


Woodrow Wilson's Theory of Presidential Leadership:  
Application and Precedents

A Research Paper  
Submitted to the Faculty  
Of Saint Meinrad College of Liberal Arts  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
For the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

Joseph Nicholas Dant  
May, 1973  
Saint Meinrad College  
Saint Meinrad, Indiana





CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
CHAPTER I. Development of Wilson's Theory . . . . .	3
CHAPTER II. Application of Theory to Action . . . . .	14
CHAPTER III. The Legacy Left to the Office . . . . .	33
CONCLUSION . . . . .	38
FOOTNOTES . . . . .	40
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	46

## INTRODUCTION

None of (the) mighty events - the upbuilding of the positive state, our plunge into the world, the crises of war and depression, the hard times of Congress, or the triumph of democracy - would have had such influence on the presidency if strong, alert capable men had not come to this high office and shaped the event to their ends.<sup>1</sup>

Even though events are probably much stronger than men in shaping the times or an institution, strong and willful men always seem to leave their imprint. The events open up opportunities, but it takes strong and willful men to make use of those available opportunities. So it is with the presidency. Looking down through American history, the presidency was indeed given many opportunities to grow by the events that surrounded it. These were mainly periods of crisis, such as the birth of a new republic, the Civil War, the Great Depression, and so forth; but with each of these great events came also a strong and willful leader who knew how to make use of the opportunities available. Each of these men who held the presidency at these various crucial times had set precedents by their bold actions that would mold the presidency of the future. Not only did the Constitution build the presidency, but the presidents, too, helped to build the office. The president of today acts, consciously or unconsciously, in the image of the presidents who have gone before him. There are many things he could not do, if

his predecessors had not done them already.<sup>2</sup>

Woodrow Wilson was one of those strong presidents who had set precedents for the future. As Arthur S. Link states: "Few men have come to the presidency with bolder schemes of leadership or made greater contributions to the development of effective national government in the United States than Woodrow Wilson."<sup>3</sup> This thesis will examine those bold schemes of leadership that Wilson utilized and the precedents they had set for future presidents to build upon. Before this is done, though, the development of Wilson's theory on presidential leadership must be examined, for it is through looking at his theory that one understands the reasons why Wilson exercised the presidential office as he did.

## CHAPTER I

### The Development of Wilson's Theory of Presidential Leadership

The Key to a knowledge of Wilson's contribution to the presidency lies in understanding his philosophy of political leadership; and especially the role the President plays in that leadership. When Woodrow Wilson became President, he had a well developed theory on strong presidential leadership. This was not always true though, for Wilson's theory on presidential leadership came around a full circle. It is important to know that Wilson's thoughts on the presidency and the whole system of American government were influenced tremendously by his readings of the British political theorists, especially Bagehot. Upon reading these men Wilson was ever after convinced of the superiority of British parliamentary government.<sup>1</sup> Wilson thus always gave a parliamentary twist to his ideas on American government. "Many years later, as president, he would attempt with considerable success to adapt some features of the British system to American conditions - by assuming more active leadership of Congress, by developing the caucus to promote party regularity, and by taking his case on major issues directly to the people."<sup>2</sup>

Wilson's ideas on political leadership were conditioned by the men he admired the most. Naturally since he admired

the British system these men were British political leaders. Among some of the statesmen he admired were Burke, Gladstone, Cobden, and Bright; conservatives and Manchesterians.<sup>3</sup> Thus Wilson's ideas on political action were of a somewhat romantic version of British statecraft- a system in which great and magnanimous constitutional statesmen, who cherished a driving zeal for public interest, debated important questions in well-fashioned rhetoric.<sup>4</sup> Woodrow Wilson had concluded then that the ideal leader was the man strong in character, determined in purpose, and bold in vision who could lead the people forward along the road of political progress.<sup>5</sup> Wilson asks:

"In what, then does political leadership consist?... It is leadership in conduct, and leadership in conduct must discern and strengthen the tendencies that make for development.... I do not believe that any man can lead who does not act; whether it be consciously or unconsciously, under the impulse of a profound sympathy with those whom he leads.... Such men incarnate the consciences of the men whom they rule...(and are) quick to know and to do the things that the hour and...(the) nation need."<sup>6</sup>

The question of leadership, and how best it could function in the government of the United States, was the question to which Wilson addressed himself between the late 1870's and early 1900's. His answer to the question would be considerably colored by his admiration of the parliamentary system and the almost absolute Congressional supremacy over the President at the time.

Believing heartily in outstanding personal leadership, he disliked the American Congressional system because it no longer gave play to the po-

wers of great debaters like Webster, Hayne, and Calhoun, but favored the off-stage machinations of petty and venal personalities and conducted its most important business in the insidious privacy of the committee room.<sup>7</sup>

Wilson's writings on the American governmental system began, in 1879, with his essay, "Cabinet Government in the United States." In this essay, Wilson proposes, for the first time, to make the Cabinet directly responsible to Congress. His proposed method for doing this was to give the Cabinet members seats in Congress.

...The framers of the Constitution, in endeavoring to act in accordance with the principle of Montesquieu's celebrated and unquestionably just political maxim, -that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a free State should be separate, -made their separation so complete as to amount to isolation.... What then is the change proposed? Simply to give to the heads of the Executive departments - the members of the Cabinet - seats in Congress, with the privilege of the initiative in legislation and some part of the unbounded privileges now commanded by the Standing Committees.<sup>8</sup>

The idea behind Wilson's proposal was to restore responsible government to the United States.

It is hardly possible for a body of several hundred men, without official authoritative leaders, to determine upon any line of action without interminable wrangling delays injurious to the interests under their care.... For if Cabinet officers sit in Congress as official representatives of the executive, this principle of responsibility must of necessity come sooner or later to be recognized.<sup>9</sup>

As we can see, Wilson blames the separation of powers maxim, built into the Constitution, for the irresponsibility in American government. In fact, separation has caused isolation between the branches. "...A responsible Cabinet con-

stitutes a link between the executive and legislative departments of the Government which experience declares in the clearest tones to be absolutely necessary in a well regulated, well proportioned body politic."<sup>10</sup>

It is thus the separation of powers that Wilson blames for the weakness of the presidency. As the legislature is sovereign, the President is rarely able to exercise leadership.<sup>11</sup>

The President can seldom make himself recognized as a leader; he is merely the executor of the sovereign legislative will; his cabinet officers are little more than chief clerks, or superintendents, in the Executive departments, who advise the President as to matters in most of which he has no power of action independently of the concurrence of the Senate.<sup>12</sup>

Wilson thus saw the President as always being weak as long as the system of checks and balances persevered. Congress would always be master, and both branches would always be ineffective because of the jealousies each had of its own prerogatives.

In 1884 Woodrow Wilson wrote another essay entitled "Committee of Cabinet Government." In this essay Wilson reiterates his theme from "Cabinet Government in the United States" about the dearth of leadership in American public life caused by the system of checks and balances. He again calls for the adoption of some form of linkage between the legislative and executive branches.

It cannot be too often repeated, that while Congress remains the supreme power of the State, it is idle to talk of steadying or cleansing our politics without in some way linking together

the interests of the Executive and the legislature. So long as these two great branches are isolated, they must be ineffective just to the extent of the isolation. Congress will always be master, and will always enforce its commands on the administration.... The only hope of wrecking the present clumsy misrule of Congress lies in the establishment of responsible Cabinet government.... Committee government is too clandestine a system to last.<sup>13</sup>

"Cabinet Government in the United States" became the basis for Wilson's doctoral dissertation, Congressional Government, published in 1885. Congressional Government was indeed the first book to view American government both pragmatically and critically. "Patterned after Bagehot's The English Constitution, it combined a keen understanding of the democratic process with an admirable analytical incisiveness.<sup>14</sup> The book was an instant success and became widely-acclaimed. In this book Wilson provided a broader criticism and analysis of the organic functioning of the federal government, and as the title implies, asserted the absolute supremacy of Congress over the President and the judiciary.<sup>15</sup>

The balances of the Constitution are for the most part only ideal. For all practical purposes the national government is supreme over the state governments, and Congress predominant over its so-called coordinate branches.<sup>16</sup>

Wilson criticized the House of Representatives because of its lack of leadership and unity, and because it performed its functions by means of numerous standing committees veiled in absolute secrecy. In the Senate Wilson accounted for the decline in leadership in the fact that national controversies had ceased to exist since the Civil War and that there were

no longer prizes of leadership for men of great ability. Also the Senate had the same radical defect as the House - it functioned through the work of standing committees. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate were thus inefficient, and their systems scattered responsibility and made it impossible for the people to hold their representatives responsible for their actions.<sup>17</sup> In his conclusion Wilson stated:

As at present constituted, the federal government lacks strength because its powers are divided, lacks promptness because its authorities are multiplied, lacks wieldiness because its processes are roundabout, lacks efficiency because its responsibility is indistinct and its action without competent direction.<sup>18</sup>

In regard to the presidential office, Wilson wrote it off as an unimportant third wheel of the government, a non-entity.

The prestige of the presidential office has declined with the character of the Presidents. And the character of the Presidents has declined as the perfection of selfish party tactics has advanced.... That high office has fallen from its first estate of dignity because its power has waned; and its power has waned because the power of Congress has become predominant.<sup>19</sup>

Wilson's assessment of the presidential office was shared by James Bryce, who stated in "The American Commonwealth," published about the same time, that the President was only to see that the laws were properly executed and to maintain the public peace. Four-fifths of his work was the same in kind as that performed by the chairman of a corporation. The qualities that the country, then, chiefly required

of a President were not knowledge, profundity of thought, and imagination, but firmness, common sense, and honesty.<sup>20</sup>

Wilson wrote:

The business of the President occasionally great, is not much above routine. Most of the time it is mere administration, mere obedience of directions from the masters of policy, the Standing Committees. Except in so far as his power of veto constitutes him part of the legislature, the President might, not inconveniently, be a permanent officer; the first official of a carefully-graded and impartially regulated civil service system, through whose sure series of merit-promotions the youngest clerk might rise even to the chief magistracy.<sup>21</sup>

The President, thus, was nothing more than an exalted secretary, for Wilson, who just duly kept things in order.

Wilson claimed that it was not important what party the President belonged to, because the control of the executive machinery was not a large part of power. Another reason was that the political leaders of neither party were never chosen for the office.

When the presidential candidate came to be chosen, it was recognized as imperatively necessary that he should have as short a political record as possible.... It is our habit to speak of the party to which the President is known to adhere and which has control of appointments to the offices of the civil service as "the party in power"; but it is very evident that control of the executive machinery is not all or even a large part of power in a country ruled as ours is.<sup>22</sup>

This caused nothing, in Wilson's eyes, except fragmentation of power and responsibility in the government. No single party could be held responsible for the actions of the government. Wilson being a strong believer in party responsibility deplored the situation.

Woodrow Wilson held these views on the presidency until the late 1890's and early 1900's. He then began to modify his views because of important political developments within these two decades. Wilson now abandoned his former demand for cabinet government as a means of achieving responsible statesmanship in the United States and declared that responsible government could best be attained by means of presidential leadership.<sup>23</sup> Even though Wilson came to this view he never did abandon completely the idea that the parliamentary system provided the best framework for leadership in a democracy.<sup>24</sup> Even as late as 1913, he writes: "Sooner or later, it would seem, he (the President) must be made answerable to opinion in a somewhat more informal and intimate fashion — answerable, it maybe, to the Houses whom he seeks to lead, either personally or through a Cabinet, as well to the people for whom they speak."<sup>25</sup> The important point to realize, though, is that his views on the possibility of strong presidential leadership in the presidential-congressional system changed fundamentally during the early 1900's.

There are two reasons for Wilson's change of heart.

One, Wilson claimed, was the war with Spain in 1898.

The war with Spain again changed the balance of parts.... Our new place in the affairs of the world has since that year of transformation kept him (the President) at the front of our government, where our own thoughts and the attention of men everywhere is centered upon him.<sup>26</sup>

The other reason was the most significant political development at the time — the revivification of the presidency by

Theodore Roosevelt.<sup>27</sup> Theodore Roosevelt had succeeded in making the President the center of action in the nation. His "dominant role in legislative affairs and in foreign policy, his guidance of public opinion, had reinvigorated the presidency, demonstrating that the Constitution provides more than adequate scope for a strong leader."<sup>28</sup> Wilson, thus, fundamentally revised his views on the role of the President in the American government.

Wilson's new views were put forth in a series of lectures he delivered at Columbia University in 1907 and later published under the title of Constitutional Government in the United States. Wilson states:

The President can never again be the mere domestic figure he has been throughout so large a part of our history. The nation has risen to the first rank in power and resources.... Our President must always, henceforth, be one of the great powers of the world, whether he act greatly or wisely or not.... We can never hide our President again as a mere domestic officer. We can never again see him the mere executive he was in the thirties and forties. He must stand always at the front of our affairs, and the office will be as big and as influential as the man who occupies it.<sup>29</sup>

Wilson now saw the President as a national leader and spokesman. As only the President is elected by all the people, Wilson now believed that the President could become as commanding a figure as the British Prime Minister through skillful leadership of both party and nation. "His is the only national voice in affairs. Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the country, and no other single force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily over-

power him."<sup>30</sup>

Woodrow Wilson saw the President's role as party leader in a new light also. He mentioned that the nominating convention, which is the very process which makes the President leader of his party, seems to be very haphazard and moves with any wind of feeling that comes from the galleries. The choices seem to be almost matters of chance. Wilson defends this system though:

In reality there is much more method, much more definite purpose, much more deliberate choice in the extraordinary process than there seems to be....<sup>31</sup>

And why is there really much more deliberateness to a convention than meets the eye? The answer is that the convention is seeking a man that can truly lead. Wilson states:

What is it that a nominating convention wants in the man it is to present to the country for its suffrages? A man who will be and who will seem to the country in some sort an embodiment of the character and purpose it wishes its government to have, - a man who understands his own day and the needs of the country, and who has the personality and the initiative to enforce his views upon the people and Congress.<sup>32</sup>

The President, thus, "can dominate his party by being spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose of the country, by giving direction to opinion, by giving the country at once the information and the statements of policy which will enable it to form judgments alike of parties and of men."<sup>33</sup>

Wilson has now accepted the fact that responsible party government can exist in the United States through the forceful exertion and leadership of the President. We find him writing, again, in 1913:

He (the President) is expected to be leader of his party as well as the Chief Executive officer of the Government, and the country will take no excuses from him. He must play the part and play it successfully or lose the country's confidence. He must be prime minister, as much concerned with the guidance of legislation as with the just and orderly execution of law, and he is the spokesman of the Nation in everything, even in the most momentous and most delicate dealings of the Government with foreign nations.<sup>34</sup>

Woodrow Wilson, in his new view, had exalted the power of the presidency so much that he now maintained that the only limitation on presidential leadership was the President's own restricted view of the Constitution. Those Presidents who denied themselves power in the past were legalistic constitutionalists who were unsuited for statesmanship, and were unable to comprehend that the flexible nature of the Constitution gave adequate scope for forceful presidential leadership.<sup>35</sup>

The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit; and if Congress be overborne by him, it will be no fault of the makers of the Constitution, — it will be from no lack of constitutional powers on its part, but only because the President has the nation behind him, and Congress has not.<sup>36</sup>

With this view Woodrow Wilson embarked upon the presidency, thus affecting a profound change in America's attitude towards its President in the twentieth century as opposed to that of the nineteenth century.

## CHAPTER II

### Application of Theory to Action

"Woodrow Wilson," Lawrence Chamberlain has remarked, "was the first President to develop systematically the legislative powers of his office."<sup>1</sup> "In contrast with President Theodore Roosevelt, whose legislative leadership was that of pragmatic opportunism, Woodrow Wilson brought to the presidency the natural theory of a would-be prime minister."<sup>2</sup> Wilson came to the presidency, though, not only equipped in theory but also experienced in the exercise of leadership as former president of Princeton University and Governor of New Jersey. During these apprenticeships he worked out and applied all methods of leadership that he would use so successfully in Washington.<sup>3</sup>

Wilson's success depended not only on his methods, but also upon the prevailing political and public circumstances of the time. He was elected on the crest of the progressive movement; he thus knew that the nation was ripe for reform leadership.<sup>4</sup> "His chief task," then, "was the relatively easy one of crystallizing and giving direction to an already aroused public opinion."<sup>5</sup> Also the situation that prevailed in Congress during Wilson's first term gave him tremendous leverage. First of all there was no powerful rival leader in Congress, because in 1910 the power of the Speaker of the

House had been considerably reduced. The Speaker, in the past, had been the most effective counterpoise to the possibility of strong presidential leadership of Congress. There was now a vacuum of power which Wilson speedily filled. In addition, because of the disruption in the Republican party from 1910 to 1916, Wilson carried in a large Democratic Congressional majority. Since most of these Democratic Congressmen were new, it was relatively easy for Wilson to direct them; because they identified their political futures with his success and thirsted for the patronage he had to dispense. The Southerners in both houses willingly accepted Wilson's leadership, for they knew that the fate of their party depended on their success in satisfying the national demand for reform. Also, probably a majority of the senators in both parties were advanced progressives. Wilson, thus, had a tremendous advantage on his side to be the spokesman and mediator for a cooperative Congressional majority. Wilson's most important advantage, though, was the fact that he was a fresh personality, new to national politics and generally respected as a selfless man.<sup>6</sup>

"It is no derogation of Wilson's contribution to emphasize the circumstances that made strong leadership possible from 1913 to 1917, for his contribution in techniques was of enormous importance."<sup>7</sup> Even before he was inaugurated Wilson let it be known that he had every intention of putting his views of presidential leadership into practice.

"He is not without party sympathies and not in-

sensible to party obligations." one reporter wrote after an interview with the President-elect in January 1913, "but he is the President; and in the end it is his judgement that will prevail, as he intends to make it, in the settlement of all matters that come before him for consideration.... He has readily assumed all responsibility that has been given him. He feels himself capable. He has faith in himself. And he looks upon himself as an instrument for bringing about certain reforms and for ameliorating certain conditions. The predestined idea is not remote from his thought and conclusion."<sup>8</sup>

The methods by which Wilson advanced his legislative program were varied, but it is possible to identify certain main characteristics. One method President Wilson employed was to use his legislative influence selectively. He pushed one measure at a time.<sup>9</sup> "Legislation is conglomerate," Wilson had written in 1885. "The absense of any concert of action amongst the Committees leaves legislation with scarcely any trace of determinate party courses. No two schemes pull together."<sup>10</sup> Through selective pressure Wilson gave this needed sense of directedness to legislation.

President Wilson provided this leadership and direction to legislation by studiously collaborating with Congress.<sup>11</sup> Woodrow Wilson was determined to tear down the wall between the executive and the legislative branches. In 1907 he wrote:

No living thing can have its organs offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary; its life is dependent upon their quick cooperation. Government is not a body of blind forces; it is a body of men, with highly differentiated functions, no doubt, in our modern day of specialization, but with a common task and purpose. Their cooperation is indispensable, their warfare fatal.<sup>12</sup>

"He began soon after his inauguration. On March 9, 1913, White House spokesmen announced that the President would help frame important legislation; ten days later these same spokesmen added that Wilson would confer frequently with Democratic leaders in the President's in the Capitol."<sup>13</sup>

Wilson's most vivid assertion of leadership, though, came when he revived the custom of the President personally appearing before Congress to address it. He was the first President since John Adams to deliver a message to Congress in person.<sup>14</sup> Wilson's chance for reinstating this practice came in his first legislative fight; which was for the reduction of the tariff rates. He called Congress into special session, and on April 8, 1913, he delivered his message for tariff reform in person before a joint session and immediately assumed a posture of command. He opened his address by saying:

I am very glad indeed to have this opportunity to address the two Houses directly and to verify for myself the impression that the President of the United States is a person, not a mere department of the Government hailing Congress from some isolated island of jealous power, sending messages, not speaking naturally and with his own voice --- that he is a human being trying to cooperate with other human beings in a common service. After this pleasant experience I shall feel quite normal in all our dealings with one another.<sup>15</sup>

"It was Woodrow Wilson's great contribution to the presidency to have made the provision of the Constitution for the Presidential message to Congress the basis for dynamic legislative leadership."<sup>16</sup>

As announced before from the White House, "Wilson fol-

lowed his tariff message with a series of personal conferences with congressional leaders, both at the White House and in the hitherto rarely used President's Room at the Capitol."<sup>17</sup> Through this method and others Wilson established his ascendancy over the Democratic membership of Congress. "For a time he fused the executive and legislative powers in his own person."<sup>18</sup> He made congressional leaders and committee chairmen his associates. He brought congressional leaders and cabinet members together for meetings at which he himself presided. Wilson also mediated disputes when it seemed fundamental differences might disrupt the Democratic ranks, and when necessary he cracked the patronage whip and used the Democratic caucuses of the Senate and House to force rebels into line.<sup>19</sup> Wilson was unremitting in his demand for legislation, and the most minute details of a bill pending before Congress received his closest scrutiny.<sup>20</sup>

Wilson's major asset though, as a legislative leader was his almost irresistible power of persuasion. He won control through the sheer force of personality and by using all the inherent powers of the party leader. The President's legislative approach, as pointed out above, was frankly through the party as an instrument for the reshaped purposes of the nation.<sup>21</sup> To control his party, through the methods mentioned above, Wilson needed to pull together all the persuasive powers he could muster in himself. The reason for this was the fact that Wilson decided to work through the existing Democratic party structure, rather than to govern by a coali-

tion of progressives, as he might have done.<sup>22</sup> John M. Blum states:

Nevertheless, in keeping with his theories of government, and on the advice of Burleson and Daniels, Wilson decided to work through his party rather than to attempt to construct a progressive coalition. The implementation of this decision called for the recognition of each important Democratic faction in the assignment of political largess. This worrisome task fell largely to Postmaster General Burleson, Secretaries Bryan and McAdoo, and Tumulty.<sup>23</sup>

Wilson, therefore, remained what he always thought the President should be - a prime minister, the leader of his party, and the one responsible for the party legislative program.<sup>24</sup>

In so deciding, the President, therefore, had to work with the regularly constituted party leaders and organs if he wanted his legislative program passed. This involved, as Blum stated, the recognition of the various Democratic factions and the distribution of political patronage. One point to notice on this was that Wilson thought that an effort should be made to sidetrack Senator Simmons in favor of a more militantly low-tariff chairman for the Senate Finance Committee. Senator Simmons was from North Carolina, and favored protective tariffs for the textile industry of his state. According to the seniority system he was in line to become chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Wilson, though, yielded to the counsel of Daniels and others, and supported Simmons for the chairmanship. It paid off, for Simmons was grateful for Wilson's support. Wilson thus gained in Simmons an unusually effective supporter in de-

fending the tariff reductions.<sup>25</sup>

Concerning patronage Wilson had to decide between expediency and principle. He chose in favor of the former when political support was urgent. Either Wilson recognized the various factions, many of whom had opposed the things for which he stood as sighted in the case of Senator Simmons, or risk the defeat of his legislative program by supporting only his progressive friends. The so-called conservatives were firmly entrenched in many states and constituted a sizeable minority of Democratic congressmen and senators. An assault by Wilson through the patronage channels might, therefore, only disrupt the party and ensure the defeat of his reform legislation.<sup>26</sup>

Even so, Wilson at the outset of his administration was willing to run the risk. In a meeting with his Postmaster General Burleson, Wilson let it be known that his was going to be a progressive administration, and that he would not advise with reactionary Senators or Representatives in making appointments. Burleson was aghast and warned Wilson that if he pursued such a policy he would ensure the defeat of his reform measures. A week later, Burleson again met with President Wilson, presenting him with a list of names for post-masterships. Burleson began with a name hotly contested by Wilson's friends in Tennessee. The President exclaimed, "Burleson, I can't appoint a man like that!" Burleson then explained how important this appointment was to a key Tennessee representative, whose vote was needed for the sup-

port of the Wilson program Wilson then said, "Well I will appoint him."<sup>27</sup>

To operate through the regular party machinery was one of the decisive turning points in Wilson's presidential career. And as pointed out in the quotation by John M. Blum, the worrisome task of appointing these petty jobs fell to Burleson, Tumulty, Bryan, and McAdoo. Wilson reserved to himself and Colonel House, though, the right to advise and veto. One of the consequences of working through the regular party machinery was to deepen Southern influence. John M. Blum notes that, "by 1917 it was too late to overcome the Southern predominance in Congress and in party councils."<sup>28</sup> Thus, the result of Wilson's decision was the triumph of the professional politicians over the idealist in the administration. "The vexations and embarrassments," though, "upon this policy of realism were more than counterbalanced in Wilson's reckoning by the results of practical politics; the consequence was the establishment of the President's nearly absolute personal mastery over the Democratic party and the Democratic members of Congress."<sup>29</sup>

Essential to Wilson's tactics were his well-timed public appeals. Wilson had stated in 1907:

The true significance of the matter, for any student of government who wishes to understand the life rather than the mere theory of what he studies, is that the greatest power lies with that part of the government which is in most direct communication with the nation itself.... That part of the government, therefore, which has the most direct access to opinion has the best chance of leadership and mastery; and at present that part is the

President.<sup>30</sup>

Through this method he asserted the President as the spokesman of the people and thus used public opinion as a spur on Congress. An example of the use of this most powerful of Wilson's weapons was when a powerful lobby plus protection-minded Senators threatened to sabotage the Underwood Tariff bill passed by the House. To break the deadlock and to expose the forces fighting the bill, Wilson lashed out hard:

I think the public ought to know the extraordinary exertions being made by the lobby in Washington.... There is every evidence that money without limit is being spent to sustain this lobby and to create an appearance of a pressure of opinion antagonistic to some of the chief items of the Tariff bill.

It is of serious interest to the country that the people at large should have no lobby and be voiceless in these matters, while great bodies of astute men seek to create an artificial opinion and to overcome the interests of the public for their private profit.<sup>31</sup>

The response of the people was immediate and effective. The Senate finally gave in to the incessant presidential pressure and actually reduced the general rates of the House bill, chiefly by adding certain agricultural products to the free list.<sup>32</sup>

Wilson was very shrewd, though, in exercising his speaking and writing ability. He always used simple language with poetic power. Here we see Wilson's romantic ideal of statesmanship coming out. He always appealed for support for measures in terms and principles that would even be acceptable to the opponents of the measure. For example, on the behalf of stronger anti-trust laws and lower tariffs he used the

language of free enterprise. This tactic of appealing to opponents on their own principles made it difficult to attack Wilson or his measures.<sup>33</sup> Arthur S. Link mentions that "it is doubtful if any leader in American history since Lincoln has succeeded so well in communicating the ideals that the American people have in their better moments tried to live by."<sup>34</sup>

In getting his legislation passed it is also necessary to see that Wilson willingly compromised important points to gain a larger goal. For Wilson today is pretty well known to have been obstinate and unwilling to compromise. But, that Wilson was able to compromise has already been shown in his working relationship with the Democratic party. Carter Glass reported that Wilson said, "...if we can hold to the substance of the thing and give the other fellow the shadow, why not do it, if thereby we may save our bill?"<sup>35</sup> He was unbending, though, on what he considered large principles; even ready to stake his prestige and leadership on the outcome. In one instance, in the fight to get Congress to repeal the exemption provision on Panama tolls for American ships, he countered suggestions of compromise by flatly stating: "Nor should the question be compromised as some have suggested; in fact it will not be compromised. It will be repealed."<sup>36</sup> And so it was. Wilson's obstinacy paid off that time, but later on it would prove to be one of the reasons for his downfall.

It is important here to take note of the limits to which

President Wilson was willing to adapt his theory of the prime ministry. So firmly did Wilson believe in the President's responsibility for legislation that he twice considered resigning and taking his case to the people if any of his major bills failed, in the fashion of a British prime minister. Once he considered resignation if the repeal of the exemption of American vessels from Panama Canal tolls failed and again if the McLenmore Resolution warning American citizens against traveling on armed vessels of belligerents was adopted. Fortunately he was sustained on both of these issues.<sup>37</sup> Wilson felt that if he was not sustained on these issues, then he would be handicapped in conducting the foreign affairs of the nation since he did not have majority support. Since he would not have had majority support, Wilson considered it only right, then, to resign.

Another instance in which Wilson considered resigning was during the presidential election of 1916. By mid-October of 1916 Charles Evans Hughes and Wilson were running neck and neck. The chances for Hughes's winning were good, and Wilson thought that if Hughes won it was definitely no time for an interim government. Therefore, "just before the election of 1916 Wilson wrote a letter to Secretary of State Lansing suggesting that if he were to lose to Charles Evans Hughes, he would appoint Hughes to Lansing's position and then, along with Vice-president Marshall, whose advice in the matter had not been asked, resign abruptly."<sup>38</sup> According to the succession laws of the time Hughes would have immediately then be-

come President. Wilson, thus, carried his view of the President as a prime minister very far indeed.

Woodrow Wilson enjoyed being President. He had self-confidence and dedication, and through his forceful leadership he enacted a remarkably coherent body of reform, known as the New Freedom. "...The New Freedom...is probably the most notable example in American history of directed party unity and leadership."<sup>39</sup> By 1916 Wilson's list of achievements were very impressive: Tariff reform, Federal Reserve Act, Anti-Trust legislation, a law improving working conditions for seamen, farm loan banks to provide farmers with cheap credit, larger self-government for the Philippines, workman's compensation for Federal employees, the eight hour day for railroad employees, a law prohibiting child labor, and a tariff commission to review tariffs. Wilson had, therefore, grabbed the platform out from under the Progressive party of Theodore Roosevelt and made most of it law. "The grist of the congressional mill became the most consistent since the Hamiltonian program of the first years of the Constitution - a program put through the First Congress by one who also insisted on being considered a prime minister."<sup>40</sup>

Wilson, during his first term and during the first two years of his second term, was a brilliant success. There were, however, premonitions during his successes of his failures of the second term. These will now be given a brief consideration. For if Woodrow Wilson was so successful during his first six years in his leadership of Congress,

then why did he fail in that leadership when it was so vitally needed? It is important to look into this matter when one is to consider the imprint Wilson left on the office.

Wilson had been a most excellent and superb political leader, but during his last two years in office, because of the stresses and strains of the war, he left many political fences broken. The first of these political fences broken was a major political blunder. Rattled by the fulminations of Theodore Roosevelt and the Republican onslaught of his conduct of the war, and also under pressure by Democratic leaders, Wilson personally involved himself in the bitterly disputed congressional elections of 1918.<sup>41</sup> On October 26, he issued a statement accusing the Republicans of hindering his work and urged the people to give him a vote of confidence by giving him a Democratic Congress. Wilson thought that election of a Republican Congress would be a repudiation of his conducting of the war, and would be an embarrassment for him at the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, his strategy was inept. As a politician Wilson should have realized that at the end of a war people are bound not only to suffer a spiritual let-down, but also to level their accumulated grievance against the men and party in power.<sup>42</sup> Also Wilson had alienated the Republicans in Congress who had consistently supported him. Again there were also many Democrats who had as consistently opposed him. An appeal by Wilson for the election of those who would accept his leadership rather than for a Democratic Congress would have been far wiser. When

the Republicans won the Congress in 1918, the President's own tactics had provided them with the ammunition to use against him. They were able to assert that by his own admission he stood repudiated by the American people. Whether or not his leadership had been repudiated, the failure of his appeal would handicap him in his dealings with the Senate, if not in Europe, on his subsequent peacemaking.<sup>43</sup>

Even more serious was Wilson's mistake of not including any Senators or prominent Republicans as members of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. The President, no doubt, did this in order to avoid having to invite Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who was now chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Wilson's arch-enemy, to be a member of the American delegation. Instead of accepting the realities of the situation, Wilson now proceeded to aggravate the opposition by completely ignoring it. In so doing Wilson had offended the great body of moderate Republicans which he could have avoided by including among his advisers such able men as former President William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, or even Charles Evans Hughes.<sup>44</sup>

These two political blunders, especially the second one, were great leaps by Wilson in ensuring the defeat of his peace program in the Senate.

Wilson continued to believe though that the people would support him in incorporating the Golden Rule into politics and thus force the Senate to do likewise. Wilson though had been so engrossed in preaching his idealistic purposes to the

people that he had failed to educate them in the realities that would have to be dealt with at the Peace Conference. The public thus became disillusioned and tired of crusades, idealism and European distresses. Through this process Wilson also caused the desertion of many "liberals" from his side and the Democratic party - the same ones who supported him during his first six years of success. They also became disillusioned by Wilson's failure to establish an idealistic situation in Europe. Wilson thus also ensured his defeat in the fight to control the Senate in getting his peace treaty accepted, by failing to educate the public in the political realities of the time.<sup>45</sup> This is important to note, for during Wilson's successful years oratory was one of his most powerful of weapons in molding public opinion. He truly led and inspired the people and in so doing kept Congress under his control. If only Wilson had realized that public opinion was growing weary of idealism, he might have then educated them in the political realities and what was thus to be expected in a peace treaty devised in conjunction with a vengeful Europe. If he had done so his fate might have been different. It must also be realized though that Wilson himself underestimated the operating force of power politics and overestimated his ability to change the world.

Underlying all of Wilson's mistakes and political blunders was his Covenanters' zeal which was rooted in his personality. "For all his highmindedness, he was stubborn, headstrong, and intolerant, finding it impossible to yield

graciously or sometimes even at all."<sup>46</sup> So it was in his defense of the League of Nations and the peace treaty. In no way could Wilson compromise when he considered moral principles at stake.

Woodrow Wilson, it must be remembered, was raised in a strict Calvinist-Presbyterian tradition. Wilson's father, the Rev. Joseph Ruggles Wilson, schooled him on a daily diet of prayers and Bible reading. He instilled in his son's mind the existence of an unalterable moral law and that God's will would ultimately always triumph. This influenced Wilson later on when he undertook a reformer's role with almost messianic zeal. He was supremely confident that what he did was morally right and thus by definition must prevail in the end.<sup>47</sup> Wilson utterly believed that God had ordered the universe from the beginning and that God used men for his own purposes. He saw himself in that light. Wilson even saw himself as ordained by God to be President.<sup>48</sup>

Therefore, burning with the flame of moral passion, he approached men with a rigidity that made him regard as enemies those who differed with him in his vision of principle, and principle was inviolable to him. This was his great weakness - a total inability to rely upon others.<sup>49</sup> This is the reason for his hatred for Senator Lodge and his breaking his friendship with Colonel House. He believed that they were thwarting the will of God by not agreeing with him. Wilson was fighting for a principle with Senator Lodge; he thus could not compromise. Wilson always subordinated men to

causes.

In looking at Wilson's flaw of character though it would be a mistake to picture him as a neurotic or ill person. The fact was Woodrow Wilson was a very successful person who combined elements of greatness with shortcomings imposed by his personality which at times exploded.<sup>50</sup>

## CHAPTER III

### The Legacy Left to the Office

Having gone through the development of Wilson's political thought and his success and failure in the application of his theories, the question now is how strongly did Woodrow Wilson influence the development of the presidential office? This is an important question in light of Wilson's failure during his last two years in office. It is important to show, even though Wilson's blunders did have a tremendous impact upon him and the way the presidential office would be exercised in the succeeding decade, that he did lay a lasting foundation for future presidents to build a strong executive department upon. The important fact to realize is that Woodrow Wilson had substantially transformed the American presidency by the end of his rule.<sup>1</sup>

"It was President Wilson who gave the first great demonstration in this century of executive leadership in legislation."<sup>2</sup> Wilson's contribution to the presidency was to institutionalize the President as legislative leader, and as seen in chapter two he showed what a President has to do to play such a role. His specific contribution to the President's legislative role, also mentioned in chapter two, was to have made the presidential message to Congress the basis of dynamic legislative leadership. Wilson thought that the Consti-

tution in granting this duty to the President - to recommend legislation to Congress - was both an opportunity and an invitation to introduce some semblance of the parliamentary system.<sup>3</sup> That Wilson believed the United States government needed a more responsible system and needed a leader comparable to the British Prime Minister was shown in chapter one through his political writings. Through the Constitutional provision for the presidential message to Congress he initiated his theory into practice and succeeded. Believing in the responsibility of the party leader for the formulation and enactment of legislation he offered a program entitled the "New Freedom" and carried his fight to enact that program, as has been seen, right into the committee rooms of Congress. Herein was Wilson's realization of the full possibility of the Constitution's provision for the presidential message. He literally dramatized his message to Congress. The significance of today's State-of -the-Union message owes much to the only political scientist to ever become president.<sup>4</sup>

Through this process of leading and dominating Congress "Wilson broke the rigid formalities of the past and made himself, in effect, the Chief Legislator of the United States."<sup>5</sup>

Whatever hopes Wilson may have had for institutionalizing this peculiar pattern of the President as prime minister were doomed to disappointment. One reason was that "his failures indicated the possibilities of Congressional revenge and the impermanence of forceful executive leadership of Congress."<sup>6</sup> Within a system such as ours, where power is

divided, whether the President is able to play a forceful role or not will depend on the mood of the country, the individual in the office, the mood of Congress, and the period of history. The second reason was the three presidents between Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt: Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover. These men were neither forceful nor contributed to the trend toward chief legislatorship in the presidency.<sup>7</sup>

Though Wilson did not institutionalize the President as prime minister he did institutionalize the idea and theory, as was pointed out, of the President as chief legislator. The idea took hold and held fast. Today the President is expected to take the initiative in legislation or at least to make proposals in the State-of-the-Union message even if he cannot control Congress politically or enforce party discipline as Woodrow Wilson did. By the time of President Harry Truman the Congress had become so accustomed to looking to the executive for legislative initiative that even the Republican Eightieth Congress was eager to have Truman's views on such red-hot issues as labor, taxes, inflation, and education. Also the Eightieth Congress always waited politely for Mr. Truman's proposals to initiate the legislative process, however scant was the regard they intended to pay them.<sup>8</sup>

Even during the mortgaged presidential leadership of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover in the 1920's, the idea of presidential legislatorship had taken such a hold that these men felt at least obliged to show interest in legislation.

Harding went before the Senate to urge his former colleagues not to ignore the budget estimates but to keep appropriations within the income. No matter how reluctant Calvin Coolidge was, he admitted it to be "the business of the President as party leader to do the best he can to see that the party platform purposes are translated into legislative and administrative action."<sup>9</sup> Coolidge even went as far as recognizing the obligation of the President in drawing up legislation to apply the unexpended balance of the Deficiency Appropriation Bill of July 3, 1926, to the prosecution of litigation to cancel the Fall-Sinclair-Doheny oil leases.<sup>10</sup> "President Hoover, according to Robert Luce, 'sent drafts of several important proposals to the Capitol to be introduced by leaders' there."<sup>11</sup>

The growth of the legislative leadership of the presidency during the administrations of Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, and even Eisenhower is so apparent that detailed discussion of it is not needed here. Woodrow Wilson had indeed set a lasting legacy for strong presidential leadership. Arthur S. Link comments about Franklin D. Roosevelt's daring leadership:

When Franklin D. Roosevelt later recovered the full powers of national and party leadership for the presidency, many critics charged that he was acting in a unique and revolutionary way in order to subvert the Constitution and establish a personal dictatorship. Actually, he was only following the example of the President under whom he had served for eight years.<sup>12</sup>

Woodrow Wilson through his forceful leadership and the pas-

sage of his "New Freedom" legislation had made the executive, beyond a doubt, the focus of national government. "Party leader and Congressional director, he held an authority no one could challenge, and people across the land looked naturally to him for guidance.... The mold of the modern executive was set."<sup>13</sup>

It is important now to discuss a precedent that Wilson had set, but which was not mentioned in chapter two. Wilson was the first President to appoint men to act as his liaisons with Congress. The reason this is mentioned now is because these appointments were purely informal and were discretely concealed from Congress. The reason Wilson kept this a secret was because he in no way wanted to give Congress the impression that he was encroaching upon its independence as a separate branch of government. Wilson did this because he felt the need for such intimate contact with the members of Congress in keeping with his theory of prime ministry. Under Roosevelt and Truman the anonymity fell away, but the men who performed the role of liaison to Congress were never publicly designated as such. This was done for the same reasons that Wilson kept his men secret. By the time of Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, in 1953, there was no longer any reason for not acknowledging publicly the President's liaison men with Congress. Eisenhower appointed his liaison man, Bryce Harlow, a "Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Affairs," a frank acknowledgement of his formal duties. This precedent is now an institutionalized function of the presi-

dency.<sup>14</sup> Here one can see a systematic growth of a Wilsonian precedent.

In other respects too Wilson left a tangible and living legacy, especially in legislation. He established the first economic stabilizers, democratization of the tax structure, stronger anti-trust protection, and a host of other domestic reforms. It was upon this legacy that Franklin D. Roosevelt built his bold "New Deal" program. Wilson had thus set the precedent for future bold presidential legislative programs.

John Wells Davidson states:

The legislative program enacted under Wilson was a substantial achievement. It laid the groundwork for the New Deal. Whether one argues that the New Deal was a direct descendent of the New Freedom or a distant relative, it is difficult to imagine Americans accepting the advanced ideas of Roosevelt and his advisers without first going through some sort of conditioning stage as the New Freedom.<sup>15</sup>

Wilson also went even further than Theodore Roosevelt in using his office as a place of moral leadership; by the articulation of his New Freedom in terms of historic American ideals.<sup>16</sup> The New Republic states:

Mr. Wilson has done what high statesmanship in a democracy must do: he has interpreted the demands, principles, and interests of group interests, and lifted them up into a national program. In a very real and accurate sense the President has made himself the spokesman of a whole people.... He has shown how to turn an energy to constructive purposes.<sup>17</sup>

This legacy held strong and developed so that Franklin Delano Roosevelt remarked:

The Presidency is not merely an administrative office. That is the least of it. It is pre-eminently a place of moral leadership.... That is

what the office is - a superb opportunity for re-applying to new conditions, the simple rules of human conduct to which we always go back. Without leadership alert and sensitive to change, we are bogged up or lose our way.<sup>18</sup>

No other chief executive before Wilson so systematically and successfully made use of the legislative powers of his office. Indeed it could be said that Wilson largely established the modern pattern of the President as both leader of his party and of Congress.<sup>19</sup>

It is fitting to end this chapter with the words of Wilson's contemporaries. From The New Republic:

Under Mr. Wilson the prestige of the Presidency has been fully restored. He has not only expressly acknowledged and acted on this obligation of leadership, as did Roosevelt, but he has sought to embody it in constitutional form.<sup>20</sup>

And from World's Work:

Aside from definite legislative achievement.... Mr. Wilson has introduced one definite idea into American political life. Because of his career, American politics can never be precisely the same thing that it was before. This one idea is that of party leadership.... This, then, is President Wilson's great contribution to our political philosophy and practice.... He has given the office a new and high dignity; he has shown that it possesses greater power for usefulness than we imagined; and certainly no President can have succeeded more completely than that.<sup>21</sup>

## CONCLUSION

It has been seen that Woodrow Wilson had indeed exercised a strong influence on the development of the presidency. Woodrow Wilson had done well in applying his theory to action; his greatest contribution was in establishing a stronger tie between the presidency and Congress. It would be for future presidents, though, to develop this precedent to a much fuller degree.

Wilson had flaws of character also. These deeply affected his exercise of the presidential office in his later years. Though, as was seen, "his flaws of personality did not weaken the presidency as an institution but only himself and his policies."<sup>1</sup> For his precedents did survive the presidential hiatus from 1921 to 1933. Starting with Franklin Roosevelt the precedents Woodrow Wilson left were developed and utilized to much fuller degrees.

Still the point to note about Wilson as President is that he demonstrated that the President has it within his power not only to be the chief spokesman of the American people, but also to destroy the wall between the executive and legislative branches of government. Arthur S. Link states:

He accomplished this feat not accidentally, but because he willed to be a strong leader and used his opportunities wisely; and historians a century hence will probably rate his expansion and

perfection of the powers of the presidency as  
his most lasting contribution.<sup>2</sup>

Never again could the presidency shrink enough to fit a lesser man.

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

<sup>1</sup>Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: The New American Library, 1964), p. 84.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Arthur S. Link, Wilson, Vol. II: The New Freedom (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 145.

Chapter one

<sup>1</sup>E. David Cronon, "Woodrow Wilson," in America's Ten Greatest Presidents, ed. by Morton Borden (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), p. 209.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition & the Men Who Made It (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1964), p. 237.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 145.

<sup>6</sup>Woodrow Wilson, Leaders of Men, quoted in Link, The New Freedom, p. 145.

<sup>7</sup>Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, pp. 237-238.

<sup>8</sup>Woodrow Wilson, Cabinet Government in the United States, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. by Arthur S. Link, I (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 497-498.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 496 & 498.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 502.

<sup>11</sup>Sidney Warren, The President as World Leader (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 63.

<sup>12</sup>Wilson, Cabinet Government, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, pp. 505-506.

<sup>13</sup>Woodrow Wilson, Committee or Cabinet Government?, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. by Arthur S. Link, II (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 639-640.

<sup>14</sup>Charles A. Madison, Leaders and Liberals in 20th Century America (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 69-69.

<sup>15</sup>Arthur S. Link, Wilson, Vol. I: The Road to the White House (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 13.

<sup>16</sup>Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1967), p. 53.

<sup>17</sup>Link, The Road to the White House, pp. 13-14.

<sup>18</sup>Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 206.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 47 & 48.

<sup>20</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 64.

<sup>21</sup>Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 170.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 48 & 177.

<sup>23</sup>Link, The Road to the White House, p. 108.

<sup>24</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 146.

<sup>25</sup>Woodrow Wilson, Letter to A. Mitchell Palmer, in The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, II (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1925), p. 24.

<sup>26</sup>Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 59.

<sup>27</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 146.

<sup>28</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 64.

<sup>29</sup>Wilson, Constitutional Government, pp. 78-79.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>34</sup>Wilson, Letter to A. Mitchell Palmer in The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, pp. 23-24.

<sup>35</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 65.

<sup>36</sup>Wilson, Constitutional Government, p. 70.

## Chapter two

<sup>1</sup>L. H. Chamberlain, The President, Congress, and Legislation, quoted in Arthur W. MacMahon, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader and Administrator," The American Political Science Review, L, No. 3 (September, 1956), 651.

<sup>2</sup>Wilfred E. Binkley, "The President as Chief Legislator," Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science, CCCVII (September, 1956), 95.

<sup>3</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 147.

<sup>4</sup>Erwin C. Hargrove, Presidential Leadership: Personality and Political Style (Toronto, Ontario: The MacMillan Company, 1969), p. 44.

<sup>5</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 148.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 147-149.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 149

<sup>8</sup>Samuel G. Blythe, "Our New President," Saturday Evening Post, CLXXXV (March 1, 1913), quoted in Link, The New Freedom, p. 147.

<sup>9</sup>Arthur W. MacMahon, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader and Administrator," The American Political Science Review, L, No. 3 (September, 1956), 652.

<sup>10</sup>Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 211.

<sup>11</sup>MacMahon, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader and Administrator," p.653.

<sup>12</sup>Wilson, Constitutional Government, pp. 56-57.

<sup>13</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 152.

<sup>14</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 73.

<sup>15</sup>Woodrow Wilson, First Special Address to Congress, in The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, II (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1925), p. 32.

<sup>16</sup>Binkley, "The President as Chief Legislator," p. 95.

<sup>17</sup>Cronon, "Woodrow Wilson," p. 215.

<sup>18</sup>Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, p. 45.

<sup>19</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 153.

<sup>20</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 74.

<sup>21</sup>MacMahon, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader and Administrator," p. 654.

<sup>22</sup>Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1954), pp. 34-35.

<sup>23</sup>John M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 69.

<sup>24</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 153.

<sup>25</sup>MacMahon, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader and Administrator," p. 654.

<sup>26</sup>Link, The New Freedom, pp. 157 & 158.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 158 & 159.

<sup>28</sup>Blum, Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era, p. 159.

<sup>29</sup>Arthur S. Link, "Wilson and the Democratic Party," Review of Politics, XVIII, No. 2 (April, 1956), 156.

<sup>30</sup>Wilson, Constitutional Government, pp. 108-109 & 110.

<sup>31</sup>Woodrow Wilson, Statement Delivered to the Press May 26, 1913, in The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson ed. by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, II (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1925), p. 36.

<sup>32</sup>Cronon, "Woodrow Wilson," p. 215.

<sup>33</sup>Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, p. 41.

<sup>34</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 149.

<sup>35</sup>Carter Glass, An Adventure in Constructive Finance, quoted in Arthur MacMahon, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader and Administrator," The American Political Science Review, L, No. 3 (September, 1956), 657.

<sup>36</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 75.

<sup>37</sup>Wilfred E. Binkley, The Man in the White House: His Powers and Duties (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 133.

<sup>38</sup>Rossiter, The American Presidency, p. 202.

<sup>39</sup>William G. Carleston, "The Growth of the Presidency," Current History, XXXIX, No. 230 (October, 1960), 194.

<sup>40</sup>Binkley, "the President as Chief Legislator," p. 96.

<sup>41</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 107.

<sup>42</sup>Madison, Leaders and Liberals in 20th Century America, p. 115.

<sup>43</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 108.

<sup>44</sup>Cronon, "Woodrow Wilson," p. 226.

<sup>45</sup>Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-1920 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 179 & 180.

<sup>46</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 137.

<sup>47</sup>Cronon, "Woodrow Wilson," p. 208.

<sup>48</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 5.

<sup>49</sup>Warren, The President as World Leader, p. 137.

<sup>50</sup>Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, p. 38.

### Chapter three

<sup>1</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 156.

<sup>2</sup>Binkley, The Man in the White House, p. 151.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>5</sup>Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963), p. 238.

<sup>6</sup>Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, p. 32.

<sup>7</sup>Binkley, The Man in the White House, p. 168.

<sup>8</sup>Rossiter, The American Presidency, pp. 27 & 106.

<sup>9</sup>Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge, quoted in Binkley, The Man in the White House, p. 152.

<sup>10</sup>Binkley, The Man in the White House, p. 152.

<sup>11</sup>Legislative Problems, quoted in Binkley, The Man in the White House, pp. 152-153.

<sup>12</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 156.

<sup>13</sup>Robert H. Wiebe, The Search For Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), pp. 221-222.

<sup>14</sup>MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, pp. 252-254.

<sup>15</sup>John Wells Davidson, "Wilson as Presidential Leader," Current History, XXXIX, No. 230 (October, 1960), 200.

<sup>16</sup>Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, p. 32.

<sup>17</sup>The New Republic, VIII (September 2, 1916), quoted in Arthur S. Link, Wilson, Vol. V: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 92.

<sup>18</sup>Rossiter, The American Presidency, pp. 142 & 143.

<sup>19</sup>Cronon, "Woodrow Wilson," p. 230.

<sup>20</sup>The New Republic, I (December 5, 1914), quoted in Link, The New Freedom, p. 156.

<sup>21</sup>World's Works, XXIX (March, 1915), quoted in Link, The New Freedom, p. 156.

#### Conclusion

<sup>1</sup>Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>Link, The New Freedom, p. 145.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Sources

Baker, Ray Stannard and Dodd, William E., eds. The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. Vol. II: The New Democracy. New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1925.

Link, Arthur S., ed. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. Vol. I: 1856-1880. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966.

\_\_\_\_\_, ed. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. Vol. II: 1881-1884. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Wilson, Woodrow. Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. Constitutional Government in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, 1947.

### Secondary Sources

Bailey, Thomas A. Presidential Greatness: The Image and the Man from George Washington to the Present. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966.

Binkley, Wilfred E. The Man in the White House: His Powers and Duties. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959.

Blum, John M. Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951.

Cronon, E. David. "Woodrow Wilson." America's Ten Greatest Presidents. Edited by Morton Bordon. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1961.

Hargrove, Erwin C. Presidential Leadership: Personality and Political Style. Toronto, Ontario: The MacMillan Company, 1969.

Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition & the Men Who Made It. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1964.

Link, Arthur S. Wilson. Vol. I: The Road to the White House. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947.

\_\_\_\_\_. Wilson. Vol. II: The New Freedom. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956.

\_\_\_\_\_. Wilson. Vol. V: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965.

\_\_\_\_\_. Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910-1917. The New American Nation Series. Edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1954.

MacNeil, Neil. Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963.

Madison, Charles A. Leaders and Liberals in 20th Century America. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961.

Rossiter, Clinton. The American Presidency. New York: The New American Library, 1964.

Smith, Daniel M. The Great Departure: The United States and World War I 1914-1920. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965.

Warren, Sidney. The President as World Leader. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964.

Wiebe, Robert H. The Search For Order, 1877-1920. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.

Wise, Sidney and Schier, Richard F., eds. The Presidential Office. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968.

#### Periodicals

Binkley, Wilfred E. "The President as Chief Legislator." Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science, CCCVIII (September, 1956), 92-105.

Carleston, William G. "The Growth of the Presidency." Current History, XXXIX, No. 230 (October, 1960), 193-197.

Davidson, John Wells. "Wilson as Presidential Leader." Current History, XXXIX, No. 230 (October, 1960), 198-202.

Link, Arthur S. "Wilson and the Democratic Party." Review of Politics, XVIII, No. 2 (April 1956), 146-156.

MacMahon, Arthur W. "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader and Administrator." The American Political Science Review, L, No. 3 (September, 1956), 641-675.

Watson, Jr., Richard L. "Woodrow Wilson and His Interpreters, 1947-1957." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV, No. 2 (September, 1957), 207-236.

Faint, illegible text at the top of the page, possibly a header or title.

Second line of faint, illegible text.

Third line of faint, illegible text.

