


AN ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY OF RELATION

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The term "category" was coined by Aristotle and it is now used in Logic and Metaphysics. Originally, the term applied only in a court of law (meaning to accuse, charge demonstrate, attribute; accusation, attribution), and referred to the charge lodged against someone in a judicial court. Aristotle perceived a similarity between a court of law in its verdict and the mind in its act of judgment, in so far as the mind in its judging attributes something to another. Due to this similarity of attribution in the judgment of the court and in the judgment of the mind, Aristotle transferred the term "category" to Philosophy and gave it a logical meaning - the logical attribution of a predicate to a subject.

Aristotle employed the term "category" or "predicament" primarily in a logical sense, as a classification of the predicates used in our judgments. He considered the categories to be the ultimate and supreme classes or groups of direct universal ideas. Taken in this sense, the categories belong to Logic. However, Aristotle did not restrict the meaning of "category" to this logical sense, but also used the term in an ontological sense.

Since it is the purpose of the categories to bring order into our knowledge of reality, the number of the categories should be neither too small nor too large. Whatever the number, it should not be arbitrary but natural - based on things as

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they are found in nature. The categories must contain a complete classification of being. Every being and every determination of being must be reducible to the categories; they would fail in their function if any real being would find no place in the system. Such are the requisites of a truly serviceable list of categories.

Before the time of Aristotle, the problem of a list of categories does not seem to have accured to the minds of the early philosophers. Certain classifications of things are found, but they can hardly be called categories. Plato made no attempt at an enumeration of categories, although he seems to divide all things into being, rest and motion, same and other.

Aristotle attacked the problem in a definite manner. He distinguishes ten distinct categories: substance and nine accidents. He enumerates them as follows:

Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse'; of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long'; of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating position; 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection. 1

Each of these ten categories expresses an attribute that can be predicated of a subject. Each category is an answer to a question that can be asked about a thing. To properly under-

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stand this list of supreme modes of being, a brief explanation of each category is in order. However, this paper is limited to the explanation of one category - the category of relation.

What constitutes a relation? Three factors or elements are necessary for a relation: the subject, the term, and the foundation. The subject of the relation is the thing that is related to another. The term is the thing to which the subject is related. The foundation is the reason why the subject is related to the term.

The word 'relation' immediately brings to our minds the idea of connection between two or more objects. It signifies some interdependence, some order between beings. Aristotle states that, "Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing."² It is this order to other things which constitutes relation. Following this same idea, St. Thomas states, "There must be some order in things, this order is relation. Wherefore, there must be some relation in things, and according to those, one is ordered to the other."³

The true idea of a relation is not taken from its regard to that in which it inheres, but from its respect to something outside, something external. So if we consider relations to be in creatures formally as such, in this respect they are said to be assistant and not intrinsically affixed, for in this way,

they signify a respect which affects the thing related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in that subject.⁴

Relation cannot be in the intellect only, for nothing can be placed in any of the ten predicaments unless the thing exists outside the mind. Therefore, if there would not be relation in things outside the mind, it could not be classed as a genus of the predicaments. And perfection and good, which are things outside the mind, are not only attributed to something inhering in things absolutely, but also to the order of one thing to another.⁵

A strict definition of relation can hardly be given. Using a descriptive definition, we can say, "Relation is the highest of all the predicaments"⁶, and "Relation in its proper meaning signifies only what refers to another."⁷

A relation may be real or logical; and whichever it is, is determined by three conditions. Sometimes the relation stands between two extremes both of which are extremes in idea only, as when we compare a thing with itself and say that it is identical with itself. Obviously the thing is two, and so related to itself, only in our idea, not in reality. Other relations are real as regards both extremes; for example, quantitative relations like half and double have two real quantities as extremes; and agent - patient relations have two real ext-

remes, one acting and the other receiving the action. Finally, a relation may be real as regards one of its extremes, but only logical as regards the other; it is in one really, but in the other only in idea. Thus when I say that a tree is on my right, the relation expressed is real as regards to me, but only logical as regards the tree. Knowledge and the thing known are related by such a one-sided relation. Sense and science refer to sensible and intelligible things, and this relation is real and essential in sense and science; but in the things it is nothing real at all. Things are what they are whether I know them or not; nothing in them is different by virtue of being known. Hence, the relation between sensible things and sense, and between intelligible things and intellect is real on the side of sense and intellect, but only logical on the side of the things; these things are relative only in the sense that something is related to them, not in the sense that they are related to it.⁸

Asserting then that there is such a thing as a real relation existing previously to any act on the part of the mind, one that the intellect finds in nature, and does not put there, in its proper meaning it signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of thing, as in those things which by their very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an

inclination and an order to the center; and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the center and the same applies to other things.⁹ Or to use a definition of a real relation - a connection between two things according to some reality found in both - "a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both".¹⁰

As an example to prove that real relations do exist, let us imagine two twin brothers who are really alike, apart from what anybody thinks. Hence, in nature itself, there do exist real relations. The universe is made up of individual beings that are not entirely absolute but which are interconnected with one another, long before we have any knowledge of them, by a number of relations that constitute the order of the universe. "Therefore, there must be a certain order in things. However, this order is relation. Hence, there must be certain relations in those things, according to which one thing is ordered to another."¹¹

A real relation can be either predicamental or accidental. First we shall go into the definition of a predicamental relation. Predicamental relation is a real accident whose whole being consists in its being a pure relation to a term, that is, likeness, paternity. Hence, there are two aspects in predicamental relation: 1) the aspect in (esse in), inherence, by which predicamental relation is an accident which has the same kind of existence as other accidents; 2) the aspect towards (esse

ad), towardness, by which predicamental relation is formally constituted, and is an accident of a genus all its own, distinct from other accidents. Aristotle, St. Thomas, and almost all scholastics teach that real relation is general, that is, both predicamental and transcendental, exist; and in particular they affirm the existence of predicamental relation. St. Thomas holds that in nature there are real relations. If real relations exist whose whole being consists in their being pure relations to terms, some real relations are predicamental relations. But real accidents of this kind exist in nature. Therefore, some of the real relations which exist in nature are predicamental relations, that is, a likeness exists between two white objects, and yet this likeness is not a white object, nor is it whiteness, but rather it is a real accident by which one white object is related to another.¹²

According to John of St. Thomas, for a predicamental relation it is required that it have those conditions by which it is distinguished from a transcendental relation; then a predicamental relation is defined as one whose whole being (esse) is "ad aliud", while the esse of a transcendental relation is not ad aliud, but is absolute in itself.¹³

St. Thomas, on the other hand, defines predicamental relation as:

The weakest of all the predicaments, therefore some thought it to be of the second intellect. First things

known are things outside the mind, in which first intellect grasps the things known. The second things known are said to be intentions following the mode of knowing; secondly this intellect knows in so far as it is reflected upon itself, knowing itself to know and the mode by which it knows.... Secondly, relation follows this position that it may not be in things outside the mind, but in the intellect only; as intention of genus and species, and of second substances. This however cannot be. 1) In no predicament is placed anything unless it exists outside the mind, for ens rationis is divided contrary to the ens divided in the ten predicaments. 2) If relation is not in things outside the mind, it is not placed as one genus of the predicaments. 3) Therefore, there must be a certain order in things, this order is relation. Wherefore, there must be certain relations in things, of which one thing is ordered to the other. One thing is ordered to another either as to quantity, or as to action or passion.¹⁴

A predicamental relation is a predicament or a category, and so an accident. It is defined by Thomists as a real accident whose whole being consists in its reference to some other. Considered as a accident it has the same kind of existence as other accidents; but considered precisely as a relation according to its own nature, its relativity is not toward something (subject) in which it inheres, but toward something outside it.¹⁵ The other accidents, as quantity and quality, modify the subject itself, but the essence of relation signifies only a respect to something else.

Predicamental relations can be divided into the accidental and essential divisions. Of the accidental division there are mutual and non-mutual relations.

A mutual relation is a relation to which there corresponds in another extreme a relation of the same entity, that is,

paternity, sonship. A mutual relation may be a relation of the same denomination, and this relation is a relation which corresponds in another extreme a relation of the same entity and of the same species, that is, the relation of likeness between two white objects. A mutual relation may also be a relation of different denominations; this mutual relation of a different denomination is a relation to which corresponds in another extreme a relation of the same entity, but not of the same species, that is, paternity and sonship.

A non-mutual relation is a relation to which there corresponds in another extreme not a relation of the same entity, but of another entity, that is, corresponding to a real relation of the speculative intellect to an object of knowledge there is, on the side of the object of knowledge, only a relation of reason to the intellect.

Since predicamental relation is a relation to a term which results from a foundation, its essential or specific division is derived from the restriction of the foundation to the term, that is, predicamental relation is divided according as the foundation is related to the terms of the relation. There are three sources of the essential division of predicamental relation; and these are: quantity, action, and passion.

The quantity of a thing can be related to another, which is unity and number. The unity or plurality (number) of a relations is considered in respect, not to its terms, but to its

cause or subject. For if it were considered in respect to its terms, every man would have in himself two filiations - one in reference to his father and another in reference to his mother. But every man bears one relation to both his father and mother because of the unity of the cause thereof. For man is born by one birth of both father and mother; whence he bears but one relation to both.¹⁶

In order to classify unity, therefore, it must be said that this unity concerning which we speak is not really in God, except in our own way of thinking; but it is really in human nature, which is creature.¹⁷

St. Thomas gives the three modes of relation, concerning which he says:

Of those the first is according to number and quantity, as double and half, and triple to the third, and multiplication, that is, multiplied, to the multiplied part, that is to the sub-multiplied.... For everything exceeding according to quantity contains in itself that which it exceeds. For it is this and to this more; as five contains four.¹⁸

There are relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; which applies to all relations of quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes; the same applies to relations of action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son and the like.¹⁹

There are certain predicamental relation founded upon

action. This action, in its primary sense, means origin of motion; for as motion derived from another into a mobile object, is called passion, so the origin of motion itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is called action.²⁰

Action and passion are not the same, because action implies reference as of something from which there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something which is from another.²¹

Action and passion are both foundations of relation, not only inas much as they are actually being produced, but also in as much as they are already produced. Action and passion are foundations of relation because, when they are produced, they leave the subject changed, that is, when Peter paints a picture, he has not the same relation to the picture as he had before he painted it, but rather he is related to it as artificer to artifact.²²

Of the three types of relation - real, rational, and a relation where one extreme is in reality and the other only in the idea - this third type is called a transcendental relation. This type of relation can be considered real and rational, depending upon the extreme looked upon. To take an example, a relation from a creature to God is a real relation: since God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to him, and not conversely so, it is evident that crea-

tures are really related to God, whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, in as much as creatures are referred to Him.

To clarify this further, we shall take another example - when a pillar is seen by a tourist, there is a relation set up between the two; something quite impossible without both the pillar and the tourist. The same is true of the relation established when the earth is heated by the sun, or when human nature is assumed by the Word of God. Do we say that something is added to the pillar by the fact that it was seen by the tourist? Or to the sun because the earth was heated by it? Of course not. Nor do we say that something was added to the Word of God through the union of the human nature.

Rather there was something very definitely added to the tourist, to the earth, to the human nature. The difference between the two is that on one side there is a real relation - the side of the tourist, of the earth, of human nature; on the other side - that of the pillar, of the sun, of the Word of God, there is only a relation of reason. The rule by which we can distinguish one from the other is this: where dependence is found, there is a real relation; where there is no dependence there is a relation of reason.²³

Concerning the real and rational relation, St. Thomas says:

Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only be between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing is the same as itself. For reason apprehending one

thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relation between being and non-being formed by reason, apprehending non-being as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species and the like. Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes; and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and movable thing, father and son, and the like.²⁴

Speaking of the third type of relation, St. Thomas says that sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only: and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to the intellectual things; which are outside the order of the sensible and intelligible existence, in so far as they are realities existing in nature. Therefore, in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in the idea, in as much as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relation of science and sense. Hence they are called relative, not because they are related to other things, but because they have others related to them. For instance, on the right is not applied to the column, unless it stands as regards an animal on

the right side; which relation is not really in the column but in the animal.²⁵

Grenier holds that transcendental relation is defined as the entity of an absolute thing (that which depends upon nothing for its existence) related of its essence to another thing, that is, the relation of a soul to a body, of accident to substance, of potency to act. Hence, transcendental relation, because it does not constitute a genus, that is, a special predicament of being, but transcends every genus, in as much as it could be found in all genera.²⁶

As was stated earlier in this paper, there are two main divisions of the category of relation: real and rational. Having treated real relations, we shall proceed to treat of the rational relations. As a definition of a logical relation, we can say that sometimes, relation is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical or rational relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to genus.²⁷

Since a relation can indicate something positive even when that something has no objective reality, an 'ens rationis', considered as something positive, is called a relation of reason. Proving that there is an ens rationis, we quote St. Thomas as saying, "There are two kinds of being, namely, being of reason and being of nature".²⁸ And concerning being of reason, he says, "It is not being in nature, but being in the mind".²⁹

Ens rationis is an idea and therefore, it is conceived as if it were a nature. But, in itself, it has no reality, no intrinsic possibility, no order or relation to a real being. Renard gives an example to help clarify this:

I am able to conceive and to talk about a hole in a wall, a hole in a doughnut, as if this hole were something real. As a matter of fact the hole is merely a lack of wall, or a lack of doughnut.³⁰

According to Renard there are two kinds of relation of reason. He uses the example: to the right and to the left of a column. This is a relation of reason for the column has neither a right nor a left, but an "order to" is conceived in the mind, a relation, in reference to the "situs" of a person looking at the column. He states that the reason for a relation of reason is a more subtle one. It is found primarily in the weakness of the human intellect, which, in its effort to understand being in all its various aspects, needs to establish diverse "orders to" and the relations of reason in order to acquire a more complete knowledge of the object.³¹

Renard's second kind of relation is the relation of reason which is the subject of Logic. It is generally called the second intention. This second intention is a relation which the mind places between natures which have been conceived, and in so far as they are in the mind or understood. Wherefore, the relation is understood to be between two or more concepts of nature. For example, the nature of animal as conceived is understood to be related as a genus to the nature of man and beast

as conceived. These relations are entia rationis in the strictest sense. The words of St. Thomas are extremely helpful when he says,

Being of reason is properly said of those intentions which the mind finds in the natures it has considered, as for instance, the intention of genus, species, and the like, which are not found in the things of nature but follow the consideration of reason. And such a being of reason is properly the subject of Logic.³²

Relation of reason, explained by St. Thomas, may have four different modes. The first of these modes is had when one of the terms of relation has a foundation in the nature of the thing, and the other only in the mind. There is such a relation existing between knowledge and the known object. This relation has a real foundation in the subject acquiring knowledge, for the subject by the acquisition of knowledge attains a new mode of being; but it has no real foundation in the known object apprehended by the intellect and does not undergo any change. The knowledge, however, is in the thing through the instrumentality of the intellect, for the mind apprehending a certain thing as an object of knowledge refers it to the mind.

Concerning this first mode, when one relative depends upon another and not conversely so, as knowledge depends upon something to be known, and not conversely so, then there is the relation to science.³³ And St. Thomas says, "Sometimes it is in the idea only, as when we say a thing is identified with

itself". 34

A second mode is had when two related terms are one and the same term, which is apprehended mentally by two distinct acts. To obtain a clear understanding of this, we must know that the mind, being one, can at different times exercise its powers, and that the intellect can apprehend one and the same thing by many distinct acts in such a manner that what is actually one may be mentally manifold because of the number of acts by which it is apprehended. As St. Thomas says, "For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two, thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself".³⁵

Again St. Thomas comments:

When something is referred to itself, as when we say something is itself; if this relation places something added to itself in the nature of things, that is said to be the same to proceed into the infinity of things, because it is the same through some other relation and thus into infinity.³⁶

The third mode consists in the relation existing between two extremes, one of which denotes being (esse) and the other non-being (non esse). Although non-being cannot be the term of real relation, it may have logical relation to the being with which it is compared. Since the intellect knows that non-being is the negation of being, the intellect relates the former to the latter. But a relation in which one term denotes being and the other non-being is logical. Thus, when we say that we are prior to those who will exist in the future, this priority is

a logical relation, because what does not actually exist cannot be the term of a real relation.

St. Thomas states that a relation from two ultimate extremes which has a relation of priority places nothing in the nature of things, but only in the intellect.³⁷

Finally, the fourth mode of relation of reason is that whereby one term of relation is understood to have order to another. Since all relation, by its very essence, must have order to another, it follows then that the mind perceiving the reference of one thing to another should at the same time perceive the relation of the relation itself. But this perceiving of the relation of relation is not a real relation but a logical relation.³⁸

St. Thomas comments again that it cannot be said that paternity is referred to its subject through some median relation, because then that median would again be interrupted by some other median relation, and thus into infinity. Then it follows that that relation which is signified by paternity to its subject, is not said to be in the nature of things, but in reason only.³⁹

Then, to summarize what has been said in this paper, we must say that there are mainly two kinds of relations: real and rational. Rational relations are those which have both extremes of the relation in the mind only; which is contrary to real relation which has both or at least one extreme in reality. And

of real relations there are two main divisions: predicamental and transcendental. Transcendental relations being those which are in one extreme really and in the other rationally; while predicamental relations are those whose whole being consists in its being a pure relation to a term by either inherence (esse in) or towardness (esse ad). Predicamental relations are made up of the accidental and essential divisions. The accidental division is the mutual and non-mutual divisions. Of the essential division of predicamental relation there are three sources, which are quantity, action and passion.

The knowledge or acquaintance of the category of relation cannot be said to be so all-important in one's Philosophical studies in themselves. However, in so far as one's Philosophy serves as a handmaid to Theology, the knowledge and working ability of the category of relation is all-important, especially when one studies into the Doctrine of the Most Blessed Trinity, with each Person being really related to the other, and each relation is identified with the Divine Essence of God. Should there be a greater need exhibited for the importance of a thorough knowledge of Relation?

FOOTNOTES:

1. Aristotle, Categories, chap. 4.
2. Aristotle, Categories, chap. 7.
3. De Potentia, 7, 9. "Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quendam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur."
4. Summa Theol., I, 28, 2, c.
5. De Potentia, 7, 9.
6. De Potentia, 7, 9. "Relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia predicamenta."
7. Summa Theol., I, 28, 1, c. "Relationes significant secundum propriam rationem solum respectum ad aliud."
8. De Potentia, 8, 9.
9. Summa Theol., I, 28, 1, c.
10. Summa Theol., I, 13, 7, c. "Habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique."
11. De Potentia, 7, 9. "Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus quendam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur."
12. H. J. Philips, Modern Schoolman, vol. II, p. 228.
13. John of St. Thomas, Ars Logica, XVII, 1.
14. De Potentia, 7, 9. "Relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta, ideo putaverunt quidem eam esse ex secundis intellectibus. Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit in quantum reflectitur supra se ipsum intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit.... Secundum, ergo hanc positionem sequeretur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra animam, sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio generis et speciei, et secundarum substantiarum. Hoc autem esse non potest. In nullo enim praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res extra animam existens. Nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem praedicamenta. Si autem relatio non esset in rebus extra animam non poneretur ad aliquid unum genus praedicamenti.... Ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quendam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam vel secundum quantitatem, vel secundum virtutem activam seu passivam."
15. Summa Theol., I, 28, 1&2, c.
16. Summa Theol., III, 35, 5, c.
17. Summa Theol., III, 2, 7, c.
18. Summa Theol., I, 28, 4, c. "Relatio omnis fundatur vel supra quantitatem, ut duplum et dimidium; vel supra actionem et passionem, ut faciens et factum, pater et filius, dominus

et servus, et huiusmodi."

19. Summa Theol., I, 13, 7, c.
20. Summa Theol., I, 28, 4, c.
21. Summa Theol., I, 28, 3, lm.
22. Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 200-208.
23. Walter Farrell, O.P., Companion to the Summa, p. 36.
24. Summa Theol., I, 13, 7, c. "Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum: quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum apprehensionem rationis tantum, ut pote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum, statuit illud ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non ens; quas format ratio, in quantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum rationis, ut genus et species, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero relationes sunt, quantum ad utrumque extremum, res naturae: quando scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique. Sicut pater de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, et huiusmodi: nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum. Et simile est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut morivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia."
25. Summa Theol., I, 13, 7, c.
26. Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 200-208.
27. Summa Theol., I, 28, 1, c.
28. In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, IV, 574. "Et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae."
29. Summa Theol., I, 16, 3, lm. "Non est ens in rebus, sed sed ens in intellectu."
30. Henri Renard, S. J., Philosophy of Being, p. 113.
31. Henri Renard, S. J., idem, p. 114.
32. In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, IV, 574. "Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodis, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subjectum logicae."
33. De Veritate, I, 5, 16m.
34. Summa Theol., I, 13, 7, c. "Relatio secundum rationem tantum, in quantum res refertur ad ipsum."
35. Summa Theol., I, 13, 7, c. "Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum statuit illud ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum."
36. De Veritate, I, 5, 16m. "Quando aliquid ad seipsum refertur, ut cum dicimus idem eidem; si enim haec relatio aliquid in rerum natura poneret additum ei quod dicitur idem

esset in infinitum procedere in rebus, quia ipsa relatio per quam aliqua res diceretur eadem, esset eadem sibi per aliam relationem, et sic in infinitum."

37. De Veritate, I, 5, 16m.
38. Summa Contra Gentiles, II, cap. 13.
39. De Veritate, I, 5, 16m.

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