

THE ANARCHISM OF PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON

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Introduction

Most first reactions to anarchism are negative. It is usually perceived initially as total disorder and complete chaos. Violence, uncontrollable crime, no security whatsoever, either internal or external to a country, isolation, -- all these are seen as the result if anarchism were to prevail. Nihilism and terrorism are also often mistaken for anarchism. If initial reactions are not negative then anarchism is seen as Utopian and therefore unrealizable-in-principle. Or anarchism is connected with religion in such a way that it is similar to, and just as hard to realize as, Christian communism.

Where does "anarchy" come from? The word itself, etymologically, means without a principle of authority or without a ruler. This is one reason why Proudhon, when first using the term, separated the prefix thus: an-archism. By doing this he meant to denote that the term meant not disorder but opposition to rule by force. (1) This was consistent with the Greek notion of "anarchos" which translates as "without a ruler." But the Greeks saw this as referring to one of two states: 1) a negative condition of unruliness; or 2) a positive condition of being unruled because rule is unnecessary for the preservation of order. (2) The principal anarchist of the ancient world was Zeno (336-264 B.C.) who was opposed to Plato's political philosophy the idea of a free community without government. If man would only live in accordance with his true nature,

Zeno maintained, perfect equality and freedom would be possible without coercive institutions. (3) This is the distinguishing feature of anti-political philosophy in all times.

A concept about which anarchists are not in agreement is that of authority. It has been said that "Whoever denies authority and fights against it is an anarchist." (4) Certainly, anarchists deny authority, except, of course, personal authority over one's own life. It was in fact the misuse of authority that immediately led to anarchism, but the anarchist holds that any authority of man over man is bad. This is why most anarchists find a laissez faire economy preferable to the welfare state of the liberal. The latter reduces the appeal of anarchism. (5) One must be careful here not to equate authority with order. This is one of the anarchist's main points: order must be maintained, but without authority. How this is to be accomplished is the chief problem for the anarchist theory.*

Mortimer Adler, a sympathetic critic of anarchism, has said that those concerned with the betterment of human life have to choose one of two views. Human progress comes chiefly through changes in human institutions or through changes in human nature. (6) Here is another fundamental disagreement between the traditional political philosophers and philosophers of anarchism. Adler contends that the only way in which human progress has ever been made has been through "meliorative changes" in the institutions of government. (7) Behind this contention is the view that man's

*The idea, to be elaborated later, of mutualism has a direct bearing on this problem which is, in fact, the hardest for anarchists to face. It is also the point on which they are the most inconsistent, especially in their personal lives. On the whole however, I think that the inconsistency of anarchists on this sticky subject of authority is due to the fact that almost none of them were professional philosophers, especially not Proudhon.

nature is such that he cannot live without someone, or some institution, in authority over him. The anarchist, on the other hand, contends that if man were allowed to live in accordance with his nature, with no authority to stifle that nature, the society would operate very cooperatively. Here again is the crux: Is the nature of man such that, to live most fully, he requires the presence or absence of institutions of authority?

It is interesting to consider the disagreement between Adler and Robert Paul Wolff, a contemporary exponent of anarchism, over this fundamental problem of political philosophy. Adler formulates the question thus: "What institutions should be devised and how should they be organized and operated in order to produce a good society?" (8) Wolff, however, sees a different emphasis. He puts the question as follows: "How can the moral autonomy of the individual be made compatible with the legitimate authority of the state?" (9) The second formulation of the question reflects a tension that is present in many modern-day societies between the government and those governed, while the first aims towards a more cooperative solution to the problem of the relationship between institutions and their members. Adler sees institutions of government as necessary for all time, while Wolff sees this necessity, if it exists at all, to be temporary at best. Anarchists have always made the opposite presumption as Adler regarding institutions. The question of the necessity or the non-necessity of institutions is of course critical in the evaluation of anarchism.

The Anarchism of Proudhon

Proudhon's life and writings

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was born in Besancon, France on January 15, 1809. His father, Claude, was a cooper and is described as "honest and hard working but not very thrifty." (1) His mother, Catherine Simonin, was "a very good and moral woman with a very delicate moral sense." (2) Though Proudhon studied much in his younger years, he also spent much time in the outdoors. His time spent as a cowman was to greatly affect his later thinking about society. (3) His youthful studies included the Bible and many theologians, but he also studied the Greeks, and his anti-religious attitudes took root in these early years. According to Woodcock, it was at Besancon that Proudhon became an atheist because of the "ineptitude" of the defense of Christianity made there. (4) Proudhon was later to elaborate this atheism. Man becomes himself by opposition to all that is non-human. But this non-human "all" is governed by God. If God exists then He must be in opposition to man, and since the only good we can know is human good, God must be evil. The conquest of tyranny and poverty and falsehood therefore lies in opposition to God. (5)

Proudhon supported himself in various ways throughout his lifetime. He wrote constantly, of course, and he never lacked anything to print though selling it was another question. He was in contact with all the liberal and radical social movements of the day. He knew Marx, Bakunin, Fourier, and others. But he kept to himself when it came to action, although he enjoyed and apparently needed the intellectual exchange he received from such persons. (6) He published various newspapers during his lifetime. Each one was suppressed and revived at least once or twice.

Proudhon was imprisoned once and once forced into exile on account of this publishing.

Proudhon's works are many and varied. In his ~~his~~ second principal essay, published in 1839, Sunday Observance and Its Usefulness from the Points of View of Hygiene, Morality, and Family and Town Life he first stated that moral law is absolute. He also makes here the categorical assertion that "equality of conditions is the aim of society." (7) What is Poverty? A Study in the Principle of Right and Government, published in 1840, contains the basic elements from which all his later libertarian and decentralist ideas were to be built. These ideas, however, were in quite underdeveloped form since industry was not taken into account at all. (8) They were elaborated in 1846 in The System of Economic Contradictions or the Philosophy of Poverty, the work that drew Marx's "spiteful criticism" in The Poverty of Philosophy and caused the life-long split between them. (9) In 1851 Proudhon published A General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, in which he sets down the outline of a program for an anarchial society. He followed this in 1853 with a more philosophical work, The Philosophy of Progress, in which he maintains that evolution and the movement of the universe which he calls "progress" is constant, perpetual, and never completed. In this work he denies the Absolute which he had earlier proclaimed and would return to in later years.

Proudhon's largest and most comprehensive work is Justice in the Revolution and the Church. Henri de Lubac explains how this work came about.

In August, 1854, a friend of Proudhon, Villiaume, arranged a meeting between Proudhon and a Catholic publicist who called himself M. de Mirecourt. The latter was publishing a series of short biographies of

"contemporary celebrities." Mirecourt's biography of Proudhon appeared in May, 1855. It was an insulting lampoon. What aggravated the offence in Proudhon's eyes was the fact that the book contained a letter written by Cardinal Mathieu, the Archbishop of Besancon, who seemed thus to guarantee it. He (Proudhon) disregarded Mirecourt and set himself to attack the Archbishop, and through the Archbishop the Church herself. His reply grew bigger and bigger and finally became the bulkiest and the most important of all his works. (10)

This book was siezed by the police and Proudhon hurried to Belgium with his family where he settled under another name. (11) In 1861, Proudhon published War and Peace, described by Woodcock as "a provocative work on the sublimation of war-like impulses into creative social urges." (12) His final work, The Political Capacity of the Working Classes, was a commentary on Tolain and Lefort's Manifesto of the Sixty which had held that workers must have their own political organization. In contrast to his earlier prohibitions against any kind of political action, at the end of his life, Proudhon seemed to be allowing for some legitimate political action on the part of working men, but he was careful to reiterate the necessity of the principle of mutuality.* His basic suspicion of the political process is still present in Political Capacity, where he wrote: "The political system can be defined as follows: A compact democracy founded in appearance on the dictatorship of the masses, but in which the masses only have so much power as is needed to secure universal servitude." (13) Proudhon died on December 19, 1864. He was not quite 56.

Proudhon was a multi-faceted personality. Woodcock has characterized him as a "man of paradox." (14) In his personal life a conservative and skeptical of any fundamental improvement in human life, (15)

*This will be discussed later in conjunction with Proudhon's economics and politics.

he could yet say, "I regard myself as the most complete expression of the revolution." (16) And again, "The representative of the people, that am I. For I alone am right." (17) He seemed to take a sensible view of free will and determinism, maintaining that determinism is false because it makes the thinking being into a plaything of matter, when really, both "Liberty and Necessity" play a part. (18) Woodcock notes how this affected his ideas of societal progress.

It is not the proliferation of written laws that constitutes progress; it is the increase of laws conceived and observed in the hearts of men. (19)

Brogan points up the seeming primacy of the spiritual in Proudhon for the methods of Proudhon are more moral than economic and likewise, the satisfaction gained is moral rather than material. (20) But just how Proudhon will resolve this dilemma will be discussed when considering his notion of "Justice." For now, let us conclude with Brogan.

A logical method, the series of Fourier, the antinomies of Kant, the dialectic of Hegel, the syllogism of the scholastics, was, for Proudhon, not a means of testing truth, or of finding it, but a device for persuading his readers of truths which he held on institutional grounds. (21)

The Influence of the French Revolution and the Church

What was the effect of the French Revolution on Proudhon's ideas? As we know, the society which followed the Revolution did not fulfill all of the promises it had sloganeered. Proudhon is undismayed. He sees the revolution as an ongoing process: the importance of 1789, its revelation of certain absolute moral truths. (1) These were, of course, liberty, equality, and fraternity, which had not been seen before the Revolution as the foundational values of human life. They would be the guiding force in history from now on, according to Proudhon. For their full realization society had many changes to undergo, but Proudhon, a good Hegelian here, was certain that these changes were as inevitable as the revelation of the values they would realize.

In view of this ongoing revolution-revelation, what was Proudhon's reaction to the political events of the nineteenth century? It will be explained later that Proudhon really saw no distinction between politics and economics. Though surely he thought it necessary to comment on the political developments of the time, he did not do so until the revolution of 1848. At this time he said, "Our idea of anarchism is launched: non-government is developing as non-property did before." (2) Strangely enough, Proudhon's only active involvement in a revolution was in this one. Not only did he help erect a barricade in the streets, he gained election to the National Assembly and called for the dethronement of Louis-Phillip. He did not however fully agree with the leaders of this revolution. They seemed to him only interested in political and constitutional changes instead of real social revolution and a reformation of the system of poverty. (3) His short career in the National Assembly was

disappointing. He voted against the Constitution "not because it contained things of which I disapprove...but because it is a constitution."

(4) According to Joll:

He was disappointed in his attempts to use the Assembly as a means of economic reform: when he tried to introduce a bill to reorganize the system of taxation in such a way as virtually to confiscate a large part of all private fortunes in order to set up credit banks and subsidies for peasants and workers, he was greeted with incredulous laughter in a rapidly emptying chamber. (5)

This was the end of his political adventures. As Joll states: "From 1849 onwards he was to turn away from politics and political reforms for good and develop into a true anarchist." (6) He did however remain alert to political developments and shortly after Napoleon was first elected published a pamphlet attacking him. (7) For this he was tried and imprisoned for sedition. At the time of the coup d'etat of 1851 Proudhon's attitude was one of welcome, because of his hope that the dictatorship of Napoleon would lead to the "collapse of established society and pave the way for true social and economic reform." (8) Proudhon's later reaction to political events had the aim of showing both the inevitability of change and the desirable directions this change might take. He did not, as did other anarchists, lay out specific details (which are barely understandable outside a particular setting) for an anarchial society. (9) His criticism was studiously general that it might be meaningful and useful for other times and places. In this respect Proudhon is a good French moralist.

Henri de Lubac points out that Proudhon was quite anti-church and yet quite a theologian in his own way. The Bible is one of the works which Proudhon admitted as having an intellectual influence on him. Lubac

remarks that "a thesis might be written on 'The Bible in Proudhon's Works' ...not only could numerous quotations be cited, but also a Biblical turn of mind is everywhere apparent." (10) His hostility to church and religion was probably due in large measure to the Church's association at his time with the powerful and established of society. According to Lubac, it was "the Christianity of the theologians, and not that of the gospel" which he fought against. (11)* Details of Proudhon's seeming grudge are not important here except insofar as they influenced his philosophy. As has been suggested earlier, he saw authority as legitimate only in the family. The Church, Proudhon thought, supported and tried to legitimate authoritarian and oppressive practices in society. Since these practices were outmoded by the revelation of the revolution of 1789, so was the Church. Its purpose having been served, it should now die as an institution. Woodcock sums up the way in which the Revolution would replace the Church.

Proudhon sees the values of the Revolution eventually overtaking the world in the form of "a universal federation, the supreme guarantee of all liberty and all right which must replace the society of Christianity and feudalism and in which the life of man will pass in tranquility of the senses and serenity of the spirit. (12)

*It must be noted here that Proudhon's concept of Gospel Christianity was probably as warped as that of the theologians he opposed.

Proudhon's Economics and Politics

Proudhon's conception of society is bound up with considerations of both the political and economic orders. It is difficult to separate the various components of his thoughts on society. It seems to me that this difficulty stems at least in part from the fact that Proudhon did not foresee a cataclysmic change in society. His doctrine of anarchism aimed not to overthrow the state, but to dissolve it in the economic order. (1) In other words, he wanted to arrange the economy of society such that the state would no longer be necessary. In Proudhon's mature thought there are a number of key ideas which show not only how and why it is possible but why it is necessary to achieve a new society.

To the question, what is the relationship between the individual and the group as a whole, Proudhon answers that the individual in society is both the starting point and the ultimate goal of any restructuring of the social order. (2) This distinguished Proudhon from an individualist anarchist such as Stirner who maintained that society is an enemy to the individual. (3) But there is no such thing in nature as an isolated being, for Proudhon. (4) The individual is the basic unit, but it is society that provides the kind of direction wherein "each man's personality finds function and fulfillment." (5) Society is part of the natural and universal order. (6) It is not a collection or mere aggregate of individuals, but possesses a collective force or consciousness of its own. (7) This seems to me to be a particularly clear example of Proudhon's debt to Hegel.

Still, Proudhon did not believe that the ideal society could be achieved by institutional changes alone. Each man must also be reformed

individually. (8) Whereas traditionalists like Adler, hold that all improvements in human affairs must come through changes in institutions. (9) Proudhon maintains that institutional changes, though necessary, are insufficient for a total reformation of society. But of course, there is an equally fundamental disagreement as to the type of institutional changes which ought to take place. Proudhon is not, however, blind to the difficulty of his proposals. His conception of human nature takes into account the power of the irrational and the constant effort needed to make men behave reasonably. (10)

According to Proudhon, the individual and society must work together in harmony. Just as society is natural and good so is the harmonious cooperation between society and the individual. But Proudhon points out that harmony and agreement in society can be maintained and tyranny avoided only by "sustaining social energies in a state of perpetual struggle." (11) Proudhon himself best sums up how this harmonious relationship is to come about. (Emphasis added below)

All men are equal and free; society, by nature and destination, is therefore autonomous and ungovernable. If the sphere of activity of each citizen is determined by the natural division of work and by the choice he makes of a profession, if the social functions are combined in such a way as to produce a harmonious effect, order results from the free activity of all men; there is no government. Whoever puts his hand on me is an usurper and a tyrant; I declare him my enemy. (12)

Proudhon did not pass over the obvious fact of authority when he was considering society. And it is here that we encounter one of the many paradox's in Proudhon's philosophy. Proudhon thought that there was some kind of mystical base for the authority of a father of a family, but that there was no such base for society in general regarding authority. (13)

In fact, as far as society is concerned, even though authority was the first social idea of the human race, the obligation to work to abolish authority was the second. (14) For Proudhon, the use of authority in society had no place. For example, it was mutual cooperation not authoritarian communism that would solve the economic problems just as it was voluntary federalism not parliamentary (and the reform authoritarian) democracy which would solve the political problems. (15)

Any consideration of Proudhon's vision for a new society must take into account his economic theory. According to Brogan, Proudhon wanted an economic system based not on monopolies of money but on mutuality. (16) In such a mutuality, producers are the consumers of the goods produced by each other. (17) Such an arrangement is immediately seen to be not only economic but political as well. In fact, Proudhon wanted to collapse the distinction between economics and politics. There is no relationship between economic interests and representative government, according to Proudhon, for they are the same. (18) The only "institution" in Proudhon's society that would resemble what has been traditionally referred to as government would be the mutual economic arrangements set up among various members of this same society. But, these associations will have no authority of their own. A key to the functioning of this idea is the notion of contract, to be dealt with in detail later.

How can such mutual relationships be compatible with the institution of private property? If the name of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon brings anything at all to mind it is the dictum: "Property is theft!" This is an important factor in Proudhon's philosophy but it is almost always misunderstood. Proudhon did not mean at all for it to be taken literally. He

was speaking out against the property of those who use property to exploit the labor of others while making no effort themselves. (19) As Proudhon says, he is speaking out against "the property that is distinguished by interest, usury, and rent, by the impositions of the non-producer upon the producer." (20) Proudhon's point is more accurately expressed in Woodcock's paraphrase: "The sum of the abuses of property is theft." (21) It was really interest that Proudhon was opposed to. He maintained that there was no reason to charge for the use of someone else's property. He thought that the Church, for once, was right when she condemned usury. The only charge that could possibly be justified in lending would be one to cover bookkeeping expenses. (22) With this possible slight exception, Proudhon insisted on free credit. Since only labor creates wealth, interest was a theft by the lender from the borrower. (23) Proudhon certainly had nothing against private property for personal use, for example, a man's home, some land and tools to work and live with. In fact, he saw this as necessary for liberty and he criticized the Communists for wanting to get rid of it and replace it with the state. (24)

Proudhon was concerned for those who were destitute, although he was convinced that were the principle of equality adhered to in society the standard of living would not be very high overall. The idea of the Utopians that all could have increased wealth was false to Proudhon for he thought that, at best, everyone could have a decent poverty. (25) But most importantly everyone should be paid equally for their work. (26) This, Proudhon hoped, would decrease some of the unfairness in society. One of the principle contributing factors to violence was greed on the part of the rich. (27) The poor were kept poor and sooner or later they

were bound to violently revolt against this injustice. And although Proudhon did not encourage violence, he saw it as unavoidable. He thought ~~the~~ the orthodox pacifist attitude fruitless. Violence must first be understood as a social phenomenon before it can be brought to an end. (28)

Some of Proudhon's ideas in the economic sphere seem to be rather poorly thought out. For example, he advocated an across the board reduction of prices. In Brogan words he was a "fanatical deflationist." (29) He thought of low prices as goods-in-themselves. With this general reduction of prices everyone would end up exactly where they were before. As one of his opponents pointed out, why go to all the trouble? (30) Taxation also came under attack from Proudhon. He again rightly observes that most countries, (Proudhon spoke mainly of France, of course) think they have to be Number One and impress in some way all other countries, hence the need for large armies, many bureaucracies, big "justice" systems, and therefore high taxes. (32) But the root of the matter is that there can be no real justice in taxation in a society which permits economic inequality. (33) The beginning of a solution, Proudhon suggested, would be for the government to sell its services at cost price and those who get more services, i.e. the rich, should pay more than those who get less, i.e. the poor. (34)

Another leading economic idea of Proudhon's is association. He strongly distinguishes here between association and organization and firmly maintains that the two ideas are not synonymous. (35) Some amount of basic organization seems to be necessary. As Brogan points out, Proudhon sees the "apparent" necessity of organization due to economic inequality -- because of the absence of justice. However, he thought that

once all men bind themselves to mutual justice, i.e. association, the need for the "coercive apparatus", i.e. organization, will end. (36) Proudhon stated his vision in one of his innumerable pamphlets which is quoted by Woodcock.

We believe in a radical transformation of society, in the direction of freedom, personal equality, and the confederation of peoples. (37)

There is one example of an actual attempt by Proudhon to put this idea of mutualism into effect. It is interesting to note that as Proudhon attempted to actualize the "Bank of Exchange" or "People's Bank" as it was more commonly referred to, an almost identical attempt was being made across the Atlantic by Josiah Warren in Cincinnati. Proudhon's institution was to foster the exchange of products between workers, based on "labor checks", and for providing credit with a nominal interest rate to cover administrative costs. He wanted to create a network of independent craftsmen and peasants as well as a network of associations of workers who would eventually achieve what Proudhon hoped would be a peaceful transformation of society. (38)

Mutualism is the main way in which Proudhon hoped to effect change in society. Additional means would be 1) making education a balanced apprenticeship; 2) retaining the advantages of a division of labor but protecting the workers from its evils. (39) Underlying these proposals is Proudhon's conviction that the key to the economic organization of society is the integration of work, which cannot be achieved without economic equality. (40) For Proudhon, one of the disastrous effects of modern society is the divorce between ideas and work. (41) This becomes particularly critical when it is realized that the best way to change

society, according to Proudhon, is by the "natural development of a collective consciousness" of the necessity of social reform. (42) This is summed up in his book, the Political Capacity of the Working Classes.

(Emphasis added)

To possess political capacity is to have the consciousness of oneself as a member of a collectivity, to affirm the idea that results from this consciousness, and to pursue its realization. Whoever unites under these characteristics is capable. (43)

The "consciousness" is an awareness of justice which is "realized" in federalism. Proudhon's hope was that as this happened among working people the prevailing government would "commit suicide gracefully, giving way to the free anarchial society without trying to make the birth of the new order difficult." (44) This hope dwindled as Proudhon came to realize that a government, any government, does not go down without a fight.

Brogan has quoted Robert de Jouvenal's view of the differences in certain of those committed to change in society.

There is more in common between two members of parliament, one of whom is a revolutionary, than between two revolutionaries, one of whom is a member of parliament. (44a)

For a while, Proudhon actually attempted to work legitimately within the existing governmental structure. However, when he found that his membership in the legislature isolated him from most of the people he came to regard as entirely mythical the idea that universal suffrage was a panacea for social ills. (45) He was now convinced that political democracy without economic changes would result in regression rather than progress. (46) And he eventually came to believe that, in Brogan's words, "not only was the state an evil, it was not a necessary evil." (47) Government was always for the governors, never for the governed. (48)

If this is reminiscent of Marx, the similarity is more apparent than real, viz. Marx's reaction to Proudhon's System of Economic Contradictions:

The work of M. Proudhon is not simply a treatise on political economy, an ordinary book, it is a Bible. "Mysteries," Secrets dragged from the bosoms of God," "Revelations," nothing is lacking. These rhetorical passages are irrelevant, but they are symptomatic of M. Proudhon's mind, for he thinks of economic activity as subordinate to ethical activity, but if the work of one man is now worth that of another, it is not the doing of M. Proudhon's "eternal justice" it is solely the accomplishment of modern industry. (50)

With Proudhon and Marx, then, we seem to have a clash between the spiritualist and the materialist views of history. (51) Though Proudhon himself comes out for an economic interpretation of history before Marx and Engels, (52) he maintains that the solution is not in communism because it fails to recognize man's love for independence. (53) Proudhon advocated socialism as a way to deliver the individual from the injustices which he suffered on account of the industrial system. (54) But Proudhon thought of the worker as a peasant. He did not understand the industrial worker as such and therefore was unable to speak to him. (55)

Both Marx and Proudhon were heavily influenced by Hegel but in very different ways. For Proudhon, as we have seen, the French revolution was a revelation of absolute moral truths which had existed from the beginning. For Marx this was not all the case; the fundamental force was the organization of the methods of production. (56) Proudhon was simply not a social determinist to the extent that Marx was. For Proudhon saw the individual affecting society by exercising his free will, not as completely ruled by social forces. It is the organization of society that he regards as economic in basis and nature. The individual motives and justice itself have a status of their own. (57)

Proudhon often theorized on the nature of the ideal society, as did other political social philosophers, including anarchists. At times his vision was comprehensive, as in the following sketch of a free society.

In the place of laws, we will put contracts; no more laws voted by the majority or even unanimously. Each citizen, each town, each industrial union will make its own laws. In place of political powers we will put economic forces...In place of standing armies we will put industrial associations. In place of police we will put identity of interests. In place of political centralization we will put economic centralization. (58)

It was also firmly maintained by Proudhon that real unity was in inverse proportion to the size of the population. The ideal would be small states or communes, each ruled by its own citizens, who were economically equal, each master of his trade or his farm - - and, of course, of his family. These small, local, natural units of government could then be federated for purposes of trade, etc. This federation would solve any purely governmental problems. (59) An administration of any kind in society would not serve to govern but only to arrange mutual cooperation of all interests. (60) This seems to me to be very similar to the role played by a mediator in a labor dispute and I do think that this is the kind of function that Proudhon saw as needing fulfillment.

The society described by Proudhon has gone by many titles. However, he did prefer one to all the others, just as he preferred to describe himself in one way above all others.

What is to be the form of government in the future? I hear some of my readers reply "Why, how can you ask such a question? You are a republican." "A republican! Yes, but that word specifies nothing." Res publica; that is, the public thing. Now, whoever is interested in public affairs - - no matter under what form of government may call himself a republican. Even kings are republicans. "Well, then you are a democrat." "No..." "Then, what are you?" I am an anarchist! (61)

The essential definition of anarchism for Proudhon is that it is the absence of a master or a sovereign and the absence therefore of subjects.

(62) Society, as had been explained above is a network of voluntary understandings between free individuals based on labor and equality. This individual freedom or liberty is of highest importance to Proudhon as Brogan makes clear. (emphasis added)

A society for production creates no bond between its members outside those indispensable for the economic activity of the society. The absolute independence of each member must be observed. No social good is worth the price of liberty. Naturally, such a doctrine made its author suspicious of trade unions, and strikes he abhorred from the beginning to the end of his life. (63)

Proudhon and Rousseau

Aaron Noland states that "Rousseau should be included...as one of the 'masters' of Proudhon." (1) I will here try to consider in some detail Rousseau's basic notions and how these may or may not have affected Proudhon. One immediate similarity is that both Rousseau and Proudhon considered man to be basically good, and it is for this reason that both were of the opinion that man could live in a different society than that in which he found himself. Admittedly, the types of societies which they envisioned were quite different.

There is some disagreement as to whether or not Proudhon had an adequate understanding of Rousseau and there is therefore disagreement on the effect of the latter. For example, Noland points out that Proudhon was full of contradictory statements about various social theorists, Rousseau included, so that it is possible that Proudhon may have been too unfamiliar with Rousseau to benefit from his ideas. (2) But this is not at all clear, for Proudhon cites Rousseau often and he did first formulate his problem with the social order in much the same way as did Rousseau. (3) Proudhon levels two criticisms at Rousseau which seem to be less than accurate. First he faults Rousseau for not being specific enough in outlining citizens' rights and duties to one another. Proudhon took this to be a specific neglect of the economic sphere of society. Second, Proudhon accuses Rousseau of betraying his original doctrine of the sovereignty of all the people, in favor of mere majority rule by representatives. This criticism suggests that Proudhon himself is an advocate of pure democracy. (4)

Proudhon and Rousseau both agreed that civil order or society was

not an artificial construct but that the possibility of creating a society was inherent in man. Society was therefore a "natural" environment for man. (5) What is important to note here is that neither Proudhon or Rousseau seems to be maintaining at this point that "government" is necessary or even natural. They seem to hold only that society is natural. This is not the case, however, for Rousseau certainly holds that some government is necessary and moreover that it is this same government that is inherent in the nature of man. Proudhon recognized that the principle of order in civil society which Rousseau conceived of was essentially a political principle. In Proudhon's eyes what Rousseau failed to grasp was that government as such was "illegitimate and powerless" as "a principle of order." (6) Moreover, according to Proudhon, Rousseau's theory was metaphysical, artificial, and therefore arbitrary, and it could contribute nothing of value to the problem of establishing a viable civil society characterized by liberty, equality, and justice. (7)

Both Proudhon and Rousseau saw the sovereignty of the people as basic to a just social order. As was just mentioned, Proudhon saw Rousseau's notion of sovereignty as artificial because it was conceived of only through governmental institutions which are not themselves natural to society. Proudhon saw this sovereignty of the people based in what he called a "natural group." (8) He defines natural group as follows:

Whenever men together with their wives and children assemble in some one place, link up their dwellings and holdings, develop in their midst diverse industries, create among themselves neighborly feelings and relations, and for better or worse impose upon themselves the conditions of solidarity, they form what I call a natural group. (9)

Proudhon sees a pure democracy at work in these natural groups. "Thus

what Proudhon set forth is a state of affairs which satisfies Rousseau's own specifications for the form of constitution, namely that in which the executive and legislative powers are united." (10) These natural groups seem for Proudhon to have an existence of their own. They certainly are supposed to be completely independent. They may, however, for the sake of some greater mutual interest, unite with one another temporarily or even permanently in a very limited way. What Proudhon is aiming for here is a great decentralization of government so that universal suffrage becomes not the "gimmick" that it was within the centralized government of his own day, but a useful and necessary tool to express the true interests of the inhabitants of a "natural group." (11)

Proudhon also characterized the phenomenon of this pure democracy at work as "collective reason." (12) As has been mentioned elsewhere, Proudhon is not a rugged individualist. In fact, he sees individual reason as too personal, absolute, and subjective. Collective reason, however, is impersonal, synthetic, and objective. Here again Hegel's influence is obvious. Noland states this point well.

The collective reason achieves this objectivity not at the cost of repressing individual reason: quite the contrary, the collective reason necessarily presupposes the latter, since it is the product of the clash of individual reasons. (13)

Collective reason, which is seen to be working in the pure democracy of the natural group, is, for Proudhon, the guardian of all truth and justice, the source of all public law and human rights, and the fount of all morality and progress. (14)

Proudhon's theory of mutualism was mentioned earlier. The specific way in which this mutuality in society takes place is through contracts.

"Contracts" were the concrete form by which the new society was to come into being, for Proudhon. Brogan phrases the question thus: "How was the state to be replaced and society given its constitution? By the magic power of the contract." (15)

Freedom, equality, and justice could only be assured, in Proudhon's view, in a civil society in which a network of associations and private groupings flourished and in which "each individual would be equally and synonomously producer and consumer, citizen and prince, ruler and ruled!" (16)

Rousseau also advocated a society based on the Social Contract. What is the difference in thinking here between these two social theorists? For Proudhon, the solution for which he was searching when he put forth his notion of social contract was a state wherein social equality would prevail. The community would not be a repressive one, nor would it be a disordered grouping. It would be a state characterized by its order and by liberty. Its members would be united yet independent. (17) Rousseau was attempting to build or propose a form of association which would unite all members of the community and put the defense of the entire community behind each person and his goods while at the same time allowing each person to remain perfectly free obeying only himself. (18) Notice here that Proudhon would concentrate on social equality (which he also calls economic equality) while Rousseau would emphasize security for all persons and property. Even though both saw liberty as the highest priority, the difference in theory is significant. Proudhon maintained that all Rousseauian contracts were really enemies of the right of every man to rule himself. (19) Since for Proudhon it followed from the nature of men that they would live together with some amount of order or equality, and this was quite a loose association, any attempt to politicize this order could only be counter-

productive. In fact he held, contrary of course to Rousseau, that the very idea of the social contract excluded that of government. For what characterized the contract, in Proudhon's view, was an agreement for equal exchange between the contracting parties, and "it is by virtue of this agreement that the liberty and well-being increases" while by the establishment of governmental authority "both of these necessarily diminish." (20)* Proudhon said that Rousseau failed to see that the sixteenth century revolutionary tradition gave us the Social Contract as an antithesis to government. (21) Proudhon the anarchist was not at all searching for a new type of government.

The rule of contracts substituted for the rule of laws would constitute the real sovereignty of the people, the Republic. (22)

The principle difference between Proudhon and Rousseau is then that Rousseau's theory is built upon one contract agreed to by all the people whereas Proudhon would have many contracts between many people with only one agreement among all: the agreement to agree. Proudhon gave the name society to the sum total of all these contracts. This contractual society he called "mutualism." (23) For Proudhon, contracts served two ends: first, to solve the problems of exchange and credit; second, to effect all the political organization that was needed in society. (24) These two ends served by contracts as means are, of course, identical. As was mentioned before, Proudhon collapses the distinction between politics and economics, so that there is not an institution of government itself.

*To what extent Proudhon's notion of contract can be taken as commonly conceived remains a question. The question of enforcement is not dealt with satisfactorily and, furthermore, the very idea of a contract which can be broken by any party at any time is self-contradictory.

However, there is a principle of contract, for Proudhon. And it is this principle of contract by which society turns into a network of mutual undertakings between individuals. (25) It seems to me that it is this principle that Rousseau speaks of as The Social Contract, although there is much more to it than that. Rousseau sees it as essential that this agreement to agree, so to speak, be formulated into an institution in and of itself, into something which has, contrary to Proudhon's view of contracts, a life of its own. (Proudhon thought, with some justification, that if a contract does have any life of its own tyranny would eventually be the result.) (26)

It was Proudhon's firm conviction that contracts and government were incompatible. (Emphasis added)

The idea of contract excludes that of government. What characterized the contract, the mutual convention, is that in virtue of this convention man's liberty and well-being increase, while by the institution of authority, both necessarily diminish. (27)

Each person must be free to make agreements with others as he sees fit. He must not be constrained to follow the ideas of others. Proudhon thought Rousseau made a great mistake when he put faith in the rule of the majority. For Proudhon, Justice must rule. Proudhon said of Rousseau (emphasis added):

In founding right on human conventions, in making laws the expression of wills, in other words, in submitting justice, and morality, to the decision of the greater number and the rule of the majority, he plunged deeper and deeper into the abyss from which he believed he was emerging, and absolved the society he accused. (28)

The rule of justice rather than will - general or other - is essential to the society of Proudhon's vision, and deserves a chapter of its own.

Proudhon's Concept of Justice

Proudhon's definitions of justice are many and perplexing. (1) Their variety and occasional inconsistency are due to the fact, once again, that Proudhon was not a professional philosopher. (2) He calls Justice the "universal and absolute criteria of certitude" and "the eternal formula of things, the idea which upholds all ideas, the law which asserts itself." He refers to it as the "first and last reason of the universe." (3) Again, it is "supreme reason," the synthesis of the law of selfishness and the law of love, "the social sacrament of liberty." (4) Proudhon also locates Justice in various functions of man and the natural world. When operating in man's intelligence, Justice is seen as equality; in the imagination of man it manifests itself as an ideal; and in Nature itself, Justice is the principle of equilibrium. (5)

Proudhon insisted strongly that Justice was immanent in humanity. He maintained that it was a faculty of the human soul. (6) This is contrasted, in his writings, with a transcendent principle of Justice such as is held by the Catholic Church.

Justice as seen by the Church is transcendental; the moral principle is held to originate in God and hence to be superior to man. But, according to Proudhon, true Justice is immanent; it is innate in the human consciousness. (7)

Why did Proudhon reject any kind of transcendent Justice? The political scene of the time which motivates him throughout all of his writings is especially clear here. Proudhon saw the transcendental theory of Justice as leading to systems of state administration, moral regulation, restrictions on ideas, etc. (8) These kinds of controls were not consistent with the true nature of Justice, which is to be found in the human conscience

and human moral sense. (9)

It will be noticed already that however much Proudhon insists that Justice is inherent in humanity itself, it has for him a transcendental character. On the one hand he insists that it "really exists and acts," that it is not just a goal or an aim. (10) On the other hand he says that "Justice exists in us like love, like notions of beauty, of utility, of truth...Justice is human, completely human...we wrong it by relating it to a principle superior or anterior to humanity." (11) But then he states that Justice is a law which governs both humanity and nature. (12) It is, according to Proudhon, the fundamental principle, it is not inherent in nature nor dependent on anything like a God, but is rather, a faculty of the soul. Proudhon is quoted by Lubac.

What is excellent in me, what distinguishes me in the highest degree, and established me most forcibly as man, is not intelligence, nor love, nor liberty, it is Justice. (13)

Note the capital J. If justice is a faculty of the soul, it is the supreme faculty, and therefore the supreme principle of human life. Accordingly, to say with Lubac that Justice is Proudhon's God is no abuse of language. Nor is Lubac's phrase Proudhon's theology of Justice, to which we now turn.

Influenced by Comte, Proudhon originally saw religion and philosophy as necessary stages in the progress of human understanding which were superseded by science. (14) In fact, at one point, Proudhon thought that man should live without anything resembling religion. However, his view changed when he realized that his idea of Justice could not be known through science. (15) and indeed that the only kind of proof he could give for this Justice was an ontological argument very much like St. Anselm's.

"What can be imagined more universal, stronger, more complete than Justice." (16) In fact, Lubac indicates that Proudhon agreed with Catholic philosophy when it states that, in God, existence and essence are one. For Proudhon, "God is not a Just being, he is Justice itself." (17)

Still, Proudhon saw this religious understanding of Justice as a mere predecessor to Justice as it was revealed in the Revolution. (18) As Lubac interprets him:

It was in order to prepare for the reign of Justice that nature first of all created religion. (19)

His theory was that Christianity was to the Revolution what the Religion of Israel was to Christianity. (20) But now that the stage of Christianity had passed, according to Proudhon, "the Church is an enemy of Justice." (21) For in the Revolution the "theology of Immanence" came into full view. (22) Justice has now become the new Absolute.

Proudhon wavers in his conviction that man is able to know the Absolute itself. At one point he indicates that it cannot be known at all, but more often he speaks as if the main task is simply to replace one idea of the Absolute with another. It seems as though he is again reacting to the Church and society of his time when he says that God can be replaced subjectively only by conscience, objectively by Justice. (23) So that, while admitting that Justice as Absolute could not be fully known in itself it was still the binding and guiding force of all nature. Whereas before, Justice (hidden under the guise of God or Spirit) may have been very mysterious, the Revolution served to bring it down from heaven to earth. (24) Strictly speaking, the task of the Revolution is not ended until the two principles of Anarchy and Justice have completely defeated their enemies, Authority and Property. (25)

All the metaphysico-theological systems, brought into being by dreams of the Absolute and the ideal, are, in short, but the archaeology of Justice, the apocalypse of the Revolution. (26)

As was just mentioned, the Revolution, for Proudhon, was an ongoing affair. It was at work in the world both before and after the French Revolution of 1789. This revolution of 1789 was, of course, a turning point. (27) Government by divine right was abolished and justice began its official reign. (28) But Proudhon also pointed out that there had been other turning points in the over-all Revolution. Each one had brought about equality in a particular relationship that was not previously there. The first of these was Christ, who brought equality between men and God. Next, the Reformation and DesCartes brought about equality between men and reason. The events of the 18th century brought about equality between men and the law. The revolutions of the 19th century served to bring equality to "men among men." (29) Sometimes it seems as though it were progress that Proudhon was concentrating on instead of Justice. But he states that progress comes about only through a new realization of Justice. (30)

He even spoke of Revolution, in the singular, as though it were a permanent force, a more or less existing reality, both inwardly and outwardly, the correlative of Justice, to which it had to act as midwife down through all the ages. "Just as the notion of right is eternal and innate in mankind, so, too, is the Revolution innate and eternal. It did not begin in the year of Grace 1789, in a spot situated between the Pyrenees, the Atlantic, the Rhine and the Alps. It belongs to all ages and all countries." (31)

In his battles with Christianity Proudhon often came up against the concept of charity as opposed to Justice. Here, as elsewhere, he is less than consistent. He refers to Charity as the principle of progress, on the one hand, and Justice as the principle of equilibrium on the other. (32)

We have seen previously how he considered Justice to be manifested through progress. At times it seems as though he is simply using Charity and Justice to name two aspects of the same principle. When he states that Charity is the law of the spiritual world and that Justice is the law of the temporal world this seems to be the case. But then he goes on to maintain that these both form only one world. (33) He states at one point that if Charity is a law in its own right then the spirit of Justice suffers. At other times, however, Proudhon indicates that Charity is simply a prelude to Justice. (34)

The main problem, that Proudhon had with the notion of Charity seems to be one of emphasis. In Proudhon's day, for example, charity was advocated by the Church to support the existing social order. The emphasis was primarily on almsgiving with no thought of changing the status quo. This charity did not respect the basic dignity of man. (35) This misplaced emphasis was also termed by Proudhon as a lack of moral equilibrium, (36)* Proudhon outlined some possible consequences of this lack of moral equilibrium. When this lack is present, crimes are the result. It is the responsibility of society to try and set right the imperfect social relations which generate crimes. The institutions of society must be changed such that the same opportunity for crime is not present again. A lack of moral equilibrium is also evidenced in a lack of equality in social forces. This results in poverty for some of the people. Again, a society without moral equality will turn to violence. Only when the

*Moral equilibrium refers to the failure to keep Justice as the keystone of all efforts in the social order, in this example, charity without Justice would be fruitless. Justice must be the prime factor in all changes in society.

material and spiritual are united will social peace be established.

As was brought out before when considering the immanence of Justice as opposed to its transcendence, Justice is known not only through man but also through society. As Proudhon himself states:

Justice is the central star which governs society, the pole around which the political world revolves, the principle and regulator of all transactions. Nothing takes place between men save in the name of right, nothing without the invocation of Justice. (38)

Justice governs all relationships between men in society. In fact, it seems more accurate to say that Proudhon saw Justice as resting in humanity as a whole rather than in man as an individual. As Lubac states, "Justice cannot be fully defined in relation to an individual existence." (39) But, even given this necessity to define Justice in terms of all humanity, it is still in some way, according to Proudhon, the product of conscience, each man being the final judge of good and evil. (40)

If Justice is then this individualized in its judgements, what governs its practice by men in society? Proudhon once again draws on the influence of Christianity and states that it is a faith that is needed. He is quoted by Joll.

What guarantees the observance of Justice? The same thing that guarantees that the merchant will respect the coin, -- Faith in reciprocity, that is, faith in Justice itself. (41)

This faith which Proudhon falls back on here seems to stem from his recognition of a fundamental law of human nature, namely, Do as you would be done by. It is likely that he picked this up from Kant originally. (42) But he went further and said that as mankind becomes aware of the implications of this moral imperative, Justice develops. (43) Moreover, when this "golden rule" develops along economic lines, mutualism results. (44)

Proudhon recognized that no matter how hard man attempts to realize this principle of Justice he is always unable to do so fully. As Lubac points out, Proudhon wanted to eliminate "the mystery of original sin; he had wanted to replace every idea of grace with the sole idea of Justice." But he was always hit in the face with "evil and death" where he thought there should have been "virtue and life." (45) Proudhon cannot escape being a little supernatural here. When he states that Justice is not simply a goal but really acts in society, this is not a purely immanent principle of which he is speaking. It is something outside of man which has the power to transform him and his actions. This force is, for Proudhon as for everyone else, Divine. Proudhon admits it in this statement.

Where do I get my passion for Justice which torments me and irritates me and makes me angry? I cannot account for it. It is my God, my religion, my all: and if I try to justify it by philosophical reasons, I cannot. (46)

Proudhon's entire theory of Anarchism rests on this concept of Justice. For, according to Proudhon, society can only be changed by means of Justice. (47) In fact, he would say that Justice is the only hope of survival for society. As Brogan points out: "The essential doctrine in Proudhon is the identification of Justice with equality and the coercion of economic life into accord with Justice." (48) It is Justice which he saw as ultimately revealed by the Revolution of 1789 and it is Justice which he sees as the governing force in all of society. Consistent with his anarchism he maintains that this Justice cannot be made effective in society by means of governmental institutions. For Proudhon, a new society must be created by "stirring up a new consciousness of Justice" -- anything other than this would be Utopia. (49) According to Lubac, Proudhon could have said with Peguy: "The Revolution will be a moral one or

else there will be no Revolution." (50) Proudhon wanted Justice to flourish in all men and thereby flourish in society. He did not know precisely how this would be effected. But he had faith in Justice and in his own way prayed for the victory of this Justice in society.

I build no system. I ask an end to privilege, the abolition of slavery, equality of rights, and the reign of law. Justice, nothing else. That is the alpha and omega of my argument: to others I leave the business of governing the world. (51)

CONCLUSION: Anarchy + Justice

As was mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the fundamental problem of political philosophy is whether institutions of government are necessary or not, given the nature of man. Proudhon never confronts this problem in precisely this formulation; however, he does deal with it indirectly. One of his own fundamental principles is, in fact, the necessity of maintaining order without dependence on a ruler. He sees men capable of living together in agreement with no instituted arbiter ready to intervene in the event of differences of opinion. The particular features which set man apart from all other beings in nature, and the order of goods which flows from these principles, are for Proudhon a different than in traditional thought.

Proudhon saw "Justice" as the distinguishing feature of humanity. As was brought out earlier in the paper, it was not man's rationality or his sense of freedom which set him apart, rather, it was Justice itself. (1) What kind of being is this man which is characterized by a spirit of Justice? Is he a being which exists prior to the entry of Justice into his life and over which Justice finally gains control depending on his openness and cooperation? Or is he simply an incarnation of the eternal spirit of Justice with no direction, purpose, or meaning of his own save to further the movement of history? Proudhon is not clear. It is, therefore, difficult to state precisely how the fact that man is distinguished by

Justice fits in, not only with the understanding of man himself, but, more importantly, with Proudhon's notion of society and how it should function.

Proudhon does not leave this question altogether untouched. He seems to think that man, while endowed with this kernel of the spirit of Justice, is, at the same time, obligated to work towards its fulfillment, which cannot be achieved overnight. Consider Proudhon's ideas on how the new anarchist society will come about. He does not see as in any way desirable that the present state of affairs should be overthrown, rather, they should be dissolved. (2) They should fall away because they are unnecessary due to the natural development of Justice in mankind. This dissolution cannot be forced. It must arise from the efforts of all men to perfect the spirit of Justice with which they have been endowed. It must be the product of collective reason.

At this point we face another paradox in Proudhon. For as we have seen he views collective reason, when at work in a pure democracy-type situation, as the "guardian" of Justice itself. (3) Yet it would seem to follow from the preceding paragraph that the accuracy of collective reason is guaranteed by the spirit of Justice. I will come back to this when considering another paradox of priority involving Justice and Anarchy.

Two key concepts for Proudhon, although not as quite as fundamental as those we have been dealing with, are mutual aid and liberty. Proudhon is clearer here on his priorities. Even though the betterment of human life and society needs the establishment of mutual contracts, this progress must be sacrificed if it interferes with "liberty." (4) This gives us an indication as to why Proudhon advocates rather slow movement in the restoration of society. Liberty must be preserved as much as possible and

this does not usually happen in societies constantly undergoing all kinds of disturbances and upheavals. Although Proudhon certainly did not support society as it existed in his time he saw no value and no real progress in abrupt changes which are not fully understood. In everything, liberty is to be upheld. How is Justice made compatible with liberty? It seems fair to infer that Proudhon would see the conflict between Justice and liberty as non-existent.

I mentioned that Proudhon sees collective reason at work in a pure democracy. Although Proudhon often spoke against democracy as he knew it (particularly in Rousseau) and though he even at one point welcomed dictatorship, it seems to me that Proudhon hints at a kind of democracy in his themes. He does not place his brand of democracy first among his priorities as we have seen. But if mutualism and the system of contracts surely constitute a kind of democracy. The base of power is different, it is much more decentralized, but it is nevertheless democracy. It would seem to be the case that democracy is a first step toward anarchy. Wolff certainly agrees with this when he says that democracy is the only form of political community which offers any hope of resolving the conflict between authority and autonomy. (5) Proudhon seems to support this but, of course, we can never know for certain.

Proudhon never really articulated an ontology of any kind. That is why we do not know just how he stands regarding the priority, both in being and value, of Anarchism itself and Justice. On the one hand we see that he exalts the value of order without a ruler, whereas on the other hand Justice is his God. As has been brought out previously Proudhon speaks at times as if Anarchy were dependent on Justice and at other times

as if it were the opposite. Perhaps it is not at all two separate notions with which we are dealing here, but rather two aspects of the same notion. Exactly how to refer to it, or what to name it, is impossible to say.

Although Proudhon did see liberty as subordinate to no other social good, he did not ignore these other social goods altogether. He seems to indicate, in fact, that if certain social goods are observed and respected by all men, we would achieve anarchy. These are Proudhon's words on the Good Life.

Human life enters its fulness...when it has satisfied the following conditions: 1. Love, paternity, family, 2. Work, or industrial generation, 3. Social communion or Justice...If these conditions are violated, man is anxious, if they are fulfilled, existence is full; it is a feast, a song of love, a perpetual enthusiasm, an endless hymn to happiness. At whatever hour the signal may be given, man is ready; for he is always in death, which means that he is in life and in Love. (6)

In his belief that the Justice which distinguished each man would eventually lead to anarchy, he fathered, in the modern age, anti-political philosophy. He also saw that the modern moral dilemma was mainly a crisis in faith, faith in that Justice which leads to anarchy. Proudhon insisted that we must not be pessimistic about Justice but must be confident that it can and will be attained. I conclude with his own words as quoted by Brogan.

When doubt, secretly awakened in souls of men, strikes Justice: when man comes to regard laws and institutions as bonds imposed by force or necessity, but without roots in his conscience; when in presence of social defects, incredulity shakes religion, then society is done for; it is on the way to decadence and can only recover by a revolution. No one says to himself that there are mistakes in the established order, inadequacy in recognized rights, that the ideas behind the laws must be rectified, the formulas corrected, that men must set themselves bravely in search of truth and Justice, enduring the while, with resignation and devotion, the

effect of evil institutions...No one has faith any longer in the legislator or in men; men say to themselves, as did Brutus, that human nature is corrupt, that Justice is but a word, since experience has shown her to be unequal, contradictory and there is no security that she will become better. Men see in the state henceforward, simply an arbitrary constitution, which profits only the ambitious and the cunning; men see in religion only a conjuring trick, an instrument of depotism. Every man keeps to himself, the good virtuously, the bad, and the men of no faith, selfishly...Society has passed insensibly from Justice to despair. (7)

FOOTNOTES

Introduction to Anarchism

1. Krimerman and Perry, Patterns of Anarchy (Patterns) p. 13
2. George Woodcock, Anarchism (Woodcock) p. 10
3. Patterns p. 7
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5. Patterns p. 14
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7. Adler p. 19
8. Adler p. 19
9. Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (Wolff) p. vii.

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1. Henri de Lubac, The Un-Marxian Socialist: A Study of Proudhon (Lubac) p. 3
2. Lubac p. 3
3. Lubac p. 3
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7. George Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (Proudhon) p. 39
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18. Proudhon p. 212
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1. Brogan p. 43
2. Joll p. 71
3. Joll p. 71
4. Joll p. 72
5. Joll p. 72
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7. Joll p. 72

8. Joll p. 73
9. Joll p. 75
10. Lubac p. 115
11. Lubac p. 115
12. Proudhon p. 209

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2. Woodcock p. 107
3. Woodcock p. 107
4. Woodcock p. 107
5. Proudhon p. 78
6. Woodcock p. 107
7. Proudhon p. 78
8. Joll p. 67
9. Adler p. 8
10. Joll p. 68
11. Proudhon p. 211
12. Proudhon p. 156
13. Brogan p. 61
14. Proudhon p. 156
15. Brogan p. 82
16. Brogan p. 49
17. Brogan p. 50
18. Joll p. 74
19. Proudhon p. 45
20. Proudhon p. 45
21. Woodcock p. 112
22. Brogan p. 52
23. Brogan p. 50
24. Proudhon p. 45
25. Brogan p. 17
26. Brogan p. 32
27. Proudhon p. 234
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29. Brogan p. 51
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32. Brogan p. 62-63
33. Brogan p. 79
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35. Woodcock p. 133
36. Brogan p. 62
37. Proudhon p. 192
38. Woodcock p. 129
39. Proudhon p. 79
40. Proudhon p. 79
41. Proudhon p. 209
42. Proudhon p. 79
43. Proudhon p. 273

44. Brogan p. 58
- 44a. Brogan p. 88
45. Woodcock p. 126
46. Woodcock p. 125
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49. Joll p. 81
50. Brogan p. 45
51. Brogan p. 43
52. Proudhon p. 79
53. Woodcock p. 114
54. Brogan p. 43
55. Brogan p. 86
56. Brogan p. 43
57. Proudhon p. 79
58. Woodcock p. 134
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20. Noland p. 42
21. Noland p. 42
22. Brogan p. 61
23. Noland p. 50
24. Brogan p. 60
25. Proudhon p. 171
26. Brogan p. 62
27. Brogan p. 60
28. Proudhon p. 40

Proudhon's Concept of Justice

1. Lubac p. 276
2. Lubac p. 252
3. Lubac p. 278
4. Lubac p. 277
5. Lubac p. 278
6. Lubac p. 277
7. Proudhon p. 206
8. Proudhon p. 206
9. Woodcock p. 136
10. Lubac p. 277
11. Proudhon p. 206
12. Lubac p. 278
13. Lubac p. 277
14. Proudhon p. 77
15. Lubac p. 243
16. Lubac p. 278
17. Lubac p. 242
18. Lubac p. 233
19. Lubac p. 240
20. Lubac p. 233
21. Proudhon p. 209
22. Lubac p. 299
23. Lubac p. 240
24. Brogan p. 70
25. Lubac p. 110
26. Lubac p. 231
27. Brogan p. 18
28. Brogan p. 71
29. Lubac p. 169
30. Lubac p. 169
31. Lubac p. 169
32. Lubac p. 222
33. Lubac p. 222
34. Lubac p. 219
35. Lubac p. 199
36. Proudhon p. 215
37. Proudhon p. 216
38. Woodcock p. 109
39. Lubac p. 277
40. Proudhon p. 206
41. Joll p. 75
42. Joll p. 76
43. Proudhon p. 211
44. Lubac p. 217
45. Lubac p. 292
46. Proudhon p. 106
47. Lubac p. 210
48. Brogan p. 49
49. Lubac p. 296

- 50. Lubac p. 296
- 51. Proudhon p. 46

Conclusion: Anarchy and Justice

- 1. see p. 32 above
- 2. see p. 13 above
- 3. see p. 26 above
- 4. see p. 23 above
- 5. Wolff p. 21
- 6. Proudhon p. 21
- 7. Brogan p. 93

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