

U. I. O. D. G. et J. M. J.

Theodicy

Ralph J. Reichert

August 17, 1945

II Philosophy

THEORIES OF PANTHEISM: REFUTATION

*


*

* * *

* * * * *

* * *

*



OUTLINE

I. Introduction.

II. Pantheistic theories.

A. Classification of ancient and medieval pantheistic theories, according to the following:

1. God is the matter of the world.
2. God is the form or soul of the world.
3. God is the necessary efficient cause of the world.
4. God is the world.

B. Modern pantheists,--after St. Thomas: Spinoza, Fichte, etc.

III. Refutation.

A. Reasons for the development of these theories.

B. Thesis;

1. Proof I.p. God is not the matter of the world;
2. Proof II.p. nor the substantial form of the world;
3. Proof III.p. neither does God act externally by a necessity of his nature;
4. Proof IV.p. God and the world are distinct.

C. Application of refutation to the different theories.

D. Morality and pantheism.

IV. Conclusion.

In man there is an unquenchable thirst for knowledge. In almost all groups of men this thirst has centered primarily on the One whom they knew must be the cause and reason for the reality they knew through their own experiences. First they want to know something about this First Cause. After that they attempt to discover how He is the cause and reason of the universe. Many theories have been advanced to answer the latter question; only one is correct. However among the erroneous theories a prominent one is Pantheism, or Monism.

Pantheism is an ancient doctrine. At least as early as 1500 B.C. it was a part of Indian philosophy and it was the basis of Lao-Tse's doctrine in China in 604 B.C. Pantheism has continued, with a lull in the early ages of Christianity, until our own time, having many famous and colorful supporters throughout so many centuries. Despite its fallacy, pantheism is an interesting object of study and is important yet today because of our comparative proximity to some of the most influential Pantheists.

Let us roughly divide the systems of pantheism into four kinds; (a) Pantheism that teaches that God is the matter of the world; (b) Pantheism that teaches that God is the form or soul of the world; (c) Pantheism that teaches that God caused the world by a necessity of his nature; and (d) pantheism that teaches that God and the world are one. In our study of the main pantheistic theories, let us first study the ancient and medieval theories according to this division and then go on to the modern proposals to see how they can be reduced to the older theories.

Among those that held that God is the matter of the world the first to come to our attention is the Early Ionian School, especially Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. We shall not be so rash as to state definitely that this school taught materialistic Pantheism, for which reason it may be wondered why it is mentioned. The fact is they taught hylozoism in a form which many call pantheism.

Documents are rare and so we cannot be certain of their theory, but it may be inferred that by their hylozoistic cosmology they believed God to be the substance of the universe.(1)

If, however, the Early Ionians were not definitely materialistic monists, David of Dinant was, beyond doubt. For it was not without reason that St. Thomas so severely reprimanded him with these words: "Tertius (error) fuit Davidis de Dinando qui stultissime posuit Deum esse materiam primam."(2) This pantheism of David of Dinant is the most absolute materialism for it places God as the very prime matter of all things. We learn from St. Thomas that included in this doctrine is this that there are three categories of Being--separate eternal substances, souls, and bodies--which really are the same:

Divisit enim res in partes tres, in corpora, animas et substantias separatas. Et primum indivisibile ex quo constituuntur corpora dixit Yle; primum autem indivisibile ex quo constituuntur animae dixit Noym, vel mentem; primum autem indivisibile in substantiis aeternis dixit Deum. Et haec tria esse unum et idem; ex quo iterum consequitur esse omnia per essentiam unum.(3)

Among the Greeks there also appears a school teaching that God is the form of the world--the Later Ionian Philosophers, founded by Heraclitus--who held that "all is becoming". With his doctrine of nothing permanent, which Heraclitus held absolutely, and his doctrine of fire, by which he held that all things are made up of fire, we might at first classify him as one who holds that God is the matter of the world. But the doctrine is not simple as that, and when we see that he posits divine fire as the constitutive of the human soul, we tend to put him in the second division.

The Stoics, of the 2nd century, B.C., appear as the next important proponents of this type of monism. They held simply that God is at once the Author and the soul of the universe. He is the principle of all life and motion, of all action. Whether he resides in the earth they did not agree upon, though they were sure

that he diffused himself throughout all the universe. Yet here again classification is not easy, for though God is the soul of the world, he is still all material, for the stoics were pure materialists. Hence it is seen why they called God at one time "Mind", and at another, "Fire", "Ether", or "Air".(4)

Among the third group of pantheists, those who hold that God necessarily created the universe, we find the Latin Averroists. Though this is not expressed in their doctrine, it lies implicitly at least in the doctrine of Averroes himself, for he held that God created the universe from all eternity, which doctrine, since Averroes held it was necessary that God did create from eternity, shows Averroes belief that it was necessary on the part of God to create.

Another doctrine which holds that God necessarily created the world is emanationism which explains all reality as formed by a necessary emanation of the supreme Principle. Plotinus (205-270 A.D.) and the Neo-Platonists posit four degrees in the scale of emanations, the One, Intelligence, the World-Soul, and Matter. (a) The One is the highest degree: it is the Supreme transcendent Essence which has all perfections. The One principiates, as it were (emanates--without diffusing the substance of the One!) the Intelligence(b), by shedding the Intelligence about itself. The Intelligence is inferior to the One by its dependent principiation, and it cannot contain all that it receives from the One, so that it knows only by spreading all into a multitude of ideas, through which the One knows itself. The Intelligence necessarily produces the World Soul(c), which is some kind of nature containing ideas and forces, and which in turn generates Matter(d). Matter is merely a place for the forces of the World Soul, which is really non-being, as Plato held. It is important, before condemning this as pantheism, to determine (which has not been done) the type of production of the Intelligence by the One, for,

If we inquire whether this philosophy is a form of pantheism, we may say that it is so if the Intelligence which the One voluntarily begets

is regarded as one of its (own) energies; in any case the rest of reality is a necessary effusion from Intelligence and hangs upon the Mind's thought. (5)

A second important exponent of emanationistic Pantheism was John Scotus Erigena (800/15-877). According to Erigena there is only one being, God; all other things proceed from Him as if by substantial emanations or participations. He divides all reality into these four: (a) *Natura quae creat et non creatur*; (b) *Natura quae creatur et creat*; (c) *Natura quae creatur et non creat*; and (d) *Natura quae nec creatur nec creat*. Thus the first is God, the principle and source of all things. By *Natura quae creatur et creat* Erigena understood God as containing the primordial types of all things, and conceived as such he might be called the Word or Logos. Erigena states that the primordial types or causes, coeternal with God, flow from God, by which mode of procession the system is clearly pantheistic. *Natura quae creatur et non creat* is a part of God for it is derived from God, as by a mode of participation in the divine nature. This is the world of phenomena, our world, which is subject to change. The fourth division of nature, *Natura quae nec creatur nec creat*, is God as the end of all things. Erigena saw that all things return to God as to their goal. This he saw in the universe, for the skies return to their original form every twenty-four hours; the sun returns to its starting point every four years, etc. This he found especially true of man who will not rest until he return to his end, to God.

And now let us turn to what we might call total pantheism: God and the world are one. The first important exponent of this kind of system was Parmenides (540 B.C.), most important in the Eleatic School, and one of the first important metaphysicians in the history of philosophy. Parmenides' problem was that of Being, which he took in a purely univocal sense that led him directly to Pantheism. William Turner tells us of Parmenides' system:

The greatest error lies in treating Being and non-Being as the same. From this fundamental error arise the opinions of men. Truth lies in thought, for "nothing can be but what can be thought". The senses lead to error. Being, therefore, is, and since not-Being is not, Being is one. It is consequently unchangeable and unproduced, despite the testimony of the senses to the contrary. For how could Being be produced? Either from not-Being, which does not exist, or from Being, in which case it was before it began to be. Therefore it is unproduced, unchangeable, undivided, whole, homogenous, equally balanced on all sides, like a perfect sphere.(6)

Since the being which is evident to us is evidently produced, changeable, divided, composite, and heterogeneous, our senses therefore deceive us.

In Medieval times we see the total pantheism of Amalric of Bene. The following quotations from the Opera of Gerson show clearly what Amalric intended:

Cum in Ipso sint omnia, imo Ipse sit omnia...non facile posse negari Creatorem et creaturam idem esse.

Omnia esse unum. Deum esse essentiam omnium creaturarum et esse unum.(7)

Gerson's account is substantiated by the testimony of the council of Paris (1210) which condemned Amalric.(8)

Going on now to the modern theories of pantheism our attention is first drawn to the system of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600). According to Bruno God and the universe are identical, because the universe is infinite, and there cannot be two infinities. To explain this identity Bruno points out that God is the Being; all phenomena are but accidental forms of being unfolding from the Being. Truly God is the matter of the world (on this point he cites, and agrees with, David of Dinant), and also the form of it, or the world soul--hence we may compare his doctrine to that of the Stoics. Turner points out that, according to Bruno,

...these two, matter, and form, not only interpenetrate each other, but are absolutely identical. (9)

Wherefore we see that Giordano Bruno carried his system out fully as an interpretation of his first assumption, that God and the world are identical, on which account we can reduce this system primarily to the total pantheism of Parmenides and Anaximander of Miletus who held that God is the world.(10)

From his own definition of substance Baruch Spinoza drove straight into total pantheism. For, according to Spinoza, "Substantia est id quod in se est et per se concipitur." We find that he meant to define substance as something "a se" for Gredt points out: "Spinoza enim verbis 'in se' et 'per se' excludere intendit non subiectum inhaesionis, sed causam a re distinctam.(11) It is seen that this definition of substance is quite like that made by Descartes. It was in an attempt to bridge the antithesis placed by Descartes between mind and matter that Spinoza so defined substance and worked out his system. Indeed he proved the existence of God from his idea of substance, for God is substance, and substance must exist.

For Spinoza creation is impossible, because whatever is, is God. And so the earth was not caused by any transient causal action, but God is the immanent cause of finite existence. In this manner Spinoza thought he had a way to bring together the res extensa and the res cogitans of Descartes, but of course that is not pertinent here.(12) Spinoza's doctrine also can be reduced to the total pantheism of Parmenides.

The monistic theory of Fichte may rightly be called unique. For him all reality is in the Ego. This system is thus shortly described by Father Boedder:

According to Fichte the Ego is the embodiment of all reality. All individual things, to the existence of which consciousness and experience testify, are nothing but different aspects of the infinite reality of the Ego, bound by fatal necessity to oppose itself to itself. Whatever therefore man perceives is properly speaking in himself, inasmuch as his own being is one reality with the many-sided Ego.(13)

Considered in the light of the rest of Fichte's philosophy this is no surprise, for his is absolute idealism. This system is difficult to reduce to one of the ancient or medieval kinds of Monism, but it may perhaps be compared to the total pantheism, that God is the world, but here God, or the world, is the Ego.

A close contemporary of Fichte, George W. Hegel, also derived a system of pantheism which is much like that of Parmenides in its origin for it stems from his notion of Being. The basis of this theory is that the universal really exists, whence it follows that there is one concept which expresses the most universal object, namely Being as such. Since this is the concept of the most universal object it is the foundation of all reality--indeed all things are a determination of that one Being. Hegel calls this 'Being' or 'Divine Essence', the Idea. Thought and being are the same thing, and so God is both Infinite Being and Infinite Thought. This Idea is itself infinite, generating by its own nature all finite things.(14) As this doctrine unfolds it resembles more the ancient theories which hold that God necessarily created or otherwise formed the universe.

Having thus far examined the more important pantheistic theories it is in place to refute them. But first it is interesting to see why these theories are advanced in the first place. Three reasons are advanced, which are really more in the nature of objections to creation than positive arguments for Pantheism. (a) Creation is not possible; (b) Efficient causality is impossible if it amounts to transient action going between two substances^{which} are distinct; (c) the existence of beings distinct from the infinite Being makes God imperfect.

These objections avail little. (a) That creation is impossible is usually based on the dictum, "Ex nihilo nihil fit". If this be taken to understand that everything has a material cause it is only because everything we see has a material cause, and every efficient agent we see operating we see making

something out of something material. There is no reason, however, to suppose that spiritual things demand material causes on that account, nor indeed to suppose that spiritual causes need material causes with which to make something, let alone that the Infinite God need such. No, there is no reason to say that God cannot make something "ex nihilo".

(b) Transient causal action is indeed a difficult problem of metaphysics. But equally so is the manner in which (Mercier) "a substantial agent influences an accident really distinct from itself or how one part can effectively act upon another part of the same whole".(15) Just as efficient causality denied in its system results in occasionalism, so too a denial of the distinction between the substance of the universe and its accidents brings about phenomenalism.

(c) If the things distinct from God were independent of Him, there would be a limit to God's perfection, but that God can create beings distinct from Himself, yet dependent on Himself, does not bespeak any imperfection in Him.(15)

To refute pantheism, then, in all its forms, we put forth this proposition:

GOD IS NOT THE MATTER OF THE WORLD; NOR THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM OF THE WORLD; NEITHER DOES GOD ACT EXTERNALLY BY A NECESSITY OF HIS NATURE; GOD AND THE WORLD ARE DISTINCT.

This shall be proved by parts.

Proof of Part I: GOD IS NOT THE MATTER OF THE WORLD. It is impossible that God be the matter of the world for this reason that matter, which from experience we see in motion, cannot be moved except by something other than itself, as proved by the first argument of St. Thomas for the existence of God, and expressed in the resulting dictum, "Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur." But if God

is the matter of the world, then by whom is this matter moved?

Proof of Part II: GOD IS NOT THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM OF THE WORLD. God cannot be the form of the world for then He would be something participated--He would be a part of a composite. Now a part is always less perfect than the whole of which it is a part. But God is omniperfect, as is evident from the Henological proof of St. Thomas, and from the fact that God is pure act. Further than this a composite requires a cause, whereas God is uncaused, the *Prima Causa efficiens non effecta*, as seen in the second proof of St. Thomas. Hence concerning these first two parts of the proposition St. Thomas says, "...neque possibile Deum aliquo modo in compositionem alicuius venire, nec sicut principium formale, nec sicut principium materiale".(16)

Proof of Part III: GOD DOES NOT ACT EXTERNALLY BY A NECESSITY OF HIS NATURE. This is proved by the order of agent causes whereby it is seen that every natural agent acting toward an end is directed toward it by an intelligent agent which itself must act by intellect and will and not by necessity. This is shown more clearly by St. Thomas:

Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem nature, ut quidam existimaverunt. ...Cum enim propter finem agant intellectus et natura, ut probatur in II Physicorum, necesse est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminentur finis et media necessaria ad finem ab aliquo superiori intellectu, sicut sagittae praedeterminantur finis et certus motus a sagittante. Unde necesse est quod agens per intellectum et voluntatem sit prius agente per naturam. Unde cum primum in ordine agentium sit Deus, necesse est quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat.(17)

Beyond this there is the difficulty, as Garrigou-Lagrange points out, that if the first cause acted by a necessity of its own nature, it would produce something like itself, just as an ox generates an ox. But God evidently has produced many very diverse things, all inferior to Himself. Nor could he produce another like to Himself for then there would be two infinities!(18)

And again, God does not create because of a necessity of His intellect, for there would be no motive necessitating Him to create. There is not even the motive of greater perfection, for God is already infinitely perfect and happy, and cannot acquire any additional perfection.

Proof of Part IV: GOD AND THE WORLD ARE DISTINCT. To prove this it would be best to use the formal proof advanced by Gredt to prove his thesis XXXVII: Deus est ens distinctum a mundo. It is quoted directly:

MAJOR: Deus est ens maxime unum, immutabile, omnino simplex, omni-perfectum, infinitum, necessarium.

MINOR: Atqui mundus non est maxime unus, immutabilis, omnino simplex, omniperfectus, infinitus, necessarius.

ERGO. (19)

The major stems from our very notion of God as it is demonstrated throughout the study of Theodicy a review of which is not in place here. It is proved more particularly from the fact that God is pure act, whence it follows that He is immutable, infinite, omniperfect and necessary.

We may demonstrate the minor briefly, though it is quite evident from experience. First, the world is not maxime unus, but it is manifold and complex, made up of many distinct and separated substances. Secondly, the world is a mutable being, for mundane things are changeable, accidentally, according to place, quantity, and quality, etc., and substantially, according to generation and corruption. Nor, thirdly, is the world altogether simple, for even the very individual things within the world are themselves composed, metaphysically, of the metaphysical grades of being, and physically, of quantitative parts, of matter and form, and of substance and accidents. Neither, fourthly, is the earth omni-perfect for it is composed of an aggregate of imperfect things, no number of which, when gathered together, can form an omniperfect being. And finally, the earth is not necessary, as is evinced from the fact that what changes is contingent. The

world and God, therefore, cannot be identical in any way, for this would contradict the attributes of God which are sufficiently supported by philosophical study of God.

There are indeed all sorts of ways of attacking pantheism besides those used in proving the above proposition. As authors have done, we might first refute idealistic and then realistic pantheism. Idealistic pantheism is thus described by Cardinal Mercier: "Idealistic monism makes the origin of all things to consist in an indeterminate being called the Absolute--which, on account of a law of its internal evolution, is ever progressively differentiating itself and 'becoming' all things."(20)

This doctrine arises from applying being in a univocal sense to God and to finite things. This of course cannot be done, as metaphysics shows. One result, among others, is that we then apply the notion of simplicity to both God and other beings in a univocal sense. This is done erroneously, for finite things are simple by way of negation. Simplicity applied to God is a positive perfection. But now idealistic evolution denies the real nature of God, which, as already noted, is amply demonstrated in Theodicy. For by making God become all things by internal necessity, His immutability is denied. And (Mercier) "if the result of our investigations must come to anything else than a mature reasoned conviction that God exists who is at once Pure Actuality, necessary, and infinite Being, we may as well renounce all hope of being able to demonstrate the existence of God Himself, which is the object of all Theodicy."(21)

And those who hold real pantheism do not posit any becoming or differentiation, but rather they say that the things of the world are parts of God, or manifestations of Him. This general kind of pantheism is of course refuted by Part IV of the above thesis, but it especially cannot be reconciled with the difficulty of change in the universe. A changeable being is contingent; but God must be necessary.

Beyond this there is the difficulty of the consciousness of the indivi-

dual personality. Every man is conscious that he is a free agent, that he acts freely, and independent of other men. As Cardinal Mercier puts it, "Nothing in the world can persuade me...that I am the self-expression of somebody else. The very fact that I can use of myself the word ego in opposition to whatever is non-ego implies that I am myself, that my being is incommunicable." (22) This is a great stumbling block of pantheism. Another point not to be overlooked is that all things in the universe do not tend toward the good of the world, but look to their own good first. This is especially true of men who can frustrate the designs of nature and certainly do what is not for the good of the universe. It would assuredly seem that if all things were a part of one Being, they would exist in harmony and act only for the good of the Being of which they were a part. Evidence to the contrary does not augur well for Pantheism.

Turning back to the different kinds of pantheism previously outlined, the refutation just completed can easily be applied individually. Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, the Greeks, it will be recalled, held, at least implicitly, that God is the matter of the world, as David of Dinant expressly held. This is refuted by the first part of our thesis, and we can but repeat it that if God is matter, there would be none to move matter.

Those that held that God was the substantial form of the world are refuted by the second part of the thesis. Heraclitus held that divine fire constituted the human soul, and for the Stoics He is the principle of all motion and life, neither of which is possible, for they make God participated. As to Heraclitus again, St. Thomas says:

Respondeo dicendum, quod dicere animam esse de substantia Dei, manifestam improbabilitatem continet. Ut enim ex dictis patet, anima humana est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quas omnia aliena sunt a Dei natura, qui est actus purus et nihil ab alio accipiens et nullam in se diversitatem habens... (23)

Among those holding that God created by a necessity of his nature we first met Averroes whom we can first refute by saying that there is not sufficient reason for holding this. Furthermore this necessity would make God imperfect and limited and would also deny the natural order of things by which all things are ultimately moved by an agent who moves according to an intellect and will. The Emanationists, both Plotinus and Erigena, to whom reference has been made, can be refuted in their root idea of emanation by saying simply that emanation is entirely incompatible with the unity in God, for He is "ens maxime unum", as shown in the Henological proof for the existence of God and He is actus purus, as shown in the 2nd proof, wherefore He is not even made composite by any admixture of potency with act.

Parmenides, who held that God and the world are one, got around the apparent dissemblance between the world and a true notion of God by saying that our senses deceive us. The reliability of the senses is shown in scholastic psychology, wherefore the fourth part of the thesis is applied in its full sense. Amalric of Bene is similarly refuted.

Turning again to the modern pantheists we find Giordano Bruno in the same position as Parmenides and Amalric of Bene, positing identity of God and the world, and he is refuted in the same way. However, in the first place Bruno begins with the supposition that the world is infinite, basing the identity on that. That the world is not infinite is evident from our own experience and from the scholastic proof--for the world is composite.

Baruch Spinoza's pantheism is generally refuted by the fourth part of our thesis refuting all total pantheism. But his basis--his definition of substance--must be denied; there is no valid reason for assuming it. Spinoza also had difficulty with creation; we have already shown creation possible. Fichte's pantheistic system, too, is already refuted. His idealism, in which it is in-

volved, is refuted in scholastic epistemology. The system of Hegel, whether it be considered as total pantheism or as teaching that God created by a necessity of His nature, is refuted above.

Finally, as if to reduce pantheism to absurdity, it is asked what would become of morality if pantheism were true? Granted pantheism, there can be no distinction between good and bad acts. The miser is to be praised as the philanthropist, the coward as the hero, the criminal as the honest. All human law is unnecessary, criminal detection pointless, and punishment of perverts a most ridiculous--not to say unfair--procedure. All acts are good because they are all performed by what are parts of one Reality!

And so we have seen that pantheism is a doctrine of no little fame. It has been incorporated into several religions and has had many ardent supporters among the philosophers. The burden of proof rests upon the proponents of pantheism. Many thought they proved it, but most of these based their proofs upon false assumptions. Many and varied though pantheistic theories be, they all join the world to God, or identify them, in a way which denies either the true nature of God or the true nature of the world. All pantheism can be refuted. It can be reduced to very ridiculous absurdities. These theories have come and gone for centuries; no doubt they will continue to do so. Their refutation, however, will continue to stand.

DEO GRATIAS!

- (1) Turner, William, S.T.D., "Ionian School of Philosophy", The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VIII, p. 93.
- (2) St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., Ia III, 8, c.
- (3) St. Thomas, In II^{um} Sententiarum, Dist. XVII, Q. I.
- (4) Turner, William, S.T.D., History of Philosophy (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1929) p. 168.
- (5) Mercier, Cardinal, A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1919) vol. II, p. 365.
- (6) Turner, William, History of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 47.
- (7) Gerson, Opera (Hague, 1728) vol. IV, p. 826.
- (8) Turner, William, History of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 307.
- (9) *ibid.*, p. 429.
- (10) *ibid.*, p. 429.
- (11) Gredt, Iosepho, O.S.B., Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae (Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder & Co., 1937) vol. II., p. 123.
- (12) cf. Turner, William, History of Philosophy, op.cit., pp. 468-469.
Mercier, op. cit., vol. II, 436.
Boedder, B., Natural Theology (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1921) pp. 200-205.
- (13) Boedder, op.cit., p. 205.
- (14) *ibid.*, p. 207.
- (15) Mercier, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 115, 118.
- (16) St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 3, 8.
- (17) *ibid.*, I, 19, 4.
- (18) Garrigou-Lagrange, R., O.P., God--His Existence and His Nature (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1934) vol. II, p. 459.
- (19) Gredt, op. cit., vol. II, p. 227.
- (20) Mercier, op. cit., vol. II, p. 116.
- (21) *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 117.
- (22) *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 118.
- (23) St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 90, 1.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boedder, Bernard, Natural Theology (London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1921)

Garrigou-Lagrange, R., O.P., God--His Existence and His Nature (St. Louis:
B. Herder Book., 1934)

Gredt, Iosepho, O.S.B., Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico--Thomisticae
(Eriburgi Brisgovias: Herder & Co., 1937)

Madgett, A. Patrick, S. J., Christian Origins (Cincinnati: Xavier University)

Mercier, Cardinal, A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy (St. Louis:
B. Herder Book Co., 1919)

St. Thomas: Summa Theologica
In IIum Sententiarum

Turner, William, S.T.D., History of Philosophy (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1929)

----- "Ionian School of Philosophy", The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VIII, p. 93.

