God being "maxime ens", He is also "maxime unus". Nevertheless we do realize that a being can be divisible or composed of parts, quantitative, logical, abstract and concrete, substance and accident or essence and existence. However there are no quantitative parts in God, for He is immaterial. There are no genus and specific difference in God because He transcends all genera. He is not a composite of essence and existence for He is existence. We cannot distinguish the abstract (Deity) from what is concrete or individual (God), since individualized material conditions have no place in the Self-subsisting Being



and He is essentially actual existence. God's substance, supremely determined by itself, naturally admits of no distinction between substance and accident. God is therefore one and simple, and also unique, for if there were any multiplication of the Deity, then we could distinguish a divine essence common to all the gods from individualized conditions, which would postulate more than one existence and therefore the basic notion of the Self-subsisting Being would fall by the way.<sup>7</sup>

That God is the First Truth is not difficult to prove. Every being is true in so far as it is in conformity with its eternal type known by the divine intellect. Now in God, divine intellect and God's essence are identified. Therefore we must designate God as the First Truth.

We go on to observe that God is perfection and sovereign goodness. Pure act certainly admits of no imperfections. Existence is all perfection when not limited by essence, and such is the case when essence and existence are one. Likewise the cause of all created perfections must naturally possess them in an eminent degree. The fact that God is infinite goodness can be deduced from the fact that He is self-subsisting and therefore infinite being and thus infinite goodness since "being" and "good" are interchangeable. God is His own end and that of all creatures. He is the Supreme Good which every rational creature can recognize as his final, completely satisfying good, and toward which every creature tends in its own way, loving God more than itself.<sup>8</sup>

God's infinity follows directly upon the notion of the identification of His essence and existence, or pure act, for infinity indicates the absence of any limitations or imperfec-

tions, and pure act is just that, for existence of itself is devoid of any notion of potentiality, imperfection or limitation.

It is quite natural for us to wonder just how completely and how in general God is present in created things. We have heard from our youth that God is everywhere, even in our innermost thoughts, and that He is boundless. Now we approach the question from a philosophical standpoint and find that the parallel attributes of immensity and ubiquity are predicated of God. Immensity is God's immeasurability and capability to be in any place whatsoever, actual or possible, while this ubiquity is simply the affirmation of the fact that God actually is present everywhere. This does not say that God is corporeal at all or that He is present circumscriptively. God is pure spirit above all considerations of space, but nevertheless He is present in everything by His power to which all creatures are subject; by His presence, since He knows everything to the most minute detail; and by His essence, in that He maintains all things in existence by His very being.<sup>9</sup> Thus by virtual contact, God is everywhere.

The fact that God is immutable is also very easily drawn from the notion of Self-subsisting Being or Pure Act, because we know that in any being whatsoever in which an intrinsic change takes place, there must be potency which is defined as a capacity for actuality. Now if a being has no potency it naturally cannot receive any act at all since it would be pure act, and if no act can be received, it is obvious that no change can take place. God can acquire nothing

because He has no potentiality and He can lose nothing because He is absolutely simple.

Flowing directly from God's immutability is His eternity, for eternity is the duration or non-cessation of existence of a being which is entirely immutable, such as we have just proved God to be.

In connection with the being of God as we see it, writers also mention the attributes of invisibility, incomprehensibility, and knowableness. When we compare or contrast our naturally acquired knowledge, sense or intellectual, to the knowledge we may acquire of the divine Being, we see that God is invisible. He is simply too much for our intellect. He is too luminous. The well worn example of the bat which is unable to see the sun by reason of its excess light is about as good as any to illustrate this point. Plato and Aristotle were even familiar with it.<sup>10</sup> It is evident from experience that God cannot be seen by the body's eyes, and even the created intellect cannot see Him in this life because its proper object is the essence of any sensible being, abstracted from a sense phantasm. The object is proportionate to the power. Seeing God in some sense form is not seeing the essence of God so therefore even visions of God are not knowledge of His essence. St. Thomas ably presents these facts in two brief sentences:

God cannot be seen in His essence by one who is merely man, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is, because, as was said above, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. (11)

Thus we cannot expect to see God's essence in this life except by analogy and the mirror of sensible things, and naturally not perfectly in heaven either, for that is for God alone, and that very limitation of our separated soul or intellect is brought out in the notion of the incomprehensibility of God. However it is very erroneous to deny that the immediate vision of God by the help of the light of glory is impossible, as apparently Rosmini does in stating that God does not communicate Himself to created intelligences except inasmuch as He enters into a relationship with them as their creator, forseer, redeemer and sanctifier. We shall know God in His essence but we shall not know Him as we would thoroughly know and comprehend a mathematical problem in its totality.

Nevertheless, we must grant that God is naturally knowable in this life by the use of reason. Of course, as said before, this knowledge can be no more than analogical, but regardless, we do know that He has something analogically in common with His effects. For that reason do we predicate unity, truth, goodness, infinity, immensity, immutability, eternity, invisibility, and incomprehensibility of God, as relative to His being.

Now we have not exhausted our supply of attributes predicable of God by any means. We have yet His operations to consider in order to complete our natural picture which we set out to draw. These are wisdom, foreknowledge, providence, free will, love, justice, mercy and omnipotence. We say "natural picture" because we do not intend to consider the supernatural elements here, this being a purely philosophical dis-

cussion of the derivation of the attributes from the concept of Subsisting Existence; not from revelation. For revelation goes on to supplement our natural knowledge with that of the divine activity. This we leave to Theology. With this in mind, then, let us consider the first of the operative attributes.

Divine wisdom is that comprehensive knowledge, extending to all things, exhausting the knowability of all things and all their actual and possible relations with other things, which is predicated of God.<sup>12</sup> This infinite knowledge exists in God and is one with the Divine Essence. We prove this in the following discussion. Knowledge of itself is a pure perfection, and we stated before that God must possess all pure perfections infinitely. Therefore perfect knowledge exists in God, and since God is absolutely simple, this perfection must be identified with His essence. Thus we deduce that God is the eternal intellection of infinite truth. Another approach is the fact that God is supremely immaterial and so, supremely intelligent. It is seen that materiality limits beings very much and that immateriality does the exact opposite, that it is the basis of cognition and that the less materiality, the higher the knowledge. The immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive and the mode of knowledge is in accordance with the mode of immateriality so God occupies the highest place in knowledge since He is the highest degree of immateriality.<sup>13</sup> We said that God is the eternal intellection of infinite truth. His intellect cannot be a faculty which is simply the principle of various acts, but rather the divine essence is the very act of knowing since God is Pure Act, all of which St. Thomas brings out in discussing this matter very clearly:

"It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaphysics, XII), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance would be related as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible, because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. (14)

Naturally all things knowable constitute the object of divine intellect but still we say that God knows only Himself.<sup>15</sup> We say this because it is through Himself that God knows all other things. He perfectly comprehends His power and all things to which it can extend, actual and possible. Primarily God knows His essence and secondarily He knows all other things which are participations of His essence, even evil, for He sees the good in which the privation occurs. God's knowledge of possible things is called the knowledge of simple intelligence, as it presupposes no act of the will or actual existence of the object. His knowledge of what has existed, does exist, or will exist is called knowledge of vision because it is concerned with beings really existing.

Now an interesting "feature" of God's knowledge is the fact that it is the cause of all things in creation. The divine will is joined to the divine intellect so that this union constitutes the divine decree. This does not mean that everything God knows must exist, but that--"the knowledge of God is the cause of things in so far as His will is joined to it".<sup>16</sup>

Concerning God's foreknowledge pages and pages can and have been written, but we must limit ourselves to the

following. No extraordinary difficulty is found in understanding His foreknowledge of necessary future events but much controversy centers about His foreknowledge of futuribles or future free events dependent upon free will of rational creatures. God knows what choices will be made, but how does He know? Molina, a sixteenth century Spanish Jesuit held that God knows these future free events by a supercomprehension of causes called "scientia media" as distinct from God's knowledge of simpleintelligence and knowledge of vision. Suarez considered this notion to be destructive of creative liberty and therefore maintained that God knows these events by knowing His decree in accordance with which He concurs with the realization of free acts, while at the same time knowing the part the free will is to play in realizing them. On the other hand, most Thomists hold that God knows future things of all kinds in His essence as it is determined by His own free decree which is pre-determining since it preordains free acts and moves the free cause in time previous to the determination of the created will.<sup>17</sup> These are the principal doctrines. We cannot attempt to prove the validity of any one here. Subject to correct explanation, either the doctrine of Molina or of St. Thomas can be held.

Divine providence is simply God's ordering of all things to their end. This attribute is predicated of God because in any effect which an intelligent agent produces, the idea preceeds the effect by its existence in the agent. But God is the cause of all created good and also the order of all those things to their end so this ordering or providence pre-exists in God.<sup>18</sup> This particular attribute is of the utmost importance in the question of

Deism of which we spoke in beginning this discussion, since it is, according to the proper concept, directly opposed to their teaching which separates man from God so much that God supposedly has little concern with man's individual affairs and with the result that man cares little if God does exist, creating one of the greatest problems of modern times, indifference. God's providence extends to individual things in their smallest details because divine causality is universal. God directs everything firmly but with suavity in accordance with individual natures. Even evil is permitted by divine providence because God can bring good therefrom. Physical evil, in view of the ultimate end of things can be regarded as very good. It can bring about all kinds of good things as we well know. Even moral evil can be turned to good by God. It cannot be understood very well but we can see that moral evil can promote moral growth and virtue. Moreover, had God created rational creatures with perfect freedom, that is, inability to sin, they would have to be infinite. So we have these two arguments, but the rest we must leave to God. Our intellects are finite and we cannot explain everything fully.<sup>19</sup>

This free will which we have just been discussing must also be found in God by reason of the fact that He is infinitely intelligent because the relationship between cognition and volition is a necessary one. The will is simply an inclination to good as apprehended by the intellect. God is Will. Just as God's intellect is not a faculty capable of successive acts, neither is His Will. It is always in act. Obviously the first act of any will is to love the good. Now in God we find a pure



love of Himself. He is Love, Perfect Love, loving Himself, willing His essence infinitely and thus all beings other than Himself which partake of His essence as secondary objects of the divine will. God loves Himself necessarily as the primary object of the divine will because the divine intellect understands perfectly the infinite good of the divine essence and as a result God cannot will anything else. He is impeccable but as said before, that constitutes perfect freedom. Now on the other hand, God does not will creatures necessarily. God loves or wills these beings freely. Some have said that God's goodness forces Him to create. God cannot be forced by a perfection which is identified with His essence to any activity affecting things other than Himself, He being the only necessary being, wholly self-sufficing, requiring nothing outside Himself for infinite being and existence.<sup>20</sup> If He were forced to will these beings outside Himself, all creatable things would be created, which is not the case. But good is diffusive of itself and for this reason it is fitting for God to create, to add to His extrinsic honor and glory. According to Phillips:

The will of God is active, and throws out, as it were, showers of goodness, truth, beauty and all perfections, in so far as His Essence is capable of imitation, thereby constituting the finite universe. (21)

In passing it might be well to note that in the case of the intellect, will, and action in God, there can be no separation of anything like faculties and their activity ultimately producing an effect as in the case of created intellects and wills where one process follows upon another? No, in God all are one. He knows, wills, and loves all at once.

The two great virtues of the divine will are justice and

mercy. There are no other virtues in God for the rest imply imperfection. Knowledge of these is very important in our day, especially of justice, which materialists deny as "an illusory symbol created by religious sentiment".<sup>22</sup> Naturally commutative justice between God and man is out of the question because they are not equals.<sup>23</sup> However there is distributive justice in God's distribution of good things to His children, infinite justice. Every man receives grace sufficient for salvation; some receive more than others and there is inequality among men but this inequality is necessary for the harmony of creation, just as the members of a human body must be unequal and subordinate to provide harmony. In the eyes of God, inequality is destroyed regardless of relative inequalities in creation. There is also justice evidenced in God's distribution of rewards, natural rewards for natural virtues, and supernatural rewards for supernatural virtues. Likewise God's punishments are just. He does not hate the sinner but He hates sin infinitely. He punishes small offenses with temporal punishment and mortal sin with eternal punishment, for final impenitence is an irreparable disordering of man to his final end by the destruction of charity. Death makes this disorder permanent and the only way in strict justice to preserve order is by proportionate contrition and satisfaction, namely eternal punishment. God is infinite Justice.

Modern Agnostics attack God's mercy. They consider it to be a mere figure of speech, an imperfection even, which we humans predicate of God. This can be traced to a large extent to a misunderstanding of mercy in God. Mercy is really an abso-

lute perfection. It is not sadness and weakness in God or a restriction upon His justice. In God there is no sensible feeling of pity, no emotion causing Him to feel unhappy over anything. But that is not mercy. Mercy in God is a virtue of His benevolent will.<sup>24</sup> It is an absolute perfection manifesting God's power and goodness. God out of the abundance of His goodness, bestows upon creatures what is due them more bountifully than is proportionate to what they could deserve because less would suffice for preserving the order of justice since between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.<sup>25</sup> All God's rewards display mercy because we cannot truly earn anything from God. Whatever meritorious acts we perform, we do because God gave us grace and He did that out of His infinite goodness, so how could we call that our due? All His punishments are also merciful. Punishments for sin upon earth help to lift hearts to God, while eternal punishment is always alleviated or else the sufferings of the damned would be greater than they are.<sup>26</sup>

The lack of proportion between creatures and God's goodness accounts for the fact that God's justice and mercy cannot be reconciled. Mercy surpasses justice because justice presupposes mercy in God. Divine justice demands that we have what is necessary to attain our end; God gives more than is necessary. Divine justice rewards men according to merits; God gives greater rewards than necessary. Divine justice demands the penalties due to sin; God alleviates these, not going against justice, but simply doing more than justice. And why do we always say, "more than necessary"? -- to prove that justice pre-

supposes mercy. For every act of justice that God performs, He must perform ultimately for the sake of His own goodness, because man has nothing in himself to deserve any gifts of God. Therefore God could not even begin to perform a work of divine justice were it not for divine mercy.

We have been discussing the attributes relative to divine and immanent operations. Here we shall discuss briefly God's operations which are virtually transient; not formally transient we may note, for they only produce an effect outside of God; they are not accidents emanating from God and being received in created beings. These operations will be considered as: infinite power in general, creation and conservation, and divine motion.

Infinite power in God follows from pure act. God is in the highest degree the active principle admitting of no passivity. His power is all active. He can do anything which involves no contradiction, or which does not conflict with the divine perfections. Moreover this requires no effort. For God to will is to accomplish.

Now omnipotence is creative, because all the things existing outside of God must have been created or produced from absolutely nothing since the only thing from which they could otherwise be produced would be God Himself, and this we know is not the case for created beings are imperfect and God is simple. God brings the very being of things out of nothing. This is an infinite act because the distance between existence and non-existence is an infinite distance. For this reason, no creature can create because they would need infinite power as principal or as instrument<sup>1</sup> causes and this is indeed inconceivable for a creature to

be infinite. So God's infinite power is creative, proper to Him alone and not communicable.

The fact of divine conservation is very easily seen from a correct understanding of creation, because creation and conservation must be one act, God being simple. Conservation is spoken of as a continuation of God's creative action. It is postulated by the fact that God must preserve created things in being, not simply create them. Just as fire makes steel hot and is necessary to keep that steel hot, so also God creates and conserves creatures in being and existence. There is an essential dependence. The father produces a son and is thereby responsible for the son's coming into being, but he can die and the son will live on; there is not that essential dependence. However God creates a thing and conserves it all in one act, no time element being involved from His standpoint at all. He continually pours existence into created beings.<sup>27</sup>

Thus we see that creatures are utterly dependent upon God for production and existence. But creatures also have activities and operations which must be taken into consideration. These, in the power whence they flow and in their actual exercise, require the action and cooperation of God to explain their existence. This cooperation we call "concurrence".

Now whenever a creature acts to produce an effect, God is the total cause of the effect in one respect, and the creature is the total cause in another respect; like when a man uses a hammer to drive a nail. Both man and hammer are total causes in their own way, one principal, the other instrumental. So also God is the primary cause and creatures are the secondary causes.

It is obvious that there is concurrence because creatures are entirely dependent upon God for their being and operation. They are made capable of action, determined in action, moved to action, and supported in action by divine power. Likewise the effects produced by secondary causes manifest divine concurrence because there is definitely "something of God" in them in so far as they are real existences. True as it is that secondary causes supply the "causality" of an effect, nevertheless God must be the author of this basic existence.<sup>28</sup> So divine concurrence is a fact.

Although it is not difficult to understand how God is the cause of the actions and operations of creatures in general, nevertheless great difficulty arises in the question of divine concurrence in the operation of man's free will. Everyone agrees to the fact of such concurrence but there is much controversy concerning the manner in which it is exercised. The two major opponents are the Molinists and Thomists, just as in the case of God's foreknowledge as we have seen above. Now the Molinists hold that God gives man's free will a concurrence which is immediate, moral, indifferent in itself, simultaneous, and extrinsic. God's premotion consists in the fact that He has created the will of man for good in general, has impelled it infallibly in the direction of such good, and in every human choice He allures it by moral influence toward the actual good. Man's will acts or individual choices of means toward the general good are determined by man alone, God simultaneously concurring. Thus the Molinists stress the free will of man, so much so that their opponents believe they slight the absolutely supreme and necessary operation of God in every

creatural action, while such a doctrine in their opinion also reverses the true order of things by making man, in the moment of free choice either independent of God, or the actual determiner of God's own action.<sup>29</sup>

The Thomists prefer to hold that God moves free wills to connatural action by physical premotion which is, besides, physical, previous, immediate, special, and intrinsic. Moreover, in the actual exercise of free will acts, there is a simultaneous concurrence which rounds out and completes this premotion, whereby God physically moves and applies the free will to determinate action. The choice remains free; God simply moves the will in a manner consistent with its nature. The human will of itself is a potentiality incapable of absolute self-determination; its movement must originate in God. Therefore do these men stress God's physical motion and supporting action.

Just as in the case of God's knowledge of futuribles, neither of these views can be called heretical. If taken in the proper sense either one can be held.

And so with this we have briefly covered the derivation of the divine attributes, discussing their nature with equal brevity as we went along. It is to be hoped that through this discussion we have succeeded in presenting a rough sketch of God as we can analogically know Him in this life through His various entitative and operative attributes. All the foregoing words will have served their purpose doubly well if only one person, even the author, can realize with any greater clarity the magnificence of his Creator; if he can have a more ready answer for

some of our modern indifferentists, agnostics, or practical deists; or at least can say that he knows God just a little bit more than he did before. For to know God is our first purpose in being created, and from this knowledge will come our love and service of God, and as a consequence the reward of some day seeing Him <sup>NOT</sup> by analogy, but as He really is.

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Deo Gratias!



## FOOTNOTES

1. R.P. Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1935), Vol.II, p. 303.
2. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 13, a. 5.
3. Phillips, op. cit., p. 306.
4. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1941), Vol. II, p. 33.
5. Paul J. Glenn, Theodicy (St. Louis: B. Herder & Co., 1939), p. 143.
6. Iosepho Gredt, O.S.B., Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae (Friburgi Brisgoviae: B. Herder Book Co., 1937), Vol. II, p.796.
7. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p. 43.
8. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Ia, q. 60, a.5.
9. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p. 50.
10. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk.I, ch. ii.
11. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Ia, q. 12, a.11.
12. Paul J. Glenn, op. cit., p. 182.
13. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1939), q.14, a.1.
14. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Ia, q.11, a.4.
15. R.P. Phillips, op. cit., p. 314.
16. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Ia, q.14, a.8.
17. R.P. Phillips, op.cit., p. 323.
18. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Ia, q.22, a.1.
19. R.P. Phillips, op. cit., p. 371.
20. Paul J. Glenn, op. cit., p. 217.
21. ibid., p. 338.
22. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 111.
23. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Ia, q.21, a.1.
24. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p. 125.

Footnotes (continued)

25. Thomas Aquinas, op.cit., Ia, q.21., a.4
  26. ibid., Ia, q.21, a.4 ad ium.
  27. ibid., Ia, q.104, a.3
  28. Paul J. Glann, op.cit., p.289
  29. ibid., p.276
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