

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL

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DEFINITION OF THE SOUL

Every human being, if he truly be a human being, must necessarily have a human, rational soul. But just exactly what is this human soul? St. Thomas in his Summa Theologica says:

"Anima igitur, quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus, sed corporis actus." 1)

Thus St. Thomas tells us that the soul is a principle of the body. It is not any principle though, but it is the first principle of life. It is that act which actualizes potential matter.

So we call the soul the substantial form of man. 2) This act of the body actuates the potential matter and the result is a rational animal. St. Thomas once again in regard to the soul stated:

"The soul is the substantial form of man. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply." 3)

There is only one substantial form or only one rational soul in man. This is quite evident if one considers the soundness of the doctrine of St. Thomas. For if the substantial form gives being simply, then it rightly follows that there is only one substantial form in every body. If we were to suppose that more than one substantial form were in the body, then it would be the same as saying that the being simply which is the result of the substantial form is not really simple for another form is also said to be giving being simply. It would be a contradiction to affirm that there are two substantial forms in man. There can only be one substantial form and any other form is

accidental.

This idea of the substantial and accidental form is all clearly summarized by St. Thomas in his Opuscula Philosophica Et Theologica. In this regard he says that there is only one soul or only one substantial form in one body for:

"Forma enim substantialis in hoc differt ab accidentali; quia forma substantialis facit esse hoc aliquid simpliciter; forma autem accidentalis advenit ei quod jam est hoc aliquid, et facit ipsum esse quale vel quantum, vel qualiter se habens." 4)

When speaking of the soul we also refer to it as the principle of intellectual operation. By this we mean that the intellect is one of the faculties or one of the powers of the soul. Every human being has an intellect. The external expressions of the intellect may not be too well balanced and coordinated, but this defect is not due to a defect in the intellect; rather it is because of some organic failure. It is through the intellect that a man is able to think, judge, and reason regarding various and sundry things that are of interest to him. From experience we are aware of the fact that we are able to know the essences of all things. But this intellectual knowledge that we have is immaterial. The Angelic Doctor in reference to the intellect which is a faculty of the soul says:

"Homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura; quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter, impediret cognitionem aliorum. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus." 5)

Since the intellect is a faculty of the soul, then it must

be of the same nature as the soul; for "agere sequitur esse". Now in the previous quotation which I cited from the Summa of St. Thomas, I quoted the passage in which he posited the fact that the intellect is able to know the nature of all bodies. First of all it must be observed that St. Thomas said that the intellect is "able" to know the natures of all bodies. The intellect is able, but it does not necessarily have to know all bodies. But it does have that potentiality to know all bodies.

And we know that the intellect is able to know all bodies because of the fact that the intellect knows the material and individual in an immaterial and universal way. Take for example an elephant. I am able to know one elephant or a herd of elephants. In my intellect I have the universal concept of elephant and this abstract concept that I have in my mind is applicable to any elephant, be it in Africa or in the city zoo at Chicago.

The nature of these universals is not a material one. St. Thomas explains the abstracting of the universal from the particular as follows:

" Similiter dico quod ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cujuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis, aut hominis, aut hominis, aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel intelligibilem a phantasmatis, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur." 6)

So we see that the intellect understands material things in

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an immaterial way, and it also grasps that which the senses cannot reach, namely, truth, beauty, the idea of loyalty, etc.⁷⁾

This follows the principle which states that "that which is received is received according to the mode of the receiver." ⁸⁾

Now if the intellect receives the immaterial universal, then it necessarily has to be devoid of any matter. Since it receives the immaterial, then it too must be immaterial. Thus the dictum "agere sequitur esse". If the intellect is immaterial, then that spiritual substance of which it is only a faculty must also be immaterial.

Another faculty which we predicate of the soul is the will. The free will is the rational appetite of man. Nothing directly forces the will to act, but the object toward which it tends could be said to draw it on. But at any rate, the will is free to choose what it wishes to will.

Father O'Brien, in regard to the freedom of the will, writes:

" Now the rational will can be irresistibly drawn only by that which the intellect proposes as so completely and absolutely attractive that it contains no disagreeable element. As long as the intellect is able to detect any such element, the will does not have that for which it is naturally yearning, namely, perfect happiness, and is consequently able to reject the proposed object." ⁹⁾

Thus the object of the will is good and perfect happiness. It does not seek any particular good, but it seeks universal good. ¹⁰⁾ As the intellect understands the particular in a universal way, so too does the will seek that universal good. And

as the intellect was said to be immaterial and the faculty of an immaterial being, namely, the soul, because of that principle which states that "a cause cannot produce an effect transcending its own nature," so too is the human will shown to be immaterial.

It has been shown that since the faculties of the soul are immaterial, the principle from whence these faculties arise must also be immaterial. And since this is true the reverse is also true, namely, since this principle of life is immaterial, its faculties of intellect and will are also immaterial.

Some philosophers or men of various fields hold that the brain and the soul are synonymous. But this idea is definitely seen to be erroneous because of the following: The human brain has been proven to be localized in the head of the man. It is a material organ which requires matter for its operation. In the brain are found the nerve termini of the various external sense organs. It requires phantasms, and, unlike the intellect, it does not abstract the immaterial from the material in these phantasms. It is believed to be the organ of internal sense.

Brother Benignus in regard to phantasms stated:

" There are three salient features of images:
materiality, concreteness and particularity." 11)

It is in the phantasms that the material matter is represented. Thus, since the brain directly uses the images which are in the phantasms, it too, just as the material phantasms, must also be material. To cite the philosophical dictum again, "agere sequitur esse". If the brain has the material phantasms,

and if it can be injured by any means whatsoever, such as by an accident or by sickness, then it can quite easily be seen to be a part of the extended body. And since it depends on the body for its existence, then it is also evident that it is material and not immaterial.

The fact that the brain is not immaterial can be shown from the fact that the brain has no self-reflection. It cannot possibly consider its various operations and at the very same moment be the operator which is considering its operations. The brain is incapable of being both the agent and patient at the same moment. It tends toward that which is outside of itself. Thus we see that the brain is limited greatly by its materiality, and, unlike the rational soul, it is incapable of having complete identification between the knower and the known. Take for an example a fighting rooster. If I took a fighting rooster and put him in with another fighting rooster and then let them fight, neither of these roosters in the midst of their cock fight could stop and consider himself fighting. The rooster is able to fight, but he cannot reflect upon his passion or animal drive which is causing him to fight. Not only can the brain of the rooster not reflect back upon itself, but neither can any other irrational animal, nor the brain of any rational animal. Man's intellect can have self-reflection, but not the brain of man. So we can put aside as false the idea of the brain being the soul--the substantial form of the body.

Now that we have considered the soul in itself, its facul-

ties of intellect and will, and why the brain cannot be the principle of life in man, let us go over to the nature of the soul.

NATURE OF HUMAN SOUL

Since the soul is the substantial form of the body we can see that it is natural to the soul to be joined to the body. But it does not follow from this that the soul is dependent upon the body for its existence. The soul needs the body insofar as it needs phantasms from which it can abstract the immaterial and universal species.

In regard to the idea of the soul needing the body for the sake of having phantasms from which it can abstract the universals, John of St. Thomas in his "Naturalis Philosophia" wrote:

" Operationes animae rationalis, licet secundum se et propriam rationem spiritualem sint independentes a corpore dependent tamen ministerialiter et dispositive, quia pro hac vita exercentur dependenter a sensibus et a phantasmatibus, et ratione huius dependentiae ad naturam spectant, sicut etiam generatio hominis naturalis est, licet anima non dependeat a corpore quantum ad esse, sed quantum ad informationem." 12)

St. Thomas in his work entitled "De Anima" tells us concisely why the soul is united to the body. He writes as follows:

" Ultima perfectio animae humanae consistit in cognitione veritatis, quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc autem quod perficitur anima in cognitione veritatis, indiget uniri corpori; quia intelligit per phantasmata, quae non sunt sine corpore. Ergo necesse est ut anima corpori uniatur ut forma et sit hoc aliquid." 13)

The soul of man, being independent of the body for its existence, is thus said to be subsistent. A subsistent being is one which exists "in se", or as St. Thomas says, "per se".

To quote the Angelic Doctor in regard to the idea of the soul being subsistent:

"Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur, mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid operatur quo est. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse incorporeum et subsistens." 14)

We may speak of the soul not only as being subsistent, but also as being spiritual. For if it exists "in se", if it is not corporeal but is only united to the body for the sake of understanding by abstracting from the phantasms, then it is surely spiritual. 15)

It follows that since the soul is spiritual and subsistent, that it is also simple. By simple I mean that it lacks parts. And as was said in the first part of this paper, the soul is the first principle of life; it is the act of the body. Now since the soul is the first principle of life of the body, it must be the first principle of life of the whole body. If it is the substantial form of the body it must actualize the whole body and not just a part of it. But if the soul were corporeal it would then be unable to actualize the entire body. The "law of physical extent" would come into play here, for it is self-evident that no two bodies can occupy the same identical space at

the same time. Thus if the soul were corporeal, then it would be unable to be the first principle of life which actualizes matter. If we would suppose that two corporeal bodies would come together and become joined to each other then we would still find it necessary to posit some first principle through which this matter would be actualized so that a human being capable of the immaterial and spiritual process of understanding and willing would result. This necessity of positing a first spiritual principle is quite obvious for a cause cannot produce an effect transcending its own nature. And it is just this very thing that matter would be said to be doing if we were to say that a corporeal body came to matter and actualized it with the end product being a rational creature, a composite of a rational form and a material body. It would be a metaphysical impossibility for no-one gives what he does not have.

So we see that this first principle of life cannot be corporeal, but it must be spiritual, simple and subsistent. This soul is the principle of life for the entire body. St. Augustine stated it thus:

"The soul is present as a whole not only in the entire mass of a body, but also in every least part of the body at the same time. For the soul senses the suffering of a part of the body as a whole, and yet not in the whole body." 16)

There are three types of totums, and, of the three, one of them is applicable to the soul and its permeation of the entire body. The first type of totum is the quantitative whole, but since the soul is incorporeal it therefore lacks quantitative

parts. Then there is the totality according to power; but this whole cannot be applied to the soul for if it were, then the arm would be able to see, the ear could smell, etc. So we see that all the various powers of the soul are not in each and every part of the body. The totum that is applicable to the soul is the totum or the totality according to the perfection of essence.¹⁷⁾ It is in this manner that the soul is said to be in the whole body. And since the soul is throughout the entire body we can see that it has no parts, for no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time.

To further illustrate the simplicity of the soul let us take another quick glance at the intellectual act.. In the foregoing section of this thesis I have shown that the intellect is a faculty of the human soul. If the intellect were corporeal then it would be impossible for it to come to know or to be able to know all corporeal bodies. The philosophical axiom "the receiver ought to be free from the nature of that which is received" brings this point out.

"Recipiens debet esse denudatum a natura recepti, sicut pupilla caret colore. Omne autem organum corporale habet naturam aliquam sensibilem. Intellectus vero quo intelligimus est cognoscitivus omnium sensibilibus naturarum; unde impossibile est quod ejus operatio, quae est intelligere exerceatur per aliquid organum corporale." ¹⁸⁾

As the intellect is seen to know all corporeal bodies, it is said to be immaterial. This point of the intellect being simple is pushed one notch further by considering its ability

of self-reflection. By this self-reflection we mean that:

" The intellect can make its very own act
it's object and think of its own thoughts." 19)

Or as Brother Benignus expresses it:

" The human intellect not only knows external objects and relations, but it knows the acts by which it grasps these objects and relations and knows itself as exerting these acts. In a word, we not only think things, but we know our own thinking as our own, and know ourselves thinking. Therefore the intellect is subject and object at the same time. Reflex consciousness of self demands the total identity of knower and known." 20)

In our consideration of the brain we found that it is incapable of self-reflection. It cannot consider itself as being both the agent and patient of its own act. This inability of the brain to reflect back upon itself is due to its corporeality. For a thing to have self-reflection it must be free from any corporeal substance. It must be spiritual and simple. And this is just what the rational soul is, namely, spiritual and simple.

From all that has preceeded, the facts of the human soul's spirituality, subsistence and simplicity have been firmly established. The following will just be what we might call a rounding out or a fuller development of the matter. I now want to point out that the soul can exist after separation from the body.

To anticipate any refutation which might arise at this point regarding the origin of the soul, let it be known that the rational soul does not come from our parents, but it comes from the Supreme Pure Act, God. To use the dictum of philosophy

"a cause cannot produce an effect transcending its own nature." Or again: "anyone doing something is greater than that which he is doing." For example, God our Maker is greater than any of us. Or again, we can build a pigeon house, but still we are superior to that pigeon house, for we have a rational soul; and that is something which the pigeon house will not have even if we wish to give it a rational soul. Let us also take a birth of an infant for an example of how the doer is above or is greater than that which is done. It is true that a man and woman can co-operate to give birth to a child, but they do not fashion the life of the child. They are the cause of the child's coming to be, but they are not the cause of the child's being. They can only produce a body to which is joined the soul. They do not get together and decide to give a soul to the sperm-ovum combination. It is true that the sperm is a material product of the male and the ovum is from the female, but only God can give a spiritual soul to the child. God alone has the power of giving life and death to the fetus. Then again, it would be impossible for a man or woman or both to give a spiritual soul to the body for man is a composite of both body and soul. 21) Now if he is a composite how could he possibly give to the child a spiritual soul. How could this composite give to the child a soul with its characteristics of spirituality, subsistence and simplicity. No-one gives what he does not have. So too, a composite cannot give forth simplicity; for if it did, then it would be giving what it did not have. And this is an impos-

sibility. 22)

In order to bring together all that has so far been said regarding the nature of the soul, it is necessary to go back to a fundamental point and state that the soul is spiritual. We know that the receiver ought to be denude of the nature which it is going to receive. To follow up this axiom with the Thomistic words of Phillip:

"The nature of the intellect cannot be that of any one of the bodies which it can know. Since then these are all the bodies that there are, its nature cannot be corporeal or bodily at all, but must be incorporeal or spiritual." 23)

These words "incorporeal" and "spiritual" are interchangeable. The word "incorporeal" is just a negative way of saying the positive "spiritual".

If the soul is incorporeal or spiritual, then from this it follows that it is simple. For a thing which lacks parts is said to be simple; and if the soul is incorporeal, if it is without a body, then it cannot have extension. It cannot be composed of quantitative parts, for extension is predicated in the truest meaning of the word only of something which has quantity.

Anything which can be said to be spiritual and simple can also be said to be indivisible. Whenever a thing is said to lack parts, or whenever it is not a composite, then it is indivisible; for if a thing has nothing which can be divided, then no matter how hard one may try, he could not divide it for there would be present nothing divisible. Even God Himself cannot

divide an indivisible thing for it would be a contradiction. It is just as absurd to talk about dividing a simple, spiritual and indivisible thing as it is to consider a square circle. Both are impossible.

CORRUPTION AND INCORRUPTION

We are now at the very goal of our problem regarding the immortality of the human soul. A restatement of this is to ask whether or not the soul is incorruptible. This corruption is a change; it is a transition from potency to act. In his Summa Theologica St. Thomas treats of corruption in the following manner:

" Non enim invenitur corruptio, nisi ubi invenitur contrarietas; generationes enim et corruptiones ex contrariis et in contraria sunt. In anima autem intellectiva non potest esse aliqua contrarietas: recipit enim secundum modum sui esse. Ea vero quae in ipsa recipiuntur, sunt absque contrarietate; quia etiam rationes contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae, sed est una scientia contrariorum.. Impossibile est ergo quod anima intellectiva sit corruptibilis." 24)

First let us glance about us and consider how corruption is in material things. The human person is a composite of both matter and form, of body and soul. This composition of the body is known as the composition of constitutive parts. Since the soul is that principle which gives life to matter, we see that prior to, and posterior to, the time when the soul is in matter, that the matter is not animated by a rational soul. It is evident then that the man dies when the soul departs. Man is subject to corruption for corruption is only possible in a com-

posite.

The Angelic Doctor develops the explanation of the corruption of a composite in the following manner:

" Proprium subjectum generationis et corruptionis est materia. Intantum igitur unumquodque a corruptione recedit, inquantum recedit a materia; ea enim quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, sunt per se corruptibilia." 25)

In the preceeding quotation the great Dominican philosopher and theologian states that which is capable of corrupting, namely, composites. And as he further illustrated in Prima Pars, Question 75 of the Summa Theologica, corruption is brought about by contrariety. We know that contraries do rub together in the world about us. When a bucket of hot water is poured into a bucket of cold water there is a friction between the two. The final result is that the hot and cold water will both change. The cold water will become a slight bit warmer and the hot water will lose some of its hotness and become a little cooler. So thus we can see that there is a corruption of the degree of coldness in the cold water, and there is a corruption of the degree of hotness in the hot water. This corruption is all brought about because of contrariety. Or again, say that I have a can full of white paint and a container full of black paint. I cannot mix both of these containers of paint together and still have the same whiteness and blackness in the respective cans. Both colors of paint will lose their respective whiteness or blackness and the result of the mixture will be a sickening gray. So we see that the contraries expel one another; and the

resulting product is neither the first degree of whiteness nor the first degree of blackness, but it is a combination and a mixture of the two. This combination results in the corruption of the perfection of the white and black into the imperfection of the two. And thus since there is corruption here, there is no immortality.

And now regarding the intellect, let it be said that it knows composite things which, existing independently of the intellect, are corruptible. But, as has been shown, when the intellect comes to know something, it abstracts the universal from the particular notes. Thus everything that is in the mind is immaterial and universal in so far as it is abstractly in the mind. If an idea or concept is in my mind immaterially and abstractly, then it cannot possibly have any material or corporeal qualities actually in it as it is at the present moment actually existing in the intellect. The universal is completely devoid of any materiality or individuality in the intellect. But, as we have seen, corruption is only brought about by contraries.²⁶⁾ Contraries which are contraries in corporeal beings are not contrary while in the intellect. Corruption implies change, and change implies movement. And what is able to move from one place to another except that which is extended body. The rational soul has been shown not to be an extended body and therefore it follows that it is also incapable of corrupting either per se or per accidens.²⁷⁾

Varvello gives us a more or less digested restatement of St.

Thomas in regard to corruption per se and corruption per accidens in the following quotation:

" The human soul cannot be corrupted. Things can possibly be corrupted in two ways: 1) of themselves, that is by corruption properly so called, by a dissolution of substantial parts of which they are constituted; or 2) by accident, that is, through corruption improperly so called, by a separation from the matter which a thing needs in order to subsist. In the following way only individual bodies can be corrupted, since they alone are made up of substantial parts (matter and form). In the other way all non-subsisting forms can be corrupted, namely, forms which depend for their existence on matter. But the intellective, the human form being spiritual, does not depend on matter. Therefore it cannot be corrupted." 28)

No matter how hard we may try, we will never be able to exhaust the intellect. Our material organs may function faultily, but these mishaps are due to the fatigue which overwhelms the various sense organs. Our spiritual intellect is never overcome by fatigue. The more it knows the more perfect it is. This idea is stated quite succinctly in the Contra Gentiles:

" Nullum corpus potest alterius corporis formam substantialem recipere nisi per corruptionem suam formam amittat. Intellectus autem non corrumpitur, sed magis perficitur per hoc quod recipit formas omnium corporum; perficitur enim in intelligendo; intelligit autem secundum quod habet in se formas intellectuum. Nulla igitur substantia intellectualis est corpus." 29)

If there is no body in the intellect, then there is no composition. If this be lacking, then it follows that no contrariety is possible. Non-contrariety implies incorruptible. And if the soul is incorruptible, it will always remain as it is. The soul is the first principle of life. If it gives life to the

body, then this first principle must also have this life for no-one gives what he does not have... Therefore, since the soul is incorruptible, since it is the principle of life, and thus, since it has life, it will have this life forever. Immortality can therefore be predicated of the human soul.

All the foregoing arguments will logically and rightly lead one to the conviction of the soul's immortality. But then, suppose that one might hold that God annihilates the soul. They might say that since God made all things out of nothing, He therefore will annihilate all things or reduce all things back to nothingness.

In refutation of this I would answer the following. We are quite certain that God will not annihilate the human soul. If we consider the annihilation of the human soul in regard to the absolute potency of God, then we can say that God can annihilate the soul; for in this type of potency we find no contradiction present. Thomas Aquinas states it thus:

" Quod sicut posse creari dicitur aliquid non per potentiam passivam, sed solum per potentiam activam creantis, qui ex nihilo potest aliquid vertibile in nihil, non importatur in creatura potentia ad non esse, sed in creatore potentia ad hoc quod esse non influat." 30)

The Angelic Doctor goes on in his Opuscula Philosophica Et Theologica to say:

" Deus potest subtrahere suam actionem a rebus conservandis et hoc ipso omnia in nihilum deciderent." 31)

Most intelligent philosophers, when touching upon this sub-

ject, are of the opinion that God does not annihilate the soul; they hold, and rightly so, I think, that God could not have made the soul to be immortal in vain.

Di Napoli states, when speaking about the power of God, that when considering only the absolute power of God, then the Almighty Creator can be said to be able to annihilate the human soul. Following upon this he asserts regarding the relative potency::

" Potentia ordinata seu relativa--scilicet consideratione habita omnium attributorum Dei, Deus non potest annihilare animam, scilicet non annihilabit eam, ne contradicat suae iustitiae, sapientiae, bonitati et sanctitati." 32)

We know that the soul is a subsistent being, and thus it has per se operation. But do you think that God would take away the per se operation of something which He at the time of creation willed that form to have? Could God have blundered at the time of creation and perhaps have given per se existence and immortality to something from which He later decided to remove it? It seems hardly possible, or probable, that God could have created and bestowed life in this manner. The very idea of this is repulsive to one's mind and heart. God's infinite wisdom and goodness wouldn't let Him create something for per se operation and then remove this per se operation. God's wisdom of creating the soul simpliciter and spiritual for its own nature of perpetual duration couldn't have been in vain. 33)

He, out of the plenitude of His goodness, would not have placed in the soul of man an appetite, a yearning and a continual de-

sire for happiness if this desire for happiness were to be in vain.³⁴⁾ Our souls seek for this happiness and true happiness endures perpetually. And if God were to remove this longing of the soul for perpetual happiness, this quest for happiness which He, the Creator, instilled into the souls of men, then He would be contradicting Himself; for everything that He does is perfect.

The only path left open for us to follow now regarding the soul is the one that proves the human soul to be immortal. This life giving principle of the body has the two spiritual faculties of knowing and willing. The intellect and will work with universals; these universals are independent of the particulars. To bring in the axiom "agere sequitur esse" we see that it applies both to the soul and its faculties and vice versa. If the soul is, but is not materially, then it must have a spiritual existence. Since it is independent of the body, it then follows that it is subsistent; a subsistent being is that being which has in se existence and operation. When the matter is no longer disposed to the soul and dies, then it begins to corrupt. While the body may corrupt, still the subsistent soul does not corrupt. Therefore, since the soul is not corruptible, and since it is impossible that God would have made the soul to have per se or in se operation, to be immortal, and then to annihilate it, I posit that the human soul will live on after the corruption of the body. For the human soul is immortal.

FOOTNOTES

1. Summa Theologica, I, q. 75, a. 1c.
2. St. Thomas Aquinas, "De Anima," q. 1, a. 1., Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. II.
3. Summa Theol., I, q. 76, a. 4.
4. St. Thomas Aquinas, Opuscula Philosophica Et Theologica, opus. XXXII, Caput XC, vol. III.
5. Summa Theol., I, q. 75, a. 2.
6. idem., I. q. 85, a. 1, ad 1.
7. Cardinal Gibbons, The Soul Is Immortal, pp. 2-3. (pamphlet)
8. Summa Theol., I, q. 84, a. 1.
9. John A. O'Brien, Truths Men Live By, p. 261.
10. Cardinal Mercier, A Manual Of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 297.
11. Brother Benignus, F.S.C., Nature, Knowledge and God, p. 194.
12. Joannis a Sancto Thoma, O.P., "II Naturalis Philosophia," q. 9; a. 2, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, vol. II.
13. "De Anima," q. 1, a. 1, op. cit.
14. Summa Theol., I, q. 75, a. 2, c.
15. Cardinal Mercier, op. cit., p. 295.
16. St. Augustine, Concerning the Teacher and On the Immortality of the Human Soul, p. 83.
17. St. Thomas Aquinas, "De Spiritualibus Creaturis," q. 1, a. 14, c, Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. II.
18. "De Anima," q. 1, a. 14, op. cit.
19. Cardinal Mercier, op. cit., p. 297.
20. Brother Benignus, F.S.C., op. cit., pp. 197-198.
21. Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Cap. 79.

22. R. P. Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 1, pp. 312-313.
23. Idem., p. 254.
24. Summa Theol., I, q. 75, a. 6, c.
25. St. Thomas Aquinas, Opuscula Philosophica Et Theologica, opus. XXXII, Cap. LXXXIV, vol. III.
26. Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Cap. 79.
27. Ibid., Liber II, Cap. 55.
28. Rev. Francis Varvello, S.C., Metaphysics, pp. 259-260.
29. Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Cap. 49.
30. Summa Theol., I, q. 75, a. 6 ad 2.
31. St. Thomas Aquinas, "Quaestiones Quodlibetales IV," a. 4, Opuscula Philosophica Et Theologica, vol. II.
32. Joannes Di Napoli, Manuale Philosophiae, vol. II, p. 190.
33. Rev. Francis Varvello, S.C., op. cit., p. 260.
34. Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Cap. 55.

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