

THOMISTIC DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY

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


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I INTRODUCTION

Since analogy is so important both to philosophy and theology and even in our learning and everyday speech, an examination of the Thomistic doctrine of analogy is valuable for anyone searching knowledge. The understanding of this doctrine is a current problem to those studying St. Thomas. So many books have come out and are coming out on the subject by such authors as Cajetan, Penido, Phelan, Anderson, Lyttkens, Klubertanz, and McInerney, yet no one seems to have published a definitive work on it. The following pages are a study of the Thomistic doctrine of analogy not through the eyes of the interpreters of St. Thomas but through his own texts. There will be an examination of analogy in its definition, division, and important characteristics.

Analogy refers to a term or concept that signifies a likeness between two natures which are not totally the same nor totally different: for example, the word "sharp" applied to a knife, a writer's pen, and a person's tongue. It is distinct from univocity and equivocity. Univocity refers to a term of concept related to many things and signifies the same nature in each; for example, the idea of man applied to real men. Equivocity does not refer to a concept but only to a term that signifies two entirely different natures; for example, the term

"cardinal" applied to a bird and a prelate of the Roman Catholic Church. Terms and concepts are used univocally when in their application they mean the same thing. Terms are used equivocally when in their application they mean something different. Terms and concepts are used analogically when in their application they mean something between univocity and equivocity. If a word presents concepts to the mind that have some sameness and yet some difference, that word is analogous. With this in mind, the next step is to look at what St. Thomas himself had to say about analogy and its two principal divisions: proportion and proportionality.

II THE ANALOGY OF PROPORTION

A. Definition

Writers commenting on St. Thomas refer to his analogy of proportion as the analogy of attribution. However, in all the texts cited in this study, St. Thomas uses the word "attribution" only once.² In the other texts, he refers to this type of analogy as the analogy of proportion.

The analogy of proportion is defined as the "convenientia inter ipsa quorum est ad invicem proportio, eo quod habent determinatam distantiam vel aliam habitudinem ad invicem."³ There are two types of proportion. The first type of proportion occurs when "multa habent proportionem ad unum sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina in quantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis."⁴ The second type of proportion occurs when "unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, in quantum medicina est causa sanitatis, quae est in animali."⁵ The analogy of proportion is described as "aliqua duo participant unum...vel...unum habet aptitudinem determinatam ad aliud."⁶

The multa ad unum and the unum ad alterum are the two aspects of the analogy of proportion which demand further investigation.

B. Division: According to number of Analogates

1. Multa ad unum

The first type of analogy of proportion occurs when many objects are designated by a term when only one deserves the term formally. Later authors designate the object which deserves the term formally as the primary analogate. They refer to the objects which receive the term by extrinsic denomination as the secondary analogates. They use the term "analogon" to name the common perfection predicated of these analogates. Although St. Thomas does not use these terms himself, his doctrine of analogy will not be distorted by the use of these terms. The following text gives a very good example of what is meant by a primary analogate and secondary analogates:

...Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo denominantur; sicut sanum dicitur de animali, et urina, et medicina, non quod sanitatis sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominantur medicina sana, in quantum est illius sanitatis significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina, neque in urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod illud quidem facit, istud autem significat sanitatem....⁷

Although health is predicated of animal, urine, and medicine, it belongs properly only to the animal, i.e. the organism.

Health is said of medicine and urine because of their relationship to the healthy animal. Medicine causes health, and urine is a sign of health.

St. Thomas expresses the relationships of the primary analogate and the secondary analogates in terms of one being per prius to the others and the others being per posterius to the one. This point is illustrated in the following text:

...in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum. Et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio...necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis, vel minus; sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana, in quantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sani, in quantum est signum sanitatis animalis....⁸

Although in the order of nature, healthy is applied to the organism before it is applied to medicine and urine, technically speaking medicine is prior to the healthy organism and the urine is posterior to the organism. The primary analogate, the organism, enters into the definition of the secondary analogates; namely, medicine, urine, food, etc. Another example would be being as predicated of substance and accidents. Being is predicated per prius of substance and per posterius of accidents. Substance, the primary analogate, is placed in the definition of accidents, the secondary analogates. In regard to this type of analogy, when a term is predicated of many in reference to one which possesses the perfection intrinsically, the secondary

analogates must be preceded by the primary analogate to which the secondary analogates are related; for example, quantity and quality are preceded by substance.⁹

The following texts give a further illustration of the analogy or proportion:

...multa habent respectum ad aliquid unum: sicut secundum respectum ad unam sanitatem animal dicitur sanum ut eius subiectum, medicina ut eius effectivum, cibus ut conservativum, urina ut signum.¹⁰

...aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquod tertium, sicut ens de qualitate et quantitate per respectum ad substantiam.¹¹

...medicabile dicitur de diversis particularis per respectum ad unum et idem, non tamen significat unum et idem de omnibus de quibus dicitur.... Dicitur enim corpus medicabile, quia est subjectum medicinae; et opus medicabile, quia exercetur a medicina, ut purgatio et vas medicinale, quia eo utitur medicina ut clystere.... Non enim est eadem ratio secundum quam dicitur medicinale id quo utitur medicina, et quod facit medicinam. Sed dicitur analogice per respectum ad unum, scilicet ad medicinam....¹²

In this first type of proportion there is a relationship between the secondary analogates and the primary analogate; such as, medicine, food, and urine to the healthy animal. When a term is predicated of two things in respect to a third, as being is said of quality and quantity in relation to substance, the term properly belongs to that to which the other two have a relationship. Strictly speaking, only a substance has being per se while accidents have being because they exist in a sub-

stance. Another example would be the term "medical" predicated of many different objects where a different concept is involved in each case.

a. Not Applicable to God

Nothing is predicated analogously of God and creatures by this type of proportion. The reason is explained in the following texts:

...Quia ergo in his quae primo modo analogice dicuntur, oportet esse aliquam determinatam habitudinem inter ea quibus est aliquid per analogiam commune, impossibile est aliquid per hunc modum analogiae dici de Deo et creatura, quia nulla creatura habet talem habitudinem ad Deum per quam possit divina perfectio determinari.¹³

...Hujusmodi igitur nomina de Deo et rebus aliis non dicuntur analogice secundum primum modum, oporteret enim aliquid Deo ponere prius.¹⁴

Dicendum quod homo conformatur Deo, cum sit ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus. Quamvis autem propter hoc quod a Deo in infinitum distat, non possit esse ipsius ad Deum proportio, secundum quod proportio proprie in quantitativibus invenitur, comprehendens duarum quantitatum ad invicem comparatarum certam mensuram....¹⁵

In this type of proportion there is priority and posteriority. The term "good" applied to creatures is said first of creatures and then of God, but it exists per prius in God and per posterius in creatures. God and His good do not exist one prior to the other but simultaneously. The good in creatures does not determine the divine perfection but vice versa. There is an

infinite distance between God and creatures so that a proportion between them does not exist in the same way that it does when two things are compared to a third. Therefore, since it is necessary that there be a determined relationship between the analogates in this type of proportion and since there is no determined relationship between God and creatures, nothing can be said analogously of God and creatures by this type of proportion. If names were predicated of God in this mode, something would have to be prior to God, and this is impossible.

2. Unum ad Alterum

The other type of analogy of proportion to be investigated is designated by St. Thomas as the unum ad alterum. It differs from the multa ad unum only insofar as it has only one secondary analogate whereas the multa ad unum has two or more secondary analogates. The unum ad alterum is only a subdivision of the multa ad unum.

The unum ad alterum occurs when a term is predicated of one object because of its relation to another object. St. Thomas explains this type of proportion in a number of texts:

...unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, in quantum medicina est causa sanitatis, quae est in animali.¹⁶

...aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum, sicut ens de substantia et quantitate.¹⁷

...secundum quod duorum attenditur ordo vel respectus, non ad aliquid alterum, sed ad unum ipsorum: sicut ens de substantia et accidente dicitur secundum quod accidens ad substantiam respectum habet, non secundum quod substantia et accidens ad aliquid tertium referantur.¹⁸

The term "healthy" is applied to medicine in reference to the healthy organism. Being is predicated of quantity in reference to substance, for being exists primarily in substance and secondarily in accidents. Accidents receive their being from a substance. In this type of analogy the primary analogate and the secondary analogate have a "habitudinem ad invicem, sicut binarius cum unitate, eo quod est eius duplum...."¹⁹ The following text gives a better illustration of this type of proportion:

...dupliciter denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum. Uno modo quando ipse respectus est ratio denominationis, sicut urina dicitur sana per respectum ad sanitatem animalis.... Alio modo denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum, quando respectus non est ratio denominationis, sed causa sicut si aer dicatur lucens a sole....²⁰

The first way in which things are named in this type of proportion, the ratio or nature of health is predicated of urine as a sign of health in an organism. "In talibus, quod denominatur per respectum ad alterum, non denominatur ab aliqua forma sibi inhaerente, sed ab aliquo extrinseco ad quod refertur."²¹ The second way in which things are named in this type of proportion is not because of the relationship of one to another but by reason of the very cause one has to another; for instance, when

the atmosphere is called bright because of the sun. The relationship the sun has to the atmosphere is not the reason for calling the atmosphere bright. It is called bright because the sun, being directly opposite the atmosphere, causes the atmosphere to be bright.²²

In regard to the prime analogate and secondary analogate "necesse est unum esse prius altero."²³ A clear illustration of this follows:

In huiusmodi autem analogica praedicatione ordo attenditur idem secundum nomen et secundum rem quandoque, quandoque vero non idem. Nam ordo nominis sequitur ordinem cognitionis: quia est signum intelligibilis conceptionis. Quando igitur id quod est prius secundum rem, invenitur etiam cognitione prius, idem invenitur prius et secundum nominis rationem et secundum rei naturam.... Quando vero id quod est prius secundum naturam, est posterius secundum cognitionem, tunc in analogicis non est idem ordo secundum rem et secundum nominis rationem....²⁴

A term stands as a sign of our understanding of an object. Substance is both prior in reality to accidents, since accidents receive their being from substance, and prior to knowledge since substance is placed in the definition of accident. Medicine causes an organism to be healthy and is prior to the health in the organism; but the only way we know that medicine causes health is from its effect and that is why it is called healthy. That which produces health is prior in nature but the organism is first called healthy according to the meaning of the name.²⁵

a. Application to God

This type of analogy of proportion can be said of creatures and of God. The following texts mention this very point:

...Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice.... Et sic quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum ut ad principium et causam....²⁶

...Ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum de Deo et rebus aliis doctorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum, sed ratio nominis per posterius. Unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis.²⁷

Et ideo cum Deo nihil sit prius, sed ipse, sit prior creatura, competit in divina praedicatione secundus modus analogiae, et non primus.²⁸

Creatures are ordered to God who is their principle and cause of being. We come to a knowledge of God through other things. The names we apply to God's effects belong first of all to Him and secondarily to His effects, but we name God through His effects, so that the meaning of a name belongs to God secondarily.

The following texts speak of a likeness of creatures to God:

...unum per se est simpliciter, et alterum participat de similitudine eius quantum potest...et talis convenientia esse potest creaturae ad Deum, quia Deus dicitur ens hoc modo quod est ipsum suum esse....²⁹

...id quod in Deo perfecte est, in rebus aliis per quandam deficientem participationem invenitur illud secundum quod similitudo attenditur, Dei quidem simpliciter est, non autem creaturae. Et sic creatura habet quod Dei est: unde et Deo recte similis dicitur. Non autem sic potest dici Deum habere quod creaturae est. Unde nec conveni-

enter dicimus suae imagini esse similem cui tamen sua imago recte similis enuntiatur.³⁰

God possesses a perfection absolutely, but the creature does not. The creature is like God; God is not like a creature. God does not receive a perfection from creatures and hence is not moving toward them; but they are moving toward Him.³¹ St.

Thomas adds another note to this likeness:

...Nihil autem de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur eodem ordine, sed secundum prius et posterius: cum de Deo omnia praedicentur essentialiter, dicitur enim ens quasi ipsa essentia, et bonus quasi ipsa bonitas....³²

St. Thomas says that "hoc modo creatura dicitur bona per respectum ad bonum; unde rationem sequitur."³³ He explains that in this type of proportion "unum esse et rationem ab altero recepit,"³⁴ or "secundum quod unum imitatur aliud quantum potest, nec perfecte ipsum assequitur...."³⁵ Creatures receive their being from God, yet they do not possess it as fully as God.

C. Division: According to Cause

The divisions according to the number of analogates and according to cause are not mutually exclusive divisions, rather they are coordinate divisions. They are simply two different ways of looking at the analogy of proportion. These two divisions overlap one another. The primary analogate, namely the unum or the alterum, can be one of four causes: exemplary, fin-

al, efficient, or material. These four causes which bring about this type of proportion will be examined in detail.

In the exemplary cause something is represented as an ideal to be imitated. In explaining this type of cause St. Thomas uses the example of God as the exemplary cause:

Dicendum quod exemplar rerum est in Deo dupliciter. Vel quantum ad id quod est in intellectu suo, et sic secundum ideas est exemplar intellectus divinus omnium quae ab ipso sunt, sicut intellectus artificis per formam artis omnium artificiutorum. Vel quantum ad id quod est in natura sua, sicut ratione suae bonitatis qua est bonus, est exemplar omnis bonitatis; et similiter est de veritate.³⁶

...creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit, nec nominantur ens nisi in quantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur.³⁷

...et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat.³⁸

Manifestum est autem quod ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatas formas consequuntur. Haec autem formarum determinatio oportet, quod reducat, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam, quae ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit. Et ideo oportet dicere quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes omnium rerum, quae supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in mente divina existentes. Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout eius similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode. Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium. Possunt etiam in rebus creatis quaedam aliorum exemplaria dici, secundum quod quaedam sunt ad similitudinem aliorum, vel secundum analogiam alicuius imitationis.³⁹

All creation is an imitation of the Divine Creator, just as the form of an artifact in the mind of an artist is imitated in his

work. God is set up as the good to be reflected. He is the exemplary cause of being, goodness, wisdom, justice, and the like in creatures. All of the exemplary forms of creatures exist in the divine mind, for every thing is reduced to God as its first principle. Creatures share in the likeness to the divine essence in many different ways. This is what is known as the analogy of imitation whereby one thing is like another. God as the exemplar is the primary analogate and His creatures, insofar as they imitate His divine essence, are the secondary analogates.

The second way the analogy of proportion can come about is by final causality whereby several things are referred to one end. It is a goal to be attained. An example of this type of causality is given in the following text:

...unum nomen dicitur de multis secundum rationes diversas non totaliter, sed in aliquo uno convenientes.... Quandoque vero in hoc, quod referuntur ad unum finem sicut medicina dicitur sana, eo quod est factiva sanitatis, dieta vero eo quod est conservativa sanitatis, urina vero eo quod est sanitatis significativa.⁴⁰

Medicine, diet, and urine are called healthy in reference to one end: the healthy organism. Medicine produces health, food conserves the health, and urine is a sign of health in the organism. The healthy organism is the unum toward which medicine, diet, and urine are directed. The organism contains the health which the medicine produces, which the food preserves, and the urine signifies.⁴¹ Another example of a final cause would be

God whose creatures are ordered to the order of the universe which in turn is ordered to God Himself.

Efficient causality occurs when several things are referred to one efficient cause, source, or agent. An example of this is given in the following texts:

...unum nomen dicitur de multis secundum rationes diversas non totaliter, sed in aliquo uno convenientes.... Quandoque quidem in hoc, quod referuntur ad unum principium, sicut res aliqua dicitur militaris, vel quia est instrumentum militis, sicut gladius, vel quia est tegumentum eius sicut lorica, vel quia est vehiculum eius sicut equus.⁴²

...Aliquando enim ea quae conveniunt secundum analogiam, idest in proportione vel comparatione vel convenientia, attribuuntur...uni agenti, sicut medicus dicitur et de eo operatur sine arte, ut vetula, et etiam de instrumentis, sed per attributionem ad unum agens quod est medicus....⁴³

The term "military" can be predicated of a soldier's sword, cloak or horse because these are objects which the soldier uses. The soldier is the agent of these objects. Another example would be the term "medical" predicated of a doctor, a midwife, medicine, and the instruments which a doctor uses. A midwife, medicine, and instruments are called medical because they refer to one agent, namely the doctor.

The analogy of proportion can come about by a material cause whereby several things are referred to one subject. This type of causality is discussed in the following texts:

...unum nomen dicitur de multis secundum rationes diver-

sas non totaliter, sed in aliquo uno convenientes.... Quandoque secundum proportionem diversas ad idem subiectum, sicut qualitas dicitur esse ens, quia est dispositio per se entis, id est substantiae, quantitatis vero eo quod est mensura eiusdem, et sic de aliis....⁴⁴

...Sed tamen omne ens dicitur per respectum ad unum primum. Sed hoc primum non est finis vel efficiens...sed subjectum. Alia enim dicuntur entia vel esse, quia per se habent esse sicut substantiae, quae principaliter et prius entia dicuntur.⁴⁵

Being can be predicated of quantity, quality, and of all the other accidents, because they are a measure of being. All accidental beings are referred to one subject, namely substance. Accidents are called being because they are the properties of a substance. All things which are called being have a relation to substance.

These are the four species of causes which bring about the analogy of proportion.

Now that the analogy of proportion has been defined with its twofold division and its main characteristics illustrated, the analogy of proportionality with its twofold division and main characteristics will be examined.

III THE ANALOGY OF PROPORTIONALITY

A. Definition and Division

The analogy of proportionality or plurium ad plura occurs when--

...convenientia...attenditur duorum ad invicem inter quae non sit proportio, sed magis similitudo duarum ad invicem proportionum, sicut senarius convenit cum quaternario ex hoc quod sicut senarius est duplum ternarii, ita quaternarius binarii....⁴⁶

There is a twofold division of the analogy of proportionality which St. Thomas makes in the following text:

...quandoque enim illud nomen importat aliquid ex principali significatione, in quo non potest attendi convenientia inter Deum et creaturam.... Quandoque vero nomen quod de Deo et creatura dicitur, nihil importat ex principali significato secundum quod non possit attendi praedictus convenientiae modus inter creaturam Deum....⁴⁷

The main characteristics and applications of this type of analogy will now be examined in detail.

B. Divisions

1. Proper Proportionality

Proportionality is a term used to signify the similarity between proportions; for example, $\frac{8}{4} \dots \frac{6}{3}$. Eight and six are similar insofar as eight is the double of four, and six is the double of three. Another example of proper proportionality would be between a navigator and a consul, for a navigator is to his ship as a consul is to his city.⁴⁸ There is a similarity of operations between them. A navigator guides his ship, and a

consul guides his city. St. Thomas gives another example of proper proportionality when he says that "...nomen visus dicitur de visu corporali et intellectu, eo quod sicut visus in oculo, ita intellectus est in mente."⁴⁹ The term "sight" is applied to the power of the eye and the power of the intellect. These powers are different in general, but they are alike in a particular way. The power of the eye (seeing) presents an object to the sensitive being, and the power of the intellect (understanding) presents an idea to the intellectual being. Both of these powers are means of obtaining knowledge. In this type of analogy, a term or concept signifies the relationship between two proportions.

a. Main Characteristics

In order to have an intelligible understanding of proper proportionality its main characteristics must be examined.

The analogon is intrinsically present in each of the analogates. The nature of the analogate determines the degree or manner in which it possesses the analogon. The term "sight" is applied to both the power of the eye and the power of the intellect, but each possesses the perfection in a different manner. The perfection "sight" is modified by the subjects in which it is realized. The common perfection is realized more fully in the prime analogate. The nature of the prime analogate

in the analogy of proper proportionality will be discussed in detail in the next division.

The analogy of proper proportionality is based on the similarity between the proportions. The proportions are similar and not mathematically equal. Sight predicated of corporeal vision and intellectual vision are not equally the same but similar. There is a proportion of two proportions which are univocally the same. This likeness between the proportions consists in "...alterum se habet ad alterum sicut aliud ad aliud"⁵⁰ In the analogy of proportion the likeness between the analogates diminishes the distance between them, because by taking into account the primary analogate the secondary analogates are unified. In the analogy of proper proportionality, the likeness does not diminish the distance between the analogates. There may be a likeness between small or great proportions; i.e. between proportions which are closely associated or far distant from one another. The following text illustrates this point:

...Talis enim similitudo similiter invenitur in multum vel parum distantibus; non enim est maior similitudo proportionalitatis inter duo et unum et sex et tria, quam inter duo et unum et centum et quinquaginta....⁵¹

There is just as much likeness between the proportions $\frac{2}{1} \dots \frac{6}{3}$ as there is between the proportions $\frac{2}{1} \dots \frac{100}{50}$. The term "double" signifies the similarity between the proportions; neither set of

proportions is more double than the other.

Though the proportions are similar, they do not depend on one another. The proportions are related because of their likeness of one to another. In the following texts St. Thomas makes this point very clear:

...Sed in alio modo analogiae nulla determinata habitudo attenditur inter ea quibus est aliquid per analogiam commune....⁵²

...Sed in his quae proportionata dicuntur per modum proportionalitatis, non attenditur habitudo eorum ad invicem, sed similis habitudo aliquorum duorum ad alia duo....⁵³

In the analogy of proportionality one proportion is proportionally the definition of the other; i.e., in some manner one proportion is the same as the other.

The analogy of proper proportionality includes "...omnia in quorum definitione non clauditur defectus, nec dependent a materia secundum esse, ut ens, bonum, et alia huiusmodi."⁵⁴

b. The Primary Analogate

The question of whether there is a prime analogate in the analogy of proper proportionality is one that is debated among scholars. On the one side, some Thomists hold that in every analogy of proportionality there is a prime analogate, and on the other side, Thomists such as Ferariensis and his followers either deny it or speak of it in a limited sense.⁵⁵ The meaning of a prime analogate must be understood in order to obtain a

definite answer to the question.

When used in the context of the analogy of proportion, the prime analogate refers only to the object which possesses the common perfection intrinsically and formally. In the analogy of proper proportionality all the analogates possess the analogon intrinsically and formally but according to different modes. No analogate in this type of analogy differs from another insofar as the perfection is inherent in each. The secondary analogates in the analogy of proportion depend on the the primary analogate from which they receive the common name, and the primary analogate is placed in the definition of the secondary analogates.

Though in the analogy of proper proportionality the principal point considered is the similarity between the proportions and not the relationship between the proportions,⁵⁶ one proportion does depend on another in the analogy between God and creatures. There is not a mutual dependence between the analogates, but only one analogate depends on the other. In this type of analogy God is the primary analogate from which all creatures receive their perfection. When a perfection is predicated of God and a creature each possesses it intrinsically. In the analogy of proper proportionality between creatures there is a prime analogate because one creature will possess the analogon in a higher degree than the other. In this analogy the prime

analogate is not placed in the definition of the secondary analogate.

Therefore, both the analogy of proportion and proper proportionality have a prime analogate. The prime analogate in proper proportionality is different from the prime analogate in the analogy of proportion, for in proper proportionality the prime analogate is not placed in the definition of the secondary analogate. There are two ways of looking at the prime analogate in the analogy of proper proportionality. The prime analogate can be considered the object which receives the analogon per prius to the other analogate: for example, the name "sight" can be predicated both of the eye and of the intellect, but it is predicated per prius of the eye and per posterius of the intellect. The intellect can be called the prime analogate in the sense that it possesses the analogon in a higher degree than the other analogate. The term "sight" can be predicated of the power of the eye and the power of the intellect, but the power of the eye does not receive the name "sight" from the intellect, but it is applied to the intellect proportionately. In the analogy of proportion one analogate will receive its name from another analogate since only one possesses the analogy intrinsically. This is not the case for the analogy of proper proportionality since each analogate possesses the analogon intrinsically.

c. Application to God

In the following texts, St. Thomas discusses the similarity between God and creatures by means of the analogy of proper proportionality:

...Sed in alio modo analogiae nulla determinata habitudo attenditur inter ea quibus est aliquid per analogiam commune; et ideo secundum illum modum nihil prohibet aliquod nomen analogice dici de Deo et creatura....⁵⁷

...Quandoque vero nomen quod de Deo et creatura dicitur, nihil importat ex principali significato secundum quod non possit attendi praedictus convenientiae modus inter creaturam et Deum; sicut sunt omnia in quorum definitione non clauditur defectus, nec dependent a materia secundum esse, ut ens, bonum, et alia hujusmodi.⁵⁸

Since there is no restricted relationship between the proportions in this type of analogy and since there is an agreement between the proportions, the essential attributes of being can be predicated of God and creatures according to the analogy of proper proportionality. This type of analogy expresses the intrinsic similarities between God and creatures. When the term "good" is predicated of God, the analogy of proper proportionality is being used; for example, man . . . God . . . The analogy of "good" is the common perfection possessed intrinsically by both God and man. God acts according to His perfection and man acts according to his perfection (alterum se habet ad alterum sicut aliud ad aliud).⁵⁹

How the infinite can be related to the infinite is explain-

ed in the following texts:

...Talis enim similitudo similiter invenitur in multum vel parum distantibus; non enim est maior similitudo proportionalitatis inter duo et unum et sex et tria, quam inter duo et unum et centum et quinquaginta. Et ideo infinita distantia creaturae ad Deum similitudinem praedic- tam non tollit.⁶⁰

...nihil prohibet dicere aliquam proportionem hominis ad Deum, cum in aliqua habitudine ipsum ad se habeat, utpote ab eo effectus, et ei subiectus.

Vel potest dici, quod finiti ad infinitum quamvis non possit esse proportio proprie accepta, tamen potest esse proportionalitas quae est duarum proportionum similitudo: dicimus enim quatuor esse proportionata duobus, quia sunt eorum dupla: sex vero esse quatuor proportionabilia, quia sicut se habeat sex ad tria, ita quatuor ad duo. Similiter finitum et infinitum, quamvis non possint esse proportionata, possunt tamen esse proportionabilia: quia sicut infinitum est aequale infinito, ita finitum finitio. Et per hunc modum est similitudo inter creaturam et Deum quia sicut se habet ad ea quae ei competunt, ita creatura ad sua propria.⁶¹

Even though God and creatures are infinitely distant from each other, a similarity between their proportions can be observed.

God and His being are infinite; the creature and his being are finite. There is a similarity between these two proportions:

God . . . creature . Both God and creature intrinsically
His Being . . . his being
possess the common perfection "being". The finite can be rela-
ted to the infinite insofar as there is a likeness between their
proportions, because the similarity between the proportions does
not diminish the distance between the analogates. The similar-
ity in the proportion $\frac{2}{1} :: \frac{100}{50}$ does not diminish the distance
between two and one hundred.

2. Improper Proportionality

The essential attributes of being and other perfections, such as wisdom, justice, mercy, and the like are predicated of God according to the analogy of proper proportionality. These perfections exist in God prior to creatures, although they are first predicated of creatures. There are certain perfections attributed to God and creatures in a manner which belongs only to creatures. Terms which signify these perfections cannot be properly predicated of God because they do not signify God's perfections per se but an entirely different nature. These terms are said metaphorically of God; i.e. there is an implied comparison between God and creatures. This type of predication is called the analogy of improper proportionality. St. Thomas discusses this type of analogy in the following texts:

Dicendum quod de his quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, quaedam sunt quorum res significatae per prius inveniuntur in Deo quam in creaturis, quamvis nomina prius fuerint creaturis imposita; et talia proprie dicuntur de Deo, ut bonitas et sapientia, et huiusmodi. Quedam vero sunt quorum res significatae Deo non conveniunt sed aliquid simile illis rebus; et huiusmodi dicuntur metaphorice de Deo, sicut dicimus Deum leonem vel ambulantiem.⁶²

...Quandoque enim illud nomen importat aliquid ex principali significatione, in quo non potest attendi convenientia inter Deum et creaturam, etiam modo praedicto, sicut est in omnibus quae symbolice de Deo dicuntur, ut cum dicitur leo, vel sol, vel huiusmodi, quia in horum definitione cadit materia, quae Deo attribui non potest....⁶³

The terms "lion" and "sun" cannot properly be predicated of God,

but they can be predicated of God improperly. Both in the order of nature and in the logical order these terms are predicated of God per posterius. This type of analogy is found many times in Scripture, when "...secundum talem similitudinem fit transumptio ex corporalibus in divina."⁶⁴ A name proper to a creature is transferred to the Creator. Though names are applied to God improperly by this type of analogy, they are not said falsely as St. Thomas points out in the following passage:

...aliquis loquens per metaphoricas locutiones, non mentitur: non enim intendit sua locutione ducere in res quae per nomina significantur, sed magis in illas quarum illae res significatae per nomina similitudinem habent....⁶⁵

Metaphor is not a falsehood but an impression or illustration of some object. It is a figure of speech which states a fact in a more dramatic way. A boxer may be called Hercules to give the impression that he has the strength of Hercules. This is much more forceful than merely saying he is strong.

With this description of improper proportionality in mind, the main features or properties of it will now be examined.

a. Main Characteristics

In the analogy of improper proportionality as in the analogy of proper proportionality, there is a similarity between the proportions. There is a proportionateness between the analogates either in their effects or in their operations. The following texts exemplify the similarity of effects between God and creatures:

Dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus, quia enim proprium est irati punire, eius ira punitio metaphorice vocatur.⁶⁶

...Cum autem aliquae passiones humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit secundum similitudinem effectus; unde illud quod est signum talis passionis metaphorice significatur. Sicut apud nos irate punire consueverunt, unde ipsa punitio nomine irae significatur, cum Deo attribuitur....⁶⁷

In various places Scripture speaks of the wrath of God. Strictly speaking, neither the passion of anger nor any passion can be predicated of God, for God is completely in act, and a passion belongs to something in potency. Anger can be attributed to God metaphorically because of the likeness of effects between God and creatures. Both God and man punish, and this punishment is a sign of their anger. God and man are similar in the effect of punishment: Angry man . . . God . God punishes the
his punishing . . . His Punishing
sinner, and man punishes him who causes his passion. By comparing God to a creature's way of acting, anger can be predicated of God.

Two other examples can be introduced here to further illustrate the similarity between God and creatures in their effects. They are taken from the following texts:

...dicitur Deus esse sol, quia est principium vitae spiritualis sicut sol vitae corporalis....⁶⁸

...Sicut enim ridere dictum de prato nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum similiter se habet in decore, cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet, secundum similitudinem proportionis....⁶⁹

The term "sun" is predicated of God because He is the efficient cause of the spiritual life in creatures, just as the sun is the efficient cause of the corporeal life in creatures: God

Spiritual life

. . sun . God causes the spiritual life in creatures.

. . corporeal life

This life in creatures is an effect of His causing. The term smiling can be applied to a human being or to a field in full bloom. There is a likeness of effects in the smiling face and the smiling field. Each one has a pleasing effect.

In the analogy of improper proportionality there is also a likeness of operations between the two analogates. The following texts illustrate the similarity of operations between God and creatures:

...nomen leonis dictum de Deo nihil aliud significat in quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut fortiter operetur in suis operibus sicut leo in suis....⁷⁰

...cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis; cum etiam aliquis homo absque mutatione voluntatis interdum velit aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis, inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae delevit....⁷¹

When the word "lion" is predicated of God, it means that His

power is similar to the power of the lion: God . . lion .

His Power . . his power

God exhibits strength in His operations as the lion does in its operations. When the term "lion" is predicated of Christ, it signifies that Christ is brave in His actions as the lion is in

its actions. There are two natures: the nature of Christ and the nature of lion, and Christ is participating in the nature of lion by His actions. The name lion is predicated of Christ metaphorically. This mode of predicating does not diminish the distance between God and creatures but merely indicates the similarity of their manner of acting. In the second text the act of repenting is applied to God in comparison with a creature's way of acting. In the Old Testament God's people did not repent of their sins, so God repented by destroying the human race by means of a flood: i.e. in repenting He destroyed what He had made. His action is similar to the action of creatures. The analogy of improper proportionality does not depend on any actual comparison between two natures but merely on a certain similarity between causes. God is the efficient cause of His actions and effects, just as man is the efficient cause of his actions and effects.

b. The Analogates

In the analogy of improper proportionality the analogon is formally present only in the prime analogate as it is in the analogy of proportion. In this type of analogy the perfection which the analogon signifies is more intrinsically present in the secondary analogates than it is in the secondary analogates of the analogy of proportion. Health as such does not exist in

exercise, in pink cheeks, or in food; but something of a lion does exist in Christ.⁷² The analogates differ entirely as to their nature, for the name lion does not designate courage or boldness but rather a member of the cat family. Knowledge of the prime analogate is prior to the knowledge of the secondary analogates. The nature of lion must be known before it can be applied to Christ, just as the nature of anger in man must be known before it can be applied to God.

In the analogy of improper proportionality there is a real likeness between either the effects or operations of the analogates, but it is a partial and imperfect likeness. The proportions are alike but different, different but alike. This type of predication is truly an analogy of proportionality because it is expressed by the analogy plurium ad plura; i.e. one proportion is compared to another.

IV CONCLUSION

The preceding pages have been an exposition of the basic Thomistic doctrine of analogy whereby "unum nomen dicitur de multis secundum rationes diversas non totaliter, sed in aliquo uno convenientes...."⁷³ The texts of St. Thomas were examined in order to learn what he had to say about analogy in its definition, divisions, and application to God. St. Thomas never gives an ex professo treatment of analogy in any of his works but interweaves it throughout all of them. In order to understand St. Thomas, his doctrine of analogy must be understood, for it permeates his whole thought.

Analogy is important for the student of philosophy and the student of theology. The student of philosophy could not begin to understand the science of being; i.e. metaphysics, without the understanding of analogy. Metaphysics examines being in all its aspects, which are different in general but alike in a particular way. It would be impossible for the student of theology to acquire a knowledge of God without understanding this doctrine of analogy. Everything that is said of God is said of Him analogously. Names applied primarily to creatures are used to name God, His operations, and His effects.

In this study only one important text; i.e. important to

later authors commenting on St. Thomas, has been left out. This is in regard to the division he makes of analogy in I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse; secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; secundum intentionem et secundum esse. Since St. Thomas never mentions this division again except in VII Phys., 1, 8, where there is a faint echo of it, and since this is one of the earliest works of the Great Doctor, it was not necessary to maintain the terminology of the Sentences.⁷⁴

FOOTNOTES

1. Thomas de Vio, (Cardinal Cajetan), The Analogy of Names, (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1953).

M.T.L. Penido, Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique, (Paris: Vrin, 1931).

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Ralph M. McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).

2. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae, (Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1950), cap. 6(102.3 - 104.19).

3. St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, Romae: Marietti, 1949), q. 2, a. 11 c.

4. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, (Parisiis: P. Lethiellieux, Bibliopolae Editoris, 1939), Ia, q. 13, a. 5 c.

5. Ibid.

6. De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11 c.

7. Summa Theologica, Ia. q. 16, a. 6 c.

8. Ibid. Ia. q. 13, a. 6 c.

9. St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia, Taurini: Marietti, 1949), q. VII, a. 7 c.

10. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, (Romae: ad Lectionem et Socii, 1888), I, 34.

11. De Potentia, q. VII, a. 7 c.
12. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, (Taurini: Marietti, 1915), VII, lectio 4, 1337.
13. De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11 c.
14. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 34.
15. De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9. cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, (Parisiis: R.P. Mandonnet, 1929), II, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.
16. Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 13, a. 5 c. cf. also De Veritate q. 2, a. 11 c.
17. De Potentia, q. VII, a. 7 c.
18. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 34.
19. De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11c. and q. 2, a. 11, ad 4.
20. Ibid., q. 21, a. 4, ad 2.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. De Potentia, q. VII, a. 7 c.
24. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 34.
25. Ibid.
26. Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 13, a. 5 c. cf. also Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 34.
27. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 34.
28. De Potentia, q. VII, a. 7 c.
29. II Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.
30. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 29.

31. Ibid.
32. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 32.
33. De Veritate, q. 21, a. 4, ad 2.
34. I Sent., Prolog. q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.
35. Ibid., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4 c.
36. Ibid., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 4.
37. Ibid., Prolog., q. 1, a. 2, c.
38. Ibid., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, c.
39. Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 44, a. 3 c.
40. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis Ad Nicomachum Expositio, (Romae: Marietti, 1949), I lectio 7, 95. Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae, (Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1950), cap. 6(102.3 - 104.19).
41. IV Metaphysic., lectio 1, 537.
42. In Ethic., I, lectio 7, 95.
43. De Principiis Naturae, cap. 6(102.3 - 104.19). Cf. also IV Metaphysic., lectio 1, 538.
44. In Ethic., I, lectio 7, 95.
45. IV Metaphysic., lectio 1, 539.
46. De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11 c.
47. Ibid.,
48. I Sent., d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2.
49. De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11 c.
50. Ibid., q. 2, a. 11, ad 2.
51. Ibid., q. 2, a. 11, ad 4.

52. Ibid., q. 2, a. 11 c.
53. Ibid., q. 2, a. 3, ad 4.
54. Ibid., q. 2, a. 11 c.
55. Lyttkens, p. 454.
56. De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11 c.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., q.2, a. 11, ad 2.
60. Ibid., q. 2, a. 11, ad 4.
61. Ibid., q. 23, a. 7, ad 9.
62. Ibid., q. 4, a. 1, ad 10.
63. Ibid., q. 2, a. 11 c.
64. I Sent., d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2.
65. I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.
66. Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3.
67. Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 11 c.
68. IV Sent., d. 45, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2.
69. Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 13, a. 6 c.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., Ia. q. 19, a. 7, ad 1.
72. Penido, M.T.L. Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique (Paris: Vrin, 1931), p. 44.
73. I Ethic., lectio 7, 95.
74. Penido, p. 35.

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APPENDIX

The following pages are a number of texts which were gathered for this study. They were not used either because they did not deal with the material discussed or they did not illustrate any further the texts already used. These texts are put here merely to help anyone who wishes to pursue the study of the Thomistic doctrine of analogy.

I Ethic., lectio 7, no. 93.

Deducitur hoc secundum membrum immediate praemisum. Et concludit, quod si nihil aliud sit per se bonum nisi idea, erit idea quasi exemplum quoddam, cuius similitudo sit aliis impressa. Exemplar autem est supervacuum, si nulli assimiletur. Unde sequitur, quod idea sit inanis, si nihil aliud sit secundum se bonum.

I Ethic., lectio 7, no. 96.

Sic ergo dicit, quod bonum dicitur de multis, non secundum rationes penitus differentes, sicut accidit in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, sed magis secundum analogiam idest proportionem eandem, inquantum omnia bona dependent ab uno primo bonitatis principio, vel inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Non enim voluit Aristoteles quod illud bonum separatum sit idea et ratio omnium bonorum, sed principium et finis. Vel etiam dicuntur omnia bona magis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem eandem, sicut visus est bonum corporis, et intellectus est bonum animae. Ideo hunc tertium modum praefert, quia accipitur secundum bonitatem inhaerentem rebus. Primi autem duo modi secundum bonitatem separatam, a qua non ita proprie aliquid denominatur.

I. Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur secun-

dum analogiam tripliciter: vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse; et hoc est quando una intentio refertur ad plura per prius et posterius, quae tamen non habet esse nisi in uno, sicut intentio sanitatis refertur ad animal, urinam et dietam diversimode, secundum prius et posterius; non tamen secundum diversum esse, quia esse sanitatis non est nisi in animali. Vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem, et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omnia corpora parificantur in intentione corporeitatis. Unde Logicus, qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit hoc nomen, corpus de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicari: sed esse hujus naturae non est ejusdem rationis in corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Unde quantum ad metaphysicum et naturalem, qui considerant res secundum suum esse, nec hoc nomen, corpus, nec aliquid aliud dicitur univoce de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus, ut patet, X Meta., text 5, ex Philosopho et Commentatore. Vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentione communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habeat aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur sed differens secundum rationem majoris vel minoris perfectionis. Et similiter dico, quod veritas, et bonitas, et omnia hujusmodi dicuntur analogice de Deo et creaturis. Unde oportet quod secundum suum esse omnia haec in Deo sint, et in creaturis secundum rationem majoris perfectionis et minoris; ex quo sequitur, cum non possint esse secundum unum esse utrobique, quod sint diversae veritates.

I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 20.

Utrum aliquod nomen possit dici proprie de Deo.

Respondeo dicendum, quod quamvis omnis perfectio quae in creaturis est, exemplariter a Deo descendat sicut a principio praehabente in se unice omnium perfectiones; nulla tamen creatura potest recipere illam perfectionem secundum illum modum quo in Deo est. Unde secundum modum recipiendi deficit a perfecta repraesentatione exemplaris. Et ex hoc etiam in creaturis est quidem gradus, secundum quod quaedam quibusdam plures perfectiones et nobiliores a Deo consequuntur, et plenius participant; et ex hoc in nominibus est duo considerare: rem significatam et modum

significandi. Considerandum est igitur, quod cum nomina sint imposita a nobis, qui Deum non nisi ex creaturis cognoscimus, semper deficiunt a divina repraesentatione quantum ad modum significandi: quia significant divinas perfectiones per modum quo participantur in creaturis. Se autem consideremus rem significatam in nomine, quae est id ad quod significandum imponitur nomen, invenimus quaedam nomina esse imposita ad significandum principaliter ipsam perfectiones exemplatam a Deo simpliciter, non concernendo aliquem modum in sua significatione; et quaedam ad significandum perfectionem receptam secundum talem modum participandi; verbi gratia, omnis cognitio est exemplata a divina cognitione, et omnis scientia a divina scientia. Hoc igitur nomen "sensus" est impositum ad significandum cognitionem per modum illum quo recipitur materialiter secundum virtutem conjunctam organo. Sed hoc nomen "cognitio" non significat aliquem modum participandi in principali sua significatione. Unde dicendum est, quod omnia illa nomina quae imponuntur ad significandum perfectionem aliquam absolute, proprie dicuntur de Deo, et per prius sunt in ipso quantum ad rem significatam, licet non quantum ad modum significandi, ut sapientia, bonitas, essentia et omnia hujusmodi; et haec sunt de quibus dicit Anselmus, in Monol., cap. XV, col. 161, t. I, quod simpliciter et omnino melius est esse quam non esse. Illa autem quae imponuntur ad significandum perfectionem aliquam exemplatam a Deo, ita quod includant in sua significatione imperfectum modum participandi, nullo modo dicuntur de Deo proprie; sed tamen ratione illius perfectionis possunt dici de Deo metaphorice, sicut sentire, videre et hujusmodi. Et similiter est de omnibus aliis formis corporalibus, ut lapis, leo et hujusmodi: omnia enim imponuntur ad significandum formas corporales secundum modum determinatum participandi esse vel vivere, vel aliquam divinarum perfectionum.

I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4 c.

Respondeo dicendum, quod tribus modis contingit aliquid aliquibus commune esse, vel univoce, vel aequivoca, vel analogice, Univoce quidem non potest aliquid de Deo et creatura dici. Hujus ratio est quia cum in re duo sit considerare: scilicet naturam vel quidditatem rei, et esse suum, oportet quod in omnibus univocis sit communitas secundum rationem naturae, et non secundum esse, quia unum esse non est nisi in una re; unde habitus humanitatis

non est secundum idem esse in duobus hominibus; et ideo quandocumque univoce convenire, propter quod etiam ens non univoce praedicatur. Et ideo cum omnium quae dicuntur de Deo natura vel forma sit ipsum esse, quia suum esse est sua natura, propter quod dicitur a quibusdam philosophis, quod est ens non in essentia, et sciens non per scientiam, et sic de aliis, ut intelligatur essentia non esse aliud ab esse, et sic de aliis: ideo nihil de Deo et creaturis univoce dici potest.

Et ideo quidam dicunt, quod, quidquid de Deo et creatura dicitur, per puram aequivocationem dicitur. Sed hoc etiam non potest esse; quia in his quae sunt pure aequivoca per casum et fortunam, ex uno non cognoscitur alterum, ut quando idem nomen duobus hominibus convenit. Cum igitur per scientiam nostram deveniatur in cognitionem divinae scientiae, non potest esse quod sit omnino aequivocum.

Et ideo dicendum, quod scientia analogice dicitur de Deo et creatura, et similiter omnia hujusmodi. Sed duplex est analogia, Quaedam secundum convenientiam in aliquo uno quod eis per prius et posterius convenit; et haec analogia non potest esse inter Deum et creaturam, sicut nec univocatio. Alia analogia est, secundum quod unum imitatur aliud quantum potest, nec perfecte ipsum assequitur; et haec analogia est creaturae ad Deum.

II Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 3 c.

Respondeo dicendum, quod est duplex modus dividendi commune in ea quae sub ipso sunt, sicut est duplex communitalis modus. Est enim quaedam divisio univoci in species per differentias quibus aequaliter natura generis in speciebus participatur, sicut animal dividitur in hominem et equum, et hujusmodi; alia vero divisio est ejus quod est commune per analogiam, quod quidem secundum perfectam rationem praedicatur de uno dividendum, et de altero imperfecte et secundum quid, sicut ens dividitur in substantiam et accidens, et in ens actu et in ens potentia: et haec divisio est quasi media inter aequivocum et univocum;....

III Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.

Dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo idem est proportio quod certitudo mensurationis duarum quantitatum. Et talis proportio non potest esse nisi duorum finitorum, quorum unum alterum excedit secundum aliquid certum et determinatum. Alio modo dicitur proportio habi-

tudo ordinis. Sicut dicimus esse proportionem inter materiam et formam, quia materia se habet in ordine ut perficiatur per formam, et hoc secundum proportionalitatem quamdam. Quia sicut forma potest dare esse, ita materia potest recipere idem esse. Et hoc modo etiam movens et motum debent esse proportionalia, et agens et patiens, ut scilicet sicut agens potest imprimere aliquem effectum, ita patiens possit recipere eundem. Nec oportet ut commensuretur potentia passiva recipientis ad potentiam activam agentis; nec secundum numerum, sicut unus artifex per artem suam potest producere pulchram sculpturam, quam tamen lignum nodosum non potest pulchram recipere.

Et ideo non est inconveniens ut hic modus proportionis inter Deum et creaturam salvetur, quamvis in infinitum distent. Et ideo possibilis est unio utriusque.

IV Metaphysic., lectio 1, 535.

In hac autem ratione primo ponit minorem. Secundo majorem, ibi, "Quemadmodum ergo salubrium omnium." Tercio conclusionem, ibi, "Manifestum egitur etc." Dicit ergo primo, quod ens sive quod est, dicitur multipliciter. Sed sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de diversis multipliciter: quandoque quidem secundum rationem omnino eandem, et tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut animal de equo et bove. -- Quandoque vero secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut canis de sidere et animali. -- Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referunt; et illud dicitur "analogice praedicari," id est proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illud unum refertur.

IV Metaphysic., lectio 1, 536.

Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens etsi dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod sit solum ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura. Et hoc patet in exemplis infra positis.

IV Metaphysic., lectio 1, 537.

Ponit enim primo unum exemplum, quando multa comparantur ad unum sicut ad finem, sicut patet de hoc nomine sanativum vel salubre. Sanativum enim non dicitur univoce de dieta, medicina, urina, et animali. Nam ratio sani secundum quod dicitur de dieta, consistit in conservando sanitatem. Secundum vero quod dicitur de medicina, in faciendo sanitatem. Prout vero dicitur de urina, est signum sanitatis. Secundum vero quod dicitur de animali, ratio ejus est, quoniam est receptivum vel susceptivum sanitatis. Sic igitur omne sanativum vel sanum dicitur ad sanitatem unam et eandem. Eadem enim est sanitas quam animal suscipit, urina significat, medicina facit, et dieta conservat.

VII Metaphysic., lectio 4, 1334.

Propter hoc enim quod omnia alia predicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo modus entitatis substantiae, scilicet esse quid participatur secundum quandam similitudinem proportionis in omnibus aliis praedicamentis; ut dicamus, quod sicut animal est quid hominis, ita color albedinis, et numerus dualitatis; et ita dicimus qualitatem habere quid non simpliciter, sed hujus. Sicut aliqui dicunt logice de non ente loquentes, non ens est, non quia non ens sit simpliciter, sed quia non ens est non ens. Et simpliciter qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed quid qualitatis.

VII Metaphysic., lectio 4, 1335.

Deinde cum dicit "oportet igitur."

Ostendit quomodo quod quid est et definitio praedicatur de eo quod invenitur in substantiis et accidentibus et dicit, quod ex quo definitio et quod quid est invenitur aliquo modo in accidentibus et in substantia, oportet igitur intendere ad considerandum quomodo oportet "dicere" idest praedicare definitionem circa singula; non tamen magis quam quomodo se habent; ut videlicet, non ea dicamus univoce praedicari quorum non est una ratio in essendo.

VII Metaphysic., lectio 4, 1336.

Quapropter id quod dictum est de definitione et quod quid est in substantia et accidentibus, est manifestum: scilicet quod quod quid erat esse primo et simpliciter inest substantiae et consequentur aliis set simpliciter quod quid erat esse, sed "quod quid erat esse huic" vel "illi" scilicet quantitate vel qualitati. Manifestum est enim aequivoce praedicari in substantia et accidentibus, vel addentes et auferentes secundum magis et minus, sive secundum prius et posterius, ut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente. Et sicut dicimus, quod "non scibile est scibile secundum quid," idest per posterius, quia de non scibili hoc scire possumus quod non scitur; sic et de non ente hoc dicere possumus, quia non est.

XI Metaphysic., lectio 3, 2197.

Manifestum est enim quod quae sic dicuntur, media sunt inter univoca et aequivoca. In univocis enim nomen unum praedicatur de diversis secundum rationem totaliter eamdem; sicut animal de equo et de bove dictum, significat substantiam animatam sensibilem. In aequivocis vero idem nomen praedicatur de diversis secundum rationem totaliter diversam. Sicut patet de hoc nomine, canis prout dicitur de stella, et quadam specie animalis. In his vero quae praedicto modo dicuntur, idem nomen de diversis praedicatur secundum rationem partim eandem, partim diversam. Diversam quidem quantum ad diversos modos relationis. Eandem vero quantum ad id ad quod fit relatio. Esse enim significativam, et esse effectivam, diversum est. Sed sanitas una est. Et propter hoc huiusmodi dicuntur analogia quia proportionantur ad unum. Et similiter est de multiplicitate entis. Nam ens simpliciter, dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia. Alia vero dicuntur entia, quia sunt huius quod per se est, vel passio, vel habitus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Non enim qualitas dicitur ens, quia ipsa habeat esse, sed per eam substantia dicitur esse disposita. Et similiter est de aliis accidentibus. Et propter hoc dicit quod sunt entis. Et sic patet quod multiplicitas entis habet aliquid commune, ad quod fit reductio.

Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 34.

...Quaecumque vero nomina huiusmodi perfectiones exprimunt,

cum modo proprio creaturis, de Deo dici non possunt, nisi per similitudinem et metaphoram, per quam quae sunt unius rei alteri solent adaptari, sicut aliquis homo dicitur lapis propter dūritiam intellectus: hujusmodi autem sunt omnia nomina imposita ad designandum speciem rei creatae, sicut homo et lapis,, nam cuilibet speciei debetur proprius modus perfectionis et esse. Similiter etiam quaecumque nomina proprietates rerum designant, quae ex propriis principiis specierum causantur, de Deo dici non possunt nisi metaphorice....

Summa Theologica Ia, q. 13, a. 10 c.

Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen "Deus," in praemissis tribus significationibus non accipitur neque univoce, neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc patet: quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est omnino ratio diversa; in analogicis vero oportet quod nomen secundum unam significationem acceptum ponatur in definitione ejusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti; sicut ens de substantia dictum ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali ponitur in definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina. Hujus enim sani quod est in animali, urine est significativa, et medicina factiva. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen, Deus, secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem, vel participationem. Cum enim aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter, cum idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine, Deus, intelligimus significare aliquid de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus; et sic manifestum est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis sed una illarum significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.

Summa Theologica Ia, q. 13, a. 9 c.

Respondeo dicendum quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter: uno modo, proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile est quod secundum totam significationem nominis est communicabile multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est quod est communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie

communicatur omnibus illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo; per similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid leonium, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones dicuntur.

Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem; sicut natura humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis non est communis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis existens. Et hoc ideo quia intellectus intelligit naturam cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari; ... nullum nomen significans aliquid individuum est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum similitudinem; sicut aliquid metaphorice potest dici Achilles, inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet fortitudinem.

Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4.

Dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum, triplum et aequale, sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum.



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