

The vindication of metaphysics through the
Transcendental Method of Rahner, Lonergan and Coreth.

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Metaphysicians have struggled with many problems through history, but no question has been more central or basic to their search than the problem of the self-vindication of the endeavor itself. Since metaphysics is the investigation into absolutely everything¹ -- being qua being -- the question of its starting point reveals itself to be a question that influences every particular endeavor within the metaphysical project because the entire project fails if this starting point cannot be vindicated. The investigation of this problem is central to the thought of Fr. Rahner, Fr. Lonergan, and Fr. Coreth. Their main intention is the explanation of how man can be a metaphysician -- one who knows the universal being in itself -- if he always first finds himself in a world of particulars -- one who knows restricted or contingent being. Another way to pose this question is, how can man know the unity of being from the multiplicity of beings? In this thesis, I will give a synthesis of the thought of these three thinkers concerning how metaphysics can vindicate itself when it always finds its starting point from the empirical world. In other words, I wish to give an exposition of a "personal" appropriation of the thought of these three "Transcendental Thomists." In Thomistic terms, this investigation deals with how the intellect can have a universal and necessary knowledge of being when the intellect cannot actually know without a conversion to the phantasm.

I believe this exposition of a synthesis of the three

thinkers is a valuable exercise, for each thinker's perspective contains strengths which the other two do not possess. Therefore, through a synthesis of the three, a more complete viewpoint is developed that is able to dialogue more effectively with competing philosophical Weltanschauungen. For example, Lonergan's phenomenological analysis of the structure of human knowing is often more precise than the same of the other two. On the other hand, Rahner's metaphysical epistemology has a depth that is not usually attained by Lonergan or Coreth. Last, Coreth seems to be the "middleman" between the other two, for his epistemology is phenomenologically more exacting than Rahner's, but his metaphysics of knowing is not as lengthy. Hence, a synthesis of the three on a first level of reflection should provide a valuable base from which a unified, yet diverse, theory of Transcendental Thomism can arise.

In consideration of the size of this examination, there is given no critical exegesis of the three author's texts in order to determine their fundamental notional compatibility. Rather, this investigation is on a first level of synthesis. For such a critical determination of the commensurate nature of their thought, one should turn to previous work in this area. I believe that this previous work critically supports my present synthesis.

To understand the importance of Rahner's, Lonergan's and Coreth's philosophical thought, we must first examine it

within the historical context of the modern age. All three admit the validity of modern philosophy's insistence on the importance of the subject in any inquiry. Philosophy must find its base in an anthropocentric world rather than a medieval cosmocentric world; that is, the basis must always be found in an examination of the conscious knower as knower rather than an abstract metaphysics of the world because man truly is the center of the world insofar as man is the knower of all that is to be known by man. This is not to suppose that Rahner, Coreth, and Lonergan wish to subjectivise the metaphysical investigation. Rather, they see that a totally justified metaphysics must be grounded in an examination of the knower who necessarily is the anknüpfungspunkt of all human metaphysics.² As Rahner states:

This anthropology is naturally to be understood as a transcendental anthropology. A transcendental investigation examines an issue according to the necessary conditions given by the possibility of knowledge and action on the part of the subject himself. Such an investigation presupposes that the subject of the act of knowing is not simply a 'thing' among others which can be made at will the object of a statement including other objects, but which is not present at all -- even implicitly -- in statements purely about other objects . . . it means that whenever one is confronted by an object . . . one inquires as to the conditions necessary for it to be known by the . . . subject, ascertaining that the a priori conditions for knowledge of the object are satisfied.³

This starting point in the knowing subject constitutes for them the transcendental method, and its beginning is discovered the moment the subject recognizes the a priori conditions of its immanent operations in knowing.⁴ As Lonergan

notes, through this transcendental method, one is able to discern in human cognition the "normative pattern of recurrent and related operations" through the use of this self-same normative pattern of recurrent and related operations.⁵ The result is a knowledge of the operations of knowing that are necessarily the formal structures found in everything known insofar as man is the knower.⁶

The importance of their work in regard to this transcendental method can be seen even more clearly when it is related specifically to the work of Kant. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant brought to technical prominence the transcendental turn.⁷ He demonstrated that there is no pure intuition of objects because every apprehension of an object presupposes the subject that apprehends and constitutes the nature of the object. Therefore, he concluded that the subject is the first object of inquiry in any metaphysics. Metaphysics, then, becomes "a logic of the pure intellect" where the pure reason which determines every object of knowledge is studied as the condition of objects, rather than the objects themselves.⁸

Through his transcendental method, Kant demonstrated that the human intellect can only think the limited within a totality or the multiple within a unity. In other words, to know that a particular being is limited -- this and not that, here and not there, now and not then -- is to presuppose a knowledge of a totality that "measures" the finite thing and

reveal its limitation.⁹ Likewise, a multiplicity of elements cannot be known as multiple without the presupposition of unity, for a multiplicity does not itself contain its own unity.¹⁰ Without this knowledge of the totality or the unity by which the limited is measured or multiplied, the particular limited object would itself not be known as limited but would itself be the totality.¹¹

However, because reason by itself determines its object and depends on sense experience for that object, Kant believed that it is a mistake to suppose that the absolute presupposed by reason in its knowledge of the finite object is actual. To suppose this is to confuse the ideal with the real, for it mistakes the function of the idea of the absolute in the determination of things for us with the real principle of things in themselves.¹² Kant maintained this because he saw the world of objects as a static relationship of position between the categories of the mind and empirical data. Because it is a static relationship of position to the knowing subject, the transcendental idea of the absolute cannot be an a priori condition of judgment about what is real. Rather, the idea of the absolute simply serves as a regulating and organizing structure to make the empirical objects intellegible to the intellect.¹³

Kant admitted that the natural tendency of the mind is to mistake the regulative categories of the intellect as a source of true knowledge, but this tendency must be ignored

by the philosopher because real knowledge is confined to the subjective sphere of human cognition.¹⁴ Kant vindicated this view by attacking the cosmological argument which is the basis of rational theology. For Kant, the cosmological argument is unable to demonstrate whether this absolute being is a reality that transcends the world or is simply the totality of the world under the categories of the intellect.¹⁵ If it could show that this absolute being transcends the world, and therefore the human intellect, then it would be a demonstration of the existence of God. However, if this absolute being is simply the totality of the world as constituted by the intellect, then it must be merely the regulative function of the human intellect devoid of all actual independent existence. Kant believed, therefore, that metaphysics is impossible because there is no possibility of affirming the objectivity of knowledge through reference to that which transcends the knower.¹⁶

The Transcendental Thomists confront Kant's interpretation of the status of the absolute presupposed in knowledge of the finite by pointing out the circular nature of human knowing. They note that, for man to question about particular beings presupposes that he already anticipates absolute being as the condition of the possibility of the question. Man cannot question that which is absolutely unknown or unknowable. Therefore, because man does ask about the being of particulars and the being of the whole, he

reveals in his questioning a pre-apprehension of absolute being as the a priori condition of the possibility of the question. Also, because man must question being through his encounter with the world of sensibility, man shows that he is not himself the absolute being. Rather, he is a finite being who must judge against the field of the absolute.¹⁷ Hence, they attempt to surpass Kant in that they do not stop their transcendental reflection at an examination of the a priori conditions of sensible objects as Kant did, but rather, they move on to examine the a priori conditions of the acts of cognition themselves as found in the original question about being.¹⁸

The above remarks should clarify the basic framework of modern philosophy from which Rahner, Lonergan, and Coreth are working. The investigation concerns the establishment of the possibility of a knowledge of the unity of being that reaches the ontological sphere through a transcendental reflection on the a priori conditions of cognition.

We will examine their philosophical thought through the following steps. First, we will examine how the transcendental method establishes itself as the unquestionable starting point of metaphysics. This will be accomplished through a recognition of the one undeniable fact of human existence. This one undeniable element will compel us to recognize that the transcendental method is the only sure starting point of metaphysics because the element is itself

known as a transcendental condition of cognition qua cog-~~ition~~. Second, with the method established through itself, we will begin to examine human cognition from this basic starting point in order to establish the validity of metaphysics. Third, we will do a metaphysics of cognition that will elucidate the ontological nature of human cognition as established through our previous phenomenological reflection. Last, we will study how their thought abrogates the phenomenism that results from the thought of Kant.

Throughout this inquiry, the thought of all three thinkers is tightly meshed. Therefore, for major portions of the paper, one must refer to the endnotes in order to know which of the three thinkers I have drawn from. However, where important terminology particular to one of them is used, I have striven to recognize in the text from whom it came.

THE VINDICATION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

We will now concern ourselves with establishing the transcendental method as the fundamental starting point of the metaphysical inquiry. First, we will consider the object of metaphysics because the method will be determined with reference to the unique nature of the metaphysical object. Second, we will determine in a general fashion what is meant by method as the starting point of any inquiry and especially with regard to the metaphysical inquiry. Third, we will examine the difference between the method of metaphysics and the method of empirical science. This difference will emerge as a result of their different objects of inquiry, and it will help clarify the unique nature of the metaphysical method. Last, in consideration of the above reflections, we will determine that the transcendental method is the fundamental starting point of metaphysics because it is the only method or starting point of inquiry that is self-vindicating and therefore presupposes nothing in its investigation into everything.

Traditionally, the science of metaphysics has always examined being qua being. This means that metaphysics is the ultimate science because it looks into the reality of absolutely everything that is.¹⁹ This absolute nature of metaphysics finds expression in two modes. First, because it examines beings as beings, metaphysics examines the basic ground of all particularized reality. Second, metaphysics

investigates the universal common nature of all these particulars. Both of these movements are possible because ultimately metaphysics endeavors to examine the universal and grounding unity of all beings. Hence, the object of metaphysics is the examination of absolute being as the unity of contingent being.²⁰

This object of being qua being is never a set of objective data alongside other possible objects of inquiry. Objective data itself is known only through an act of cognition and this act is itself being that must be included in the examination. The object of metaphysics includes all objects of knowledge, but it goes beyond this data to all its conditions and ultimately to the absolute being that grounds everything.²¹

In order to establish the possibility of man reaching this all encompassing object of the metaphysical inquiry, we must discover a method or starting point for the investigation that is both reflexively known and defensible. This method is the point of departure from which the investigation can stand in self-vindication vis a vis its object of inquiry. All sciences are required to be aware of their method, but the science of metaphysics must be more exacting in its self-reflection upon its method because of the nature of its object. Let us first make some general considerations of method qua method especially in regard to metaphysics before we proceed to compare metaphysics's self-reflection upon its

method with that of empirical science's self-reflection.

As Lonergan states it, in its most abstract definition, a method is a "normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results."²² In other words, it is a set of formal operations that are applied to every object of inquiry. The natural or empirical sciences use the scientific or empirical method which includes accurate observations and descriptions, the formulation of discoveries into hypotheses, and further experimentation that produces conditions that either confirm or deny the original hypotheses.²³ Through a knowledge and use of its method, the scientist can know that every discovery in science will conform to certain formal operations as mandated by the a priori operations of the method, and the method that science uses is completely appropriate vis a vis its object of inquiry. The important point to note is that a particular method determines through its structure what will be known, and therefore, the establishment of a correct method for metaphysics is very important. Furthermore, because of the nature of the object of metaphysics, the method itself is part of the inquiry, and therefore, the method or starting point of metaphysics must be self-vindicating. The importance of this self-critique of method can be elucidated further through an examination of empirical science's relationship to its own method vis a vis metaphysics and its own method.

First, empirical sciences may justify their method to some extent by appealing to the results of empirical experimentation. If the empirical results are as predicted by the method, then the science has verified to some extent its method. With metaphysics this cannot be the case because its object includes sense experience, but also, far transcends it. Empirical data can be used as a guiding principle of the investigation and it can be part of metaphysics verification of a method, but it can never be the formal source of verification of a method that must ground the investigation into absolutely everything.²⁴

Second, empirical sciences usually rely on some higher science to verify their method.²⁵ In fact, all particular sciences usually rest upon foundations they themselves did not develop.²⁶ For example, the biologist relies on the science of physics to provide verification of its method. It is physics that determines that matter constitutes empirical reality, and therefore, empirical observation is the only acceptable method to gather data. The biologist presupposes this fact of methodology as a starting point to investigate the biological activity of its subject. Even the vitalist in biology presupposes certain physical and philosophical tenets that he himself is not responsible to verify. Metaphysics cannot appeal to a higher science, for it is the highest science.²⁷ To investigate being qua being is to assert that there is no investigation on a more fundamental plane that can produce results.

fundamental plane that can produce results which can be presupposed by metaphysics in its method. In fact, metaphysics, by its nature, is the fundamental ground of all the other sciences, and it is itself its own ground because, as its object demands, it must examine everything including method qua method.²⁸

The last important difference is that empirical sciences can improve their method through interaction with their empirical object. The empirical object is first known in a "prescientific" way, and the method is improved as it shows an increasing affinity for the object through its predictive and explanatory abilities.²⁹ This is impossible with metaphysics because its object is not a static state of empirical data which is known as a given before the investigation begins. Rather, even the act of questioning and beyond is included in the metaphysical investigation, and therefore, the method of metaphysics continually reflects back upon itself as a dynamic element of the object to be investigated.

All of the above point to the unique nature of discovering a method or point of departure for the investigation of metaphysics, for, though the objects of everyday experience are beings, we never reach beings as being except in a metaphysical reflection that presupposes a method. But this will not do because the method itself cannot be presupposed if we are to investigate absolutely everything.³⁰ To establish a sure method or starting point for the metaphysical

inquiry, a fact must first be found that is beyond all pre-suppositions and is by its nature unquestionable that can in-itself establish itself as the metaphysical method.³¹ However, where are we to find this self-vindicating starting point if it must lie even outside of the question of being, and must itself base the question?³² We must find within human existence some given that can serve as a self-founding foundation; where are we to find it? The solution to this apparent dilemma can be discovered in the nature of the question about the starting point itself, and from that discovery, we can establish a method for metaphysics that presupposes nothing.³³

The one constituent of man's experience that resists every attempt at replacement, and therefore, is absolute is the irresistible and inescapable question. Man can never escape that to question is a necessary component of his existence. If he questions whether he must question, or he stops questioning, and thereby, answers the presupposed question by declaring it meaningless, he establishes once again that his answers and denials always lead to new questions.³⁴ "Every answer is always the beginning of a new question."³⁵ Obviously then, the question is a necessary component of man's existence that cannot be questioned away because, concomitant with his inquiry into everything including the question itself, he always finds himself within the horizon of an antecedent and inescapable a priori question.³⁶

This all encompassing reality of man is the one undeniable fact of existence that establishes that the question about the starting point of metaphysics is the unquestionable fact that reveals the proper starting point or method of metaphysics. The method of metaphysics must be the transcendental method because the one undeniable reality of the question about reality is the question itself, which is an act of cognition. The transcendental method questions the question which is itself unquestionable. Through this transcendental method of questioning the question, we can discover and explain the conditions of the question as the object of our inquiry. These conditions themselves are the conditions of the act of questioning the question because the transcendental question about the question can itself be questioned. Again, to do the transcendental method by questioning the question is totally self-vindicating because we know the question is itself an unquestionable fact, and therefore, the question about the question presupposes nothing, but only employs the unquestionable to discover its conditions.³⁷

When we come to understand the question through the transcendental method, we are able to establish two things. First, an understanding of the question through questioning the question allows us to be certain of the formal structure of all questioning and subsequent acquisition of knowledge because every question about anything -- including the question about the question -- must conform to the conditions

of the question. Second, we will possess through the transcendental method a fixed base which is invariant. It is invariant because if one wishes to question the conditions of the question, the very conditions of the question are presupposed as the condition of the possibility of this new question.³⁸

The fact that the question about the conditions of the question is our fundamental method can also be seen with reference to the thought of previous thinkers. Many philosophers have attempted to establish other points of departure for the inquiry. However, whether one starts from Mareschal's and Lotz's judgment, or from Augustine's and Descarte's methodological doubt, these "starting points" can always be reduced to a more fundamental consideration of the original question. All these other methods presuppose the dynamic act of the a priori question, and therefore, they are not the necessary self-vindicating starting point because they never reach the question about the question.³⁹

Hence, we have established that the one self-vindicating starting point of metaphysics is the transcendental method -- the questioning of the conditions of the act of questioning -- and this method provides a base in which to establish the possibility of metaphysics. We can now begin the process of discerning the conditions of the question which man necessarily does through the transcendental method.

TRANSCENDENTAL REFLECTION ON THE CONDITIONS OF THE QUESTION
(QUESTIONING THE QUESTION)

This placing of the question about the starting point as the starting point leads us to assert a fundamental determination of man. Being is for man something questionable, and man is that being which necessarily questions being.⁴⁰ It is for the questioning of being that man exists, and this statement of man's nature excludes the view that man is somehow "into" being first only then to question. Rather, man fundamentally is the questioner of being.⁴¹ We can assert that this is the fundamental determination of man because it is the most fundamental datum that man experiences about himself. Again, man can turn his attention from particular questions in his daily existence, but he can never escape that he is the question about being because, even in his questioning of this determination, he affirms as the condition of the possibility of this act the very determination he questions.⁴² The above is the first assertion that flows immediately from the transcendental method. We must now proceed to question the question as the fundamental determination of man to reveal the conditions of its possibility.

Man's question concerning being has as its essence two concomitant movements or elements. As Heidegger showed, one questions a particular existent because the being of that existent is not yet apparent to the intellect. However, one can ask about particular things only if one already possesses

a priori a certain knowledge of that thing, for otherwise, one would not know what question to ask. As Coreth explains it, in every question there is a "mixture" of not-knowing a particular existent and a presupposed knowing that allows the question to be asked. This mixture of knowing and not-knowing in every question is not to be confused with the idea that man is in a kind of gray area, knowing a little about some particular existent of knowledge but still wishing to know more. Rather, the mixture present in every question is a "knowing ignorance" that is aware of itself by proceeding beyond the known.⁴³ For example, one would not ask, "what is that" if the not-knowing of the question, "what is that" were not supported by the presupposed knowledge that the "what is that." Hence, every question is composed of a not-knowing and a presupposed knowing or pre-apprehension that enables the question to move beyond ignorance to actual knowledge.

This pre-apprehension as the condition of the question is never itself an explicit element of the question. Rather, it is presupposed as that which moves toward that which is. Furthermore, though this pre-apprehension of being is a presupposed "knowledge" that is never reflexively present to the questioner, it serves as the enabling condition of the reflexive and explicit content of the particular question.⁴⁴

Before we move on to a further examination of the

pre-apprehension of the question, we must first distinguish this pre-apprehension from other presuppositions present in all particular questions so that we can more carefully identify just what is meant here. This pre-apprehension found as the condition of the possibility of questioning as such should not be confused with what Coreth terms the "modifying co-knowledge" or the "constitutive co-knowledge" that are presuppositions present in every particular question.

Modifying co-knowledge is the knowledge that is previous to the question, and it is the result of prior acquisitions of knowledge. For example, the question concerning the starting point of metaphysics will have a slightly different meaning for different individuals because each individual's previous "field" of knowledge concerning the subject of metaphysics is slightly different. Hence, this modifying co-knowledge is not an a priori condition of questioning qua questioning, but rather, it modifies the meaning of the question vis a vis the previous knowledge of the individual questioner.⁴⁵

Constitutive co-knowledge is more fundamental than modifying co-knowledge, for it is an a priori condition of a question, but it falls short of the pre-apprehension because it is only an a priori condition of particular questions. The constitutive co-knowledge is a knowledge of the terms of a particular question. For example, if one were to ask the particular question about the starting point of metaphysics, one must presuppose as a condition of the question

a knowledge of what metaphysics is and what a starting point is. Hence, because this constitutive co-knowledge is only the condition of particular questions rather than a condition of questioning qua questioning, it falls short of this pre-apprehension under investigation because it is not self-validating in that the meaning of the particular terms can always themselves be questioned.⁴⁶

Therefore, because both types of co-knowledge referred to above only condition particular questions, they are not the conditions of the question qua question. They only explain the question vis a vis that which is already known, but do not explain how the question moves in anticipation or pre-apprehension towards that which is not known in its "knowing ignorance." What we must find in the particular question, "what is the starting point of metaphysics" is that condition which allows one to pre-apprehend what is not known in every question regardless of its particular content. This "pure" pre-apprehension does not intend an elaboration of the content of the already known of the question -- that is what co-knowledge is -- rather, this pre-apprehension in the question qua question must be something that goes beyond the already known co-knowledge toward the possibility of the unknown. It must be a "pure" pre-apprehension of the unknown in the question that constitutes the very condition of the possibility of questioning as such.⁴⁷

Though co-knowledge found in every particular question

can never be totally eliminated -- one always asks a particular question -- it can be "transcended" to such an extent that the pure pre-apprehension of questioning qua questioning can be discovered. This is done when one questions the possibility of the question itself -- the transcendental method -- and thus, transforms the co-knowledge into a simple knowledge of asking the question itself which cannot be questioned because it is unquestionable as was established above. When we question the possibility of the question, we "eliminate" the presuppositions of the co-knowledge by transforming it into a knowledge of the unquestionable fact of questioning which presupposes nothing, but only assumes the "presuppositionless."⁴⁸ We will now examine what this pre-apprehension of being that is the condition of questioning as such is in its essence.

When one questions, one is aware of already knowing a determined content, but one knows his knowledge to be limited because one asks about it. However, if one knows a limited content of knowledge because one asks about it, one reveals oneself to be already beyond the limited known in a pre-apprehension of the unknown. This pre-apprehension towards the unknown as the condition of the question is neither totally determined nor totally undetermined, It is not totally determined in that it is not a projection of the already known determinations of the object questioned onto further possible objects of knowledge. This projection is simple the

co-knowledge already discussed, and it is not a pre-apprehension of the unknown, but only "widens" the already known determinations found in a particular question. The pre-apprehension is not totally undetermined because it moves toward a positive "object" and not toward nothing. A movement towards nothing is impossible, and hence, the question could not exist. Therefore, the pre-apprehension toward the unknown is a "relative" undetermined movement vis a vis the already known of the question, but it moves toward a positive goal or object. We must determine the positive aspect of this pre-apprehension of the unknown found in the question.⁴⁹

We would like to assert that the positive aspect of the pre-apprehension found as a condition of the question as question is a pre-apprehension of absolute being. How can this statement be vindicated? This can be accomplished by discerning three attributes of the positive aspect of the pre-apprehension, and, through a synthesis of the three, arrive at a concept identical to the concept of absolute being.

The first aspect of this pre-apprehension is its unity. One questions what can be questioned, and therefore, the question qua question moves toward the questionable qua questionable. Hence, the question about the question reveals a pre-apprehension of the totality as questionable, and this movement toward the totality as questionable establishes the unity of all the is pre-apprehended in the question.⁵⁰

The second aspect of the pre-apprehension is its unlimited

nature. Once one establishes a limit to questioning, the limit can always itself be questioned. The question moves toward absolutely everything -- not every particular thing -- in that it moves toward the unity of everything as everything-as-questionable. Hence, this "horizon" of questionability as the unity of that which is questioned is itself unlimited.⁵¹

The third aspect of the pre-apprehension of the question is that it moves toward being. The pre-apprehension of the question about "everything-unknown" is the unlimited unity of being, for one always asks what or if something is. Hence, the pre-apprehension of the unknown in every question is a movement toward absolute being.⁵²

Therefore, we have established that whenever one questions about the particular beings of the world, one always presupposes as a condition of the possibility of the question a pre-apprehension of absolute being because one always pre-apprehends the unlimited unity of being in that one always questions, ipso facto, in regard as to what or whether the thing is.⁵³ In other words, the unknown pre-apprehended in every question is absolute being because one always asks "quid sit" or "an sit," and therefore, one pre-apprehends the power "to be" (sit) as the possibility of any question being asked.⁵⁴ Every possible question can only exist "within" this one a priori horizon of absolute being, for every question regardless of its content rests upon this one pre-apprehension that moves one's question toward what is absolutely.

This pre-apprehension of being as the always already realized condition of knowledge is present even in the doubt or the denial of the existence of knowledge of the ontological.⁵⁵ This is so because even when one questions whether the real can be known one goes beyond the merely subjective to the in-itself of being by the very act or performance of the question in that one intends in the pre-apprehension of the question what is. One may assert as an answer to the original intention of the question that there really and truly is no ontological being, but this assertion is only borne once again by the ontological because the performance of the original question already entailed a pre-apprehension of being in-itself as a condition of the possibility of the assertion about what is.⁵⁶

Rahner comments succinctly on the nature of the pre-apprehension as that which brings the knower to the ontological when examining the act of judgment. As he states:

. . . the esse of an individual being appears first of all at least as the intrinsic, sustaining ground of all the determinations which can possibly belong to the existent in question. But it is also in itself the fullness of all possible determinations absolutely. For in every judgment it is the same to-be-in-itself that is pre-apprehended. Insofar as all possible quidditative determinations are real through esse as to-be-real in the usual sense, in every judgment the same esse is pre-apprehended, in every judgment a knowledge of the same esse is simultaneously known. . . . But in this pre-apprehension as the necessary and always realized condition of knowledge (even in a doubt, an in-itself, and thus esse is affirmed) the existence of an Absolute Being is also affirmed simultaneously.⁵⁷

The pre-apprehension of absolute being (esse) as the condition of questioning is the immanent criterion by which the intellect comes to the ontological through the judgment, and, even when one doubts that the ontological can be reached, the ontological being-in-itself is implicitly affirmed.

Lonergan further clarifies this relationship between the pre-apprehension of absolute being as a condition of questioning and the acts of knowledge found in experiencing, understanding, and judging. The pre-apprehension of being in the question is the intentio intendens, and the acts of knowledge are the intentio intenta. For example, as particular answers stand to particular questions, so the cognitional acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging stand to the pre-apprehension of being in the question. Hence, an answer is to a question because they both refer to the same object. Likewise, the intentio intenta -- an act of understanding -- "receives" its original reference to absolute being as this being (essence) that is because it was "summoned forth" by the a prior intentio intendens -- the pre-apprehension of absolute being (esse) in the question.⁵⁸ As

Lonergan remarks:

The intentio intendens of the subject summons forth and unites cognitional activities to objectify itself in an intentio intenta that unites and is determined by the partial objects of the partial activities. As the intentio intendens of the dynamic structure, so the corresponding intentio intenta of the structured cognitional activities is intrinsically related to being and reality . . . It remains that the two relations are not identical. The intentio intendens is not

knowing but merely intending [pre-apprehension] :
It is objectivity in potency. But the intentio
intenta resides not in mere intending but in
structured activities of knowing: It is objectivity
in act.⁵⁹

We may conclude then, that the acts of cognition are the objective in act because the original pre-apprehension as objectivity in potency has already intended absolute being as the condition of the possibility of the a posteriori acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging.

We can find indications of the above insight in the thought of previous thinkers. Heidegger identified this distinction of the two components of the question with the ontological distinction between Being and beings. All the individual objects that can be questioned are beings, and the "power" of "to be" of these individual beings is Being. Being and beings are distinct "objects" of human cognition, but they are never found cognitively without being in relation to one another.⁶⁰ In one's questioning of individual beings, one always moves toward the unknown in a pre-apprehension of Being as the antecedent condition of the question.

Furthermore, this is exactly what St. Thomas means when he speaks of a general knowledge of being had in the knower. This general knowledge of being is not an accumulation of all possible objects of knowledge, but rather, it consists of an antecedent pre-apprehension of being that provides the a priori possibility of the knower's question.⁶¹ This transcendental "knowledge" as a pre-apprehension of absolute being is an unthematic -- nonconceptual -- knowledge that is

ambiguous and undetermined. That is, it is an anticipation of absolute being (esse) that becomes a particular and thematic datum of knowledge when through the intention of the question vis a vis an empirical datum the pre-apprehension of esse becomes a limited and determined object of knowledge (essence). It is important to note that these two concomitant moments of the one human knowing are not two aspects only extrinsically or accidentally related to one another. The pre-apprehension of absolute being as found in the intention of the question is the condition of the possibility of every particular question and subsequent actuality of cognition. Likewise, this pre-apprehension cannot itself be realized except in the particular question concerning individual existents.⁶²

One would make a mistake to suppose that this original pre-apprehension of absolute being as the condition of the question could itself become a finite object of knowledge along other finite objects. In fact, this pre-apprehension can never become an object of knowledge even in our subsequent reflection upon it. This is so because, by the act of making it a conceptual object of inquiry, the pre-apprehension of absolute being is again presupposed as the very condition of the possibility of this objectification through the question. The pre-apprehension is always the a priori condition that allows the object to be an object, and therefore, ipso facto, it can not itself be an object of knowledge

Our metaphysical concepts of being can mediate this original pre-apprehension to ourselves on a thematic level so that its existence can be more precisely understood, and these concepts do have an intrinsic relationship and referral to the original experience, but the concepts never capture it in its totality. Of course, even concepts about something totally different from the pre-apprehension have this relationship, for every question and answer only exists within this one field of being intended by the question regardless of its specific content.⁶³

By the same token, though our subsequent reflection on the a priori pre-apprehension never totally recaptures the original experience, the pre-apprehension is not realized except through the mediation of particular questions and concepts. That is, the pre-apprehension is given only in the process of coming to know concrete, finite existents because this process is that which allows the condition to be that which conditions in its relationship with the conditioned. How could it be otherwise, for what sense is there in speaking of the existence of the condition of the possibility of questioning without any actual question ever taking place.⁶⁴

This dialectical relationship between the original pre-apprehension and the particular acts of knowledge reveals two movements of human knowing. Because this pre-apprehension is only given as a condition of particular questions and acts of knowledge, man continually strives to bring this experience

into his categorical framework through the particular questions concerning the contingent world so as to communicate the original experience to himself and to others. Likewise, often there are concrete questions and conceptual schemes because of a common culture and society that lack any reference to the pre-apprehension of the original knower, and therefore, there is always a movement to bring these socially accepted concepts to "existential significance" in the individual by giving them a real relationship to the original pre-apprehension of the knower.⁶⁵

The nature of the relationship between the pre-apprehension of the question and objects of knowledge leads us to affirm the fundamental distinction between subjectivity and objectivity in human knowledge. As Coreth states, the object is always that which is asked about or had as a content of knowledge. The subject is the a priori intentionality of the pre-apprehension in the inquirer asking about the object.⁶⁶ When one asks a question, one is aware of oneself as the questioner -- subjectivity -- and that which stands over against oneself as the object of the question -- objectivity. In the question, this mutually conditioning duality of subject in this pre-apprehension of absolute being and the object as that asked about in the particular question is revealed. The particular question cannot exist except within this intrinsic dialectic distinction of the mutual conditions of transcendental subjectivity and categorical objectivity.

objectivity. Furthermore, subjectivity is that which is the absolute being already pre-apprehended as a condition of the question, and objectivity is that particular which comes to be known as a limitation of the prior pre-apprehension of subjectivity.⁶⁷

All that we have said so far in this section allows us to further say what the nature of man is as questioner. Man's questioning nature reveals that, insofar as he asks about the world of limited being, he shows himself to already possess a "knowledge" or pre-apprehension of absolute being that is the a priori condition and horizon of the question as such.⁶⁸ As Thomas said, when man begins with his first question, he is already "Quodammodo omnia" (in a certain way everything), and yet, he is still "tabula rasa, materia prima in ordine intellectus" (a clean slate, prime matter in the order of intellect) because he must still come to this pre-apprehension of absolute being in his daily encounter with individual existents.⁶⁹ This points to the paradoxical nature of man as questioner and knower in his unity and duality. Man, in his search for knowledge of particulars and himself, reveals through his question that he already possesses a "knowledge" of the whole from the beginning of his first question. Man has a pre-apprehension of absolute being, and yet, he is not in reflective possession of it. Only in his encounter with the multiplicity of beings does he realize his already had knowledge of the unity.⁷⁰

Thus far we have established through a phenomenological investigation the validity of the metaphysical inquiry. When man asks as to whether metaphysics is possible, he reveals through the question that it is possible because it does not consist of a building from nothing, but a limitation of the unity he already "knows" through the pre-apprehension of the question. Before we elaborate any further this conclusion, we will first proceed to do a metaphysics of cognition. This will further elucidate our contention concerning the possibility of metaphysics because it will go beyond what we have done so far by not only explaining what knowing is, but also, why that is knowing.

METAPHYSICS OF THE QUESTION
(CONVERTABILITY OF KNOWING AND BEING)

Up to this point we have determined that man's questioning nature reveals that insofar as man asks about the world of limited beings he shows that he already possesses a pre-apprehension of absolute being that is the a priori condition and horizon of the question as such. This determination of human knowledge contains within it two concomitant moments in the one human knowing, for it is a "knowing-ignorance" that pre-apprehends absolute being as the condition of the not-knowing of the question. Because this pre-apprehension is the condition of the not-knowing of the question, we can assert a metaphysical determination of being in-itself. Being is fundamentally able to be known. The idea that being is "being-able-to-be-known" contains within it both the knowing or pre-apprehension of the question (that which is not known at all cannot be asked about) and the not-knowing of the question (if something is known, it does not need to be questioned).⁷¹ We need to examine this fundamental determination of being found in the nature of the question with more depth. We will first examine being in the context of the pre-apprehensional knowing of the question. Then we will examine being in regard to the not-knowing of the question.

"Being is questionability," and therefore, it is fundamentally knowable, for the question of being presupposes this. Hence, the very notion that being could be unknown is

a contradictory notion. To say something is unknowable assumes a question has been asked without finding an answer. However, to ask a question presupposes knowledge or a pre-apprehension of being as the condition of the act. Unknowability is only a concept within the context of an already had knowledge in the question, and therefore, the "unknown unknown" is simply beyond the present horizon of the individual knower. Yet the pre-apprehension of being is the condition of the possibility of conceiving abstractly the "unknown unknown" as being because the original question always intends that which is. Hence, "whatever can be can be known."⁷² With this we have established a fundamental relationship between being and knowing. What is the possibility of this relationship?

This relationship between being and knowing cannot be seen as something subsequent to the existence of a cognitive power and its object, for then their actual coincidence in actual knowing would not be cogent. How could the question always pre-apprehend being as a condition of its possibility if there were not an intrinsic relationship between being and knowing antecedent to actual knowing? Hence, as St. Thomas said, "the intellect and the intelligible must be proportional."⁷³ There exists an a priori determination of what a cognitive power can know, and an antecedent determination in the object that limits what cognitive power can know it.⁷⁴

The vindication of this proportionality is found in the

fact that a knower has a pre-apprehension of absolute being as the condition of the possibility of knowing a particular object. This absolute being pre-apprehended in the question is itself the unlimited act of existence (esse) of the finite object of knowledge, and therefore, it establishes the antecedent proportionality of the cognitive power and its object. In other words, because of the pre-apprehension of absolute being in every question that is prior to actual knowledge, one knows that every possible object of knowledge has an intrinsic and antecedent relationship to the cognitive power in that it is.

We can still proceed further in discovering the relationship between being and knowing. This pre-apprehension of absolute being in the question -- the intrinsic relationship between being and knowing -- has its explanation in the act of the question itself. When one questions, one is aware of the question one is; one is aware of the identity of the act of the question with oneself. Therefore, the act of questioning or knowing reveals itself to coincide with being. As Coreth remarks, "The act knows itself as being."⁷⁵ Hence, as Thomas states, "the intellect and the intelligible in act are one."⁷⁶ This immediate self-presence of being to itself in the act of the question that is prior to the objects of knowledge makes intelligible the original meaning of being and knowing in their original unity. Knowing is the "being-present-to-itself" of being, and the extent that a being is

present to itself in knowledge determines the intensity of the being of that particular existent.⁷⁷ Rahner's line of reasoning is this:

First, the question about the "being of that which is" already expresses a provisional knowledge about being in general, for nothing at all can be asked about the totally unknown. Thus some kind of knowledge is already affirmed and expressed in the question about the meaning of being . . . To say this is to affirm also that every thing which is, as the possible object of a cognition, possesses, in its own right and by virtue of its being (that is, essentially), an interior reference to a possible cognition, and so to a possible knowing subject. The knowability is affirmed as an ontological definition, in the thing which is itself. But if this interior reference of every existent thing to a possible cognition is an a priori and necessary proposition, it can be so only because the being of that which is and the knowing of it form an original unity. Otherwise, this reference of every existent thing in its own right to an act of knowledge could be at best only de facto, and not a definition of these existent things provided by the essence of their being. An essentially necessary relationship of the interdependence of two facts must ultimately rest upon an original unity of the two. For if the two were originally separate, that is, if in their origin they were not relative to one another, their interdependence could never be necessary, but at most de facto, accidental. The being of that which is and the knowledge thereof are thus interdependent, because originally they are one and the same in their cause. This is to affirm nothing less than that being as such, to the degree that it is being and appears as such, is knowing. This knowing in an authentic unity with being is knowledge of being that results in knowing that the knower himself is. Being and knowledge form an original unity, that is to say, the cognitive reference to itself is part of the essence of the being of that which actually is. Conversely, the knowledge which belongs to the concept of the essence of being is the being-present-to-itself of being itself.⁷⁸

Being, therefore, in its primary reality is not object but

self-presence to itself as the possibility of objective knowing, and knowing is this subjectivity of being.⁷⁹

This is in marked contrast to a theory of knowledge that sees the nature of knowing as the reflection in the intellect of some object from "outside" with its own law of being that is only accidental to the intellect.⁸⁰ Knowing is not a coming in "contact" with an object. Rather, knowing is the "being-present-to-itself" of being "which lets knowing and being-known spring out of itself as its own characteristic and thus grounds the intrinsic possibility of an antecedent, essential, intrinsic relation of both of them to each other."⁸¹

The a priori and transcendental intelligibility of being realized in the pre-apprehension of absolute being in the question could not be understood in any other way, "for a plurality is not unified of itself."⁸² Thus far we have examined the concept of being within the context of the a priori knowledge or pre-apprehension of the question. Now we must proceed to discover the concept of being in regard to the not-knowing of the question.

The question presupposes that one knows or pre-apprehends being, but it also presuppose that one does not know, for otherwise, one would not question. Therefore, because the not-knowing of the question exists and we have already determined that knowing is being, there must exist in man's question a not-identity of being and knowing in such a way that his being as identity with the act of the question is

not totally present to itself. This "non-luminosity" of being to itself found in the question reveals the non-identity of being and knowing because we are aware of the distinction between our knowing subjectivity and the object asked about. Because we find this not-identity of being and knowing in the question, being qua being must transcend our own subjectivity with being. Man's subjectivity is not the absolute identity of being and knowing, but rather, he is a finite subjectivity that proceeds beyond himself in apprehension of absolute being in the not-knowing of the question.⁸³

From the above, we may conclude that "man is deficient in his innermost ground of being."⁸⁴ How do we account for this deficiency of man's subjectivity discovered in the not-knowing of the question? Because being is fundamentally self-presence, and man reveals a finite self-presence, there must be some determination of man that is by nature itself that which "exhausts" self-presence and is the being of "another." This determination of being that is for the other and is not self-presence is what Thomas means by prime matter or materiality. Prime matter is that which "exhausts" the self-presence of being because it is empty and indeterminate being for the other. Hence, the degree of self-presence of an existent -- the intensity of being of the existent -- is determined by its degree of immateriality. Because we find that man is not total subjectivity in that he must question his knowing in an encounter with existents, we see that man is

composed of matter and is ordered to the sensibility of the material world.⁸⁵

It has become evident that being is essentially the identity of knowing and being in subjectivity, and therefore, the problem concerning the "gap" between knowing and objects of knowledge is not a problem of how to "bridge" this pre-supposed distinction. Rather, it is a matter of discerning how the gap is possible at all. This distinction between the subjective knower and the object of knowledge exists because of man's ordination to materiality and the material world, but the non-identity of being and knowing as a consequence of this materiality rests upon the already realized identity of being and knowing found in the a priori subjectivity of the pre-apprehension in the question.⁸⁶ The question man asks because of his non-identity with being is originally possible only because of his subjective identity with being as the condition of the possibility of the question. Hence, man's identity with being is logically prior to his non-identity with being, and therefore, the "gap" between subject and object arises out of their original unity and not the unity out of an original distinction. Furthermore, when man questions, he is not only aware of the identity of being and knowing in his subjectivity, but also, he is aware through the pre-apprehension of absolute being of the totality of that which can be questioned. In other words, man's subjectivity as being present to itself transcends itself to become more through the process of questioning.

We have concluded our metaphysics of knowing. Therefore, we will proceed to the last section of our inquiry. This last section will further elucidate the vindication of metaphysics vis a vis Kant's denial of its possibility. With this last section complete, we hope to have shown even against the rigorous critique of Kant the possibility of metaphysics by the human knower.

THE VINDICATION OF METAPHYSICS CONTRA KANT

We have vindicated that metaphysics is possible because of the a priori pre-apprehension of absolute being of the question in human cognition. Behind every relative horizon is the pre-apprehension of the question that moves toward the unknown as that which is. Therefore, there is always a pre-apprehension of absolute being as the condition of the possibility of every question that brings actual knowing to the in-itself of being. Furthermore, this relationship between being and knowing is intellegible because the question itself is being. Through questioning, being realizes itself in a movement toward the absolute.⁸⁷

Furthermore, the transcendental method vindicates metaphysics even against the critical method of Kant. Kant's critical method only dealt with the conditions of the content of knowledge, but the transcendental method surpasses Kant in that it considers the original conditions of the question that condition the reaching of this content of knowledge. This condition is recognized in the dynamic intentionality of the pre-apprehension of the original question of cognition.⁸⁸ Let us look more carefully at this "transcendence" of Kant.

Kant denies that one can know reality as it is in-itself because one cannot determine whether the a priori categories are merely relative to the knower. For Kant, the affirmation

of the judgment about what is real depends upon the a priori categories, and therefore, one cannot transcend the categories to affirm their validity as a reference to the real because one always presupposes the categories in the act. Kant's critique can be surmounted by examining the very act of questioning the absolute validity of knowledge. The presupposed condition of the possibility of the question entails that, to question the absolute nature of knowledge, one must presuppose the absolute because the relative validity of knowledge is posited in-itself as "measured" by the pre-apprehension of the absolute in the intention of the question about what is.⁸⁹ In other words, to question as to whether the validity of knowledge reaches the in-itself, reveals that one has already transcended the relative, moving to the realm of the in-itself which "constitutes one anew: the 'that such a thing is not to be reached,' the 'that we are able to decide nothing about such a possibility'."⁹⁰

All types of idealism, phenomenalism, and relativism possess this contradiction in their affirmations. When they affirm that the conditions of knowledge are merely logical, they affirm that it is really and truly logical, and thus, they posit the absolute as the measure of what is in-itself. As Lonergan conveys it:

The possibility of questioning is being, and this being is being in its unqualified sense, An-Sich-Sein (being-in-itself). "From this it follows that there never is and never can be a closed "inner area" of transcendental subjectivity, for subjectivity in its very performance is already "out side" in the

realm of "being-in-itself" in general which transcends subjectivity. Performance is constituted in its nature and its possibility by its horizon, but the horizon in which subjectivity realizes itself is always the horizon of being-in-itself in general".⁹¹

Kant contradicts himself because he wishes to assert that the conditions of knowledge are only logical, and therefore, it is only logical that the conditions are logical. But this is contradictory because it is impossible that all really and truly be only logical.⁹²

Hence, we can assert that the pre-apprehension of absolute being found in an examination of the intentionality of the question as the condition of its possibility shows Kant to be inconsistent because the the intention of the pre-apprehension of his question reached toward the absolute being, and therefore, he asserted the non-existence of knowledge of the in-itself, in-itself.

CONCLUSION

How can metaphysics come to vindicate its endeavor if it has nothing to rest upon, and thereby, presuppose as a point of departure? Can man in honesty affirm that he has the possibility of knowing reality as it is in-itself? The answer to this question is not an "answer" at all, but the original question, and the question is that which is most easily overlooked because, originally, it is that which is most obvious in experience. Metaphysics is possible because in the question that man fundamentally is, he reveals himself to already be, in a certain way, everything in his subjective pre-apprehension of absolute being. Man, in this subjectivity, is already to the ontological of being in-itself because the subjectivity is the being-present-to-itself of being prior to dispersion to the limited being of the world. This establishment of the possibility of metaphysics can be viewed from two different yet mutually conditioning points of view. That is, because this vindication recognizes in human knowing both the empirical or sensible element and the a priori pre-apprehension of absolute being, it stands at the "mid-point" between naive realism and idealism. As Lonergan explains this:

Finally, against both the naive realist and the idealist of the types in question, the critical realist urges the charge of picture thinking. Why does the naive realist ground objective knowledge of reality in looking, perceiving, Anschauung? Why does the idealist assert that

it is by Anschauung that our cognitional activities have their immediate relationship to objects? It is because their world is a picture world. If their world were the universe of being, they would agree that the original relationship of cognitional activity to the universe of being must lie in the intention [pre-apprehension] of being. But their world is a picture world; the original relationship of cognitional activity to the picture is the look; and so it is in looking that the naive realist finds revealed the essence of objectivity, and it is in Anschauung that the critical idealist places the immediate relation of cognitional activity to objects. There exists, then, something like a forgetfulness of being. There exists in man a need for an intellectual conversion ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem.⁹³

Hence, the naive realists is correct in believing that knowledge reaches being in-itself, but he oversimplifies this view by seeing this objectivity of knowledge as one component of knowing rather than in the total dynamism of the intellect as questioning. The idealist correctly disclaims the naive realist's contention concerning the source of objectivity in human knowledge, but in this refutation, he is unable to discover the possibility of reaching objective being.⁹⁴

Besides this correction of these above two philosophical positions, the thought of Rahner, Longergan, and Coreth also refutes the philosophical tenets of ontologism or apriorism, for here man's arrival at objective being does not consist in an intuition of being in-itself as though it were an element in the objects as any other quality, but rather, man's coming to the ontological resides in the a priori pre-apprehension of absolute being as the condition of the possibility

of objects of knowledge. Hence, as Thomas states, "The mind cannot know without a conversion to the phantasm." Man's only intuition is of sensible objects, and therefore, his knowledge of the being-in-itself is not intuition but pre-apprehension. The metaphysics of man is limited to the being of the world, and there is no possibility of his coming to know the essence (essence as that which is an object of knowledge) of "seperated forms" that transcend the world of the imagination.⁹⁵ As Rahner states:

If the possibility and the limit of metaphysics consist only in the reflection on the excessus to absolute esse which makes physics possible, then the only metaphysical statements of a fundamental kind which can be made about an object beyond the realm of our objects, that is, beyond the realm of the imagination, are the intrinsic moments in the concept of being as such itself. . . . He (Thomas) emphasizes again and again that we do not possess a knowledge of the quiddity of "seperated things" (that is, of everything which is not a mobile being) which belongs to them as such. We only know of their existence, so that of their essence we only know implicitly what is necessarily given implicitly in the knowledge of their existence, that is, the transcendental determination in that intensity of being in which they necessarily belong to an existent or to absolute being as such without material limitation. But that defines the metaphysical object only from the empty concept of being. For although esse is in itself the full ground of every existent, nevertheless, this fullness is given to us only in the absolute, empty infinity of our pre-apprehension. . . . 96

Hence, though we have established the possibility of metaphysics through this synthesis of Rahner, Lonergan, and Coreth, because man is essentially spirit and matter -- spirit in the world -- he only has an indirect vision of absolute

being. "Thus man is the mid-point suspended between the world and God, between time and eternity, and this boundary line is the point of his definition and destiny."⁹⁷ Man's metaphysics culminates in his knowledge of God which always remains in the strictures or unlimitedness of the infinity of absolute being that can never become, ipso facto, an object of knowledge. "And so it remains true: the highest knowledge of God is the 'darkness of ignorance'."⁹⁸

ENDNOTES

¹Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word, trans. Michael Richards (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), p. 36.

²Bernard Tyrrel, Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), p. 4-5.

³Karl Rahner, "Theology and Anthropology," in Theological Investigations IX, trans. Graham Harrison (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980), p. 29.

⁴Emerich Coreth, "Immediacy and the mediation of being: An attempt to answer Bernard Lonergan," in Language, Truth and Meaning, ed. Phillip McShane (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), p.

⁵Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 14.

⁶Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978), p. xxviii.

⁷Bernard Lonergan, "The Subject," in A Second Collection, ed. William Ryan and Bernard Tyrrel (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1975), p. 70.

⁸Emerich Coreth, Metaphysics, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 23.

⁹Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. Willian Dych (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. xxiii.

¹⁰Joseph Marechal, A Marechal Reader, ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 73.

¹¹Rahner, Spirit, p. xxii.

¹²Ibid., p. xxviii.

¹³Karl Rahner, A Rahner Reader, ed. Gerald A McCool (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), p. xiv.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Rahner, Spirit, p. xiv.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. xiii.

- ¹⁸Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 24-25.
- ¹⁹Rahner, Hearers, p. 36.
- ²⁰Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 30.
- ²¹Ibid.
- ²²Lonergan, Method, p. 4.
- ²³Ibid., p. 5.
- ²⁴Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 31.
- ²⁵ibid.
- ²⁶Rahner, Hearers, p. 4-5.
- ²⁷Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 31.
- ²⁸Rahner, Hearers, p. 5.
- ²⁹Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 31.
- ³⁰Ibid.
- ³¹Rahner, Spirit, p. 57,
- ³²Rahner, Hearers, p. 34.
- ³³Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 32.
- ³⁴Rahner, Hearers, p. 33-34.
- ³⁵Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, trans. William Dych (New York: The Seabury Press, 1978), p. 32.
- ³⁶Rahner, Hearers, p. 35.
- ³⁷Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 48-51.
- ³⁸Lonergan, Insight, p. xxviii.
- ³⁹Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 47-50.
- ⁴⁰Rahner, Spirit, p. 51.
- ⁴¹Rahner, Hearers, p. 35.
- ⁴²Rahner, Spirit, p. 57.

⁴³Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 54.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 55.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 56-58.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 57-58.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 58-59.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 60-61.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid., p. 62.

⁵⁴Bernard Lonergan, "Metaphysics as Horizon: A Critique by Bernard Lonergan," in Emerich Coreth, Metaphysics (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 202.

⁵⁵Rahner, Spirit, p. 181.

⁵⁶Lonergan, Horizon, p. 203.

⁵⁷Rahner, Spirit, p. 177, 181.

⁵⁸Bernard Lonergan, "Cognitive Structures," in Introducing the Thought of Bernard Lonergan, intro. Philip McShane (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973), p. 22-23.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰John Shea, Stories of God: An Unauthorized Biography (Chicago: The Thomas Moore Press, 1978), pp. 19-20.

⁶¹Rahner, Hearers, p. 35.

⁶²Rahner, Spirit, p. 36.

⁶³Rahner, Foundations, p. 34-35.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 16.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Coreth, Language, p. 39.

- ⁶⁷Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 71.
- ⁶⁸Rahner, Spirit, p. 67.
- ⁶⁹Ibid. p. 60.
- ⁷⁰Rahner, Hearers, p. 37.
- ⁷¹Rahner, Spirit, p. 67,
- ⁷²Ibid. p. 68.
- ⁷³Ibid.
- ⁷⁴Ibid., p. 35.
- ⁷⁵Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 70.
- ⁷⁶Rahner, Spirit, p. 65.
- ⁷⁷Ibid., p. 69.
- ⁷⁸Rahner, Hearers, p. 38-39.
- ⁷⁹Rahner, Spirit, p. 69.
- ⁸⁰Rahner, Foundations, p. 17.
- ⁸¹Rahner, Spirit, p. 69.
- ⁸²Ibid.
- ⁸³Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 70-71.
- ⁸⁴Rahner, Spirit, p. 72.
- ⁸⁵Ibid., p. 72-75.
- ⁸⁶Ibid., p. 77.
- ⁸⁷Lonergan, Horizon, p. 203.
- ⁸⁸Rahner, Reader, p. xiii-xv.
- ⁸⁹Coreth, Metaphysics, p. 65.
- ⁹⁰Rahner, Spirit, p. 131-132.
- ⁹¹Lonergan, Horizon, p. 203.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Loneragan, Structures, p. 30.

⁹⁴Ibid., 26.

⁹⁵Rahner, Spirit, p. 401.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 407.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 401.

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