

ANALOGY AND THE DIVINE NAMES

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty
of the College Department of St. Meinrad
Seminary in partial fulfillment of the re-
quirements for a Bachelor of Arts Degree.

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April 24, 1958

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In proving the existence of God we arrive at a notion of God, in terms of the relationship of creatures to Him, as the First Cause, the Uncaused Cause. In other words, there is in God no potency whatsoever. He exists a se; that is, God is Subsistent Existence, the Esse Subsistens (God is improperly said to have existence, because only a being composed of act and potency can be properly said to have something.).

This Esse Subsistens is expressed positively by the expression "Pure Act", connotatively by the expression "Omni-perfection." But no perfection can be lacking to an all-perfect Being, nor can there be any imperfection in Him. Thus, whatever perfections are to be found in creatures which imply no imperfection (perfectiones simpliciter simplices) must be found in God also, but in a more excellent way than they are found in creatures, who possess them together with imperfections. If all perfections of this kind were not found in God, then He would not be all-perfect since some perfection would be lacking to Him; if they would not be in God in a more excellent way (not mixed with imperfections) than they are in creatures, then God would not be all-perfect, since there would be in Him some imperfection.

We are actually speaking improperly when we say that these perfections "are in" God, since this is the same as saying that God "has" perfections. If we are to speak properly, we must say that God "is" these perfections. Examples of perfections which imply no imperfection are goodness, truth, know-

ledge, justice, wisdom, etc. Thus, properly speaking, God is His Wisdom, His Goodness, etc. And if we wish to predicate adjectives of God, we say that He is good or wise or just; but in all these cases, we must keep in mind that we do not intend properly to say that God has goodness or has wisdom or has justice, which is what we do intend to say when we predicate these adjectives of creatures.

In the foregoing paragraph we relied heavily upon analogy when we predicated of God the name good, for instance, which can also be said of creatures. However, we never once called attention to this use of analogy and to the type of analogy which was being employed. Now let's try to discover just where analogy fits into the picture.

The same name is able to be predicated of God and creatures formally (intrinsically) only according to the analogy of proper proportionality. An understanding of this statement is very necessary for the student of Natural Theology. Hence, we must examine carefully several basic points contained therein: 1) What kind of names do we have reference to here? 2) What is analogy of proper proportionality? 3) How is this analogy applied to names said of God and creatures?

Taking the first point first, we must insist that the only kind of names which can be formally predicated of God and creatures are perfections which in their formal concept imply no imperfection. Such a perfection is commonly referred to in the Latin as a perfectio simpliciter simplex and is defined by

St. Anselm as "that which in anything it is better to be than not to be."¹ Any other perfection (perfectio mixta), whose formal concept would imply some imperfection, although it could be predicated formally of a creature, obviously could not be predicated formally of God since He is all-perfect. However, we are able to predicate certain of these perfections of God metaphorically. But these mixed perfections will be treated later; right now we are concerned only with those perfections which imply no imperfection, since they alone can be predicated intrinsically of both God and creatures.

Now it is in predicating of both God and creatures these perfectiones simpliciter simplices that analogy of proper proportionality comes into play. Perhaps this proper proportionality can be most clearly explained as a similarity of proportions. The word "analogy" itself is at once a very easy and a very difficult word to define. Etymologically speaking, as Cajetan points out,² analogy (from the Greek) means simply "proportion or proportionality." But it would seem that, over the centuries, the word analogy has taken on a few additional notes. Thus its meaning, while not being formally different from "proportion or proportionality", nevertheless views this proportion or proportionality in a special light. This would seem to be in agreement with both St. Thomas and Cajetan, as far as we are able to judge from their usage of analogy.

Consequently, analogy (taken generally) would seem to be

best defined as a proportion (relation) or proportionality, which serves as a mode of predication whereby two or more things are called by the same name, and that which the name signifies is simply diverse and relatively the same either according to intention only, or according to to-be only, or both according to intention and according to to-be.³ Analogy of proper proportionality, a particular type of analogy, is able to be defined as a proportionality (similarity of proportions) which serves as a mode of predication whereby one name, signifying something simply diverse but relatively the same both according to intention and according to to-be, is able to be predicated of two or more things. For anyone who has studied analogy, this definition will, I presume, be sufficiently clear; for those who may have had no previous acquaintance with analogy, it should become clearer in the following paragraph.

When we say "God is wise", what we are saying is, in quasi-mathematical form: $\frac{\text{man(creature)}}{\text{his wisdom}} = \frac{\text{God(Creator)}}{\text{His Wisdom}}$. In other words, God is to His Wisdom as man is to his wisdom. And, in virtue of a similarity between the two proportions, we are able to predicate wisdom of God. But we must beware of interpreting this proportionality in a strictly mathematical sense. Both the "is to" and the "as" have a different meaning in this metaphysical proportionality than they would have if the proportionality were one involving numbers. Thus, in the proportionality 2 is to 4 as 3 is to 6, the "is to"

expresses a proportion between two quantities (a determinate, finite relation), and the "as" could well be replaced by an equal sign, for a mathematical proportionality is a strict equality of proportions. But when we say that God is to His Wisdom as man is to his wisdom, the "is to" denotes not a proportion in the strict sense of the word, that is, a definite relation between two quantities, but any relation whatsoever; and the "as", instead of expressing strict equality, conveys merely the notion of similarity. Thus, God's essence is related to His Wisdom in a way similar to that in which man's essence is related to his wisdom. Obviously we do not have here a strict equality between the two proportions, because God's essence is identified with His Wisdom whereas man's essence is not identified with his wisdom; hence the proportions are only similar. Let this suffice for our formal treatment of analogy of proper proportionality and its application to the divine names.

It could easily be concluded, after a superficial study of analogy, that names are predicated formally (intrinsically) of God and creatures also according to another kind of analogy, the analogy of proportion (commonly referred to as analogy of attribution). But this would be a false conclusion. Moreover, in my opinion, it would likewise be false to conclude that names are predicated (even extrinsically) of God according to the analogy of attribution. Just as healthy is said of medicine because medicine is the cause of health in an animal, so

also good is said of God because He is the cause of goodness in creatures. If understood correctly, this parallelism is true. But, if it is understood as an application of the analogy of attribution, it is not true.

Analogy of attribution is a proportion (relation) which serves as a mode of predication whereby one name, signifying something simply diverse and relatively the same according to intention only, is predicated of one thing (primary analogate) formally and is attributed to other things (secondary analogates) because of some relationship (proportion) which these other things have to that which the name formally signifies in the primary analogate.⁴ Thus an animal is formally called healthy because health formally inheres in it. But this same name "healthy" is attributed to other things, such as medicine (a cause of health in an animal) and urine (a sign of health in an animal), because of some relation to the health of the animal. Obviously, health is not found formally in the medicine not in the urine, but only in the animal. Thus, formally taken, "healthy" is predicated only extrinsically of both medicine and urine: said of medicine, the word healthy means "causing health in an animal;" said of urine, it means "signifying health in an animal." And thus it is that, whenever the same name is predicated of several things according to the analogy of attribution, it is not (by virtue of this type of analogy) predicated formally of more than one of the analogates.

We see, then, why God is not named formally according to the analogy of attribution. But how is it that He is not named in any way whatsoever, even extrinsically, according to this type of analogy? My answer is this: while we must admit that God could be named extrinsically according to the analogy of attribution, nevertheless He is not. In other words, when we say that God is good or that He is wise, we do not intend to signify thereby that He is the cause of goodness or the cause of wisdom in creatures.⁵ Indeed, God is the cause of these perfections in creatures, but we do not intend to bring out this fact by calling Him good, or wise, or the like. Instead, "the sense (which we convey in predicating the word "good" of God) is, that which we call goodness in creatures, pre-exists in God,"⁶— and it pre-exists formally. That is, such a predication is a formal predication; and names can be predicated formally of all the analogates only according to the analogy of proper proportionality, not according to the analogy of attribution.

Much controversy has arisen about this question of formal (intrinsic) predication according to the analogy of attribution, or proportion. Suarez is the outstanding proponent of the "intrinsic" theory, while John of St. Thomas, Cajetan, Gredt, and Garrigou-Lagrange, among others hold for "extrinsic" predication according to the analogy of attribution as such. Accidentally, of course, the same name which (according to its formal concept) is predicated extrinsically of all but

one of the analogates according to the analogy of proportion, may also be predicated intrinsically of all the analogates.

But such intrinsic predication must be the result not of the analogy of proportion, but of the analogy of proportionality.

As Cajetan says in his famous treatise on analogy:

It should be carefully noted that this first condition of this mode of analogy, namely, that it is not according to the genus of inherent formal causality, but always according to something extrinsic, must be understood formally and not materially. It should not be understood as if every name which is analogous by analogy of attribution is common to the analogates in such a way that it pertains only to the primary analogate formally and to the others by extrinsic denomination.... Our explanation must be understood in the sense that every name which is analogous by attribution as such, i.e. insofar as it is analogous in this manner, is common to the analogates in this way that it pertains to the primary analogate formally and to the others by extrinsic denomination.⁷

This does not in any way contradict what was said above, namely, that names are not predicated of God and creatures according to the analogy of proportion. For we have admitted that names could be said of God and creatures according to this analogy; our point is that they are not. Father Joseph Gredt points out that analogy of proportion is applied virtually in predicating names of God and creatures.⁸ That is, if, per impossibile, good, wise, true, and names of this kind were not able to be predicated intrinsically of God and creatures (according to the analogy of proper proportionality), then we would predicate them extrinsically according to the analogy of attribution. But this, of course, is a condition contrary to fact; and thus the analogy of proportion is not actually used in predicating names of God and creatures.

We must, of course, admit that proportion comes into play remotely in our predicating names of God. Indeed it is by way of the relation (proportion) which creatures have to God that we know God in the first place. And, if we did not know Him, we certainly could not name Him. But just because a proportion between creatures and God is necessary for our knowing God, it does not follow that we name Him according to the analogy of proportion. Instead, this proportion simply makes it possible for us to have a third term in our proportionality:

$$\text{e.g. } \frac{\text{man (1st term)}}{\text{his wisdom (2nd)}} = \frac{\text{First Cause (3rd)}}{\text{x (4th)}}$$

Thus, having attained a concept of God as the First Cause by reason of the causal relation which exists between creatures and Him, we then proceed to name Him according to the analogy of proper proportionality, as has been explained above.

Names of certain other perfections (perfectiones mixtae, e.g. to see, to hear) and names such as "lion" and "fortress" are said of God and creatures according to the analogy of improper proportionality (commonly called "metaphor"). This type of analogy, as the name indicates, has much in common with analogy of proper proportionality of which we have already spoken. They are both types of analogy of proportionality, which is a mode of predication according to which the same name is predicated of two or more things on account of a similarity of proportion existing between them. Analogy of improper proportionality is so called because the same name is predicated of only one of the analogates according to its proper

signification. Or, as St. Thomas says, "According to metaphor, what belongs to one thing is transferred to another."⁹ But this transferral, unlike that which takes place according to the analogy of attribution, does not take place as the result of a proportion but of a proportionality.

Thus when we say that God is a lion, we obviously do not mean to say that God is a lion in the same way as the large carnivorous member of the cat family is called a lion. In the case of lion said of God, there is nothing in the principal signification of the word "lion" which would show clearly the reason for its being predicated of God. Instead, it is by reason of a similarity of proportions between outstanding qualities found in God and in creatures (namely, God's power and a lion's power) that we are led to call God a lion. Or, in quasi-mathematical form: $\frac{\text{lion}}{\text{its power}} = \frac{\text{God}}{\text{His power}}$. As another example of analogy of improper proportionality, let us take the verb "to see". Obviously, God does not "see" in the proper sense of the word, because He has no eyes. But "to know" is able to be predicated of both God and creatures according to its proper signification, since it is a perfectio simpliciter simplex. Now, in virtue of the fact that "to see" is for man a type of "to know", it is able to be predicated of God - but improperly. Again, in quasi-mathematical form: $\frac{\text{a seeing man}}{\text{his "to know"}} = \frac{\text{God}}{\text{His "to know"}}$. In both instances we have a proportionality; and, in both instances, the names predicated properly of creatures are improperly said of God.

There seems to be quite a bit of room for differences of opinion as to just how much of a similarity there must be between two things before a name applied properly to the one is able to be predicated of the other according to the analogy of improper proportionality, or metaphorically. Anderson holds that there must be a "real dynamic likeness - likeness consisting in the production of similar effects."¹⁰ Apparently holding a very contrary opinion is Michael P. Slattery, who seems to say that two things need only be similar in some manner in order that the name which is proper to the one be predicated improperly of the other. He asserts:

For this reason all creatures, in respect of existence, can metaphorically be called divine, since by their existence, no matter at what grade it is, they are similar to God. Conversely, all names which apply to created grades of being can be applied metaphorically to God, since God is in some way like each existing creature: "Every agent produces an effect similar to itself."¹¹

To illustrate his point, Mr. Slattery says a little later that God, as the maker of horses, can be called a horse in a metaphorical sense. But, we may well ask, does not such a wide application of metaphor render it completely unintelligible? Should we expand our concept of metaphor so as to hold that it can arise from any similarity whatsoever? For instance, just because a man and a giant ant bear both have two eyes and are thus similar in some way, are we thereby justified in calling a man a giant ant bear? Of course not. In other words, analogy of improper proportionality cannot be extended indefinitely with nonsense as the result. Thus it seems to me

that we would do well to limit the applicability of metaphor to those things whose similarity to each other is in the order of some outstanding (in the sense of "standing out" or "very noticable") quality or effect. In this way, we would seem best to maintain the metaphor as a very versatile, and yet meaningful, mode of predication.

But let's get back to the very basic problem already treated to some extent earlier in this paper: whether names predicated of God and creatures are said according to the analogy of proportion or according to the analogy of proportionality. Those who would favor the former might well point to the following texts of St. Thomas as proofs that the Angelic Doctor supports their position:

1 - Names of this kind (e.g. wise) are said of God and of creatures according to analogy, that is proportion.¹²

2 - Names said of God and creatures are predicated . . . analogically, that is, according to an order or reference to something one.¹³

3 - There is another way whereby something is predicated of two things through respect of the one to the other . . . (this) mode of analogy is fitting in the divine predication.¹⁴

And there are many other texts of St. Thomas which could be cited and which seem to indicate that St. Thomas upholds analogy of attribution as the type of analogy employed by us in the divine predications. But that these texts do not really uphold the analogy of attribution in predicating names of God and creatures, I will endeavor to show as briefly as possible.

The crux of the first argument lies in the understanding

of what is meant by "according to analogy, that is proportion." Here it is not necessary to suppose that St. Thomas is referring to the analogy of proportion (strictly speaking). Instead, he is simply referring to analogy in general as a proportion, since proportion is found both in the analogy of proportion (attribution) and in the analogy of proportionality (similarity of proportions) and serves as a basis for all analogical predication.

In regard to the second and third passages from St. Thomas (quoted above), let it be said most emphatically that names are said of God and creatures "according to an order or reference to something one," or more precisely, "through respect of the one to the other." Indeed, it is only "through respect" of creatures to God that we are able to know God. And since we know God through respect to creatures, that is precisely how we name Him. Thus we are not in disagreement with St. Thomas, but only with those who, basing their arguments on these particular texts of St. Thomas, would conclude that names are said of God and creatures according to the analogy of proportion.

When we say that God is good, or that He is wise, etc., the predication involved is an intrinsic one. But this intrinsic predication does not flow immediately from the relation, or proportion ("respect to"), which perfections of creatures have to the First Cause, God; consequently, we don't have analogy of proportion at work here. Instead, this relation of

creatures to God having been established, we are then able to make predications according to the analogy of proportionality. In short, St. Thomas is not saying in the above passages from the Summa Contra Gentiles and from the De Potentia that the analogy involved is one of proportion, but only that a certain proportion is necessary before names can be predicated of God and creatures (before the analogy of proportionality comes into play).

In most of the places in which St. Thomas treats of analogy and its bearing upon the divine names, he does little more than state that these names are said according to a certain proportion, thus leaving the reader to conclude for himself whether the analogy involved is the analogy of proportion or of proportionality. But in his Commentary on the First Book of the Ethics and in his De Veritate, St. Thomas becomes more specific, and it appears that he ascribes intrinsic predication to the analogy of proportionality alone. The following quotations should make this fact sufficiently clear (the numbers (1), (2), and (3) are mine):

Thus therefore he (Aristotle) says that good is said of many, not according to totally different meanings, as happens in those things which are equivocal by chance, but more according to analogy, that is the same proportion, inasmuch as (1) all good things depend upon one first principle of goodness, or inasmuch as (2) they are ordered to one end.... Or also (3) all things are called good more according to analogy, that is the same proportion, just as sight is a good of the body and the intellect is a good of the soul. Therefore he prefers this third way, because it is received according to goodness inhering in things. The first two ways however (are received) according to separated goodness, from which something is

not thus properly named.¹⁵

Conformity according to proportion can be twofold, and thus we have two kinds of analogy.... The first kind of conformity is a proportion, the second kind is a proportionality or similarity of proportions.... Because, therefore, according to the first mode of analogical predication, there must be some determinate relation between those things which have something analogically in common, it is impossible for anything according to this mode to be predicated of God and the creature. But in the second kind of analogy there is no question of a determinate relation between those things which have something in common analogically, and therefore according to that mode there is no reason why a name should not be predicated analogically of God and the creature.¹⁶

The first of the above texts seems to be quite conclusive. Indeed, it is difficult to get around its apparent meaning, namely that analogy of attribution is not used in predicating a name intrinsically of both analogates, but only analogy of (proper) proportionality. However, we must be careful not to deduce too much from the second passage. In it, it is rather obvious that St. Thomas upholds the analogy of proportionality in predicating names of God and creatures. But we cannot conclude from this text alone that he proposes analogy of (proper) proportionality as the only analogy according to which names are said of both God and creatures. To make such a conclusion we must have recourse to our own knowledge of analogy and to our over-all analysis of St. Thomas' doctrine.

Moreover, we must not conclude that St. Thomas, in saying that "it is impossible that anything according to this mode (proportion) be predicated of God and the creature", is contradicting what he has said in several other places, notably in

the Compendium Theologiae: "Therefore they (those things said of God and of other things) are said according to analogy, that is according to proportion to one."¹⁷ For in the latter case, St. Thomas is understanding the word "proportion" in its broader sense as any relation whatsoever and not, as is the case in De Veritate, in its limited sense as a "determinate relation." Naturally, a determinate relation does not come into play in predicating names of God and creatures, since the relation involved is necessarily indeterminate. For it is an infinite/finite relation; and, of course, there is not a definite, but an infinite distance between the infinite and the finite.

If we continue the above quotation from the Compendium Theologiae, we find that St. Thomas says in the very next sentence: "For from this that we compare other things to God just as to their First Origin, we attribute to God names of this kind which signify perfections of other things."¹⁸ Thus, once again, we run directly (but this time with greater force) into the very problem to which we have already devoted so large a part of this paper. For this particular passage lends no little additional weight to the side of those who hold for intrinsic predication according to the analogy of attribution.

Must we admit, after all, that St. Thomas does consider that names are predicated formally of God and creatures according to the analogy of proportion (attribution)? Or is the Angelic Doctor saying here that certain names, which are predicated formally of creatures, are said of God virtually

according to this type of analogy? If the latter, then we would have to say that, when we call God good, we intend to signify thereby that He is the cause of goodness in creatures. But St. Thomas himself says that this is not what we mean to imply when we say that God is good.¹⁹ Hence we must come to grips with the former possibility, namely that St. Thomas may be saying here that names are said of God and creatures formally according to the analogy of attribution.

From all indications afforded by the text in question, this must be so, that is, we must admit of intrinsic predication for St. Thomas according to the analogy of attribution. Yet, as we have already seen, this is simply not in conformity with the nature of analogy of attribution as such. Hence, we must conclude that St. Thomas, while using the word "attribute", is speaking here of the analogy of proportionality. After all, even when we predicate the same name of two or more things according to the analogy of proper proportionality, there is always a certain attribution involved. For we always apply the name to one of the analogates first, and then attribute it to another by reason of the similarity of proportion (proportionality) existing between these analogates. But this attribution is intrinsic, not extrinsic, as happens when the same name is said of several things according to the analogy of proportion (attribution) as such. Indeed, we cannot prove that St. Thomas had the analogy of proportionality in mind when he wrote the Compendium Theologiae; we must simply presume

that he did, and rest content in showing that it is possible for him to have done so.

Before bringing this paper to a close, it would be well to examine briefly a text from St. Thomas' Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences which has become a classic text, so to speak, in the world of analogy. Perhaps this is because of the unique terminology employed therein by St. Thomas. To the best of my knowledge, in no other place does he describe the various types of analogy in these same terms. The essential parts of the text of St. Thomas are as follows:

. . . it must be said that something is said according to analogy in a threefold way. Either according to intention only and not according to to-be; and this is when one intention is referred to many per prius et posterius, which nevertheless does not have to-be except in one; . . . Or according to to-be and not according to intention; and this happens when many are likened in the intention of a common thing, but that common thing does not have the to-be of one ratio in all, . . . Or according to intention and according to to-be; and this is when it is likened neither in a common intention, nor in to-be, as being is said of substance and accident; and concerning such things it is necessary that the common nature have some to-be in every single one of those things of which it is said, but differing according to the ratio of greater or lesser perfection.²⁰

(1) Analogy "according to intention only and not according to to-be" (secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse): this is just another way of referring to analogy of proportion, or of attribution. As we have already seen, a term which is analogous according to the analogy of attribution (as such) is predicated formally only of one of the analogates. This is because that which the term formally signifies exists

only in one analogate and is extrinsic to the others. Thus there is no community of existence, consequently; no analogy secundum esse, since a certain community is necessary for analogy. But analogy of attribution is analogy secundum intentionem, because the analogous term predicated of the secondary analogates always signifies some relationship to that which is signified by the analogous term predicated (formally) of the primary analogate. Indeed, it is necessary that the latter be brought into the definition of the former, as St. Thomas clearly points out in the Summa Theologiae.²¹ Thus there is, in analogy of attribution, a certain community or sameness according to intention; that is, although the intention is simply (simpliciter) diverse, nevertheless it is relatively (secundum quid) the same. Hence it is obvious that, when St. Thomas speaks of analogy secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse, he has reference to what is commonly called by us analogy of attribution.

(2) Analogy "according to to-be and not according to intention" (secundum esse et non secundum intentionem): this is the analogy which is usually referred to as analogy of inequality, or analogy of genus. Some philosophers do not even consider analogy of genus to be a type of analogy at all, but merely a type of univocity. Consequently, they do not include it in their divisions of analogy. Cajetan thought very little of analogy of inequality, so that it could indeed be questioned whether he even considered it to be anything more than uni-

vocivity in disguise.²² At the most, it was for him analogy only in a very improper sense. In this paper we shall not enter into a discussion of this problem. We only wish to point out that St. Thomas obviously did include analogy of genus in his division of analogy as quoted above.

An example might be useful here in explaining analogy of inequality. When we say that a man is corporeal and a rock is corporeal, we obviously mean the very same thing by the word "corporeal" in each case. Yet, a man is a more perfect body than a rock. Not that a man is more perfect inasmuch as he is a body than a rock inasmuch as it is a body. Nonetheless, corporeity is found in a more perfect way in a man than in a rock, because the former is a more perfect being than the latter; hence, a man is a more perfect body than a rock. The notion conveyed by the word "body" is entirely the same in all cases; and thus there can not be analogy secundum intentionem, but only univocity. However, since corporeity is found in a somewhat the same and somewhat different way in a man than in a rock (in a more perfect way), it seems that we do truly have a type of analogy, namely, analogy secundum esse tantum.

St. Thomas doesn't indicate to what extent this type of analogy can be applied. Indeed, there is apparently no reason why its validity would not obtain even in the case of the lowest genera. In this regard, Cajetan observes that "every genus can be called analogous in this way, . . . although it is not a general custom to do so except for the most general

genera and those close to them."²³ Analogy of genus has, of course, no value whatsoever in predicating names of God and creatures, since God is not in any genus.

(3) Analogy "according to intention and according to to-be" (secundum intentionem et secundum esse): this is St. Thomas' way of referring to that type of analogy which is able most properly to be called analogy, namely, the analogy of proper proportionality. For names which are analogous according to proper proportionality have a somewhat the same and somewhat different meaning (simply diverse but relatively the same) when predicated of the various analogates. Thus we have analogy secundum intentionem. And the perfections indicated by these kinds of analogous names exist in their various subjects in a more or less perfect way, which means that there is a certain sameness and a certain diversity according to to-be. As a result, what we have been calling analogy of proper proportionality can be seen to agree with that final type of analogy described by St. Thomas in I Sent. as secundum intentionem et secundum esse.

With this, we shall bring this paper to a close. Our aim herein has been twofold: 1) to examine carefully the various types of analogy, especially as proposed and explained by St. Thomas; 2) to analyze the parts played by these various types of analogy in predicating names of God and creatures. A much deeper study of analogy than this paper can afford is necessary for the student of analogy. For this study, the

books listed in the following bibliography may prove useful, especially the works of St. Thomas, Cajetan's The Analogy of Names, and James F. Anderson's The Bond of Being.

FOOTNOTES

¹"quae in unoquoque melior est ipsa quam non ipsa." St. Anselm, Monol., cap. 15, al. 14, quoted in Gredt, Elementa Philosophia (Barcelona, 1956), v. 2, #796.

²Vio, Thomas de (cardinal Cajetan), The Analogy of Names (Pittsburgh, 1953), #2.

³This terminology (e.g. "according to intention...") is found originally in I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 2. It is a very precise terminology and will be treated in detail toward the end of this paper.

⁴Cajetan says: "Analogous by attribution are those things which have a common name, and the notion signified by this name is the same with respect to the term but different as regards the relationships to this term." (Cajetan, Op. cit., #8)

⁵However, there is another opinion which states that names that refer to perfections simpliciter simplex may be predicated of God by the analogy of attribution. This opinion holds that God can be called wise because He is the cause of wisdom in creatures, but cannot be called a body properly because body is said metaphorically only of God. Although God is the cause of corporeity, he cannot be called a body by the analogy of attribution because He is an equivocal cause who produces effects entirely unlike in nature to Himself, e.g., a body as caused by God. This similarity in nature between a cause and its effect is the basis of the analogy of attribution. St. Thomas (De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11) says that ens is predicated according to proportion (not only proportionality) of substance and accident, just as, in the time honored example, health is said of animal and food.

⁶I, q. 13, a. 2c: "Cum igitur dicitur Deus est bonus, non est sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis, . . . sed est sensus, id quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum altiore."

⁷Cajetan, Op. cit., #11.

⁸Gredt, O.S.B., Josephus, Op. cit., v.1, #170.

⁹S. Cont. Gent., I, C. 30.

¹⁰James F. Anderson, The Bond of Being (St. Louis, Mo., 1949), 172.

¹¹Michael P. Slattery, "Metaphor and Metaphysics", Philo-

sophical Studies, Vol. V (1955); 88 - 89.

¹²I, q. 13, a. 5.

¹³S. Cont. Gent., I, c. 34.

¹⁴De Pot., q. 7, a. 7.

¹⁵In X Eth., VII, 96.

¹⁶De Ver., q. 2, a. 11.

¹⁷Comp. Theo., c. 26.

¹⁸Ibid., c. 26.

¹⁹I, q. 13, a. 2c

²⁰In I Sent., d. 10, q. 5, a. 2 ad 2.

²¹I, q. 13, a. 6: ". . . sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, . . ."

²²Cajetan, Op. cit., #7.

²³Ibid., #5.

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