

AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEATH OF GOD  
AND NIETZSCHE'S CONCEPT OF THE CHRISTIAN GOD  
AS FOUND IN HIS THREE WORKS:  
THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL,  
AND THE ANTICHRIST

A Research Paper

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## INTRODUCTION

The desert is the home of despair. And despair is everywhere. Let us not think that our interior solitude consists in the acceptance of defeat. We cannot escape anything by consenting tacitly to be defeated. Despair is an abyss without bottom. Do not think to close it by consenting to it and trying to forget you have consented.

This, then, is our desert: to live facing despair, but not to consent. To trample it down under hope in the Cross. To wage war against despair unceasingly. That war is our wilderness. If we wage it courageously, we will find Christ at our side.<sup>1</sup> If we cannot face it, we will never find Him.

-Thomas Merton-

If tomorrow you woke up to find out God is dead, how would you react? This question implies that we have no control over the death of God. Someone else would have killed Him. Friedrich Nietzsche makes a cultural announcement that "God is dead! and we have killed Him!" His atheism becomes the active searching out for a positive meaning in our lives without God. Many have uttered the phrase "God is dead" and have not recognized its import. They have little idea of what they are saying, and moreover, they don't seem to care. The phrase becomes a crutch for their negation of life, or their secular humanism.

This paper will attempt to show the active meaning of the death of God through an analysis of some of Nietzsche's philosophical writings. By confronting the death of God expressed in Nietzsche our own conception of God becomes

clearer. The excess, unimportant peripheral beliefs are trimmed away, and we are left with the question of the existence of God as Being. The reader will hopefully find that he can pose a much different question than the one above. If you woke up tomorrow how would you react if you willed the death of God?

CHAPTER I:

A CURSARY EXAMINATION OF NIETZSCHE'S  
LIFE, STYLE AND WRITINGS:  
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO HIS ATHEISM:  
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTIVE AND PASSIVE NIHILISM:

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on October 15, 1844 in Röcken, Saxony, to Karl Ludwig Nietzsche and Franziska née Oehler. He was named after King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia. On July 10, 1846 his sister Elizabeth was born; and in 1848, a brother was born, only to die in 1850. His father died in 1849. Nietzsche was born into a family with strong religious ties, whose immediate family counted among its members Lutheran ministers; his father and two grandfathers were all ordained to the Lutheran ministry. In his early childhood Nietzsche was reared in a strictly religious household. His young friends even called him 'der kline pastor', the little pastor, because of his behavior. "According to his sister's testimony, Nietzsche was a very pious child and gave much thought to religious questions, which, as she put it, he was always anxious to put into practice."<sup>1</sup> With the death of his father and brother, Nietzsche's young life became dominated by women. His mother, aunts, and sister were his only family in Naumburg. This is mentioned only as a matter of historic fact and intends no conclusions to be drawn as to the effect of women on his later life. As H. A. Reyburn says, the young Nietzsche, "even at the age of six, was preoccupied with the things inside his own mind and had no ready feeling for the demands of an environment which had not been made to his prescription." His early instincts were "to lead, not to follow; to create, not to conform..."<sup>2</sup>

In 1858 at the age of fourteen, Nietzsche was awarded a scholarship to the very prestigious Schulpforta, where he

attended school until 1864. His studies led him to read "Schiller, Hölderlin and Byron, of whom he preferred Hölderlin, and under the influence of his reading, as also that of one or two of the masters who expounded higher criticism, he began to move away from Christianity."<sup>3</sup> The pious and solemn child grew into a solemn and sedate youth not bothering to involve himself in the ordinary follies of his fellows. Reyburn comments that, "underneath there was the ordinary human need for the outpouring of boyish enthusiasm, but on the surface there was a restraint which held the boy back from full participation in the energies and follies of his fellows."<sup>4</sup> Again, we must be careful not to "read into" this. One remembers that as the story goes, Albert Einstein flunked math as a child and as a professor could not remember to tie his shoes. Yet no one looks for an explanation of the Theory of Relativity in the unconscious psyche of his youth. Nor is this digression meant to imply that Nietzsche was totally aware of his sense of direction and goal. For the time of youth is the time of examining the reality of "who I am?" and uncovering the answer to that question by making explicit what was originally implicit in the child through change and maturity.

From 1864 to 1865 Nietzsche attended Bonn University where he took two semesters of theology and classical philology. In October 1865, following a dispute among the faculty of the university, Nietzsche followed his favorite professor Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschel to the University of Leipzig to pursue further studies in classical philology. There the final step to atheism occurred through the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer. One day while browsing through Rohn's book shop, Nietzsche discovered Schopenhauer's book The World as Will and Idea, which he took home and read fervently by the fire. "Schopenhauer's picture of the world as the manifestation of the blind will, together with the essen-

tial position accorded to atheistic experience in his philosophy and the metaphysical significance ascribed to music in particular, spoke to Nietzsche's soul in compelling tones."<sup>5</sup> To Nietzsche, Schopenhauer opened the doors to self-redemption. Nietzsche published his first essay of major importance, Philologika, in 1866. The work was a philological study which was presented to the Philological Society which Nietzsche had started at the university.

After reading Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's atheism began to express the need for the death of God. God had to die in order that man should be bounded only by his creative will. (The beginnings of Nietzsche's atheism are expressed here with an eye to the language and terms characteristic of his later and more mature period.)

He (Nietzsche) is the spokesman for modern man in saying that he cannot endure that divinity should exist in its Christian meaning, for man cannot live and work creatively if he endures that such a condescending witness of his existence should himself be alive. This was for Nietzsche the grandeur of man's freedom in exercise even in the midst of his ugliest misery, that he refuses to allow this God to face him, or face him with the task of creating those new worlds man alone wants to shoulder. Man cannot be while God lives.<sup>6</sup>

The early humanist influences on Nietzsche from Schulpforta (Jaspers writes that Pforta was renowned for its humanists) have left their mark on Nietzsche.<sup>7</sup> He loves mankind, but only with a twist that is characteristic of Nietzsche: he writes, "As Chamfort used to say, he who does not become a misanthrope in forty years has never loved mankind." The twist is explained in this fashion:

Even the Saint (in Zarathustra) once loved mankind but know loves God instead: "I do not love man; to me he is too incomplete a thing. Love for man would be the death of me." Nietzsche, unlike the Saint, wishes to remain in the world in order to serve man. He believes that the Saint's love of the Godhead can be understood as a consequence of the same dissatisfaction with mankind that tor-

ments him. But he finds it objectionable that saints "wished to flee into a beyond instead of building for the future." "Religiosity was a misunderstanding on the part of those higher natures who were tormented by the ugly image of mankind." Hence disgust with man is the great danger. When deeply moved, he (Nietzsche) must repeatedly go through whole days afflicted by "a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy, contempt for man." This contempt is a transition, for "the great despisers are the great worshippers."

In 1868, at the age of twenty-four, Nietzsche was granted a Chair in Philology at Basel University, even though he had not yet completed the requirements for his degree! In 1870 the first book Nietzsche wrote is published, The Birth of Tragedy. Although it was not quite the style of the work expected of a young professor by his faculty, it nonetheless marks Nietzsche's entrance into the world of literature. During this time he lived at Tribschen with Richard Wagner until 1872, only taking time out from his teaching and weekend visits with Wagner to serve as a volunteer nurse in the war from August to October 1870. His relationship with Wagner slowly deteriorated during this period until it finally broke up over the publication of Wagner's Parsifal in 1878. Between 1873 and 1876 he wrote and published the four essays which comprise the book Untimely Meditations: "David Strauss" August 1873, "Of the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life" February 1874, "Schopenhauer as Educator" 1874, and "Richard Wagner at Bayreuth" 1876. Following this Nietzsche wrote Human, All-Too-Human in May 1878.

Nietzsche was never the picture of health. "After a serious attack of dysentery contracted during the war, ... stomach disorders occurred at regular intervals thereafter. The disturbances began gradually but became frequent from 1873 on. Above all, attacks of violent headaches together with sensitivity to light, vomiting, a general paralysis like feeling, and conditions such as those experienced in seasickness, more and more caused him to be bedridden. Several times he was

unconscious for prolonged periods."<sup>9</sup> In later years the migraines would be so severe they would last for weeks occasionally months; this coupled with any one or the other of his medical problems amounts to pain that is almost unthinkable. In May 1879 he retired from the faculty of Basel due to ill health and for the next ten years he became the retired professor. As a "fugitivus errans" he travelled back and forth, far and wide, to such places as Sils Maria during the summer, Venice, Genoa, Naumburg, Nice, and finally Turin. During this period of ten years Nietzsche presents his mature philosophy in the following works: The Gay Science 1881, The Dawn 1882, Thus Spake Zarathustra I 1883, II 1883, III 1883, IV 1892, Beyond Good and Evil 1886, Prefaces 1887, Toward a Genealogy of Morals 1887, The Wagner Case 1888, Twilight of the Idols 1889, The Antichrist 1902, Nietzsche Contra Wagner 1901, Ecce Homo 1908, and Dionysus Dythramps.<sup>10</sup>

The above works represent the third period of Nietzsche's philosophical development. One description of his manner during this time comes to us from Dr. Paneth who visited Nietzsche shortly after the publication of the first three parts of Zarathustra. Says Dr. Paneth, "There is not a trace of false pathos of the prophet's pose in him, as I had rather feared after his latest work (Zarathustra). Instead his manner is completely inoffensive and natural. We began a very banal conversation about climate, living conditions and the like. Then he told me, but without the least affectation or conceit, that he always felt himself to have a task and that now, as far as his eyes would permit it, he wanted to get out of himself and work up whatever might be in him."<sup>11</sup> The introspective child of six had matured through academia, youth and young adulthood to the ultimate task: making explicit the world as it must exist apart from God.

At the end of 1888 Nietzsche spent Christmas in Turin and was there for the new year. During this time his letters to friends were alternately signed "Dionysus" or "The Cruci-

fied;" indications of the oncoming madness most probably began to occur as early as the late 1870's, though no ravings indicative of insanity occurred prior to December 27, 1888. The disease was a slow growth of general paralysis. Early in January of 1889 while walking the streets of Turin, Nietzsche collapsed on the pavement, throwing his arms around the neck of a horse which had just been whipped by the driver. His friend Franz Overbeck arrived shortly thereafter to take care of Nietzsche. "The next day Overbeck found him 'cowering in the corner of a sofa.' 'He rushes toward me, embraces me violently, and then sinks, in twitches, back on to a sofa.' He launched forth in loud songs, ragings on the piano, scurrilous dances and leaps, and then uttered, 'in an indescribably soft tone, sublime, wonderfully clairvoyant, and inexpressibly awesome things about himself as the successor to the dead God.'" <sup>12</sup> After Overbeck decided to take Nietzsche to a clinic at Basel for help; he eventually took Nietzsche to the asylum at Jena. Nietzsche's mother went to Jena to take her son home, where he remained in her care until her death in 1897. His sister Elizabeth then took care of him at Weimar until August 20, 1900, the day he died.

The life of this man was unique and points to a style of equal uniqueness, the style of a craftsman in poetic touch with his tools. It is "the fusion of seriousness and satire, pathos and pun," that becomes the hallmark, the creative characteristic of Nietzsche's style and part of his total message. Nietzsche points his words; directing them at the distinction of man petty and weak (as he sees him) and the Superman. The problems encountered in translating and understanding the peculiar style developed by Nietzsche are numerous; the play on words, and general titillating and creative use of poetic language. A typical Nietzschean trick is to delete the conclusion from a long chain of argument and to indicate the conclusion with a dash or series of dots, examples of this can be

found in aphorisms 207 and 209 of Beyond Good and Evil.

"Where Nietzsche does not deliberately bypass idioms in favor of coinages, he makes fun of them -- now by taking them literally, then again by varying them slightly. Here too he is a dedicated enemy of all conventions intent on exposing the stupidity and arbitrariness of custom."<sup>13</sup>

Nietzsche's motive for writing does not permit us to relax as we read. He wants us to pursue his thoughts in the same manner he did. Nietzsche does not show us the way. Nor does he intend for us to become his disciples, in fact, he desires the opposite. "He grants us no peace, torments us ceaselessly, hunts us out of every retreat, and forbids all concealment." "It is said of Zarathustra: 'Even the least little evasion by means of silence is completely enervating to him. He feels that he has avoided a thought...The least reservation, the slightest omission, prevents any outstanding success.'"<sup>14</sup> This can be applied to Nietzsche. His thought is totally present in his work. The task is up to the reader to pursue those thoughts, uncover them through the style, and, by using his creative will, come to the conclusions to be drawn from the text on his own.

The roots of Nietzsche's atheism, and philosophy are planted in that early relationship to Schopenhauer, and Schopenhauer's foundations begin with Immanuel Kant. The following discussion will follow the outlines set forth by Reyburn with some attention to Copleston.

Kant's metaphysics began with the question: How is it possible to make statements about objects a priori which must be true whatever the object might be? His answer was that the statements about objects are possible through the conditions of experience which exist in the knowing subject's mind. That is, all objects of experience must exist in space and time. The objects must have a cause and issue in effects. Part of this first argument Kant expanded by saying that these conditions are not binding on the noumena

(things-in-themselves) and that the mind is legislating and laying down rules (i.e., conditions of experience), telling objects what they must do in order to enter our experience. The second part of Kant's argument draws the conclusion that the objects of our experience are not noumena, but rather, phenomena. For if the mind cannot assert itself on the objects, then they are completely independent noumena. But through his analysis of space, time, and causality, Kant shows that the mind does not follow objects. Just the opposite, the mind requires objects to conform to the conditions of experience else they will not be perceived. Thus the objects of experience cannot be things-in-themselves, but rather, they must be phenomena.

Schopenhauer reflects a bit of Berkeley (with a twist) when he says, "the world is my idea, something presented to my consciousness, and ideas and presentations have no existence apart from the mind. Until the first mind appeared there was no world of experience at all, only a world of things-in-themselves. From which it follows -- the world as idea -- is not ultimately real; it is not a thing-in-itself." The world of experience is a phenomenal world: which means the phenomenal world exists as an object for a perceiving subject. The reality of the world consists in its appearing to, or being perceived by, a subject. This reality manifests two sides, an inner and outer. The outer is the world as idea; the inner reality is the thing-in-itself; and unlike Kant, Schopenhauer tells us what it is. The inner reality, the thing-in-itself, is Will. The real is not fractured by the difference which time and space introduce into the phenomenal world, and in a profound sense it is an undivided unity. Through the will, the immediate experience of oneself, the inner reality of the nature of things is revealed. Bodily action which is said to follow from volition is not something different from volition but one and the

same; bodily action is simply objectified will.

All things inwardly and ultimately are will. Intrinsically the will is blind, and ultimately, even in the human being, it is purposeless. "This conception of the essential and incurable blindness of the will provides the metaphysical justification for Schopenhauer's pessimism. Life is not controlled by reason; reason does not provide the ends of existence, but only the means to ends which spring from the will itself. And in the last resort these ends are only apparent and have no value."<sup>15</sup>

The positive side of Schopenhauer's philosophy proclaims the attainment of happiness through the perception of beauty and in the moral life. "It is here that we must look for the roots of Nietzsche's attacks upon religion, and particularly Christianity, in which he detected (or thought he had detected) all the elements of nihilism and decadence."<sup>16</sup> The response to Kant (Schopenhauer considered himself Kant's true successor) easily leads to Nietzsche. Or, at the bare minimum, a filial kinship of ideas and starting points.

Nietzsche saw that Kant sought to establish the freedom of the will, God, immortality, and a moral world order, by assuming the possibility of synthetic a priori statements. These assumptions which Kant makes mask the questioning that ought to have preceded them. "Nietzsche's atheism is a corollary of his basic commitment to question all premises and to reject them unless they are for some reason inescapable."<sup>17</sup> In the conclusion of the Critique of Practical Reason Kant states: Two things remain forever worthy of reverence; the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. Nietzsche said: "Digestion is more venerable." Through this sentence, Nietzsche aptly states the direction of his dialectic. He is returning to man the responsibility man gave up to a transcendent being. And too, this sentence must be remembered in the context of Nietzsche's illness, suffering from dysentery, chronic gastritis, and tremendous abdominal pains.

"The All (Absolut Spirit) would always bring the old problems with it -- How is evil possible? etc. Therefore: there is no all, there is no great sensorium of inventorium or storehouse of force." However, a distinction must be made, in fact a remarkably wide distinction, between the truth of atheism and the truth of the death of God. "In the first case, one merely reports that among the 'furniture of the universe' is not included -- and never was included for that matter -- the being of God. In the second case, the report is that among the many items that populate the universe there are many whose force, and significance, depend of the existence of God and on the orientation of our existence toward the divine scheme of things; and that God is no longer included in the scheme."<sup>18</sup>

The great need, the "one needful thing", was to overcome the nihilistic devaluation of life and man which had followed the destruction of the metaphysical world.<sup>19</sup>

Zarathustra says that God is dead, and if he is correct, and God is identified with truth, then truth must be dead also. "Is this not another way of stating that there is perhaps no truth, no objective order, nothing which we must acknowledge as fixed, eternal, and unchanging? Which is Nihilism?"<sup>20</sup> Fredrick Copleston draws a distinction between active and passive nihilism where the latter is a "pessimistic acquiescence in the absence of values and the purposelessness of existence." In the former, however, there is an active seeking out, destroying that in which one no longer believes. "And Nietzsche prophesies the advent of an active nihilism." To Nietzsche, nihilism represented a pathological transitional stage, the pathology being that there is a tremendous generalization, the inference that there is no meaning at all. He speaks against the pathology of passive nihilism as weak and self-referentially inconsistent. The problem with passive nihilism is its own presuppositions: "There is no truth

there is no absolute nature of things, no 'thing-in-itself.'"

Nietzsche calls passive nihilism a "pessimism of weakness" in that man no longer needs a "justification of ills." For justification of anything is precisely what man abhors. Man begins to enjoy ills pur cru, "in the raw," and he begins to see senseless ills the most interesting. If he formerly had need for a God, he now takes great pleasure in the mass world disorder, a meaningless chaos without God. This is "...the most extreme nihilism. It places the value of things precisely in the lack of any reality corresponding to these values and in their being merely a symptom of strength on the part of the value positors, a simplification for the sake of life."<sup>21</sup> Nietzsche's will is diametrically opposed to this type of nihilism, no matter that his thinking should appear to the reader to be a "self-destructive process" even if the end is always nothingness.<sup>22</sup> Nietzsche proposes and practices active nihilism.

Active nihilism becomes the "pessimism of strength." It comes from the creative will of the individual. Zarathustra says, "Nothing is true, all is permitted," and this becomes a deeper truth than any which has ever been known, since from the depths of the individual's creative will comes what is to be done, what is true. It is the creative strength which is self-creating; man becomes himself. The meaninglessness of God is overcome by giving man the supremacy of his creative will.

It appears that some writers and commentators on Nietzsche attempt to explain his atheism and its roots through psychological or religious origins. This in a sense betrays the philosophical origins of his dialectic. Some look to the childhood patterns of piety and say that the attack on the God of religion was so violent, because Nietzsche was trying to convince himself of the errors of that childhood religion which he so arduously cultivated. Nietzsche was violent ac-

according to this view, because he was afraid he had been mistaken and misled. "Early influences cannot be easily obliterated, and it may well be that Nietzsche's later ferocious attack on Christianity masked a feeling, half-formed and constantly repressed, that he was being unjust to the religion of his upbringing, perhaps even that it was he himself, and not the Christian, who was mistaken and misled."<sup>23</sup> As a corollary to this hypothesis, others maintain that Nietzsche's true bond to Christianity is masked by the violence of his polemic; that he really loves Christianity, and the louder his protests grow the greater his love for Christianity. The usual supportive evidence for this position is Nietzsche's letter to Peter Gast in 1881: "Whatever I may happen to say of Christianity, I cannot forget that I owe to it the best experiences of my spiritual life; and I hope never to be ungrateful to it at the bottom of my heart." Jaspers says, "Only one who does not believe in Nietzsche's task and his awareness of this task can accept such a psychological discussion of Nietzsche."<sup>24</sup>

One must be careful in giving psychological explications of philosophical positions. For a case in point: suppose that the psychological explication of philosophical positions became generally and uncritically acceptable. One theory of psychology (which now opens the problem of the plethora of methods and approaches, and the interpretations of those methods and approaches; and the decision of the best interpretation based on psychological data) holds that over eating is a sign of anxiety and that the more neurotic the individual and the more anxious he becomes, the more he eats to satisfy feelings of inadequacy and placate a low self-image. To apply this theory to St. Thomas Aquinas and therefore to call his distinction between essence and existence into question would be drôle. Nietzsche's polemic follows philosophically from a philosophical position. One must admit that there is something strange going on in the extremeness

of the violence, but it cannot be explained purely on a psychological level. Nietzsche's pointing of the condemnatory finger does not issue from the psyche of his early childhood, but rather, from the rigorous philosophical consequences of the world existing apart from a god.

In another excuse of Nietzsche's atheism, Copleston draws an interesting conclusion: "The tolerant scorn of the cynic and skeptic is conspicuously absent from Nietzsche's writings, he denounces and hates what he knows to be a reality and which he fears -- even if he will not admit it even to himself -- may be the reality."<sup>25</sup> It is curious that because the tones of the cynic and skeptic are missing that Copleston would draw that conclusion. Eventhough cynicism and skepticism are not key premises, they are supposed to be strong supportive evidence to the conclusion about the origins of Nietzsche's atheism and nihilism. Upon examination for the "tones of the cynic and skeptic" we find them to be most conspicuous by their absence, not because of any psychologically inspired mental infidelity, but quite to the contrary, because the philosophy of his position leaves no room for a cynical stance of verbal bad-mouthing for the achievement of prideful revenge. Nor was any room permitted for the passive nihilistic stance of skepticism. Nietzsche was speaking against the two. He says of the first that precisely that sort of "love," turned into the lust for revenge through a "loving" God, is the outcome of Christianity. And the use of the second is avoided because Nietzsche does not advocate passive nihilism, but just the opposite, an active nihilism. Nietzsche maintained an intellectual honesty in his philosophical position, even to the point of accepting his theory of Eternal Recurrence which he did with some difficulty. The cynic and skeptic, of course, cannot afford to be true to themselves else their position will at once become exposed as untenable. Let us not confuse Nietzsche with the intel-

lectual dishonesty of those fervent iconoclasts of reality.

This chapter has attempted to provide the reader with the necessary background in order to understand the following three chapters. It has presented highlights of his life and examined the roots of his atheism and philosophical thought. The atheism presented in this chapter will be explained further in the next three chapters. In Chapter II we shall deal with the total context of the meaning of the death of God, the complete atheism. Chapter III will work with the specific bearing the death of God has upon morality, and Chapter IV will focus upon the death of God in Christianity.

CHAPTER II:  
NIETZSCHE'S ATHEISM AND THE DEATH OF GOD  
AS A WHOLE  
FOUND THROUGH AN ANALYSIS OF  
THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA:

Thus Spake Zarathustra contains the first comprehensive statement of Nietzsche's mature philosophy and, in fact, represents his complete thought. Nietzsche's other works support and develop the ideas put forth with attention to detail and ramification, usually speaking to a specific topic raised in Zarathustra. Because of its fictional prose and poetic style, Zarathustra lacks a truly sustained philosophical argument unlike his other works. In an exaggerated tribute to the talent, style, and emphasis of Zarathustra one of Nietzsche's early commentators, Figgis, said, "Until his coming no one knew what was height or depth and still less about what was truth. There is not a single passage in this revelation of truth which had already been anticipated and divined by even the greatest of men."<sup>1</sup> This may be a strong statement not backed by strictly objective reference and, indeed, reflects the author's own bias for Nietzsche's philosophy. But a contemporary commentator, no less in love with Nietzsche than Figgis, writes, "...there are few works to match (Zarathustra's) wealth of ideas, the abundance of profound suggestions, the epigrams, the wit. What distinguishes Zarathustra is the profusion of 'sapphires in the mud'."<sup>2</sup> Even so, he recognizes that the book should be blue-penciled and perhaps not so dramatically presented through its poetic stylus. This later remark is somewhat more acceptable to the critical mind, yet one final citation will help bring the importance of Zarathustra to a critical level, and zero in on the topic of the next chapter. "There have been, he (Nietzsche) says, a thousand goals. But so far mankind as such has had no single goal or universal morality... Zarathustra

is to redeem this moral lacuna and provide this unitary human goal."<sup>3</sup>

Zarathustra exposes the meaning of the death of God, not particularly focusing on the moral or religious ramifications but a total context to the meaning of the death of God. The broad spectrum of analysis reveals that Zarathustra is simply a series of homilies delivered by Zarathustra to crowds, friends, and to a species of man that does not yet exist, the "masters of the earth." Nietzsche himself called it the most profound book of world literature and regarded it as his magnum opus, expressed through a dramatic and poetic medium.<sup>4</sup> Zarathustra, with its ideas of Superman and the transvaluation of values, expresses the third phase of Nietzsche's thought. But its poetic and prophetic style give it the appearance of being the work of a visionary.<sup>5</sup>

There is an aphoristic and perhaps anecdotal style to the first three parts, with part four being a departure from that tone. We see Zarathustra in a number of different situations and activities. Part four was originally intended as an intermezzo and not as the end of the book. Perhaps Nietzsche's intention was to follow this part by flowing into the aphoristic style of his later works in order to explain and define the ideas offered in the first three parts with greater attention to detail and consequences for the life of the individual. Whatever his intentions, the style of the first three parts is abandoned and the fourth part picks up a unity of thought held together by a single plot and subtle sense of humor.

The sense of humor found in Zarathustra runs counter to the popular images of Nietzsche as a cold and sober thinker. Zarathustra prefers a poor joke to no joke at all and sees laughter as the test of "higher men." "The rank of a philosopher is determined by the rank of his laughter. Consequently one can say: 'The commonness of a person who roars with

laughter surpasses that of any beast,' and (of Zarathustra): 'A man transformed, transfigured, who laughed! Never in the world has anyone laughed as he did!'"<sup>6</sup> Nietzsche says, "Learn to laugh at yourself the way one must laugh." "I myself placed the crown upon my own head, I personally canonized my laughter." "The transformed Nietzsche of the Zarathustra period experienced and presented new states of a mystical union of being and uttered them in song... The yes, which has absorbed all that is, is experienced. It is the love of being in its infinitude."<sup>7</sup>

In order to examine the meaning of the book as a whole the historical origins of Zarathustra himself need be placed in perspective. Danto writes:

The historical Zarathustra (Zoroaster) believed the world to be the scene of a vast conflict between two cosmic forces, one of good and the other of evil. In this warfare it is our duty he taught, to side with the forces of light (good). Because Nietzsche was 'beyond good and evil', he did not believe in the cosmology of the Zend-Avesta. But since Zarathustra was the first to have made the error of supposing moral values to be objective features of the universe, he should be the first to rectify the mistake for the new philosophy. Thus Nietzsche chose him as his 'son', and the literary persona through which his philosophy was to be spoken.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, Zarathustra, with its singularly prophetic and poetic style becomes Nietzsche's mouthpiece for his analysis and criticism of society and existential man. In a couple of his letters toward the end of the seventies Nietzsche writes: "The loss of faith is notorious...and now follows the cessation of fear, of authority, and of trust." Nothing remains but "living according to the moment, for the coarsest of aims!" "The withering will (the dying God) is fragmentized. Its striving is always toward lost unity, its telos is always toward further decay."<sup>9</sup> This is the cultural announcement of attitudes resembling lip-service. Belief in a god is no longer sustained by social implementation of Christian

ideology. God was seen by people to be someone to appeal to in the face of a crisis situation, a gum-ball machine. You pay in to the machine and get something in return, with no sustained commitment to a life of Christ-likeness. It is Nietzsche, by looking at this cultural situation as it is disposed toward God, who infuses the meaning of the death of God and the ultimate ramifications of holding such a position while implying that God was once alive. "'God is dead, we have killed him;" and 'this tremendous event... has not yet reached the ears of man' -- that is an attempt at a diagnosis of contemporary civilization not a metaphysical speculation about ultimate reality."<sup>10</sup> One must look at the death of God in this first context and understand Nietzsche's cultural prognosis in order to proceed to the metaphysical examination of the world existing apart from God. For behind the cultural reality of the death of God lies its metaphysical justification. From the cultural side, Nietzsche very vehemently and emotionally condemns those things which, in the words of Danto, "like the Pragmatic Theory of Truth are taken without demur by freshmen in philosophy." Nietzsche exposes the inconsistencies and erroneous presuppositions which are false in the beliefs of men.

The will-to-power of man is sacrificed to a belief in God, and Nietzsche condemns these beliefs of weakness and "nay-saying." The message of Zarathustra is: "All the beauty and majesty which we have loaned to real and imagined things, all this I want returned to the property and product of man."

"I teach no to all that makes weak -- that exhausts. I teach yes to all that strengthens, that stores up strength, that justifies the feeling of strength..."<sup>11</sup> Nietzsche "summons mankind beyond good and evil, but he does so, not in order to reject all valuation, but to substitute a new valuation, the distinction noble-bad in place of the moral distinction good-evil."<sup>12</sup> Nietzsche must be taken seriously at what he

says and not shrugged off as merely a screaming maniac. He is not trying to be heard and then saying something else once he has our attention. The energy behind Nietzsche's message is too strong to accept this viewpoint, as the motto of Book V of The Gay Science (Die Frohliche Wissenschaft sometimes translated as Joyful Wisdom) suggests: "Carcasse, tu trembles, tu tremblerais bien davantage, si tu savais où je te mène."

(Carcass, you tremble, you would tremble much more, if you knew where I lead you). "It is hard to suppose that he then had in mind something so comforting as truth exists and God is truth. The destruction of this idea was what was frightening and intoxicating."<sup>13</sup>

This ultimate message of Nietzsche as expressed through the words of Zarathustra, "God is Dead", have become a tired cliché with those who sought to establish a meaningless atheism. There is a second half to the message, and this is what makes the death of God an active nihilism. "I am teaching you the Superman." In Zarathustra's life as well as Nietzsche's the first is ridiculous and makes no sense whatsoever without the second. Yet still, upon further examination, the meaning of the words "God is Dead" remain ambiguous. On the surface they tell us that a certain being, God, has merely ceased to exist. But we identify God as an immortal being. This link between divinity and immortality is found in all religious cultures with the possible exception of pre-historical or extremely primitive theologies. This bond is so tight that any thought of a God dying becomes unreasonable. "If there ever were a God, there must still be one, for if that being died he was no God. There is no point belaboring that truism, except that too many people content themselves with repeating certain slogans without realizing that, in fact, they are devoid of meaning."<sup>14</sup> Nietzsche is seeking "the elimination of the Judeo-Christian ideal of humility and its exaltation of meekness, in order to substitute for it a

glorification of power, of force, in short an exaltation of men at their highest level."<sup>15</sup> The death of God means that the individual must now accept full responsibility for his actions and the horizon of his self-creating.

For Nietzsche God was never a God. The old gods have died and now the one God must be destroyed.

With the old gods, they have long since met their end.-- truly they had a fine, merry, divine ending!

They did not fade away in twilight\*-- that is a lie! On the contrary: they once---laughed themselves to death!

That happened when the most godless saying proceeded from a god himself, the saying: "There is one God! You shall have no other gods before me!"

An old wrathbeard of a god, a jealous god, thus forgot himself:

And all the gods laughed then and rocked in their chairs and cried: "Is not precisely this godliness, that there are gods but no God?"

He who has ears let him hear.<sup>16</sup>

Sartre in his play Huis Clos writes "il faut vivre les yeux ouverts," translated to mean "we've got to live with our eyes open." To paraphrase Sartre to serve Nietzsche; "il faut vivre les oreilles ouvertes." "We've got to live with our ears open." Our third ear!... The prophetic Zarathustra, by making the proclamation "God is dead" realizes he may have come too soon, since the higher men may not yet exist even in potency. The world may not be ready for this announcement. When he meets the old Saint in the forest, Zarathustra reacts to him in the same way the madman reacted to the crowd in the market place in Joyful Wisdom (Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft).

"And what does the Saint do in the forest?" asked Zarathustra.

The Saint answered: "I make songs and sing them, and when I make songs, I laugh, weep and mutter: thus I praise God.

"With singing, weeping, laughing, and muttering I praise the God who is my God. But what do you bring us as a gift?"

When Zarathustra heard these words he saluted the Saint and said: "What should I have to give you? But let me go quickly, that I may take nothing from you!" And thus they parted, laughing as two boys laugh. But when Zarathustra was alone he spoke thus to his heart:

"Could it be possible! This Saint has not yet heard in his forest that God is dead."17

This is a curious passage in that Zarathustra would rather leave the old man alone than confront him with the world shattering report that God is dead. Why? The answer lies within the message of nihilism: Zarathustra will place no one in the realm of nothingness who does not realize the Superman, will-to-power, and eternal recurrence. If he were to report the death of God to those like the Saint who do not understand these three alternatives, then Zarathustra would condemn some people to a existence in passive nihilism, which he abhors. Better they remain... "The great need, the 'one needful thing,' was to overcome the nihilistic devaluation of life and man which had followed the destruction of the metaphysical world."18

Nietzsche did not stop with the root fact of God's death. He inquired into why He died. Nietzsche finds his answer in the Christian "nay-saying" attitude to life, the commitment it makes to meekness, humility, pity, and compassion.

Woe to all lovers who cannot surmount pity!  
Thus spoke the Devil to me once: "Even God has his Hell: it is his pity for man!  
And I lately heard him say these words:  
"God has died of his pity for man." 19

Nietzsche's response to the self-negation of God through Christianity, is to return to man what was given to God. Why would man surrender his power and creative will to a self-negating God?

He (the Last Pope) who loved and possessed him most, he has now lost him the most also:  
behold, am I not the more godless of us two now? But who could rejoice in that!  
"You served him to the last." Asked Zarathustra

after a profound silence, "do you know how he died? Is it true what they say that pity choked him,

"That he saw how MAN hung on the cross and could not endure it, that love for man became his Hell and at last his death." 20

The psychological logic of the last pope and others who surrender themselves to God "is this: When a man is suddenly and overwhelmingly suffused with the feeling of power -- and this is what happens with all great affects -- it raises in him a doubt about his own person: he does not dare to think himself the cause of this astonishing feeling -- and so he posits a stronger person, a divinity, to account for it."<sup>21</sup> God negated himself, and the solution to the death of God is through the individuals self-yea-saying to life. We cannot have a god because we must avoid bringing all events under the aegis of a supreme being who feels and knows but neither expresses nor exercises the will-to-power. Man alone by his self-affirmation to life expresses the will-to-power.

Believing in the existence of God is "nay-saying." It is a defamation of the world and masks itself. Obeisance to a god masks an escapism from the demands and arduous tasks that life in the world imposes. We are called upon by Nietzsche to realize and to do all that is possible here and now. "The possible has its source and its limits in the creative will alone. Zarathustra demands that all imagining should stop within these limits: no further than your creative will..."<sup>22</sup>

God is a supposition; but I want your supposing to reach no further than your creating will. Could you create a God?-- So be silent about all gods! But you could surely create the Superman...

...God is a supposition; but I want your supposing to be bounded by conceivability, the humanly-evident, the humanly-palpable! You should follow your own senses to the end! 23

Because of these limits, God had to die. Zarathustra says, "If there were gods, then how could I bear not to be a god? Ergo, there are no gods." He announces the death of God and

within his active nihilism proclaims the Superman. The faith in God is dead as a matter of cultural fact to Nietzsche, and any meaning of life in the sense of a supernatural purpose is gone; dead. Now it is up to man to give his life meaning by raising himself above the animals and the all-too-human, the "much-too-many."

Once God is dead the horizon of life is opened. In the words of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, "If God does not exist, everything is permitted." In paraphrase, Nietzsche, who admired Dostoyevsky greatly, wrote: "Nothing is true, all is permitted." (Nichts ist wahr, alles ist erlaubt.) In The Genealogy of Morals, he says that, "this is freedom of the spirit. The belief in truth has been notice. Has ever a European or Christian wandered in the labyrinthine consequences of this proposition." The philosophers and "free spirits" are now open to a new horizon with the news that God is dead. "Our ships can now embark again, and go forth to every danger. Every hazard is again permitted the inquirer. Perhaps there never was so open a sea." This reference from Joyful Wisdom throws into relief the fact that Nietzsche did not advocate a passive nihilism. The horizon becomes limited only by our creative wills but we must be careful: "this cannot be read as an appeal to return to the instinctual swamplands of the primitive psyche. It is a call to creativity, to new structures and to fresh ideals, in the light of which we might make ourselves over in an image of our own. God being dead, there is no reason to cringe in the corner of an unreal guilt. And let not something else take the place of this super-annuated god, to make us feel humble and insignificant. The guilt is unreal, but so is everything. Let us will our own way."<sup>24</sup>

At the same time, within Zarathustra, Nietzsche maintains a respect for what Catholics have traditionally called the "human nature" of Christ. Nietzsche allows the human nature of Jesus to be Jesus' mature message, the potentiality of

Jesus' will-to-power.

-- Truly too early died that Hebrew whom the preachers of slow death honor: and that he died too early has since been a fatality for many.

As yet he knew only tears and the melancholy of the Hebrews together with the hatred of the good and just! Perhaps he would have learned to love the earth -- and laughter as well!

Believe it my brothers! He died too early; he himself would have recanted his teaching had he lived to my age! He was noble enough to recant!

But he was still immature. The youth loves immaturity and immaturity too he hates man and the earth. His heart and the wings of his spirit are still bound and heavy. 25

With the death of God new questions open themselves. Are new gods possible? and could not Superman be considered the new god? In answer to the second question, No! Nietzsche calls on the "inestimable authority" of Zarathustra to answer the first. Zarathustra goes so far as to confess, "I would believe only in a god who could dance.--" Zarathustra, old atheist that he is, says he would believe in a new god; but Zarathustra wills not to believe and do not misunderstand him.

It is not with a kindly farewell conclusion that Zarathustra leaves us, but rather with a challenge that the sea is open to us, we must become ourselves, everything is up to us. Zarathustra leaves his disciples with these words: "Go away from me and be on your guard against Zarathustra." Nietzsche is being somewhat indirect. The message lies in a hermenutical analysis or interpolation, a reading between the lines. The statement means: "I am only law to those who belong to me; I am not a law to everyone;" but it also signifies the resistance which enables the other who really belongs to Nietzsche to find himself: "I shall not give the other the rights that I have won for myself; on the contrary, he shall have to take them -- as I did -- by force!... If it is necessary for me to promulgate a law, as though all were to be made in my image,

it can only be for the purpose of enabling the individual to discover and strengthen himself by contradicting it."<sup>26</sup> Oh the Kierkegaardian possibilities of contradiction! An open sea with creating waves.

This chapter has shown the total or overall meaning of the death of God. The next question becomes the practical consequences of this position. A final distinction that is necessary before further reading is to separate Nietzsche's atheism from a postulatory atheism, e.g., Jean-Paul Sartre. In a postulatory atheism the non-existence of God is accepted, that is, there is no seeking of a proof of God's non-existence. In Nietzsche's atheism the non-existence of God is willed, it is an active negation of the existence of a transcendent. The proofs behind both of these positions are nonetheless similar. Each holds the intrinsic contradiction in the belief of the existence of God, the impossibility of creation, and a genealogy of the idea of God. Nietzsche's atheism is not postulatory atheism and, a fortiori we can raise the questions of practical consequences. Practical not in the pragmatic sense but in the sense of life-affecting. Therefore, the next chapter will examine the immediate and mediate consequences the death of God has upon Morality.

CHAPTER III:  
EXAMINATION OF THE DEATH OF GOD  
AS IT APPLIES TO MORALITY THROUGH  
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL

Beyond Good and Evil is a commentary on Thus Spake Zarathustra. A commentary on the relationship between Being and being; being must now come to possess the will-to-power, Being (God) must now die. The book details and refines the death of Being through a moral perspective. Nietzsche himself says in a letter to Franz Overbeck August 5, 1886, "Perhaps it (Beyond) will have the effect of shedding a few rays of light on my Zarathustra..." And again in a letter to Jakob Burkhardt he writes, "Please read this book (eventhough it says the same thing as my Zarathustra -- only in a way that is different -- very different)." "With Beyond we do not have to rely on the stylistic peculiarities of Zarathustra; it is the first book he published (after Zarathustra) to explain its often obscure suggestions."<sup>1</sup>

As opposed to Zarathustra, with its poetic style and use of metaphor and analogy, Beyond presents an aphoristic, homeletic style with, nonetheless, a continuity of thought. The style does remain difficult to a degree, because of its usage of the colloquial and its prophetic eye to the future of morality. "(You see I do my best to be understood with difficulty). One should be heartily grateful for at least the attention to some degree of subtlety in interpretation."<sup>2</sup> His tool is the question, probing and searching out the reader's thoughts. Eventhough the aphoristic division of the book suggests a sort of short imperative homeletic, Nietzsche does in fact formulate more questions than answers, but even these questions are always suggestive of the answer. Nietzsche never says "thou shalt" or "thou shalt not," rather, the book

is divided into "articles" that formulate his questioning of what it means to have lived our entire lives with the moral "ought," our own as well as society's.

The criticism of Beyond strikes on this point saying that Nietzsche's destruction of morality represents a passive nihilistic stance. We know however, from our discussion in the last chapter, that Nietzsche is not leaving us in passive nihilism. The clue in Beyond is the style itself, the physical manifestation of the author's intent. The searching that the reader must do, pursuing Nietzsche's thoughts even as they trail off to a dash or series of dots. Beyond is filled with aphorism after aphorism where his typical questioning tool is to delete the conclusion at the end of a long chain of argument and to indicate it with a series of dots or a dash. The reader must come to his own conclusions and actively involve himself in the search for the new meaning of morality. Nietzsche wants us to formulate our own answers to the questions he poses. It is the attitude of Zarathustra that, "I shall not give the other the rights I have won for myself; on the contrary, he shall have to take them..." In a description of two writers, Nietzsche points out the difference between the passive nihilistic writer and his own active nihilism. The former "dripped his words hesitantly and cold..." While, "the other was handling his language like a flexible foil, feeling from his arm right down to his toes the dangerous bliss of the quivering razor-sharpe blade, which is eager to bite, hiss, cut..."<sup>3</sup> One must read and listen to Nietzsche with what he calls the "Third Ear". He must pick up the tempo and nuance of the book, "Il faut vivre les oreilles ouvertes."

Before exposing the meaning of the book a preliminary distinction must be established not only for this chapter but for the remainder of the thesis. In the last chapter, Zarathustra was able to maintain respect for the human Jesus, eventhough for the most part Nietzsche was anti-Christian.

Yet there are times when he seems very close to Christian emotion and feeling. It is important to clarify this problematic, because his cultural announcement that God is dead can be called into question along with the resulting philosophy of that position. The death of God comes from his reflection on the behavior of the Christians in relation to their God. "Nietzsche employs the word 'Christianity' almost indifferently to denote three distinct things: the mode of being manifested in the practice of Christ, the religion named after him, and the scheme of beliefs appropriated by this religion."<sup>4</sup> It is the scheme of beliefs that his cultural announcement flows from. Nietzsche saw around him people who were espousing belief in a transcendent, a transcendent which was the destruction of life, but not carrying out the practice of Christ, not acting as though God existed. The disruption between belief and life, Nietzsche thought, was created by the belief in a God. So now this God is dead. We now have the belief in life.

"Nietzsche's root objection to God is, as we might expect, that the notion of God is hostile to life... according to Nietzsche then, The Christian concept of God is a concept of a God who becomes the contradiction of life."<sup>5</sup> By announcing the death of God, Nietzsche is stating a cultural fact; diagnosing a present reality. He did not merely say "There is no God," nor did he profess his disbelief in God. Beyond answers the question of what really happens now "that everything reels, that the whole earth is shaking." The answer results from that cultural fact, which Nietzsche "living in his quiescent age of bourgeois complacency, says with genuine horror -- no one has yet noticed: from the fact that 'God is dead!'"<sup>6</sup>

Eventhough God is truly dead, Nietzsche goes on to say: "Men's nature being what it is, there probably will be caves for thousands of years to come in which His shadow will be

shown. And we -- we still have to vanquish even his shadow!"<sup>7</sup> By announcing this, it imposes the inexorable task upon individuals of making an active negation of that which does not exist, God. Once again Copleston makes a distinction between two types of destroyers of morality. On the one hand he describes those whose sole motivation for asserting the decadence and absurdity of morality is "inspired" by an allegiance to a hatred or cynicism or hedonism. In contrast, the agent who is motivated by an "ideal which transcends himself" (rightly or wrongly), is an idealist in the pragmatic sense. Not to be confused with the philosophy of Pragmatism.<sup>8</sup> It is in the second sense that we see Nietzsche's destruction of morality as practical to his transvaluation of values. The present order must be presented as chaos in order to bring about the transvaluation.

Beyond Good and Evil is aimed directly at the present value system and those adherents of the Categorical Imperative and its codifiers. The old morality is dead, and we must now find new values beyond the old ones. Nietzsche explains the point of view of the new morality as all acts "done for love are beyond good and evil." The book, then, appears somewhat similar, in an analogous fashion, to Christian thought (indeed, the analogy must be taken only in its widest sense: a relatedness with the words of Situation Ethics). "...it must be pointed out, that his polemic against conventional morality is less Christian than he supposes, and that his error springs from the fallacy frequent in Germany of identifying Christian morality with systems of some philosophers who are either not Christian at all, or else very partially so."<sup>9</sup> The systems of these philosophers, e.g., Kant, codify morality into an order of slave morality, one bent on seeking revenge on the oppressors. But Christianity "pur cru," is not a code, rather, it is a spirit in which love of God and of one's neighbor is the principle. In

Christianity the ordinary rules of morality "are merely formulae, which express the application of this principle under normal conditions."<sup>10</sup> Surely there are borderline cases where special rules, like the blanket rule Nietzsche offers, must apply. Yet a theory such as all acts done for love are beyond good and evil suffers because it transfers what is meant to be an exception of the rule, to the state of normalcy. That is to say, that all common acts are removed from the context of normal judgement and the exceptional act (reserved for those grey "what if" areas of morality) becomes common. But for Nietzsche, to be exceptional is what he hopes would become normal.

If the book is "similar" to Christian thought, why then does Nietzsche attack Christianity? Beyond attempts a clarification of the value system which Nietzsche imparts to us in Zarathustra. He commends to us a positive valuation of the world. One needs to see that Nietzsche's polemic is directed towards the Christianity of the third sense, the scheme of beliefs appropriated by the religion. The similarity of thought is applicable only in the Christianity of the second sense, the religion named after Christ. The Christianity Nietzsche sees is the Christianity of the third sense, belief. The belief in eternal life is the devaluation Nietzsche seeks to destroy in favor of life. "Christianity is not, indeed, relevant and man must set his own values; for after all God is dead,"<sup>11</sup> Nietzsche establishes the justification of life, the "yea-saying," through "Dionysian!" "A curse on that bigoted freedom: good and evil." "...this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the two-fold voluptuous delight, my 'beyond good and evil,' without goal, unless the joy of a circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself -- you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you

best concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? -- This world is the Will-to-Power and nothing besides!"<sup>12</sup>

How does the death of God bear upon this world of the will-to-power, the will-to-pure-this-worldliness? Molina captures the spirit, motivation, and goal of Beyond when he writes: "There is, as Dostoyevsky so beautifully portrayed in The Brothers Karamazov, a freedom to choose between good and evil. But there is not a freedom to go beyond good and evil. This freedom can be achieved only upon the death of God, the annihilation of the constricting force of all schemes of values, especially the Christian ones."<sup>13</sup> God is dead and the atrophy of belief allows man to develop his new found creative energies to the fullest. Man is no longer suffering under the concentration of other-worldliness. "Around the hero, all things turn into tragedy; around the demi-god, into a satyr-play; and around God all things turn into -- did you say, 'world'?"<sup>14</sup>

Nietzsche regards Christianity as the perfect example of the great ladder of religious cruelty. He attempts to reduce Christianity to its absurd conclusions by his analysis of the sacrifice of men to their God, the virgin sacrifices etc.; the sacrifice of their strongest instincts to their God, Christianity; and the ultimate sacrifice of everything including God. God himself becomes sacrificed when nothing else is left to be sacrificed.

Religious Morality. -- Affect, great desire, the passion for power, love, revenge, possessions--: moralists want to extinguish and uproot them, to "purify" the soul of them.

The logic is: the desires often produce misfortune -- consequently they are evil, reprehensible. A man must free himself from them: otherwise he cannot be a good man.

This is the same logic as: "if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out." In the particular case in which that dangerous "innocent from the country," the founder of Christianity, recommended this practice to his disciples, the case of sexual excitation

the consequence is, unfortunately, not only the loss of an organ but the emasculation of a man's character. -- And the same applies to the moralist's madness that demands, instead of retaining the passions, their extirpation. Its conclusion is always: only the castrated man is a good man.

Instead of taking into service the great sources of strength, those impetuous torrents of the soul that are so often dangerous and overwhelming, and economizing them, this most shortsighted and pernicious mode of thought, the moral mode of thought, wants to make them dry up. 15

We can easily see now why Nietzsche despised the morality of Christianity and offered the passion-exalting world of Dionysus instead. To Nietzsche the propagation of the above moral thought was carried on by the philosophical justification of faith through reason. Plato set out to prove that instinct and reason had the same telos, that of the good, God. "And all theologians since Plato have been on the same track. Which is to say that instinct, or 'faith', as the Christians say, or 'herd' as I say, has been victorious in the field of morality."<sup>16</sup>

Nietzsche says that "modern men with their blunted sense for all Christian terminology, no longer feel the gruesome superlative quality that lay for antique taste in the paradoxical formula: 'God on the Cross'." If we accept the transcendent immutable Being, there results a devaluation of the temporal sphere, the world we live in, nature. Being creates a destructive dichotomy between what "merely appears" and what "truly is". The transvaluation of values Nietzsche proclaims must take place, can never be completely fulfilled until this unrealistic loyalty to a transcendent order, God, is suppressed. "It is the God of the traditional Christian viewpoint whom Nietzsche seeks to destroy with the hammer blows of his dialectic."<sup>17</sup>

Nietzsche asks the question: "Why atheism today?" His answer is that God is unclear; the "Father" in God has been

indubitably refuted as well as the "judge" and "rewarder." God cannot hear us today, while even if he could, he cannot help us because it is clear that he seems incapable of communicating clearly. "This is what I have found out from my questions and conversations as to the cause of the decline of European theism. It seems to me that the religious instinct is growing powerfully but is rejecting theistic gratification with deep distrust."<sup>18</sup>

The death of God brings about the transvaluation, the movement to beyond good and evil. "Jesus said to his Jews: 'The Law was made for servants. Love God, as I do, love him as a son does. What do we sons of God care about morality!'"<sup>19</sup> The law was made by the masters for the slaves, the distinction between slave morality and master morality. The slave morality preaches equality of all souls, all people, master morality is as Nietzsche says above, "What do we sons of God care about morality!" Nietzsche was in complete agreement with Jesus, though he felt that Jesus took sides against those who judge and that Christ wished to be a destroyer of morality. Through the process of deification Jesus became misunderstood. But undeified, as Nietzsche saw him, Jesus expressed what Nietzsche himself desired to be; he wanted to exist beyond good and evil. "God, conceived as the state of being liberated from morality, compressing within himself all the feelings of life's contrasts redeeming and justifying them in divine agony: God as beyond good and evil."<sup>20</sup> "...I should not doubt that there are many kinds of gods. -- There are some one cannot imagine without a certain halcyon and frivolous quality in their make-up.-- Perhaps light feet are even an integral part of the concept 'god'.-- Is it necessary to elaborate that a god prefers to stay beyond everything bourgeois and rational? and, between ourselves, also beyond good and evil."<sup>21</sup> Zarathustra says God is like a snake shedding his old skin, and he shall be back beyond good and evil.

Be careful! Do not begin to think that Nietzsche perhaps believes in God. His polemic and violence toward God grow in the Antichrist and Ecce Homo almost into a pathological condition. "The non-servianism of Nietzsche is a revindication, to the benefit of man, of the privileges usurped by the God of the Jews and the Christians."<sup>22</sup>

Nietzsche gleaned to what extent the stronger type of man would have to conceive and accept a radical shift in the direction of morality for the elevation and enhancement of man. The higher man who travels beyond good and evil, "beyond those values which cannot deny their origin in the sphere of suffering, the herd, and the majority -- I sought in history the beginnings of the construction of reverse ideals..."<sup>23</sup> The callage of Zarathustra is extended in Beyond Good and Evil. Those who are to be the higher men must forsake the shackles of the old morality, a slave morality that is based upon resentment. We must rise to the new dawn -- "like those sun-seeking climbing plants in Java, called Sipo Matador, which cling to an oak so long and so often until finally they unfold their crowns to the open air, displaying their bliss high above the oak but supported by it."<sup>24</sup>

In a sense this chapter, as well as Beyond Good and Evil, provides a bridge between Zarathustra and The Antichrist. This chapter has taken the meaning of the death of God established in chapter I and explained that meaning in terms of the new shift in morality, primarily Christian morality. The last chapter will deal with the death of God as it applies to the final condemnation of the Christian belief in God, in order to establish the transvaluation of values.

CHAPTER IV:  
THE FINAL CONFIRMATION OF  
NIETZSCHE'S ACTIVE NIHILISM  
FOUND IN THE CONCEPT OF GOD IN  
THE ANTICHRIST:

With the writing of The Antichrist "it is as though the work of diagnosis were over, the time having now come to combat."<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche in a letter to Franz Overbeck dated October 18, 1888, says, "This time -- as an old artillery man -- I bring out my heavy guns." Indeed, the violence begun in the works prior to Antichrist is carried to its ultimate blasphemy. Originally The Antichrist was to be the first of four books comprising the volume The Transvaluation of Values. Antichrist was the first book to be completed but the remainder of the volumes were never written due to his illness and due to the fact that he abandoned the work in favor of compiling his notes to write his magnum opus The Will-to-Power, also never completed.

The content of Antichrist is so vehement that it would sound hopelessly insane were it not for the fact that the structure and style of the radical polemic found in Antichrist are found in his other works, e.g., Ecce Homo. This and the fact that the themes of religion and morality are worked out elsewhere make Antichrist easier to comprehend. Nietzsche does not have to spill a large amount of ink to make those preliminaries his other works have established. Now he has only to launch the arrow of criticism. His spear is thrust at the beliefs many people hold about the beliefs held by theologians and religious "snake-oil"men and philosophers. The beliefs they hold about their own beliefs too. His analysis probes at those who really no longer believe in God (cultural diagnosis) but nonetheless ally themselves strongly to the dignity of man established through the Christian morality.

These moral values they put into the mouth of a God they do not believe in. "They are rid of the Christian God and now believe all the more firmly that they must cling to the Christian morality. That is an English consistency..."<sup>2</sup> Nietzsche does not preach the humanitarian view point of mankind, but rather the advent of the Superman.

The style of Antichrist is much the same as Beyond Good and Evil with its aphorisms, but somewhat more uneven. For frequently the rhetoric, violence, and blasphemy get out of hand. The style of the book represents the action of the book; it is meant to be shockingly blasphemous. "Like Nietzsche's first essay, The Birth of Tragedy, The Antichrist is unscholarly and so full of faults only a pedant could have any wish to catalogue them."<sup>3</sup> Again, he does not need to establish a scholastic reputation; his other works have done that. What becomes stylistically significant is the amount of violence directed towards God through Christianity and how it is said.

Nietzsche's atheism furnishes as structure, a model for existentialists who wish to live a life entirely apart from God. And in his own words: "The errors of great men are more fruitful than the truths of little men." Structurally the book flows toward the distinction between contemporary Christianity and the original gospel, between Judaism and Christianity, and by comparing and contrasting the persons of Jesus and Saul. Antichrist establishes the complete atheism, the willing of atheism as a means of obtaining pure this-worldliness, with the advent of Superman. To delineate this further, Nietzsche makes clear the distinction between Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ of the Creeds; an expansion on the earlier theme of Zarathustra, "too early died that Hebrew..." It is through the use of comparison and contrast that Nietzsche makes clear the systematic exposition of his views, no matter how muddled they may appear through the rhetoric.

Nietzsche thrusts himself full-force at the Humanist's Procrustian conception (creation along the lines of the myth of Procrustus) of God; yet at the same time he always discouraged convinced Christians from reading his books, he maintains a respect for genuine Christians.<sup>4</sup> This is the meaning of Zarathustra's refusal to tell the Saint about the death of God. Nietzsche will abandon no one in the meaninglessness of passive nihilism. This respect for genuine Christianity notwithstanding, Nietzsche's bold attack upon Christendom contained much that is blasphemous and most repugnant to the Christian reader. For example: "To make a hero of Jesus! And even more, what a misunderstanding of the word 'genius'! Our whole concept, our cultural concept, of 'spirit' has no meaning whatever in this world in which Jesus lives. Spoken with the precision of a physiologist, even an entirely different word would be more fitting here -- the word idiot."<sup>5</sup> The Nietzschean prognosis is that Christian morality is declared a catastrophe. Dionysus is raised against false humility and deceit. The humanist consecration of the God of man is proclaimed venomous and inimical to life. "Dionysos gegen den Gehreuztichten! Dionysus against the Crucified!" To bring the analogy (or perhaps to change the metaphor thereby clarifying the original metaphor) to the physiological plane: "in a fight with an animal, the only of making it weak may be to make it sick."<sup>6</sup> Nietzsche must weaken Christianity in order to bring about the transvaluation of values. If he fails to do this, his polemic fails and dies. Therefore, the thrust of Nietzsche is to drive the point home about the Christian Church; it ruined man, it made him weak but laid claim to having "improved him". The inimical cry of Nietzsche is against those who do not "listen", who create their God. They are the "nay-sayers" to life!

In the face of this there remains a fantastic clinging to anything; reality transfigures into what they call "an exper-

imental laboratory" -- determinism, naturalism -- "and once these are unmasked and intensified nihilism."<sup>7</sup> They are "nay-sayers" to life because they wallow in the passive nihilism which Nietzsche warns against falling into. In passive nihilism unity crumbles to chance which becomes for modern man the final authority; Nothingness becomes the true reality. As to the Christian Church, pity represents, in Nietzsche's eyes, the practice of passive nihilism. Pity stands in direct opposition to those instincts of preservation of life, and at the enhancement of its values. "Pity persuades men to nothingness! of course, one does not say 'nothingness'; but 'beyond' of 'God', or 'true life', or nirvana, salvation, blessedness."<sup>8</sup> In short, the temporary or permanent escapes from the confrontations of life. It is the abolishment of the teaching that the son of man is the "Son of God;" that filial relationship of everyman to God, even the lowliest, that Nietzsche seeks.

The foregoing has been a discussion of the content of Antichrist as-a-whole, and appears very similar to the other two books viewed above, though more violent. The remainder of this chapter will be a discussion of the death of God through Christianity. By way of a preliminary, in this chapter, the person of Jesus will be used only as he pertains to Nietzsche's dialectic against God.

Nietzsche perceives Jesus in two ways; 1) the historical man whom Nietzsche writes about analytically and with some tint of regret as to what Jesus was made into through deification, and 2) the "Jesus" of the Christian religion, the "Son of God;" the good god made man. It is to the second interpretation that I shall limit any use of Jesus, for he is the object of Nietzsche's critique. Nietzsche writes in Anti-christ: "deus, qualem Paulus creavit, dei negatio, God as Paul created him, is the negation of God." The second interpretation is the "created" Christ, the beliefs of the Christian religion which Nietzsche attacks.

The critique is a critique of the Christian conception of God. Nietzsche's analysis flows through a historical-psychological perspective to the summary that God once represented the strength in the soul of a people. Nietzsche's conclusion is that there is only one alternative for gods: "either they are the will-to-power, and they remain a people's god or the incapacity-for-power, and then they necessarily become good."<sup>9</sup> They become the creation of the people. Nietzsche is teaching "no" to all that makes weak and "yes" to all that strengthens. With the Christian God virtue came to be taught, the modification of self, pity, even "nay-saying" to life; the Creation-Christianity preaches the weakness of God. Christianity preaches the values of the exhausted. "Under the holiest of names I pulled up destructive tendencies; one has called God what weakens, teaches weakness, infects with weakness."<sup>10</sup> "God the Supreme Power -- that suffices! Everything follows from it, 'the world' follows from it."

As in Zarathustra, Nietzsche does not stop with the basic fact of God's death. He asked: Why has God died? The answer of Antichrist is Christianity. Christianity is a reduction of the divine, "when he degenerates step by step into a mere symbol, a staff for the weary, a sheet-anchor for the drowning; when he becomes the god of the poor, sinners, and the sick par excellence, and the attribute 'Savior' or 'Redeemer' remains in the end as the one essential attribute of divinity -- just what does such a transformation signify? what, such a reduction of the divine?"<sup>11</sup>

A critique of the Christian conception of God forces us to the same conclusion. A people that still believes in itself retains its own god. In him it reveres the conditions which let it prevail, its virtues, its projects, its pleasure in itself, its feeling of power, into a being whom one may offer thanks. Whoever is rich wants to give of his riches; a proud people needs a god: it wants to sacrifice. Under such conditions, religion is a form of thankfulness. Being thankful for himself man needs such a god. Such a god must be able to

help and to harm, to be friend and enemy -- he is admired whether good or destructive. The anti-natural castration of a god, to make him a god of the good alone, would here be contrary to everything desirable. The evil god is needed no less than the good god; after all, we do not owe our own existence to tolerance and humanitarianism.

What would be the point of a god who knew nothing of wrath, revenge, scorn, cunning, and violence? Who had perhaps never experienced the delightful ardeurs of victory and annihilation? No one would understand such a god: Why have him then?

To be sure, when a people is perishing, when it feels how its faith in the future and its hope of freedom are waning irrevocably, when submission begins to appear to as the prime necessity and it becomes aware of the virtues of the subjugated as the conditions of self-preservation, then its god has to change too. Now he becomes a sneak, timid and modest: he counsels "peace of soul", hate-no-more, forbearance, even "love" of friend and enemy. He moralizes constantly, he crawls into the cave of every private virtue, he becomes god for every man, he becomes a private person, a cosmopolitan.

Formerly he represented a people, the strength of a people, everything aggressive and power-thirsty in the soul of a people; now he is merely the good god.

Indeed, there is no other alternative for gods: either they are the will-to-power, and they remain a peoples god, or the incapacity for power, and then they necessarily become good. 12

Christianity erected their God in order that man might achieve complete unworthiness. Christianity prevented ascent to a higher form of existence; Christianity is the curse of suffering and, as an ideology, of dehumanization, teaching the low estate of man.<sup>13</sup>

The belief in a resurrection created the feelings of revenge and retribution, the key signs of a slave morality. This allowed man to behave in the most unchristian manner, by indulging himself in the lust for revenge through his all merciful god. And how did this come about? In the same manner that Christianity created the "Redeemer," and "life-eternal," and suffering, and pity, and all other virtues of weakness. It put them in God's mouth; it created its own

God. "When the first community needed a judging, quarrelling, angry, indignantly sophistical theologian against theologians, it created its 'God' according to its needs."<sup>14</sup> What could be easier than to create a god to fit one's needs and then to put words and actions into him? This remains pure sophistry, and isn't this what the secular humanists have infected us with, a god of their own creation? They are sophists. They are the "haves," that is they already have and want more, they are never satisfied, they continue to need "to have." They must have their God the way they want him; this pathology calls itself faith. They close their eyes so that they might not see they are wrong. If they were wrong, then they would be without something, they would have-not something. And this grinds the bourgeois mind into putrid jealousy. If we do not agree with their "faith", we are branded and castigated, and "no other perspective is conceded any further value once one's own has been made sacrosanct with the names of 'God', 'redemption', and 'eternity'!"<sup>15</sup> Such is sophistry! Such is Bad Faith!

Their God "cannot be demonstrated to us: Epistemological Skepticism. You are all afraid of the conclusion: 'from the world we know a very different God would be demonstrated, one who at any rate is not humanitarian' -- and, in short, you hold fast to your God and devise for him a world we do not know."<sup>16</sup> According to Nietzsche, the death of God is the earth-shaking event of two thousand years. It is a frightful event, but he wills this death nonetheless. "To him this is not a matter of one basic principle among others; it is his governing propensity; it is, as it were, the principle of principles -- the one to which all others are subservient."<sup>17</sup>

"God deteriorated into the contradiction of life, instead of being its transformation and eternal Yes! God as the declaration of war against life, against nature, against 'this world', for every lie about the 'beyond'! God -- the

deification of nothingness, the will-to-nothingness pronounced holy!"<sup>18</sup> God has deteriorated into the "thing-in-itself". And Nietzsche announces the advent of the pagan faith, the living in a dismoralized world; not de-moralized, but dis-moralized. Nietzsche is not attempting to undermine morality, nor corrupt it. He establishes the beyond-morality, man becomes apart from morality. "We believe in Olympus -- and not in the Crucified!" Again, from the surface, it appears as though Nietzsche will leave us in passive nihilism; to live as before with no meaning.

Again a chopped off ending, because The Transvaluation of Values was never completed, could take an unsuspecting reader by surprise and suggest nothingness. But to say that Nietzsche leaves us in passive nihilism is the opposite of his polemic, for according to Nietzsche, Christianity has already done that. "The entire burden is placed on the individual... to follow the insecure and thus dangerous new path of the individual who is not yet sustained within a stratified society and who must find the source of his ties within himself."<sup>19</sup>

### CONCLUSION:

This thesis has attempted to show the meaning of the death of God in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. We have looked only to three of his works purposefully, thereby avoiding redundancy of material and, in so doing, getting to the root of his atheism. The thesis has traced the development of his atheism from young adulthood, through his relation to Schopenhauer, and ending finally in his mature philosophy as expressed in Thus Spake Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, and The Antichrist.

Chapter one provided the necessary historical and philosophical background needed to understand the concept and coherence of Nietzsche's atheism. Chapters two, three, and four were developmental expositions of the total atheism and its consequences on morality and Christianity. The conclusion of chapter two can be expressed as "God is dead." We are now left completely free to exercise our creative wills; the burden of responsibility lies with the individual. Chapter three keys into the meaning of the death of God exposed in chapter two with an eye to the ramifications His death has upon morality. We are no longer necessarily bound by the chains of the old slave morality; rather, we are now confronted with the unlimiting freedom of existing "beyond good and evil." Chapter four utilizes chapters two and three to make clear the cultural-moral critique directed against Christianity. The individual no longer needs Christianity to grant him security of existence and morality; he has himself.

Perhaps<sup>1</sup> this thesis has answered the question of what the death of God means in Nietzsche's writings.

The thesis attempted to show that Nietzsche's announcement of the cultural fact of God's death stems from his adherence to a basic philosophical position of atheism. We have killed God by bestowing on Him humanity. "Man could not endure the God who beheld him. So man took 'revenge on this witness', and became the murderer of God who sets and besets him in his existence."<sup>2</sup> Nietzsche announces the death of God because he looked around at society and saw men existing in the world as though there were no God. They merely believed, or thought they believed, in His existence. Plato's analogy of the cave and the shadow watchers serves us well here.

The theologians and religious "snake-oil" are the ones who hold the beliefs through reason, the "herd" believed in these beliefs. God became a "sacred" to the people (in the sense that sex, money, and technology are "sacreds" to people today). Nietzsche attempted to impart to man the limits imposed on him only by his creative will. At least we should not become limited beings merely because of beliefs in some transcendent. We should swear off any loyalty to a transcendent reality, a sacred, which does not exist with us. It is necessary to understand that Nietzsche's cultural announcement flows from the hidden thesis, which Gabriel Vahanian points out, that "God dies as soon as he becomes a cultural accessory of the human ideal."<sup>3</sup> The death of God, therefore, releases man from the bond of being "looked after" by a transcendent being; the burden of responsibility, of "yea-saying," is placed on the individual.

The question of doubt which arises, however, is: was Nietzsche really an atheist of the heart or merely an intellectual, editorial atheist, seeking to clarify the true meaning of existence in relation to God; to deliver the freedom to man which is so necessary for him to be held responsible to God? A problematic!

Ernst Benz...comes to a rather strange conclu-

sion...this theologian finally considers Nietzsche's picture of Jesus and its significance 'in the sense of a positive contribution to the realization of Christian life and thoughts.'...The antichrist turns into...the teacher of an imitation of Christ which the Church, in its indolence and weakness, has suppressed. The enemy of the Church turns into the prophet of a possible new Christianity, which the Church itself, afraid of its relentless and uncomfortable consequences, has preferred to conceal; he (Nietzsche) becomes the herald of a new evangelical order which would unite a community of his kind for a new imitation of Christ, and by acting out a life in His manner would strike the paper creeds from the hands of mere Christian believers!<sup>4</sup>

I included the above passage in order to clarify the specific question I am dealing with in this conclusion. I would agree with the above, but the question we are dealing with is Nietzsche himself and not the posthumous interpretations of his thought as it relates to the "meaning" of our lives.

In order for Nietzsche's message to have any meaning in our lives we must understand and overcome the death of God. Nietzsche is at one and the same time, violent in his atheism to the point of blasphemous cruelty and wishing no truly convinced Christian to read him. His attack is leveled at the religious God of the "mere believers." For them God has become the accessory to the human ideal, and a god conceived in this form does not exist; there is no reality behind him.

God had become for Nietzsche the representation of the humanitarian ideals of the Enlightenment. A God made pluralistic enough so that the encompassment of all human goals could be found within His gospel message. The message of morality was reduced to weak slave-minded humanitairanism, and the human ideal was personified and deified. Nietzsche saw this and said that God is dead. We do not need a God for the human ideal to be reached, we can do it ourselves. But the human ideal of Nietzsche should not be confused with the ideal of the humanitarians. The human ideal of Nietzsche is Superman. The call is to Nietzsche's ideal of Superman, and

this places as many requirements of honesty and responsibility on the individual as did the example of God found in, for example, Kierkegaard.

For Nietzsche the goals of the "human" religions were very pluralistic, yes. But each interpretation of God's message found some new necessity to place on the individual. The interpreters place God in a box and say that such and such must be so, with the usual justification of scriptural examples in the Bible. God now becomes too much necessity and we cannot grow, even to the many ideals of the God-humanists. Each point of view usually presupposed the freedom of its adherents. Yet they do not allow for the validity of any other interpretation but theirs, because their interpretation has been made sacrosanct with "God," "Redemption," and "eternity." No one, of course, would dare to stand opposed to these interpretations, after all "in my father's house there are many mansions." No one wants to be in the wrong; those poor sheep, they would become "have-nots" (and God forbid that in the American Dream that we might possibly be unable to "have" everything). There is no freedom but to accept their beliefs, although individual freedom is presupposed. This position has an odor of being self-referentially inconsistent.

God does not justify our actions, our actions justify the belief in God, and Nietzsche saw they did not. God's existence became dependent on His justification of our actions, and we do not need a God to justify human existence. Nietzsche offers our beliefs to us and says, "God is dead!" It is up to those of us who wish to, to vindicate the existence of God. Not by simply restating his existence, nor by circumventing Nietzsche. But by overcoming Nietzsche in our existential awareness of the need to relate to a transcendent God; not on the superficial terms of the humanists, but on the terms of a true reality: God must not become the

accessory to the human ideal. He is the human ideal. It is not the deus ex machina we have created where we plug into God and He responds to the weak masses. We must become men in order to respond to God with the full measure of our freedom and responsibility. The love of God and sacrifice of our will to His becomes the supreme "human" act of love we can achieve. And in order to do this we must be totally free as man, and we must will the belief in God.

ENDNOTES:

INTRODUCTION:

<sup>1</sup>Merton, Thomas. Thoughts in Solitude. Garden City: Image Books, a division of Doubleday and Co., Inc. p.22-23.

Chapter I:

<sup>1</sup>Lavrin, Janko. Nietzsche: A Biographical Introduction. London: Studio Vista, Ltd., 1971, p.62.

<sup>2</sup>Reyburn, H. A. Nietzsche: The Story of a Human Philosopher. Westport: Greenwood Pres, Pub., 1973, p. 7 & 15.

<sup>3</sup>Copleston, Fredrick. Friedrich Nietzsche: Philosopher of Culture. New York: Barnes and Nobel Books, 1975, p.3.

<sup>4</sup>Reyburn, Nietzsche, p.21.

<sup>5</sup>Copleston, Nietzsche, p. 5.

This early atheism continues to grow throughout Nietzsche's life becoming more and more violent as time goes on. Prior to the period of atheism this paper deals with (prior to 1881) he came to view Richard Wagner, his long time friend and composer, as a "decadent who had become rotten, suddenly sunk down, helpless and broken before the Christian Cross." This because of Wagner's publication of Parsifal. Around the same time another of his friends decided to become a Catholic priest. One can only imagine the rage and bitterness which swept through him.

<sup>6</sup>Vahanian, Gabriel. The Death of God. New York: George Braziller, 1961, p.xvi-xvii.

<sup>7</sup>Jaspers, Karl. Nietzsche. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, trans: Charles F. Wallraff & Fredrick J. Schmitz, p.28.

"...at Schulpforta, that venerable school celebrated for its uncommonly outstanding humanistic teachers."

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p.125-126.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p.90.

<sup>10</sup>The titles are in chronological order the way Nietzsche wrote them, the dates are of publication.

<sup>11</sup>Kaufmann, Walter. The Portable Nietzsche. New York: The Viking Press, 1968, p.105-106.

<sup>12</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche., p.88.

<sup>13</sup>Kaufmann, Portable., p.108.

<sup>14</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche., p.21.

<sup>15</sup>Reyburn, Nietzsche., p.60-61.

The forgoing summaries of Kant and Schopenhauer were culled for the most part from the summaries of Reyburn and Copleston. This author paraphrased and used the summaries without direct citation, until now, in an attempt to avoid excessive and cumbersome endnotes.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p.65-66.

<sup>17</sup>Kaufman, Walter Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, p.101.

<sup>18</sup>Molina, Fernando. Existentialism as Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, p.27-28.

<sup>19</sup>Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spake Zarathustra. trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Great Britian: C. Nicholas and Co., Ltd., 1969, p.26.

<sup>20</sup>Danto, Arthur C. Nietzsche as Philosopher. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1965, p.191.

<sup>21</sup>Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will To Power. trans. Walter Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale. Walter Kaufmann (ed) New York: Random House, 1967, p.14.

<sup>22</sup>Jaspers, Karl. Nietzsche and Christianity. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. trans. E. B. Ashton, 1961, p.84.

<sup>23</sup>Copleston, Nietzsche., p.1-2.

<sup>24</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche., p.83.

<sup>25</sup>Copleston, Nietzsche., p.117.

## Chapter II:

<sup>1</sup>Figgis, John Neville, DD, Litt.D. The Bross Lectures... 1915: The Will to Freedom or the Gospel of Nietzsche and the Gospel of Christ. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917, p.163-164.

<sup>2</sup>Kaufmann, Portable. p.106.

<sup>3</sup>Danto, Nietzsche. p.196.

<sup>4</sup>Copleston, Fredrick. A History of Philosophy. vol.7, part II, New York: Image Books, 1963, p.167. Footnote #4. Rudolph Carnap remarks that when Nietzsche wished to take to metaphor, he very properly had recourse to poetry. Carnap thus looks on Zarathustra as empirical confirmation of his own neopositivist interpretation of the nature of metaphysics.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche, p.220.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p.346.

being as opposed to Being. Heidegger's terminology Sein (Being as source, ground, and power), and, Seindes (being as concrete form of existence).

<sup>8</sup>Danto, Nietzsche. p.196.

<sup>9</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche, p.242.

<sup>10</sup>Kaufmann, Nietzsche. p.100.

<sup>11</sup>Nietzsche, Will To Power. p.33.

<sup>12</sup>Copleston, Nietzsche. p.92.

<sup>13</sup>Danto, Nietzsche. p.191-192.

<sup>14</sup>Gilson, Etienne. "The Idea of God and the Difficulties of Atheism". Philosophy Today. 13, Fall 1969, p.176.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p.176-177.

<sup>16</sup>Nietzsche, Zarathustra. p. 201.

\*Wagner would lead one to believe this in his "Twilight of the Gods". Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols was written in opposition to this Wagnerian point.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p.41.

- <sup>18</sup>Ibid., by the translator Hollingdale in Intro. p.26.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid., p.114.
- <sup>20</sup>Ibid., p.272.
- <sup>21</sup>Nietzsche, Will To Power. p.86.
- <sup>22</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche. p.429-430.
- <sup>23</sup>Nietzsche, Zarathustra. p.110.
- <sup>24</sup>Danto, Nietzsche.p.194.
- <sup>25</sup>Nietzsche, Zarathustra., p.98.
- <sup>26</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche.p.22.

## Chapter III:

- <sup>1</sup>Kaufmann, Portable. p.70.
- <sup>2</sup>Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Marianne Cowan, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955, #27, p.33.
- <sup>3</sup>Ibid., #246, p.182.
- <sup>4</sup>Hollingdale, R. J. Nietzsche. Boston: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1973, p.186.
- <sup>5</sup>Molina, Existentialism. p. 117&119.
- <sup>6</sup>Jaspers, Christianity. p.14.
- <sup>7</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche. p.247.
- <sup>8</sup>Copleston, Nietzsche. p.98-99.
- <sup>9</sup>Figgis, Will to Freedom. p.142.
- <sup>10</sup>Ibid., p.141.
- <sup>11</sup>Molina, Existentialism.p.24.
- <sup>12</sup>Nietzsche,Will to Power. p.550.
- <sup>13</sup>Molina,,Existentialism., p.28.
- <sup>14</sup>Nietzsche, Beyond.#150 p.85.
- <sup>15</sup>Nietzsche, Will to Power. p.206-207.
- <sup>16</sup>Nietzsche, Beyond., #191, p.99.
- <sup>17</sup>Collins, James. The Existentialists. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952, p.21.
- <sup>18</sup>Nietzsche, Beyond. #53, p.60.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid., #164, p.87.
- <sup>20</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche. p.160.
- <sup>21</sup>Nietzsche, Will to Power. p.534.
- <sup>22</sup>Gilson, "Atheism" Phil To. p.178.
- <sup>23</sup>Nietzsche, Will to Power. p.537.

<sup>24</sup>Nietzsche, Beyond. #258, p.201.

Chapter IV:

- <sup>1</sup>Danto, Nietzsche.p.182.
- <sup>2</sup>Kaufmann, Portable.p.515. From Twilight of the Idols. Sec. 5, IX. The reader must forgive the author the last phrase in the citation. It represents his own judgement against English analytic philosophy.
- <sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.568.
- <sup>4</sup>Copleston, Nietzsche. p.i.
- <sup>5</sup>Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Antichrist. trans. Walter Kaufmann in The Portable Nietzsche. New York: The Viking Press, 1968, #29, p.681.
- <sup>6</sup>Copleston, Nietzsche, p.71.
- <sup>7</sup>Jaspers, Christianity. p.62.
- <sup>8</sup>Nietzsche, Antichrist. #7, p.573.
- <sup>9</sup>Ibid., #16, p.583.
- <sup>10</sup>Nietzsche, Will to Power. p.34.
- <sup>11</sup>Nietzsche, Antichrist., #17, p.584.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid., #16, 582-583.
- <sup>13</sup>Danto, Nietzsche.p.182.
- <sup>14</sup>Nietzsche, Antichrist., #31, p.604.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., #9, p.575.
- <sup>16</sup>Nietzsche, Will to Power. p.534.
- <sup>17</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche, p.429.
- <sup>18</sup>Nietzsche, Antichrist. #18, p.585-586.
- <sup>19</sup>Jaspers, Nietzsche. p.157.

Conclusion:

<sup>1</sup>This insertion of "perhaps" lead me into a long thought about fiction and the self-referentiality of writing. This lead me to the thought of one of my professors Dr. Stephen C. Scheer who deals with meta-fiction and self-referentiality in almost all of his courses. In his view of meta-fiction the work of art exposes the process of fiction-making which in turn exposes the process of fiction-making whereby we interpret reality. This is more than the normal meaning of meta-fiction which is just the work of art about itself. What I am suggesting is that an analysis of Nietzsche's works is highly possible from the Structuralist point of view in literature with regard to the Scheerean concept of meta-fiction.

<sup>2</sup>Vahanian, The Death of God. p.xvii.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.,

<sup>4</sup>Jaspers, Christianity. p.26, from the footnote.

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