


THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY BASED PRINCIPALLY
ON ST. THOMAS AND THE ELUCIDATIONS OF PIUS XII

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INTRODUCTION

Thus in the second part of the Summa Theologica we may find chapters which are unsurpassed on such subjects as the power and rights of the father, the so-called domestic rights, on the rights of the state and of the nation, on natural rights and international law, on peace, war, justice, and property rights, on laws and their observance, on the duty of working for our individual welfare and for the welfare of the public. All these subjects he treats not only from the side of the natural but of the supernatural order as well. If these teachings of his were exactly and religiously observed by all men, both in their public and private lives, nothing else would be required to bring about among men that "peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ" for which the whole world so ardently sighs. There is this further reason that it is most desirable that we understand and appreciate more and more the teachings of St. Thomas on the rights of nations and on the laws which regulate the relations of peoples with one another, since these doctrines contain the foundations for a true Society of Nations.¹

These words from Pope Pius XI's Encyclical Letter Studiorum Ducem, contain the doctrinal basis for a true international society. They likewise express well the subject and the purpose of this work.

The following pages are, then, an attempt to construct a concept of international society based principally on St. Thomas and the elucidations of Pius XII. In other words, the underlying schematic or outline will be those philosophical principles (concerning international society) of the natural order, based on the natural law as developed in the philosophical system of St. Thomas Aquinas, while at the same time indicating with great emphasis throughout the paper various points or explanations pertaining to international society as developed in the writings of Pius XII. It is true that a complete and fully developed

outline of such a society is not to be found explicitly in the writings of St. Thomas. But these writings do contain sound philosophical principles which, when developed and elaborated, form a solid basis for the construction of true international society.

Francis de Vitoria was the first to extend explicitly and professedly the principles of St. Thomas to the field of international relations, and in so doing drew up, at least in general form, the outline of an international society on a world-wide scale. This eminent Spanish Thomist (1546) will be referred to frequently, and his works, along with those of St. Thomas, will make up the majority of the source material used for this study.

Grateful acknowledgement is made to Gerald Francis Benkert, O.S.B., for his Doctoral Thesis, The Thomistic Conception of an International Society. This work provided much of the source material used in this study; and in particular it provided all of the references from Francis de Vitoria, since they were not available to this writer. The remaining sources will consist mainly of the earlier works of Pius XII; such as his Summi Pontificatus and his first few Christmas Messages.

The problem then, which shall be treated in this study is that of coordinating equally sovereign and independent states in order to assure their coexistence in peace and unity. It will be considered from the particular view point of the basic philosophical principles which should underlie any form of organization which proposes to be a genuine society of nations. We shall not be concerned, however, in any way with the specific plans proposed during the past centuries for the organization of an international society within Europe or for the whole world.

I. THE NATURAL BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.

Every human society must be based firmly and objectively on the nature and end of man. Apart from man, society has no meaning. This is a cardinal principle of all Thomistic social and political philosophy. If international society is to have a solid foundation, it too must be based objectively on human nature and the end of man. International society is, in fact, the final terminus in the natural order of the basic social principles enunciated by St. Thomas Aquinas and elaborated by later Thomists.¹ Therefore, let us briefly review these social principles and show how their logical and progressive development leads to the concept of an international society.

In Thomistic philosophy, family, state, and international society form one complete and unified social pattern. St. Augustine best expresses this total view of human society in his De Civitate Dei: "After the state or city comes the world, the third circle of human society, -- the first being the home, and the second the city."² We begin with an analysis of man as a social being or as a constituent of society.

A. MAN

Man is neither wholly matter, nor wholly spirit, but an organic union of both.³ The material element places man in common with all other animals, since he has numerous material needs. But it is the spiritual principle in man which differentiates him from all other animals. It is this spiritual principle which makes man an intelligent and free agent -- a person, and "... Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend

to an end as directing and leading itself to the end."⁴ Now, since man is a rational creature, capable of self-direction towards his proper end, he also has the ability to understand and the obligation to choose the means necessary for the achievement for that end. It is for this reason that man has certain primary duties as well as certain fundamental rights which are indispensable conditions for attaining the end of his existence. Thus it is the concept of end or final cause which is the key to the whole doctrine of St. Thomas on man, and it is in this same principle of finality, which gives society its meaning, that the solution of all social problems is to be sought.⁵

Likewise, it is from the nature and end of man, considered in relation to his fellow men, that St. Thomas deduced the fundamental fact of man's sociability. As an organic composite of body and soul, man has material as well as spiritual needs; the normal and natural method of satisfying these needs is through the medium of relationships with other men. Thus there is in man a natural inclination to associate with other men and to seek their assistance. It was this that St. Thomas definitely had in mind when he called man a "social and political animal."⁶

The physical interdependence of mankind is a fact that is very evident to all. From the earliest records of mankind there have been men living in social groups for the purpose of mutual assistance in the satisfaction of their common needs. The only point that needs be stressed is that in St. Thomas's time the limits of human material interdependence were confined to the boundaries of the provincial state. Today, however, with the extension of our modern industrial civilization, it has become world-wide. The intellectual interdependence of men is likewise a fact

of common experience, for it is this which underlies our whole system of education. That man is dependent upon his fellow men for the acquisition of knowledge will not be denied by anyone, for if man had to rely solely on his own personal experiences, the intellectual development of the individual would be extremely limited, and the cultural progress of mankind would be impossible.

Social life, therefore, is a primary and immediate demand of man's nature, and is not only natural, but is also necessary. For man is conscious of a destiny, an end; for the achievement of this end it is necessary that men live and develop in society.

B. SOCIETY.

According to St. Thomas a society is a group of human beings united for the purpose of performing a common function or achieving a certain end.⁷ He goes on to say that one society must be distinguished from another by its end or purpose. The objective, teleological character of St. Thomas's concept and analysis of society is at once apparent. Society is defined in terms of end or purpose. Societies are distinguished according to their ends. Likewise, societies are to be evaluated in terms of their ends, for the principal basis for the evaluation of any object is its end or purpose. Thus St. Thomas lays the foundation for his hierarchical order of societies, each society receiving its proper position in relation to the whole and in relation to other societies according to the end or purpose it is expected to fulfill.⁸

Human society, therefore, is not unique, but takes on many forms, depending on the object to be achieved. In this hierarchy of societies

the family, of course, is considered as the primary society, for it is through the family that human beings are begotten, nourished, and supplied with the most intimate and immediate necessities of life. But the family of itself is able to provide only the very basic necessities of life. There remain many needs which can be satisfied only by the clustering of families into a community, which facilitates trade and the exchange of goods. The community too has its limitations; only the conjunction of many families and communities into a larger and higher society can provide a complete sufficiency for life. This society, which he calls a perfect community, is the province (provincia). (Here he is referring more to the modern idea of a larger territorial or national state than to the Greek notion of the city-state,) Since this gradation of societies is such an important point in postulating an international society, it will be helpful to see this passage in its entirety.

Now, since men must live in a group, because they are not sufficient unto themselves to procure the necessities of life were they to remain solitary, it follows that a society will be the more perfect the more it is sufficient unto itself to procure the necessities of life. There is, indeed to some extent sufficiency for life in one family of one household, namely in so far as pertains to the natural acts of nourishment and the begetting of offspring and other things of this kind; it exists, furthermore, in one village with regard to those things which belong to one trade; but it exists in a city (civitas), which is a perfect community, with regard to all the necessities of life; but still more in a province (provincia) because of the need of fighting together and of mutual help against enemies.⁹

The most important thing to be noted is that St. Thomas admits of degrees of perfection even in that society which he designates as the "perfect community." Its degree of perfection is proportionate to its

ability to make provision for the fullest physical, mental, and moral development of its members. If, therefore, because of changed world conditions, provision for the complete development of man can no longer be made by the isolated, individual state, but only through the close cooperation of the state with many other states, thus forming a newer, higher, and more comprehensive type of society -- a society of states -- the existence and necessity of such a society would be the natural and logical conclusion from the very principles laid down by St. Thomas himself. Such conditions have actually developed since the time of St. Thomas. Let us, then, examine the social and political teaching of St. Thomas and of later Thomists to see whether a society of states is postulated by their basic principles. But first it is necessary to consider just what the nature of the state is.

C. THE STATE.

The nature of the state has already been indicated: it is an association of human beings, a society, that is public, permanent, natural, and perfect. The specific end or purpose delineates the state, or political society, most clearly and differentiates it most sharply from all other social groups. The intrinsic and immediate purpose of the state is to assist its members in the attainment of their immediate end in life, temporal well-being and happiness. Since the state exists, not merely for this or that individual, but for all its members, it is the function of the state to provide for the common welfare or the common good of all. The common good is then the purpose of all the activities of the state.

It may be defined as "the totality of material and moral conditions which, in a natural and normal order, permit persons so willing to endeavor to attain to temporal happiness, and the eternal happiness towards which this is ordained."¹⁰ The common good is not merely the sum-total of what is useful and necessary for each individual, any more than the state itself is simply a collection of isolated individuals; just as the state is something different from the individual, so also is the common good something specifically different from the wellbeing of each individual.¹¹ The common good is not concerned directly with the well-being of one or other individual, but with the welfare of all as a totality; but at the same time such a totality is not to be conceived as something apart from the individual members, for by the very nature of things this common good must necessarily redound to the well-being of each individual member.

In order that the common good may be attained, it is necessary that order prevail within the group forming the state, and therefore that some regulative force be maintained. This regulative force constitutes the government of the state. Now in the philosophy of St. Thomas, government is not something subjective, dependent upon the will and whims of the ruler, but, like authority itself, is based objectively on the end of the state, the common good, for "the order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end,"¹² and "in every community, he who governs the community, cares first of all for the common good, made by him who has charge of the community, and promulgated."¹⁴ The precise determinations of law as well as of authority are derived from the principle of finality -- the purpose of the state, the common good. "Therefore every law is ordained to the common good."¹⁵ Law is

one of the essential elements of civil society.¹⁶ Consequently, while the state is characterized by a singleness of purpose or end, the common good, it is through the unity of authority, government, and law that this singleness of purpose is achieved, and through it one state is differentiated from another.

This brief outline of the teaching of St. Thomas regarding the state has indicated the chief characteristics of the Thomastic doctrine. The state is a natural society because it is based on the rational and social nature of man and is necessary for the complete development of that nature. As a public society the state embraces a large number of persons united by the bond of a common purpose, the promotion of their common welfare. Permanence is assured to this society through the stabilizing principles of authority and law. The perfection of this society is to be judged by its ability to provide adequately for the common good of its members. What is remarkable in the political system of St. Thomas is its thoroughly consistent objective and teleological character, its firm foundation on the nature of man and the principle of finality.

But the examination of the principles of Thomistic political philosophy cannot stop at the isolated, individual state. The very notion of the common good involves relations with other societies outside the state. The more one state depends upon another for its complete provision of that totality of material and moral conditions known as the common good, as is the case at the present time, the more evident becomes the necessity of the proper coordination of states through some form of society for the purpose of achieving a common good of a still higher order -- the common good of all states and of all humanity, which will redound to the common

good within each state, and finally to the well-being of each individual member. The principles of Thomism, when drawn to their logical conclusions, will lead to the concept of a society of states.¹⁷

D. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OR SOCIETY OF STATES.

While the principles of St. Thomas, if developed to their logical conclusions, lead to the notion and the necessity of an international society or society of states, it is not contended that St. Thomas himself explicitly elaborated such a doctrine. That he did not, however, develop a complete theory of international society in the modern sense of the term is not surprising; in fact, as Benkert remarks, if St. Thomas had done so it would have been a pure anachronism, for at the time of St. Thomas the political organization of Europe was still dominated by the feudal system, and the formation of the new states along racial and cultural lines was still too embryonic for him to perceive their complete development into the national states of modern times.¹⁸ But three centuries later, when the world picture had changed radically, when the problem of the relations between the national states of Europe came into the foreground, the political principles of St. Thomas were expanded and applied to international relations by a man who is distinguished both as the originator of the Thomist revival in Spain and as a pioneer in the field of international law and relations, Francis de Vitoria. Although an original thinker and philosopher in his own right, Francis de Vitoria remained faithful to the objective social principles of St. Thomas. Like that of the Master, his whole social and political philosophy is dominated by the notion of finality. In his political system, too, it is the

end or purpose, the common good, which determines the intrinsic structure of the state, its internal public power, authority, sovereignty, and law.¹⁹

But let us now take a closer look at the natural society of states, the purpose being to show that the exigencies of human nature itself require such a society. Reasons for the existence and necessity of a society of states will be drawn from a two-fold source: 1. the fact that nature itself has provided the basis and pattern for such a society in the unity and solidarity of the human race; 2. the principle of human sociability and the organic structure of society require a society of states to complete the social hierarchy.

The basic reasons for the unity and solidarity of the human race have been admirably summarized by Pope Pius XII in his encyclical letter Summi Pontificatus. In a single, brief passage Pope Pius XII expresses the results of human thought and Christian revelation on the question of human solidarity; the fact of the unity and solidarity of mankind, founded upon the natural order, is confirmed and clarified by revelations of the supernatural order.

In the natural order, the fact of the unity of mankind is based upon: 1. the unity of man's origin; 2. the unity of human nature; 3. the unity of man's dwelling place on earth; 4. the unity of man's immediate end and mission in this world.²⁰ These reasons are in reality a condensation of the Thomistic teaching regarding the origin, nature, and end of man.

The unity of man's origin may be taken either in the sense of his ultimate origin from God, or of the immediate origin of the whole human race from common human ancestors. The unity of man's nature is the immediate consequence of this unity of man's origin. All men possess essen-

tially the same type of physical body. But more important than this is the essential sameness of the spiritual principle in man -- the soul. The third fact, the common dwelling place -- the earth, is obvious enough, and the fourth, the unity of the immediate end and mission in this world -- is evident from what has already been said regarding the Thomistic notion of the end of man and of society.

To the natural reasons for the unity and solidarity of the human race Pope Pius adds those that are derived from supernatural sources; the unity of the supernatural end of man and of the means to achieve that end; the unity of man's Creation in the image of God and of his Redemption through Jesus Christ; the unity of mutual love and charity flowing from mankind's common Redemption and destiny. "These," concludes Pope Pius, "are supernatural truths which form a solid basis and the strongest possible bond of union."²¹

Immediately after enumerating the various reasons for the unity of the human race, Pope Pius adds a profound statement which reveals the far-reaching implications of the fact of human solidarity; "In the light of this unity of all mankind, which exists in law and in fact, individuals do not feel themselves isolated units, like grains of sand, but united by the very force of their nature and by their internal destiny, into an organic, harmonious mutual relationship which varies with the changing of times."²²

The fact of the unity and solidarity of mankind, based as it is on the nature of man, implies the principle of human sociability, (part of the second reason for the existence and necessity of a society of states).

The principle of human sociability postulates the necessity of the family, social, cultural, and occupational groups and the state for the

satisfaction of human needs.

But human needs do not stop at the frontiers of states. Especially in our present expanding material civilization the needs of man tend to transcend more and more the boundaries of states. Should the state refuse to go beyond the boundaries, it would be defeating its own purpose; it would be a contradiction in terms for a state, the very purpose of which is to satisfy more or less completely all the needs of its members, to set up barriers to the satisfaction of legitimate human needs. If the principle is sound that the state exists for the well-being of its members, then the conclusion is likewise sound that the state should reach beyond its own confines to other states to give and to receive mutual assistance, in order thereby to provide more completely for the common welfare. Hence, "it is evident that the same law of sociability which leads individuals to seek in mutual help the necessary support of their own weakness and native indigence, obliges States to obtain by close and constant collaboration the means of fulfilling adequately their purpose in regard to their own subjects."²³ It is interesting to note that Francis de Vitoria bases his theory of international society and relations on this principle of human sociability.

The last reason for the existence and necessity of a society of states is that the principle of the organic structure of society, which is fundamental in Thomistic social and political philosophy, requires it to complete the social hierarchy. St. Thomas indicates this by his analogy of society to the organism of man or lower animals. Just as the physical organism is composed of many parts, the functions of which are ordered by one central regulative force, the vital principle or soul,

for the good of the whole organism, so also society is composed of many individual members whose activities are also coordinated and directed by a central regulative force (authority) for the common good of the whole society. Society is, however, obviously not a physical organism; rather, it is commonly designated as a moral organism. The important point to be emphasized -- and it is this that gives society its organic structure -- is the reciprocal character of the functions and relations of the members of society among themselves and between the members of society and the society as a whole. As St. Thomas expresses it:

It must be observed that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil done to a member of society, redounds to the whole society.²⁴

But not only are the individual human members of a society inter-related within that society so as to give it its organic structure, social groups must be integrated with one another in a social hierarchy. Thus, families are coordinated into communities, these again into other communities, up to the more comprehensive society of the state. As St. Thomas expresses it, "an ordered multitude is part of another multitude, as the domestic multitude is part of the civil multitude."²⁵

It was Vitoria again who carried this doctrine of St. Thomas regarding the organic structure of society to its logical conclusion and thus completed the hierarchy of social institutions, by supplementing the individual state with the society of states. According to him:

As individuals cannot live well in isolation, neither can states; as individuals need the assistance of others and enter into relations with one another, so also must states; as the product of these mutual relations among individuals in civil society, so also the mutual and necessary relations between states

should produce a society of states: finally, just as the individual members of civil society are directed by a common authority, so also should the state-members of the society of states be coordinated by the authority of the whole world. ²⁶

This is Vitoria's view of an organized world. This is the society of states which Vitoria visualized -- the organic structure of the society of states.

The fact of the unity of mankind, therefore, coupled with the principle of human sociability and the organic structure of society, will yield but one conclusion: that there exists in nature, potentially at least, a society which embraces all mankind, which by the laws of natural development and through human efforts should be actualized in the form of an organized society. The Thomistic international society is, therefore, the organic society of states envisioned by Vitoria. Our next step will be to examine the basic requirements for such an organic society of states.

II. BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ORGANIZED SOCIETY OF STATES.

The first of these requirements is the clear recognition of the end of that society: its common good. Every society must have its own particular common good; the society of states is no exception. The relation between any society and its common good is clearly the relation of finality. After analyzing this first requirement, we shall consider: 1. the subjective requirements necessary in the states as potential or actual members of society of states: 2. the objective requirements of the society of states considered in itself.

A. THE UNIVERSAL COMMON GOOD.

According to the Thomistic principle of finality, the formation of every society is motivated by a specific end or purpose: its common good. It is the end, therefore, or common good which differentiates one society from another. Since there is a hierarchy of societies in the natural order, such as the family, city, state, and society of states, so also is there a hierarchy of common goods, for each society is differentiated and explained in terms of the special common good it is expected to attain.

Considering this hierarchy of common goods, we note that each state, considered in itself has its own common good to attain as the immediate end of its existence, but when considered as a member of the society of states the common good of each state becomes a particular good in relation to the good of the whole society of states -- the universal common good. Such a subordination of one good to another does not imply that the inferior in order is deficient or second - rate in nature; it indicates, rather, the proper integration of each in the hierarchy of societies and the common goods.²⁷

The universal common good does not consist simply in the summation of the common goods of the various states, nor is it something independent of them; as is characteristic of the general notion of the common good, this universal common good consists in the integration of the common goods of all states and peoples, their unification and elevation to a single whole of a higher order, to which all states should contribute and which redounds to the well-being of the member states; this is merely the application on a higher and more comprehensive plane of the observation which

St. Thomas makes in regard to the contribution of the individual citizen to the common good of the state and its return to him in terms of increased personal well-being.²⁹

In the mind of Vitoria, this universal common good of the whole world exists prior to the formation of any organized universal society of states; as a matter of fact, it is the one great motivating force, the final cause, which must inspire the formation of such a society. For this universal common good is the natural and objective norm for the promotion of the general welfare of all peoples in accordance with the law of nature and the designs of the external Lawgiver and Creator of nature.³⁰

Two essential elements are implied in the notion of the universal common good: 1. the preservation of peace and order among states. 2. the promotion of the economic, social, and cultural progress of mankind through collective institutions.

A prime requisite for the existence of any society is peace and order among its members. Since the time of St. Augustine, peace has become synonymous with order. In his celebrated definition of peace, St. Augustine stated that "the peace of all things is the tranquillity of order," and described order as "the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place."³¹ St. Thomas comments on this definition, and says that "peace includes concord and adds something thereto," for the concord required for true peace is not that which is based on fear, threats, or domination, but a well-ordered concord arising from a spontaneous agreement of wills.³²

International peace signifies a modus vivendi in which states respect one another's rights and refrain from violating them. But when used in

the Thomistic sense, peace means much more; it implies order -- the ordering of all states towards the universal common good. Hence, the true notion of peace itself contains implicitly the second element required for the universal common good, namely, the promotion of the economic, social, and cultural well-being of the peoples of the various states and of all mankind.

B. SUBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS IN STATES CONSIDERED AS MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.

Before the organization of a society of states can even be attempted it is absolutely necessary, first of all, that the states themselves (which, of course, means the people of these states, particularly those responsible for their government) recognize and agree upon the fundamental principles which underlie the concept of universal society. Without such recognition and agreement upon sound common principles, any and all attempts to organize an effective society of states will prove futile. These common fundamental principles are at root moral principles.

States must of necessity be inspired by a common agreement on basic moral principles as the norm for international relations. If, instead, they are guided by a positivistic or pragmatic outlook, the effects on international life will be disastrous in the future, as they have been in the past; instead of a genuine concern for the universal common good, economic advantage or enlightened self-interest becomes the sole motivating force in the state's conduct of its external affairs. The result is the "drift towards chaos" described by Pope Pius XII in his Encyclical

Letter Summi Pontificatus.

The present age, by adding new errors to the doctrinal aberrations of the past, has pushed these to extremes which lead inevitably to a drift towards chaos. Before all else, it is certain that the radical and ultimate cause of the evils which we deplore in modern society is the denial and rejection of a universal norm of morality as well for individual and social life as for international relations.³³

In the same document Pope Pius indicates the nature of these fundamental principles upon which states must agree if they are to build a permanent international structure, namely, the principles of the natural law and divine positive law of God.

Once the bitterness and the cruel strifes of the present have ceased, the new order of the world, of national and international life, must rest no longer on the quicksands of changeable and ephemeral standards, that depend only on the selfish interests of groups and individuals. No, they must rest on the unshakable foundation, on the solid rock of natural law and of Divine Revelation. There the human legislator must attain to that balance, that keen sense of moral responsibility, without which it is easy to mistake the boundary between the legitimate use and the abuse of power. Thus only will his decisions have internal consistency, noble dignity and religious sanction, and be immune from selfishness and passions.³⁴

The common acceptance of these fundamental moral principles, however, is the first step, but not the last; the principles themselves must be made operative through the moral virtues of justice and charity. (Though it would be possible to spend an entire paper on either of these topics, because of the nature of this particular paper, only a few basic statements will be mentioned pertaining to the matter at hand.)

Justice is the primary social virtue, as St. Thomas says, "whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perfect will."³⁵ It is the function of justice to preserve a certain equality in human relations

-- not a rigid mathematical equality by which each must receive the same share, but a moral equality by which each receives his due -- through respect for the rights of others which are derived from nature and protected by law.³⁶

Of the three types of justice, commutative, distributive, and general (or Social), when applied to international life, obligations of commutative justice exist irrespective of any organizations or states into a positive society, whereas the obligations of distributive and general justice exist in the full sense of the terms only within a specific society.

In their direct relations with one another states are bound by commutative justice, just as are individuals, to render to each state what is due to it. Thus, on the basis of commutative justice states are obligated to observe their mutual pacts and agreements, so long as these have been freely and justly entered into by the parties concerned. Distributive justice is concerned with the proportionate distribution of the benefits of the common good among the individual members of society. It is therefore evident that this virtue has a special function to perform in international society in the proper distribution of the benefits of the universal common good to all peoples and states. And thirdly, the existence of a universal common good necessitates the exercise of general or social justice, by which all things are properly ordered to the common good.

Although justice, particular and general, provides the moral basis for international social order, it does not stand alone; if it is to be effective, justice needs the support of charity, benevolence, or good will. To use the expressive phrase of Pope Pius XII, international relations

"must be actuated by justice and crowned by charity."³⁷

According to St. Thomas, justice removes the obstacles to peace by rectifying injuries done or damage caused, but true peace, the ordered concord of wills, is in the final analysis the work of charity.³⁸ The same Doctor said elsewhere that without the mutual aid of friendship and charity, society itself could not exist.³⁹ There is, consequently, a universal law of charity in the natural order as well as in the supernatural order. This universal law of charity binds all states as well as individuals. As in the case of justice, the law of universal benevolence or charity involves a two-fold movement, according to which states are obliged to show good will and benevolence to other states taken separately, and towards the community of states as a whole.

In relation to the necessity and function of charity in international society, the words of Benkert are again apropos:

It is not as fantastic as it might sometimes seem to consider international relations as really to be governed by charity. On the contrary, it is futile and utopian to imagine a real regime of international justice apart from the leavening and life-giving influence of charity. A spirit of mutual good will, understanding and sympathy is essential. Without it, even the clearest and most fundamental obligations in justice will be evaded, and the best guarantees useless. For justice is sterile and lifeless, unless charity give it life and vigour in the hearts of men.⁴⁰

C. OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS IN AN ORGANIZED SOCIETY OF STATES.

The requirements to be considered in this section are the essential constituents of the organized society of states, without which it would be impossible for the society to function effectively. They are really re-

ducible to the one primary requisite: authority, but since there are several specific functions of authority, (judicial, legislative, and coercive) we shall very briefly look at each of these under the following titles: judicial power, law, sanctions.

The necessity of authority in society is a conclusion which St. Thomas deduces from the nature of man and of society itself: "If, therefore, it is natural for man to live in the society of many, it is necessary that there exist among men some means by which the group may be governed."⁴¹ A certain amount of authority is required in every society, in which it is necessary to direct several or many members to the one common good; this is true even of the smallest of societies, the family. But among the societies of the natural order, authority is found in its fullness only in political society, for it is the specific function of such society to provide for the complete common good of man (again in the natural order). Political society in this sense is not restricted to the state, but connotes the complete and integral political order which includes the society of states as well as the individual states. Public power or authority is, therefore, an essential requisite, not only for the state, but also for the society of states.⁴²

Regarding the necessity of judicial power as the first of the essential requisites for an adequate authority in the society of states, little needs to be said. Before peace can be effectively secured it is necessary first of all that the obstacles of conflicting claims be removed and difficulties composed through the proper administration of justice.

The second requisite for an effective international authority is the power to legislate (law) -- to direct the activities of the members of the

society of states to the universal common good by means of law. Such legislative enactments are positive laws in the strict sense. The relations between states in the organized society of states are not regulated, however, solely by positive enactments of the international legislative authority: underlying these enactments are the natural law, binding all men under all social conditions, and that body of law regulating interstate relations, called international law, which has been developed prior to the explicit organization of a society of states. These positive international laws, established for the universal common good of humanity, have a binding force, and obligate states (the people, and especially those responsible for the government of states), just as positive civil laws, enacted for the common good of the state, bind in conscience the citizens of the state.

Finally, if the very notion of public authority implies the power to judge and to legislate, it also by its very nature must possess the power to enforce its decisions and laws. The latter is contained in the former as the necessary means to achieve the end, for a decision or law which has no binding force or sanction is no more than a recommendation, an admonition to be accepted or rejected at will. Hence, St. Thomas says that law by its very nature implies two things: first, that it is a rule of human actions, and secondly that it has coercive power.⁴³

Applied to the organized society of states, the necessity of coercive power immediately raises the question of international sanctions. But it is at once evident that if the organized society of states is to have authority to render decisions on international questions and to legislate for the common good of all states, it must also possess the power to

enforce these decisions and enactments by means of effective sanctions.

CONCLUSION

In the introduction of this work was quoted the statement of Pope Pius XI indicating the significance of the doctrine of St. Thomas as the basis for a true international society. There Pope Pius expressly mentioned that St. Thomas treats of social and political subjects not only from the natural order, but from the supernatural order as well. In the same introduction it was noted that the particular approach to the problem of international society followed in these pages would be that of philosophy, and specifically of Thomistic philosophy. For this reason the concept of an international society based on right reason and the natural law has been emphasized; yet, this approach does not imply any denial or undervaluation of the supernatural; rather, it is certainly acknowledged that the supernatural order rises above and supplements the natural order. As the conclusion to this work, therefore, the important contribution of the principles of supernatural revealed religion to international order and the formation of international society will be indicated very briefly⁴⁴

Pius XII, gives expression to the need of the principles of revealed religion to vivify and supplement the principles of the natural law: "the new order of the world, of national and international life, ... must rest on the unshakable foundation, on the solid rock of natural law and Divine Revelation."⁴⁵ Let us then briefly summarize the chief points in the outline of a society of states based upon principles of the natural order, and see how the principles of the supernatural order, of revealed

Christian teaching, animate, strengthen, and supplement each.⁴⁶

1. In the natural order the existence of a universal society embracing all men and all peoples is postulated by the nature of man and his natural social tendencies. Pope Pius XII, while fully admitting the natural unity of the human race, regarded the unity of this race from the supernatural point of view as "a marvelous vision, which makes us see the human race in the unity of one common origin in God, 'one God and Father of all, Who is above all, and through all, and in us all' (Ephesians iv, 6)." He concludes, after enumerating the various supernatural factors making for human unity: "These are supernatural truths which form a solid basis and the strongest possible bond of a union, that is reinforced by the law of God and of our Divine Redeemer, from Whom all receive salvation 'for the edifying of the Body of Christ: until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ' (Ephesians, iv, 12, 13)."⁴⁷

Less than a month after Pius XII had written these words on the unity of human society, he took occasion to draw a practical conclusion from these thoughts when, responding to an address of homage by the Minister of Haiti to the Holy See, he pleaded for moral dispositions which would make possible among the nations "a stable, fruitful international organization such as is desired by men of good will, an organization which, respecting the rights of God, will be able to assure the reciprocal independence of nations big and small, to impose fidelity to agreements loyally agreed upon, and to safeguard the sound liberty and dignity of the human person in each one's effort towards the prosperity of all..."⁴⁸

This argument for the necessity of organizing juridically the community of nations in a manner proportionate to and protective of their natural unity is basic in the so-called "Five Point Peace Program" which Pope Pius XII set forth in his Christmas message of December 24, 1939.

Here it is necessary to give a brief sketch of the "Five Points" because of the great importance that they play in international order. They are the fundamental postulates of any just and honorable peace.

The point that Pius XII put first was a development of the basic principles of international relations which his encyclical Summi Pontificatus had opposed to the arbitrary policy of the totalitarian states; he claimed again "an assurance for all nations great or small, powerful or weak, of their right to life and independence."⁴⁹

Point two "requires that the nations be delivered from the slavery imposed upon them by the race for armaments."⁵⁰ Pius XII specified that such a "mutually agreed, organic, and progressive disarmament" must be not only material but also spiritual.

The third point: "...Hence, in order that a peace may be honourably accepted and in order to avoid arbitrary breaches and unilateral interpretations of treaties, it is of the first importance to erect some juridical institution which shall guarantee the loyal and faithful fulfilment of the conditions agreed upon, and which shall, in case of recognized need, revise and correct them."⁵¹

In point 4, Pius XII gave an instructive example of cases in which treaties ought to be subject, if necessary, "to an equitable and covenanted revision ... by peaceful methods."⁵² He raised the delicate problem of "real needs and the just demands of nations and populations, and of

racial minorities."⁵³ In doing so, he touched on the most dangerous and frequent "incentives to violent action," and, at the same time, on the difficult problem of adjusting "the balance between nations," a balance not of power, but of rights.

In his point five he summed up his own doctrine as well as that of his predecessors, repeating that real peace was impossible without justice and charity under the law of God, which had been proclaimed in the Sermon on the Mount. And he emphasized the hope that this Christian ideal, in its most general expression, "May serve as a common ground also for those who have not the blessing of sharing the same faith with us."⁵⁴

2. There exists a universal common good of all men and all peoples; it is the recognition of this common good which provides the motivating impulse for the formation of a true society of states. Yet this universal common good itself cannot be fully appreciated without taking into account the final end of man, which is a "supernatural end, God Himself, to Whom all should tend."⁵⁵ Furthermore, this universal common good implies order and peace among all peoples, and peace is directly and primarily the work of charity, not simply and solely natural benevolence, but supernatural charity.⁵⁶

3. No true international society can be organized and effectively maintained without the agreement of the members on necessary fundamental principles. These are in the first instance principles of the natural order derived from the natural law. Yet the truths of Divine Revelation give solidity and stability to this natural foundation; both together constitute "the unshakable foundation" and "the solid rock of natural law and Divine Revelation."⁵⁷

4. The moral virtues of justice and charity are an indispensable condition for the proper functioning of an international society. Of these, charity is the distinctive Christian virtue; through it the love of man for his fellow man is based not simply on likeness of nature, but especially on likeness through creation by God and through our common Redemption by Jesus Christ, by reason of which men become the adopted sons of a common Father and brothers one of another. Christian charity, therefore, is universal in scope, extending to all men of all nations.

5. Authority is an essential requisite for an international society. This authority -- judicial, legislative, and coercive -- is required by the very nature of man and society, and is therefore based on and derived from the natural law. But supernatural revelation ennobles this authority and strengthens its binding power through its doctrine concerning the Creator of nature from Whom all authority is derived, "for there exists no authority except from God." (Romans xiii, 1.)

6. Individual states are related to the society of states as parts to the whole, not physically but morally, as members of a moral organism. Both the members individually and the society as a whole have specific ends and functions which are not to be confused or absorbed, one by another. These two elements of the integral political order -- individual member states and the society as a whole -- give rise respectively to the duties of patriotism and internationalism in the true sense of the terms. Both of these are recognized, safeguarded, and encouraged as mutually compatible by the principles of Christianity. As Pope Pius says:

Nor is there any fear lest the consciousness of universal brotherhood aroused by the teaching of Christianity, and the spirit which it inspires, be in contrast

with the love of traditions or the glories of one's fatherland, or impede the progress of prosperity or legitimate interests. For that same Christianity teaches that in the exercise of charity we must follow a God-given order, yielding the place of honor in our affections and good works to those who are bound to us by special ties. Nay, the Divine Master Himself gave an example of this preference for His own country and fatherland, as He wept over the coming destruction of the Holy City. But legitimate and well-ordered love of our native country should not make us close our eyes to the all-embracing nature of Christian charity, which calls for consideration of others and of their interests in the pacifying light of love.⁵⁸

From this it is evident that the Christian Religion with its revealed truths and moral teaching is an exceedingly important and vital force in promoting peaceful and orderly relations between men and nations. Even if the philosopher, political theorist, or practical statesman would not accept this Religion as divinely revealed, he is nevertheless forced to acknowledge its importance as a powerful sociological factor making for unity among men and nations. So powerful, in fact, is this force of Christianity that some regard it as the sole basis for international order and a community of states. According to these, the only feasible and workable community of states is that which is composed exclusively of peoples who accept Christian principles, at least nominally, and are therefore entitled to be called Christian states.⁵⁹

This brings up the question of whether there can be a society of states for which the principles of the natural law serve as a basis, or must such a society be based only on Christian principles and embrace only Christian states? The answer is that it is not necessary to set up such a dilemma, for there is no contradiction between the natural and the Christian basis. The supernatural ennobles the natural, but does not contradict or destroy it. That there is a natural basis in the rational and social

nature of man and in the natural law for a genuine international community has definitely been proven, it is hoped, by this work. But the supernatural, Christian basis strengthens and solidifies the natural basis. The one is good, but the other is better. It would certainly be the ideal if all states throughout the world would be Christian states, guided really, not merely nominally, by Christian principles, and if these states were organized into a community of states founded on Christian teaching. But this is far from a reality at the present time.

Finally, therefore, Pope Pius XII has indicated the fundamental teaching of Thomistic philosophy, as well as of Christianity, in a brief paragraph which is at once both an excellent summary and an appropriate conclusion to this work.

A disposition, in fact, of the divinely-sanctioned natural order divides the human race into social groups, nations or States, which are mutually independent in organization and in the direction of their internal life. But for all that, the human race is bound together by reciprocal ties, moral and juridical, into a great common wealth directed to the good of all nations and ruled by special laws which protect its unity and promote its prosperity.⁶⁰

FOOTNOTES.

1. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Studiorum Ducem.
1. Benkert, Gerald F., The Thomistic Conception of an International Society, Washington, The C.U. Press, Cap. II, p.48.
2. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX, c. 7.
3. Summa Theologica, I, q. 1, a. 2.
4. Ibid., I, II, q. 1, a. 2.
5. Benkert, op. cit., Cap II, pp. 50-52.
6. Summa Contra Gentiles, III, Cap. 85. It may be noted while Aristotle used the single term "political animal" (Politics 1,2 -- 1253 a.3, 8b., 3,6 -- 1278 b.19, and Nic. Ethics, 1,5 -- 1097 b.11) to designate this natural propensity in man to associate with his fellowmen, especially in political society, St. Thomas added the term animal sociale to animal politicum of Aristotle. Sometimes he used the two terms in conjunction, but more frequently he used either one or the other. The opinion has been advanced that ST. Thomas used these two terms, not to express identically the same thing, nor on the other hand two different inclinations in man, but the one and same inclination in man to associate with his fellowmen, first, in simple social groups, and secondly in the more complex political society. cf. Benkert, G., op. cit., p. 52, note 11.
7. Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem, Cap. 3.
8. Ibid., Cap 3.
9. De Regimine Principum, Lib. I, Cap. 1.
10. Benkert, G., op. cit., Cap. 2, p. 62.
11. Summa Theol., II, II, q. 58, a. 7, ad 2.
12. Ibid., I, q. 108, a. 4.
13. Ibid., I, II, q. 21, a. 4.
14. Ibid., I, II, q. 90, a. 4.
15. Ibid., I, II, q. 90, a. 2.

16. Summa Theol., I, II, q. 105, a. 2.
17. Benkert, G., op. cit., Cap II, pp. 69-70.
18. Ibid., Cap. II, p. 70.
19. Ibid., Cap. II, p. 71.
20. Ibid., Cap. II, p. 75.
21. Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Letter, Summi Pontificatus.
22. Ibid.
23. A Code of International Ethics, - Oxford: The Catholic Social Guild, 1940, p. 12.
24. Summa Theol., I, II, q. 21, a. 3.
25. Ibid., III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2.
26. Benkert, G., op. cit., Cap II, p. 87.
27. Ibid., Cap II, pp. 90-1.
28. Ibid., Cap II, p. 91.
29. Summa Theol., II, II, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2.
30. Benkert, G., op. cit., Cap II, p. 93.
31. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX, p. 13.
32. Summa Theol., II, II, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1.
33. Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Letter Summi Pontificatus.
34. Ibid.
35. Summa Theol., II, II, q. 58, a. 1.
36. Ibid., II, II, q. 57, a. 1.
37. Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Letter, Summi Pontificatus.
38. Summa Theol., II, II, q. 29, a. 3, ad 3.
39. Summa Contra Gentiles. III, Cap 13.
40. Benkert, G., op. cit., Cap 3, pp. 108.

41. De REg. Prin., Lib. I, Cap 1.
42. Benkert, G., op. cit., Cap 4, p. 109.
43. Summa Theol., I, II, q. 96, a. 5.
44. By supernatural revealed religion is meant the Christian Religion as handed down through nineteen centuries by the Church of Christ, the Catholic Church. Also it might be well to mention here that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural order (referring to the concept of an international society) is based on the authority of the three writers which were used extensively throughout this work: Pius XII, Gerald F. Benkert, O.S.B., and John J. Wright. (A quotation from Pius XII, which immediately follows this paragraph expresses this distinction well.)
45. Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Letter Summi Pontificatus.
46. The following 5 points will be taken in general from Benkert, G., op. cit., pp. 178-9.
47. Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Letter Summi Pontificatus.
48. Pius XII and Peace, (pamphlet) Washington: N.C.W.C.
49. Pius XII, Christmas Message, 1939, Koenig, H.C., Principles for Peace, Milwaukee: Bruce, 1943.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Letter Summi Pontificatus.
56. Summa Theol., II, II, q. 29, a. 3, ad 3.
57. Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Letter Summi Pontificatus.
58. Ibid.
59. Hoffman, Ross J. F., The Great Republic, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942, pp. 153-4.

60. Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Letter Summi Pontificatus.

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