

TRANSLATION AND NOTES ON ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA'S TREATISE
ADVERSUS GRAECOS DE COMMUNIBUS NOTIONIBUS

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty
of the College Department of St. Meinrad
Seminary in partial fulfilment of the re-
quirements for a Bachelor of Arts Degree.

Henry Andrée Schmitt
May, 1959

St. Meinrad Seminary
St. Meinrad, Indiana



Table of Contents

Sections	Pages
Introduction -----	1
I. The Life of St. Gregory of Nyssa -----	3
II. The Works of St. Gregory of Nyssa -----	6
III. The Present Work -----	10
A. Occasion and Date	
B. Purpose and Influence	
C. Analysis and Valuation	
D. Sources	
IV. Notes on Grecian Style in Text -----	12
V. Text -----	16
VI. Translation -----	27
VII. Critical Notes on Translation -----	41
VIII. Summary: Discussion of Terms in Text -----	44
A. <u>οὐσία</u> -- Substance	
B. <u>φύσις</u> -- Nature	
C. <u>ὑπόστασις</u> == Hypostasis	
D. <u>πρόσωπον</u> -- Person	
Footnotes -----	48
Bibliography -----	50

Introduction

This thesis presents to others an exact English translation of the Greek text (critical) of St. Gregory of Nyssa entitled: Treatise of Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, Saying Why We Cannot Possibly Call the Three Persons in the Godhead Three Gods; Written Against the Greeks; Taken from the Common Notions.

This treatise Adversus Graecos de Communibus Notionibus,¹ as it will be called in this thesis, is found in Jaeger's work: Gregorii Nysseni Opera Dogmatica Minora.² It can also be found in Migne, 45.177A, but this is an incomplete text. Jaeger's work is a critical text (and is the basis for my translation.) This is pointed out by Jaeger in his Lectori Salutem when he says, "... sic in hoc volumine liber Ad Graecos e decurtata forma in integram restitutus legitur"³

The translation as presented here is, to my knowledge, the first into English, and, perchance, excepting the incompleteness of Migne's edition, the first into any language.

When reference in the thesis is made to lines of the text, it is not made to the lines as found in the text of Jaeger, but refers to the text as it is presented here in full.

There are two sets of notes. One is a set of critical notes on the translation, and the text, (found immediately after the translation). The other is a set of "footnotes" (found at the end of the thesis). The words or phrases of the text which are to be noted are marked in the English translation by an asterisk, and when reference is made to each, they can be found in

the section on critical notes, which corresponds to the line and page on which the asterisk is found in the English translation. The footnotes are marked by arabic numbers.

**** Special note** -- The text (De Comm. Not.) was prepared by Frederic Mueller. In this thesis when it talks about Jaeger's text, this refers to the text of Mueller, for whom Jaeger was the editor and supervisor in editing the text.

The Life of St. Gregory of Nyssa

St. Gregory of Nyssa, the younger brother of St. Basil, and the friend of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, was born about 335, as many scholars believe, but his exact date of birth is unknown. As far as we know, Basil took charge of his education, for he calls Basil and speaks of him to his younger brother, Peter, in terms of gratitude and respect, as when he calls him, "our father and our master".

Gregory possessed neither the authority of Basil nor the eloquence of Gregory of Nazianzus, but he had a particular gift for speculation and was the philosopher and dialectician of the group. This group of the three was known as the "Cappadocian Fathers", a title revealing the birthplace of Gregory of Nyssa as Asia Minor.

Gregory, though already a reader in the Church, let himself be weaned from his vocation, and became a professor of rhetoric. It would also seem that he was married at this time, but this is denied by some scholars. But eventually Gregory yielded to the prayers and to the advice of his friends, principally of Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus, who convinced him of the vanity in the world. Whereupon he entered the ecclesiastical state. He gave up his office as teacher and withdrew for some time into solitude, and in 371, much against his will, was consecrated bishop of Nyssa by Basil. But Gregory didn't have much administrative ability. Basil tells us this when he complains of Gregory's amiability, credulity, and simplicity, and also of his naiveté.

and clumsiness in connection with his business administration.

Gregory then met with violent opposition from the Arians and, in 376, he was deposed from his see by a synod of Arian bishops convened by Demosthenes, governor of Pontus. For several years he led a wandering life, being like a bit of drift-wood tossed hither and thither by the waves.⁴ But the death of Valens, at the end of 378 brought about a change in the politico-ecclesiastical situation. He returned to his people and this return assumed the character of a triumphal procession.

In 379 Gregory took part in a synod at Antioch specially convoked for the purpose of healing the Meletian schism, which arose from the presence of two rival orthodox parties at Antioch. Then in 381 he attended the Second Ecumenical Council at Constantinople, and took a prominent part in the proceedings as one of its principal theologians. So, although he was at a loss in administrative affairs, he was remarkable for his eloquence and the depth of his theological and philosophical training. At this Council, because of his acumen, he was acclaimed the "Column of orthodoxy".⁵

The last time we see Gregory mentioned is when he appeared at Constantinople in 394, assisting at a synod held by the patriarch, Nestorius, for the purpose of reconciling some Arabian bishops. After this his name disappears from history. It is believed that his death occurred about this time, 394.

It is difficult to outline clearly his personality, since his writings contain too many flights of eloquence to permit fi-

nal judgment on his real character.⁶ But in general Gregory of Nyssa is called the "Mystic" and the "Philosopher". He gets the name mystic from his moral aspect, and the name philosopher from his intellectual point of view. He was less practical than Basil, and not such an elegant preacher as Gregory of Nazianzus, but he surpassed them both as a philosopher, while equaling them both as a theologian. In philosophy he was a Neo-Platonician, but preferred to follow Origen in theology.

In so far as he was inspired by Origen, Gregory of Nyssa was an Origenist, even though he did not adopt the more eccentric ideas that were the fruit of Origen's bold theological fancy.⁷

The ecclesiastical importance of Gregory of Nyssa consists in the power of his philosophical and theological defence and tradition of the Christian faith. His scientific accomplishments, which he put to his best use in his speculation on the doctrine of the Trinity and of the resurrection of the body, are a great contribution to the Church and to the spreading of religion.

The Works of St. Gregory of Nyssa

His work consists of exegetical, theological, and ascetical writings, together with his sermons and letters. He uses much allegory in his writings. If we consider each section separately, we find:

A) Exegetical writings: The greater part of his works deal with scriptural purpose, but some were written with a moral end in view. In these exegetical writings he betrays the influence of the hermeneutical principles of the Alexandrian doctor, Origen.

1) Those with an exegetical purpose are:

- a) Liber de Hominis Opificio, which completes St. Basil's work, in which the "sixth day" was not treated
- b) Liber in Hexaemeron deals with creation and various subtle and difficult questions which Basil omitted. It is often called: Apolegetical Explanation on the Hexaemeron.
- c) On the Witch of Endor, which affirms against Origen that it was not Samuel but a devil that appeared to Saul.

2) Those with a moral end in view are:

- a) De Vita Moysis treats of the mysterious ways by which the soul is brought to perfection.
- b) In Psalmorum Inscriptiones treats of the spiritual progress of the soul and distinguishes the five stages in this progress.

c) Sermons: On Ecclesiastes; On the Canticle of Canticles; Beatitudes; The Lord's Prayer.

B) Theological writings: These dogmatic and speculative writings of Gregory of Nyssa are fairly numerous and, for the most, controversial.

1) The most important of them is his Catechesis or Oratio Catechetica, which is an argumentative defense of the principal Christian doctrines against heathens, Jews, and heretics. These doctrines are the Trinity, the Redemption of mankind by the Incarnate Logos, and the application of the grace of Redemption through Baptism and the Eucharist.

2) The most extensive of his extant works are his writings against Arianism (the heresy that contends that Christ was not the eternal Son of God, nor of the same substance with the Father), and among these the most important is Contra Eunomium. He also wrote two works against Apollinaris of Laodicia in refutation of the false doctrines of that writer, viz., that the body of Christ descended from heaven, and that in Christ the Divine Word acted as the rational soul. The name of the works are:

a) Adversus Apollinarem

b) Antirrheticus Adversus Apollinarem

3) Other works of Gregory which are devoted to the defence and illustration of the Trinitarian teaching of

the Church are:

- a) Quod non Sint Tres Di, to Ablabius. It tells why we must not believe that there are three Gods.
 - b) Adversus Graecos de Communibus Notionibus (the treatise under consideration at present), which is against the heathens on basis of common notions.
 - c) De Fide, dedicated to Simplicius. It is in defence of the divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit.
 - d) De Trinitate, ad Eustathium.
- 4) The rest of his dogmatical writings are as follows:
- a) De Anima et Resurrectione (or Macrinia)
 - b) Contra Fatum (against astrological fatalism)
 - c) De Infantibus Qui Praemature Abripiuntur (why God permits such untimely deaths)

C. Ascetical writings: These deal with Christian life and conduct:

- 1) The best known is the treatise De Virginitate. It deals with perfection in general and shows that by becoming perfect the soul is made the spouse of Christ.
- 2) The four following treat of other particular subjects.
 - a) De Professione Christiana (what is required of the Christian)
 - b) De Perfectione (nature of perfection)
 - c) De Instituto Christiano (the degree of piety necessary for the monk, and the means of advancing therein)

d) De Castigatione (necessity of mortification)

3) The Life of St. Macrina (a commentary, by means of examples, on the ascetical and spiritual teaching explained theoretically)

D) Sermons and Letters: He delivered mainly dogmatic and moral sermons, and also some funeral orations. His letters number twenty-six.

The Present Work

It is not certain at what time Gregory of Nyssa composed this treatise Adversus Graecos de Communibus Notionibus, which deals with the Trinitarian question. But it seems that it must have been written about or after 381, because scholars place the time of his work Contra Eunomium about the year 381. Since Contra Eunomium is his main and most important work on the Trinity, and since the Adversus Graecos..., along with the Quod non Sint Tres Dii are more specialized minor dogmatic works, it seems that they would have been written after his main work treating the Trinitarian question. For they are more limited to a specific discussion of certain aspects of the Trinity, while the Contra Eunomium deals with the Trinity in whole and all its aspects.

Gregory's occasion for writing this treatise on the Trinity was one of the upsurges of the Pagan Polytheists. He wrote it in defence and as an illustration of the Trinitarian teaching of the Church. The Adversus Graecos... was directed mainly against the heathens in refutation of the Pagan Polytheists. In it Gregory also was an indefatigable defender of the divine nature.

He tended to treat this work as a philosopher more than as a theologian,⁸ because the heretics made an extensive use of philosophy to undermine and discredit the things we know on faith and because the heretics he was refuting based their errors on strictly philosophical notions. For he believed that philosophy would bring the mysteries of faith nearer to understanding of

human reason, and his chief aim was to show that far from there being any opposition between faith and reason, there rather is perfect agreement between the two.⁹ In his employment of philosophy in defence of the Trinity, he never lost sight of the limitation of philosophical speculation in matters of faith.

Although this treatise is one of Gregory's minor dogmatic treatises on the Trinity, it presents us with a clear understanding of the problem (Polytheist), and gives us Gregory's objections and reasons why the heathens are wrong in holding Polytheism. In the final analysis the treatise explains to us why we cannot possibly say that three persons in the Godhead are three Gods.

Philosophy in this work was for Gregory a mere instrument for refuting the heathens on the Trinitarian doctrine. The real telling sources of his writings were the Scriptures and Tradition.¹⁰

Notes on Grecian Style in Text

In order to acquire a clearer understanding of Gregory's style, one may consider the main constructions which are used again and again throughout his treatise Adversus Graecos de Communibus Notionibus. The following are especially significant:

- 1) λέγοντες οὐ φάμεν - "saying...we cannot possibly call".

(See text in the title on p. 16) This use of the participle in this way is found in the Greek-English Lexicon, Liddell and Scott, New Edition (Stuart Jones & McKenzie) on p. 1034 under λέγω, 2nd col. top.

In Jaeger p. 19 - Title.

- 2) δηλωτικὸν - "capable of manifesting or manifestative".

(See text 1. 1, p. 16) This is an adjective formed directly from the verb δηλόω - to manifest. -τιχο- is added to the stem of the verb and it is well translated "fit for" or "capable of". (The use of the adjective in this way is explained in the Greek Grammar, Goodwin & Gulick, 1930, on p. 188 #843b.) In Jaeger p. 19, 1.1.

- 3) διὰ τὸ μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι τὰ πρόσωπα - "because the persons are not the same". (See text 1.8, p. 16) The whole phrase is known as the "articular infinitive" (epexegetic or explanatory infinitive). The prefixing of the article (τὸ) emphasizes the nominal character of the infinitive (εἶναι), and thus it becomes through the articles declension, a declinable neuter noun. (It is found in all of the four cases.) When the infinitive is in the nominative or

accusative case, it may or may not have the article prefixed. When the infinitive is in the genitive or dative case, it must have the article. The infinitive is in the accusative case here. The most frequent use of this infinitive is as an object of a preposition, as in the present case. This construction also follows (εἰς) and (πρός). The subject (here τὸ πρόσωπον) of the infinitive is always in the accusative case. (πάντα) is for (τὰ αὐτά)- the same. A good explanation of the use of this construction is found in A Reading Course in Greek, Bartholomew Fuerst, O.S.B., 1953, on p. 262 #471, and note; and also in the Greek Grammar, Goodwin and Gulick, 1930, on p. 325 #1544. In Jaeger p. 19, l. 10.

- 4) ὥστε λέγειν ἡμᾶς - "so that we say". (See text l. 11, p.16) This is an infinitive of result. ὥστε (sometimes ὥς) "so as", "so that", is used with the infinitive and with the indicative to express result. It denotes the result of the action of the principal verb. This construction is generally introduced by (ὥστε). Here it is used with the infinitive (λέγειν). The subject of clause goes in the accusative case (here ἡμᾶς). (Explanation of this construction is found in Greek Grammar, Goodwin & Gulick, 1930, on p. 308 #1466.) In Jaeger p. 19, l. 14.
- 5) μηδὲν ὡς πομπήν γε δὲ τῆς οὐσίας - "but since the substance is not divided". (See text l. 29, p.17) This is the Genitive Absolute. When a circumstantial participle belongs to a

noun or pronoun which is not grammatically connected with the main construction of the sentences, they stand together in the genitive absolute. This construction should generally be translated into English by an adverbial clause introduced by the conjunction "when", "since", "although". (Explanation taken from Greek Grammar, Goodwin & Gulick, 1930, p. 330 #1570.) In Jaeger p. 20, l. 20.

- 6) ἀνάγκη ... λέγειν - "it is necessary to say". (See text 1.36 p. 17) The infinitive may depend on a noun and a verb (generally ἔστι) which together are equivalent to a verb which takes an objective infinitive, such as verbs of wishing, commanding, necessity. In this case it depends on a noun (ἀνάγκη) and verb (λέγειν). (Explanation taken from Greek Grammar, Goodwin & Gulick, 1930, on p. 321 #1525.) In Jaeger p. 21, l. 2.
- 7) τὸ πάντα ἐποπτεύειν - "looking over all". (See text 1. 55, p. 18) Again, the infinitive with the article. When the infinitive has the article, its character as a neuter substantive becomes more distinct, while it loses none of its attributes as a verb. The addition of the article extends its use to many new constructions, especially to those with prepositions; and the article is sometimes allowed even in many of the older constructions in which the infinitive regularly stands alone. (Explanation taken from Greek Grammar, Goodwin & Gulick, 1930, p. 325 #1544. In Jaeger p. 22, l. 5.)

8) λεκτέον - "to be said". (See text 1. 128, p. 21) The verbal adjectives have the endings -τός and -τέος, added to the verb stem of the 1 or 2 aorist passive, eg. δεκτός-acceptable. Those ending in -τός denote capability and have the force of a past participle; those ending in -τέος denote what must be done, like the Latin passive periphrastic. The explanation of the verbal adjective is found in Greek Grammar, Goodwin & Gulick, 1930, p. 146 #581. In Jaeger p. 26, 1. 2.

TEXT

ΓΡΗΓΟΡΙΟΥ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΥ ΝΥΣΣΗΣ

Πῶς τρία πρόσωπα λέγοντες ἐν τῇ θεότητι

οὐ φαμεν τρεῖς θεοὺς

πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀπο τῶν κοινοῶν ἐννοιῶν

Εἰ τὸ ὄνομα προσώπου δηλωτικὸν ὑπῆρχεν, τρία πρόσωπα λέγοντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης τρεῖς ἂν ἐλέγομεν θεοὺς· εἰ δὲ τὸ θεὸς ὄνομα οὐσίας σημαντικὸν ἐστίν, μίαν οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦντες τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος ἓνα θεὸν εἰκότως δογματίζομεν, ἐπειδὴ μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐν ὄνομα τὸ θεός ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ ἀκολουθῶς τῇ τε οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ὀνόματι εἷς ἐστὶ θεὸς καὶ οὐ τρεῖς. οὐδὲ γὰρ θεὸν καὶ 5 θεὸν καὶ θεόν φαμεν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, ἐπεὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι τοῖς τῶν προσώπων σημαντικοῖς συμπλέκομεν τὸν καὶ σύνδεσμον διὰ τὸ μὴ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὰ πρόσωπα, ἑτεροῖα δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ διαφέροντα ἀλλήλων κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σημασίαν, τῷ δὲ θεὸς ὀνόματι δηλωτικῷ τῆς οὐσίας ὄντι ἕκ ἰδιώματος προσόντος αὐτῇ οὐ συνάπτομεν τὸν καὶ 10 σύνδεσμον ὥστε λέγειν ἡμᾶς θεον καὶ θεὸν καὶ θεόν, ἐπεὶ περ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν οὐσία, ἧς ἐστὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ ἣν σημαίνει τὸ θεὸς ὄνομα· διὸ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς θεός· τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπὶ δηλώσει τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ καὶ σύνδεσμος οὐ συμπλέκεται ποτε. εἰ δὲ λέγομεν πατέρα θεὸν καὶ υἱὸν θεὸν καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον θεὸν ἢ θεὸν πατέρα καὶ θεὸν υἱὸν καὶ θεὸν πνεῦμα ἅγιον, τὸν καὶ σύνδεσ- 15 μον κατ' ἐννοιαν τοῖς τῶν προσώπων ὀνόμασι συνάπτομεν, οἷον πατρί, υἱῷ, ἁγίῳ πνεύματι, ἵνα ἢ πατήρ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, τουτέστι πρόσωπον καὶ πρόσωπον καὶ πρόσωπον, διὸ καὶ τρία πρόσωπα. τὸ δὲ θεὸς ὄνομα ἀπολύτως καὶ ὡσαύτως κατηγορεῖται ἐκάστου τῶν προσώπων ἄνευ τοῦ καὶ συνδέσμου, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς λέγειν θεὸν καὶ θεὸν καὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ νοεῖν τὸ 20 ὄνομα (δεύτερον καὶ) τρίτον μὲν λεγόμενον τῇ φωνῇ διὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα

πρόσωπα, προ(σ)βαλλόμενον δὲ τῇ δευτερώσει καὶ τῇ τριτώσει ἄνευ τοῦ συν-
 δέσμου διὰ τὸ μὴ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι θεόν. οὐ γάρ, καθὼς τὴν ἑτερότητα
 σφίξει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱόν, κατὰ τοῦτο θεὸς ὁ πατήρ. οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ ἂν θεὸς ὁ
 υἱός. εἰ γάρ, ἐπειδὴ πατήρ ὁ πατήρ, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, ἐπειδὴ 25
 μὴ πατήρ ὁ υἱός, οὐ θεὸς ὁ υἱός. εἰ δὲ θεὸς ὁ υἱός, οὐκ, ἐπειδὴ υἱός.
 ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ πατήρ οὐκ, ἐπειδὴ πατήρ, θεός, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐσία τοιαύτη, ἧς
 ἐστὶ πατήρ καὶ υἱός καὶ δι' ἣν πατήρ θεὸς καὶ υἱός θεὸς καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον
 θεός. μὴ διαιρουμένης δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν προσώπων ὥστε καὶ
 τρεῖς εἶναι οὐσίας κατὰ τὰ πρόσωπα, δηλὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ὄνομα διαιρεθή- 30
 σεται, ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν, τουτέστι τὸ θεός, εἰς τὸ εἶναι τρεῖς
 θεούς, ἀλλ' ὥπερ οὐσία ὁ πατήρ, οὐσία ὁ υἱός, οὐσία τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καὶ
 οὐ τρεῖς οὐσίαι, οὕτω καὶ θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, θεὸς ὁ υἱός, θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ
 ἅγιον καὶ οὐ τρεῖς θεοί. ἓως γὰρ θεὸς καὶ ὁ αὐτός, ἐπεὶ καὶ μία οὐσία
 καὶ ἡ αὐτή, εἰ καὶ λέγεται ἕκαστον τῶν προσώπων καὶ ἐνούσιον καὶ θεός. 35
 ἡ γὰρ ἀνάγκη τρεῖς λέγειν οὐσίας πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος,
 ἐπειδὴ οὐσία τῶν προσώπων ἕκαστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ
 Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον καὶ Βαρνάβαν φάμεν τρεῖς οὐσίας. μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὐτή
 τῶν τοιούτων προσώπων ἡ οὐσία. ἢ μίαν λέγοντες οὐσίαν, ἧς ἐστὶ πατήρ καὶ
 υἱός καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, καίπερ ἐνούσιον δίδότες τῶν προσώπων ἕκαστον, ἕνα 40
 δικαίως καὶ ἀκολούθως φάμεν θεόν, εἰ καὶ τῶν προσώπων ἕκαστον θεὸν εἶναι
 πιστεύομεν, διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας. ὥπερ γὰρ (διὰ) τὸ διαφέρειν τὸν
 πατέρα τοῦ τε υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος τρία φάμεν πρόσωπα πατρὸς καὶ
 ἁγίου πνεύματος, οὕτως, ἐπειδὴ μὴ διαφέρει πατήρ υἱοῦ τε καὶ ἁγίου πνευ-
 ματος κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, μίαν εἶναι λέγομεν τὴν οὐσίαν πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ 45
 ἁγίου πνεύματος. εἰ γάρ, ἔνθα διαφορά, τριᾶς διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν, ἔνθα ταυ-
 τότης, μονὰς διὰ τὴν ταυτότητα. ἐστὶ δὲ ταυτότης τῶν προσώπων κατὰ τὴν

ούσίαν· μονὰς ἄρα αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν μονὰς τῆς
 ἁγίας τριάδος, ὁρῶν ὅτι καὶ κατὰ τὸ θεοῦ ὄνομα. δηλωτικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς
 οὐσίας οὐ τὸ τί αὐτῆς παριστῶν (ὁρῶν ὅτι ἐπεὶ περ ἀπερινόητον καὶ ἀκατά- 50
 ληπτον τὸ τῆς θείας οὐσίας), ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τινος ἰδιώματος προσόντος αὐτῇ λαμ-
 βανόμενον παραδηλοῖ αὐτήν, καθάπερ τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν καὶ τὸ γελαστικὸν
 ἰδιώματα ὄντα φύσεων λεγόμενα σημαίνει τὰς φύσεις, ὥν περ ἐστὶν ἰδιώματα.
 ἔστι τοίνυν ἰδίωμα τῆς αἰδίου ομοσίας, ἧς ἐστὶ πατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ ἅγιον
 πνεῦμα, τὸ πάντα ἐποπτεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν καὶ γινώσκειν, οὐ μόνον τὰ ἔργα 55
 γινόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ βλαπῶ λαμβανόμενα, ὅπερ μόνος ἐστὶν ἐκείνης τῆς
 οὐσίας, ἅτε δὴ καὶ αἰτίας πάντων ὑπαρχούσης τῆς τὰ πάντα ποιησάσης, τὰ
 (δὲ) κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντα συμφέροντί τινι καὶ ἀρρήτῳ λόγῳ πρυτανευούσης.
 ἐντεῦθεν εἰλημμένον τὸ θεοῦ ὄνομα κυρίως λεγόμενον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν
 ἐκείνην, ἥτις ἀληθῶς δεσπόζει τῶν ὁπλάντων ὡς πάντων δημιουργός. μιᾶς τοῦ- 60
 γαροῦν ὑπαρχούσης τῆς οὐσίας, ἧς ἐστὶ πατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα,
 καὶ ἐνὸς τοῦ παραδηλοῦντος αὐτὴν ὀνόματος (φημὶ δὴ, τοῦ θεός) εἷς θεός
 ἔσται κυρίως καὶ ἀκολουθῶς τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας, μηδενοῦ λόγου καταναγκά-
 ζοντος ἡμᾶς τρεῖς λέγειν θεοὺς, ὥν περ οὖν οὐδὲ τρεῖς οὐσίας. εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ
 Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου καὶ Βαρνάβα τρεῖς οὐσίας οὐ φαμεν διὰ τὸ μιᾶς αὐτοῦς 65
 εἶναι, πόσω μᾶλλον ἐπὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος τοῦτο δικαίως
 οὐ ποεήσομεν· εἰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ διαιρετέον εἰς τρεῖς διὰ τὰ πρόσωπα,
 ὁρῶν ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐπεὶ μὴ πρόσωπον δηλοῖ τὸ θεός, ἀλλὰ τὴν οὐσίαν.
 εἰ γὰρ πρόσωπον ἐδήλου τὸ θεός, ἔν καὶ μόνον τῶν προσώπων ἐλέγετο θεός,
 ὅπερ ἐσημαίνετο τῷ τοιῷδε ὀνόματι, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ πατὴρ μόνος ὁ πατὴρ. λέ- 70
 γεται διὰ τὸ προσώπου δηλωτικὸν εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα.

Εἰ δὲ φαίη τις, ὅτι Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον καὶ Βαρνάβαν φαμέν τρεῖς

ούσίας μερικᾶς (δηλον ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἰδικᾶς). τοῦτο γὰρ κυριώτερον εἰπεῖν,
 γνῶτω ὅτι μερικὴν οὐσίαν, τουτέστιν ἰδικήν, λέγοντες οὐδὲν ἕτερον σημᾶναι
 βουλόμεθα ἢ ἄτομον, ἐστὶ πρόσωπον. διδὼ δὴ καὶ τρεῖς εἰ λέγοιμεν μερικᾶς 75
 οὐσίᾳ, τουτέστιν ἰδικᾶς, οὐδὲν ἄλλο φαμέν ἢ τρία πρόσωπα· προσώποις δὲ
 οὐχ ἔπεται τὸ θεός, καθάπερ δέδεικται. οὐδ' ἄρα οὐδὲ τῇ μερικῇ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν
 ἰδικῇ, οὐσίᾳ ταύτην γὰρ ἐστὶν ἰδική· οὐσία τῷ προσώπῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων λε-
 γομένη. τί οὖν λεκτέον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον καὶ Βαρνάβαν
 τρεῖς φαμέν ἀνθρώπους; εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα πρόσωπα, πρόσωπα δὲ τῷ σημαντικῷ ὄν-80
 ματι τῆς κοινῆς οὐσίας οὐ σημαίνεται, ὁμοίως οὐδὲ ἡ μερικὴ λεγομένη ἦτοι
 ἰδικὴ οὐσία, ἐπειδὴ ταύτην αὕτη τῷ προσώπῳ ---- τίνος χάριν τρεῖς ἀνθρώ-
 πους φαμέν αὐτοὺς μιᾶς οὐσίας ὑπάρχοντας, ἥς ἐστὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος δηλωτικόν,
 εἰ μήτε διὰ τὰ πρόσωπα μήτε διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι μερικὴν ἡγουν ἰδικὴν οὐσίαν
 ἐκφωνοῦμεν τοῦτο; φαμέν, ὅτι καταχρηστικῶς καὶ οὐ κυρίως τοῦτο λέγομεν 85
 διὰ τινὰ συνήθειαν ἐξ ἀναγκαιῶν αἰτιῶν κρατήσασαν, αἵτινες οὐ θεωροῦνται
 ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος, ἵνα καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῆς τοῦτο αὐτὸ ποιῶμεν. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ
 αἰτίαι αὗται· ὁ ὅρος ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἂν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀτόμοις ἡγουν
 προσώποις θεωρεῖται· τῶν μὲν γὰρ προτέρων τελευτώντων ἕτερα ἀντ' αὐτῶν
 συνίσταται καὶ πάλιν τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις μεθόντων ἄλλα τινὰ ἐπιγίνεται, 90
 ὥς ποτὲ μὲν ἐν τούτοις, ποτὲ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνοις, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐν πλείοσιν,
 ποτὲ δὲ ἐν ὀλιγωτέροις θεωρεῖσθαι τὸν τῆς φύσεως ἡγουν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὅρον.
 διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τε προσθήκης καὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως τῆς τε
 ἀποβιώσεως καὶ γεννήσεως τῶν ἀτόμων, ἐν οἷς θεωρεῖται ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
 ὅρος, ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ πολλοὺς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ὀλίγους τῇ τροπῇ 95
 καὶ ἀλλοιώσει τῶν προσώπων ἐκκρουσθείσης τῆς κοινῆς συνηθείας καὶ παρ'
 αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον, ὥστε συναριθμεῖν τοῖς προσώποις τρόπον τινὰ
 καὶ οὐσίας. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον συμβαίνει ποτέ· δεῖ

γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ πρόσωπα καὶ οὐχ ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα λέγεσθαι ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ
 ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα μήτε προσθήκην τινα δεχόμενα τὴν εἰς τετράδα μήτε μείωσιν 100
 τὴν εἰς δυάδα· (οὔτε γὰρ γεννᾶται ἢ ἐκπορεύεται ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ ἐξ ἐνὸς
 τῶν προσώπων πρόσωπον ἕτερον, ὥστε καὶ τετράδα εἶναι ποτε τὴν τριάδα·
 οὔτε τελευτᾷ ποτε ἐν τῶν τριῶν τούτων προσώπων καὶ ὥσει ῥοπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ,
 ὥστε δυάδα τὴν τριάδα γενέσθαι καὶ τῇ ἐνθυμήσει·) προσθήκης δὲ καὶ μειώ-
 σεως τροπῆς τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως μηδεμιᾶς γινομένης τοῖς τρισὶ προσώποις 105
 πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος οὐδὲν τὸ παρακροῦον τὴν ἡμετέραν διά-
 νοιαν πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ προσώποις καὶ τρεῖς λέγειν θεούς· πάλιν τὰ τοῦ ἁν-
 θρώπου πρόσωπα πάντα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσώπου κατὰ τὸ προσεχὲς ἔχει τὸ
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τούτου, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἐκείνου ὡς πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα εἶναι
 πρὸς τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς καὶ τὰ αἴτια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος οὐχ οὕτως· ἐν 110
 γὰρ πρόσωπον καὶ τὸ αὐτό, τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐξ οὗπερ ὁ υἱὸς γεννᾶται καὶ τὸ
 πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκπορεύεται· διὸ δὴ καὶ κυρίως τὸν ἕνα πᾶντιον μετὰ τῶν
 αὐτοῦ αἰτιατῶν ἕνα θεὸν φάμεν τεθαρρηκότως, ἐπειδὴ καὶ συνυπάρχει αὐτοῖς·
 οὔτε γὰρ χρόνῳ διῆ ρηται ἀλλήλων τὰ πρόσωπα τὴν θεότητος οὔτε τόπῳ, οὐ
 βουλῇ, οὐκ ἐπιτηδεύματι, οὐκ ἐργασίᾳ, οὐ πάθει, οὐδενὶ τῶν τοιούτων, 115
 οἷα περ θεωρεῖται ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἢ μόνον, ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ πατὴρ ἐστὶ καὶ
 οὐχ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ υἱὸς υἱὸς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ πατὴρ, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον
 οὔτε πατὴρ οὔτε υἱός· διόπερ οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη παρακροῦει ἡμᾶς τρεῖς θεοὺς
 εἰπεῖν τὰ τρία πρόσωπα, ὥπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φάμεν τὰ πολλὰ
 πρόσωπα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένους αἰτίας· ὅτι δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένους αἰτίας καὶ οὐ 120
 κατὰ λόγον ἀναγκαῖόν φάμεν τὰ πομπὰ πρόσωπα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλοὺς ἀνθρώ-
 πους, ἐντεῦθεν γένοιτ' ἂν δῆλον· τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ οὐ
 δύναται εἶναι· ἐστὶ δὲ Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος καὶ Βαρνάβας ὁμοκοινοῦμένως κατὰ
 τὸ ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἄνθρωπος· κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα, τουτέστι κατὰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος,

πολλοὶ οὐ δύνανται εἶναι. λέγονται δὲ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι καταχρηστικῶς δη- 125
 λονότι καὶ οὐ κυρίως· τὸ δὲ καταχρηστικῶς λεγόμενον διαφθείρειν οὐκ ἄξιον
 οὐδὲ ἱκανὸν παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονούσι τὸ κυρίως τε εἶναι καὶ λεγόμενον. οὐκ ἄρα
 λεκτέον ἐπὶ τῶν τριῶν προσώπων τῆς θείας οὐσίας τρεῖς θεοὺς, ἐπεὶ κατὰ
 τὸ θεὸς εἷς ἐστὶ θεὸς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς διὰ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ἧς ἐστὶ
 τὸ θεὸς σημαντικὸν κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον. 130

Εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις, ὅτι περὶ ἡ γραφὴ συναριθμεῖ τρεῖς ἄνδρας λέγουσα, κατὰ
 περιουσίαν ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἡμᾶς ἐλέγξει πειρώμενος, οὐκ ὀρθὸς οὐδὲ ὁσιος
 πέφανται τῆς γραφῆς ἀκροατῆς ὁ τοιοῦτος· οὗτος γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ἐκίνοι πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς λόγους περὶ τοῦ εἰ δεῖ λέγειν τρεῖς θεοὺς τὰ τῆς θείας οὐσίας τρία
 πρόσωπα συνορῶν μάλιστα, ὅτι πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα διδοῦσα ἡ 135
 γραφὴ καὶ θεὸν λόγον, θεὸν μὴ λόγον (τουτέστι θεὸν πατέρα), θεὸν ἅγιον
 πνεῦμα (θεὸν) παραδιδούσα καθόλου παραιτεῖται τρεῖς θεοὺς εἰπεῖν, ἀσέ-
 βειαν ἡγουμένη τὴν πολυθεΐαν καὶ ἕνα θεὸν διόλου κηρύττουσα μήτε τὰ πρό-
 σωπα συμφύρουσα μήτε τὴν θεότητα διαιροῦσα, φυλάττουσα δὲ μᾶλλον ταυτό-
 τητα θεότητος ἐν ἰδιότητι ὑποστάσεων ἡγουν προσώπων τριῶν. εἰ τοίνυν 140
 ὀρθὸς ἦν ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ τοῦ δικαίου λόγον ἐποιεῖτο, ταῦτα κατανοῶν ἐκ
 τῆς γραφῆς τὰ ἴδια κυροῦν οὐκ ἔσπευδεν, ἐπυνθάνετο δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν αἰτίαν
 μαθεῖν αἰτούμενος, δι' ἣν τρεῖς ἄνδρας λέγει ἡ γραφὴ καί περ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον
 τὴν σύμπασαν φύσιν γινώσκουσα κατὰ τὸ Ἄνθρωπος ὥσει χόρτος αἱ ἡμέραι
 αὐτοῦ ἐνικῶς τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως ἐκφωνήσασα· τὸ προσδὸν γὰρ τῷ κοινῷ τῆς 145
 φύσεως ἀποφαινομένη καθ' ἑνὸς αὐτὸ εἶπε δεῖ τὸ ἕνα γινώσκειν ἄνθρωπον τὸν
 σύμπαντα ἄνθρωπον καὶ οὐ πολλούς· ἤκουε γὰρ φιλομαθῶς ἐρωτῶν, ὅτι καὶ ἡ
 γραφὴ ὡς τροφὸς ἀγαθὴ ἴδια βρέφη γινώσκουσα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν ὅτε συμ-
 ψελλίζει αὐτοῖς ὡσαύτως χρωμένη τισὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ παρατιτρώσκουσα τὸ
 τέλειον δηλονότι καὶ τοὺς τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνειν δυναμένους στερεῶς 150

ἀδικοῦσα· οὐ γὰρ δόγματα τὰ ψελλίσματα ὀρίζομένη τὰ τέλεια καταβλάπτει,
 ἀλλὰ συγκαταβαίνουσα τοῖς νηπίοις δι' εὐσπλαγχνίαν καὶ μιμουμένη τὰ ἐκεί-
 νων μῦθως ἀνάγει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν εἰς τελειότητα ἡλικίας ἄγουσα. ὀρίζεται δὲ
 ὁμῶς καὶ δογματίζει τὰ τέλεια κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῇ πρέπον καὶ τοὺς μαθητευομέ-
 νους προσήκον διδάσκεισθαι. ἡμέλει ὅτι ὥτα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ 155
 τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ μόρια σωματικὰ λέγουσα ἔχειν τὸν θεὸν οὐ δόγμα τὸ τοιοῦτο
 παραδίδωσι σύνθετον ἐκ διαφόρων μελῶν ὀρίζομένη τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν
 εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν ἡμετέρων λαμβάνουσα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς
 ἀναγωγὴν, ὡς εἶπον, τῶν μὴ ἁμέσως ἐπὶ τὰ ἀσώματα χωρεῖν δυνάμενων στερε-
 αῖς τισι καὶ τρανοτάταις ταῖς λέξεσι τὰ δόγματα ἐκτίθεται, πνεῦμα λέγου- 160
 σα τὸν θεὸν εἶναι καὶ πανταχοῦ, ἔνθα τις πορευθεῖη, παρεῖναι τὸ ἅπλουν
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπερίγραφον τούτους σοφῶς ἐκπαιδεύουσα. οὕτως καὶ τρεῖς ἄνδρας
 λέγουσα διὰ συνήθειαν, ἵνα μὴ ξενίζῃ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἐν χρήσει τῶν πολλῶν
 ὑπάρχον, καὶ ἕνα φησὶ δι' ἀκρίβειαν, ἵνα μὴ παρασαλεύσῃ τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἐν
 τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων θεωρούμενον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡγούμεθα συγκατάβασιν ἐπὶ 165
 χρησίμῳ καὶ συμφέροντι τῶν νηπιωδεστέρων γεγενημένην, τὸ δὲ ὀρίζομεθα
 δόγμα ἐπὶ βεβηλώσει καὶ παραδόσει τῆς τελειότητος ἐκτιθέμενον.

Ἀλλὰ τινες συζητητικοὶ ὑπάρχοντες καὶ διεγгерμένοι πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν
 εἶναι ἀναντίρρητον ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκροαμένους, ὡς ἔγωγε
 φαίην ἂν, φιλοπόνως γυμνάσαι παρορῶντες τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν λελεγμένον καὶ τὸ μὴ 170
 δεδομένον ὡς ὁμολογούμενον λαμβάνοντες παραλογισμῷ τε χρώμενοι τὸ δοκοῦν
 κατασκευάζουσιν καὶ φασιν, ὅτι ὥσπερ λέγομεν ὑπόστασις ὑποστάσεως, ἣ ὑπό-
 στασις, τουτέστι καθὼς ὑπόστασις, οὐδὲν διαφέρει, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο μία
 ὑπόστασις αἰ πᾶσαι ὑποστάσεις· καὶ πάλιν οὐσία οὐσίας, ἣ οὐσία, οὐδὲν
 διαφέρει, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο μία οὐσία αἰ πᾶσαι οὐσίαι, οὕτως ἂν εἵποιμεν 175
 θεὸς θεοῦ, ἣ θεός, οὐδὲν διαγέρει, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο εἷς θεὸς αἰ τρεῖς

υποστάσεις, καθ' ὧν τὸ θεὸς κατηγορεῖται· καὶ πάλιν ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, ἥ
 ἀνθρώπους εἶναι Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον καὶ Βαρνάβαν· διαφέρει οὐσία οὐσίας
 οὐ καθὼς οὐσία, ἀλλὰ καθὼς τοιάδε οὐσία καὶ ὑπόστασις ὑποστάσεως καθὼς τοι-
 ᾶδε ὑπόστασις· ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀνθρώπου, ἥ τοιόσδε ἄνθρωπος, καὶ πάλιν θεὸς 180
 θεοῦ, ἥ τοιόσδε θεός· τὸ δὲ τοιόσδε ἢ τοιόσδε ἐπὶ δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων
 εἶωθε λέγεσθαι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ὡς εἶπομεν, ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσιν· ἡμεῖς δὲ
 δείξομεν σόφισμα τὸ πᾶν εἶναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον τὸ λελεγμένον, ῥύδαμώς
 ἄλλως περιγινόμενοι ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἰρημένοις κεχρημένοι καὶ δεικνύν-
 τες μὴ δεῖν τὸν τοιόνδε θεὸν καὶ τοιόνδε θεὸν ἢ τοιόνδε ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοι- 185
 όνδε λέγειν· ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα τοιάνδε ὑπόστασιν θεοῦ καὶ τοιάνδε ὑπόστασιν ἄν-
 θρώπου· πολλὰς γὰρ ὑποστάσεις τοῦ ἐνδὸς ἀνθρώπου καὶ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις τοῦ
 ἐνδὸς θεοῦ φάμεν δικαίως. τὸ μὲν ῥῦν τοιόσδε λεγόμενον διακρίναι βούλεται
 τί τινος κοινωνοῦντος κατ' ἐκεῖνο τοῦνομα, ᾧ τὸ τοιόσδε προστίθεται· οἶον
 ἄφρον τοιόνδε φάμεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον διακρίναι βουλόμενοι τοῦ ἵππου, φέρε εἰ- 190
 πεῖν, κοινωνοῦντος αὐτῷ κατὰ τοῦνομα τοῦ ἄφρου, διαφέροντος δὲ τῷ λογικῷ
 καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ· διακρίνεται δὲ τί τινος ἢ οὐσίᾳ ἢ ὑποστάσει ἢ οὐσίᾳ καὶ
 ὑποστάσει· καὶ οὐσίᾳ μὲν διακρίνεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἵππου, ὑποστάσει δὲ
 Παῦλος Πέτρου, οὐσίᾳ δὲ καὶ ὑποστάσει ἦδε ἢ ὑπόστασις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῆςδε
 τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ ἵππου. ἀλλὰ φανερούμενου τοῦ λόγου τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν 195
 ἀπλῶς καὶ τῶν καθ' ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐ κατ' οὐσίαν διαφερόντων πρόδηλος ἔσται
 καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ἅμα καὶ ὑπόστασιν διακεκριμένων. περὶ τούτων
 οὖν ἡμῖν ἐξεταζέσθω ὁ λόγος· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὰ διαφέροντα κατ' οὐσίαν
 λέγονται δύο ἢ τρεῖς οὐσίαι καὶ τὰ διαφέροντα καθ' ὑπόστασιν ὡσαύτως λέγ-
 ονται δύο καὶ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς· διαφερό- 200
 μεθα δέ, ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου φασὶ δεῖν (δύο) λέγειν ἀνθρώπους,
 ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ κυρίως μέντοι καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον· οὐδὲ εἰς γὰρ

νῦν ἡμῖν λόγος περὶ κοινῆς καὶ καταχρηστικῆς χρήσεως· αὕτη γὰρ οὔτε πρὸς
 ἀναίρεσίν τινος οὔτε πρὸς σύστασιν ἰσχύει· σαφηνιζέσθω τοιγαροῦν πρότερον
 ἡμῖν, τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν ἵππον ἢ τὸν ἵππον καὶ τὸν κύνα τίνος χάριν 205
 διαφέρειν λέγομεν καθὼς τοιαύδε οὐσίαι· ἢ πρόδηλον ὅτι ἐπειδὴ διαφέρουσιν
 ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὰ χαρακτηρίζειν οὐσίαις εἰωθότα, οἷον λογικῶς καὶ ἀλόγῳ, χρε-
 μετιστικῶς, ὑλακτικῶς καὶ εἴ τι νι τοιούτῳ· τῷ γὰρ λέγειν οὐσίαν τοιάνδε
 οὐδὲν ἕτερον λέγομεν ἢ ὑπαρξιν ζωῆς μετέχουσαν πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολήν τῆς μὴ
 τοιαύτης, ὑπαρξιν λογικεῦσθαι πεφυκυῖαν πρὸς διάκρισιν ἀλογίᾳ διαφεροῦ- 210
 σης, ὑπαρξιν τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν ἔχουσαν χαρακτηριστικόν, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον,
 ἂντι γὰρ τοιούτων διαφορῶν καὶ ἰδίῳ προστίθεται τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἢ καὶ παντὶ
 γένει πρὸς διάκρισιν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ εἰδῶν τὸ τοιάδε καὶ τοιόνδε οἷον τοιάδε
 οὐσία ἂντι τοῦ αἰσθητικῆς ἢ ἀναίσθητος, τοιόνδε ζῷον ἂντι τοῦ λογικόν ἢ
 ἄλογον· καὶ πάλιν λέγομεν· διαφέρει Παῦλος Πέτρου, καθὼς τοιάδε ὑπόστασις 215
 ἐκάστω αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων κατὰ τινὰ τῶν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐκ
 οὐσίαν συνιδεῖν πεφυκότων, οἷον φαλακρότητι, μακρότητι, πατρότητι, υἱότητι
 καὶ εἴ τι νι τοιούτῳ· πρόδηλον γάρ, ὡς οὐ ταύτῳ εἶδος καὶ ἄτομον, του-
 τέστιν οὐσία καὶ ὑπόστασις· λέγων γάρ τις ἄτομον, τουτέστιν ὑπόστασιν,
 εὐθὺς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἀκρωμένου παραπέμει πρὸς τὸ ζητῆσαι οὔλον, γλαυ- 220
 κόφθαλμον, υἷον, πατέρα καὶ εἴ ὅμοιον· λέγων δὲ εἶδος, τουτέστιν οὐσίαν,
 πρὸς τὸ γινῶναι δηλονότι ζῷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν,
 ζῷον ἄλογον, θνητόν, χρεμετιστικόν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῳ οὐσία
 καὶ ἄτομον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὑπόστασις, οὐδὲ ταύτῳ τὰ χαρακτηρίζοντα ταύτην τε
 κάκεινην· εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ ταύτῳ, οὐδὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι δυνατόν συν- 225
 ἅπτεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τοῖς κατ' οὐσίαις ἢ οὐσιῶν κειμένοις, τὰ δὲ τοῖς κατὰ
 ἄτομον λεγόμενοις· τρία τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὀνόματα, περὶ ὧν ἡ ζήτησις· οὐσία,
 ἄτομον, ἄνθρωπος· καὶ τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ συνάπτομεν τὸ τοιάδε πρὸς διάκρισιν,

ὡς εἶπον, τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὴν εἰδῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ἀλλήλων διαφερόντων· τῇ δὲ ὑπο-
 στάσει πάλιν ὁμοίως τὸ τοιαῦδε συζεύγνυμεν πρὸς διαίρεσιν προσώπων τῶν 230
 ἀλλήλοις κοινωνούντων τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, τουτέστι τῆς ὑποστάσεως, καὶ
 διαφερόντων ἀλλήλων οὐ τοῖς οὐσίαν χαρακτηρίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς λεγομένοις
 συμβεβηκόσιν. τί νι οὖν βούλονται τρόπον συνάψαι τῷ ἄνθρωπος ὀνόματι τὸ
 τοιοῦδε; (ἔκ γάρ τῶν κοινῶς ὁμολογουμένων τὰ ἀμφιβαλλόμενα δέχεται τὴν
 λύσιν.) ὡς τῇ οὐσίᾳ; ἔσται οὖν τὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν οὐσιώδει διαφορᾷ διακεκρι- 235
 μέναι ἀλλήλων; ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κατ' οὐσίαν Παῦλος Πέ-
 τρου, καθ' ὃν κατηγορεῖται τὸ ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ' ὡς τῇ ὑποστάσει; προσώπου
 ἄρα δηλωτικὸν τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ὀυσίας, ὅπερ ἄτοπον λέγειν· τὸ κοινὸν
 γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας σημαίνει τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἰδικὸν πρόσωπον, Παύλου, φέρε
 εἶπεῖν, ἡ Βαρνάβα. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδενὶ τρόπον τὸ τοιοῦδε συνάπτεται τῷ ἄνθρωπος 240
 κατὰ γε τὸν ἱστορημονικὸν λόγον. εἰ δὲ ἡ κοινὴ χρῆσις ἀπορεῖ τούτου καὶ
 κατακέχρηται τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας ὀνόμασι εἰς προσώπου δηλώσιν, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν
 ἀκριβῆ κανόνα τῆς λογικῆς ἐπιστήμης. ἀλλὰ τί κατατρέχω τῆς συνήθους κατα-
 χρήσεως ἀποροῦσης εἰς τὸ τοιαῦτα λανθάνων, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐπιστημονικοὶ τῶν
 λόγων λόγοις προσφάτοις φράσαι τὸ νοηθὲν πολλάκις οὐκ εὐποροῦντες ἑτέροις 245
 καὶ αὐτοὶ καταχρηστικοὺς χρῶνται ὀνόμασι πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ λεγομένου;
 πλὴν ἐκεῖνο σαφὲς ἡμῖν ἔστω, ὅτι περ, εἰ ἐλέγομεν ἐπὶ Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου
 ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, ἢ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἀλλ' ἢ τοιοῦδε ἄνθρωπος,
 καὶ οὐσία οὐσίας, ἢ οὐσία, οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἀλλ' ἢ τοιαῦδε οὐσία, λέγειν
 ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἡδυνάμεθα. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο λέγειν μὴ δυνατόν, ἐπεὶ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ 250
 οὐσία Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου, οὐδὲ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο, ἐπεὶ περ οὐσίας δηλωτικὸν
 τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὄνομα· εἰ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦδε καὶ τοιοῦδε οὐκ ἀκόλουθον συνάψαι τῷ
 ἄνθρωπος ὀνόματι, μὴδ' ἄρα οὐδὲ δύο ἢ τρεῖς κυρίως λέγομεν ἀνθρώπους.
 καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ταῦτα δέδεικται, πόσῳ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῆς αἰδίου καὶ

θείας ούσίας κυριώτερον ἀρμόσει τὸ μὴ τοιόνδε θεὸν καὶ τοιόνδε λέγεσθαι 255
 τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἐκάστην μηδὲ θεὸν καὶ θεὸν καὶ θεὸν ἐκφωνεῖσθαι τὸν πα-
 τέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα μηδὲ τρεῖς θεοὺς, καὶ τῇ ἐνθυμήσει,
 δογματίζεσθαι. συνέστηκεν ἄρα τῷ πρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ δικαίῳ καὶ ἀκολούθῳ καὶ
 ἐπιστημονικωτάτῳ λόγῳ, ὡς ἓνα θεὸν φάμεν τὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργόν, εἰ
 καὶ ἐν τρισὶ προσώποις ἡγῶν ὑποστάσεσι θεωπεῖται — πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ 260
 πνεύματος.

Translation

Title: Treatise of Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, Saying Why We Cannot Possibly Call the Three Persons in the Godhead Three Gods; Written to the Greeks; Taken from the Common Notions

If the name God is manifestative of person,** when we say that there are three persons, we would of necessity speak of three Gods. But if the name God is that which indicates substance,* then when we confess one substance of the Holy Trinity, we reasonably affirm that there is one God, since God uniquely* names one substance. Consequently, with respect to both the substance and the name there is one God and not three. For neither do we say God and God and God, even as we are wont to say Father and Son and Holy Spirit, since by the names which indicate the persons we bind the conjunction and as the persons 10 are not the same, but rather diverse and differ from each other according to the very signification of the names; but we do not join to the name God, which manifests the substance and which is deprived from some of its properties, the conjunction and, so as to say God and God and God, since really it is the same 15 substance, pertaining to* the persons and which the name God indicates; because indeed it is the same God and to the same and for manifesting the same the conjunction and is never joined. But if we say the Father God and the Son God and the Holy Spirit God, or if we say God the Father and God the Son and God the 20 Holy Spirit, we join the conjunction and in thought to the names of the persons, such as to Father, to Son, to Holy Spirit, so

that it might be Father and Son and also Holy Spirit, that is to say, person and person and person, therefore, because there are three persons. But the name God absolutely and in like 25 manner is predicated of each of the persons without the conjunction and, so that we are not able to say God and God and God, but to understand the name repeated vocally the second* and third time on account of the subject persons, while joined the second and third time without the conjunction and because God 30 is not other and other. In so far as the Father keeps his otherness with regard to the Son, not for this is the Father God. For thus the Son would not be God, for if, in so far as the Father is father, therefore the Father is God, in so far as the the Son is not father, the Son is not God; but if the Son is 35 God, not, in so far as he is Son. Likewise also the Father, in so far as he is father, is not God, but in so far as there is substance of such a kind, to which father and son belong and on account of which the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God. But since the substance is not divided 40 in each of the persons so that there are also three substances according to the number* of the persons, it is evident that neither will the name be divided, which indicates the substance, that is to say God, with the result that there be three Gods. But just as the Father is substance, the Son is substance, 45 the Holy Spirit is substance and they are not three substances, so thus the Father also is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God and they are not three Gods. For God is one and the

same, since indeed the substance is one and the same, even
 though* each of the persons is said to be both subsistent be- 50
 ing and God. For either one would have to say that there are
 three substances of Father and of Son and of Holy Spirit, since
 each of the persons is substance, which is most absurd, as in-
 deed neither do we say that Peter and Paul and Barnabas are
 three substances. For the substance of such persons is one 55
 and the same. Or else admitting that there is one substance
 pertaining to Father and Son and Holy Spirit, though recognizing
 each of the persons as subsistent we rightly and consistently
 say that God is one; even though we believe each of the persons
 to be God on account of the commonⁿness of the substance. For 60
 just as, by reason of* the Father differing from the Son and from
 the Holy Spirit, we say that there are three persons, of Father
 and of Son and of Holy Spirit; as to substance, we say that the
 substance of Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one. For if;
 where there is difference, there there is triad because of the 65
 difference; where there is identity, there there is monad be-
 cause of identity. But there is identity of persons as to sub-
 stance; therefore they form a monad as to the substance. But
 if as to substance there is a monad of the Holy Triad, it is
 evident that for the name God the same holds.* For this is 70
 manifestative of the substance -- not setting down* its what
 (evidently since that for the divine substance is inconceivable
 and incomprehensible) -- but taken from some property pertaining
 to the substance it insinuates it, just as reference to* neigh-

ing and laughing, which are properties of natures,* signify 75
the natures of which they are properties. Indeed the eternal
substance, which pertains to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit,
does have a property, the overseeing, the contemplating, and
knowing all, not only those things which actually are, but also
things conceived in the mind. And this is peculiar* to that 80
substance alone, as indeed it is the cause of all things, which
has made all things, and which rules over all things as its own
products, yet* which administers all those things which concern
men by some appropriate and ineffable plan. Therefore the name
God taken and spoken exactly signifies that substance, which 85
truly is master of all things as maker of all things. Therefore
indeed since the substance is one, which pertains to Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit, and one is the name which insinuates it
(I mean the name God) God will then be one exactly and consis-
tently with the character of the substance, while no reason 90
constrains us to say there are three Gods, so likewise then nei-
ther three substances. For if we do not say three substances
for Peter and Paul and Barnabas because they are of one sub-
stance, how much more do we rightly not do this concerning Fa-
ther, Son and Holy Spirit. For if the substance is not to be 95
divided into three by reason of the persons, it is evident that
neither is God to be divided, since the word God does not indi-
cate person, but the substance. For if the word God indicated
the person, one and only one of the persons would be called God,
that which was signified by such a name, just as then the 100

Father alone is called the Father because this name is manifestative of the person.

But if someone might affirm that we say that Peter, Paul, and Barnabas are three partial substances, (namely proper). For, to say it more accurately, let it be known that when speaking105 of a partial substance, that is to say, a proper one, we do not wish to signify anything else than individual, that is, person. Wherefore indeed if we should say three partial substances, that is to say, three special substances, we say nothing else than three persons. Now the word God is not consequent upon the 110 persons, as has been shown. Therefore neither will it be consequent upon the partial, that is, upon the special substance. For special substance referred to individuals is identical with same person. What then is to be said about the fact that we say that Peter, Paul and Barnabas are three men? For if these 115 are persons, and persons are not indicated by the name which signifies the common substance, so likewise neither is what is called partial or special substance since this is the same thing as person --- why then do we say three men when they are of one substance, of which the name man is manifestative, if neither120 on account of the persons nor on account of our speaking of partial or special substance, do we so pronounce ourselves? We affirm that we speak so by a misuse and not with accuracy because of a custom become dominant for necessary causes, which do not enter into consideration with the Holy Triad, so that we125 should also do the same in its regard. Now these are the

causes:* the definition of man is not always considered in the
 same individuals, that is to say, persons. For as the earlier
 ones die, different ones take their place and again if often
 they remain, some others come after, so that now in these, 130
 now in those, or now in many, now in fewer the definition of the
 nature, that is to say, of man is considered. For this cause
 then - the augment and loss by the passing away and birth of in-
 dividuals, in whom one considers the definition of man -, we
 also are constrained to speak of men both as many and as few 135
 in accord with the change and alteration of persons to the de-
 triment of the common custom even outside the very reason of
 substance, so that we number substances* after a fashion* along
 with persons. But in the Holy Triad no such thing ever happens;
 for one must speak always of the same persons -not others and 140
 others- ever together and identically the same, receiving no
 augment, so as to be tetrad, nor diminution so as to be dyad.
 (For from the Father, or from one of the persons, another an-
 other person, is neither begotten nor proceeds, so that the
 Triad ever is tetrad; nor ever does one of the three persons 145
 die, though it be but for the blinking of an eye, so that the
 Triad ^{would} become dyad even in thought). But since no augment nor
 diminution, no change nor alteration ever happens to the three
 persons of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, there is nothing which
 deceives our understanding as regards the three persons, and 150
 to say there are three gods too. Again all the persons of man-
 kind do not have their being directly from the same person ^{from which} they

have single existence, but some are from this one, and others
 from that one, so that there are many and different causes with
 regard to the caused. But it is not so with the Holy Triad; 155
 for it is one and the same person, the Father's, from which the
 Son is begotten, and the Holy Spirit proceeds. Therefore also
 rightly we say with boldness the one cause, with the caused, is
 one God, since in fact* he coexists with them. For neither are
 the persons of the Godhead divided among themselves by time, 160
 nor by place, nor by counsel, nor by pursuit, nor by operation,
 nor by passion, nor by any such things that are beheld in men,
 but only, because the Father is Father and not Son and the Son
 is Son and not Father, likewise also the Holy Spirit neither is
 Father nor Son. Therefore no necessity compels us to say 165
 that the three persons are three gods, ~~just~~ as among ourselves
 we say many persons are many men because of aforesaid causes.
 And that it is for the mentioned causes and not for a reason
 that we say the many persons of mankind are many men, should
 this become clear. The same thing according to same respect 170
 cannot be both one and many. But Peter, Paul, and Barnabas are
 admittedly one man according to man, according to the same, that
 is to say, according to man, they are not able to be many. But
 they are called many men, by misuse wrongly and to be sure, not
 rightfully; but a misuse in speech is neither fit nor suffi- 175
 cient with prudent men to undo that which properly is and is so
 spoken. Three gods therefore is not to be said of the three
 persons of the divine substance; for as to God, one and the same

is God because of the identity of substance, of which God is significant according to the mentioned manner. 180

For if someone would say that the Scripture* counts, mentioning three men,** from our own abundance attempting to refute us, such a student of Scripture does not appear to be upright nor pious. For he would not argue with us about whether one should say that the three persons of the divine substance are 185 three gods, as especially perceiving that the Scripture, while showing Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and teaching as tradition God the word, God not the word (that is to say, God the Father), and God the Holy Spirit; altogether refuses to say three gods, considering polytheism as impiety, and everywhere proclaiming 190 one God, neither confusing the persons, nor dividing the Godhead, but guarding rather the identity of Godhead in the individuality of hypostasis, that is to say, of the three persons. If therefore such a one were upright and spoke as a just man, he, on understanding these things from Scripture, would not be eager to 195 confirm his own views, but rather he would inquire and seek to learn the reason why* Scripture says three men, though it recognizes the whole nature as one man,* according to the statement* of Scripture, "Man his days are like grass", expressing in the singular* the common of the nature. For in declaring that 200 which pertains to the common of the nature, it said it in the singular because it knows the whole man (mankind) as one man and not many. For an eager questioner has heard that the Scripture, like a good nurse, knows men as her own children when she stam-

mers to them with the use of certain words, doing no violence²⁰⁵
 to the perfect, of course, ~~not~~ harming those who are able to
 take solid food. For she does not hold such stammerings^{dogmas},
 and does no damage to the perfect, but by condescending to the
 infants through the goodness of heart and by immitating their
 manner, she leads them up to herself and brings them to matu-²¹⁰
 rity. But nevertheless, Scripture defines and decrees things
 that are perfect according to what is seemly to itself and what
 is fitting that disciples should learn. Of course, because it
 says that God has ears and eyes, and mouth, and indeed the rest
 of the bodily parts, it does not give it out as a dogma defi-²¹⁵
 ning that the Godhead is composed of different parts, but ac-
 cording to the afore-said manner, by the translated use of human
 things, for the leading up, as I said, of those who are unable
 to bear incorporeal things, it sets forth the dogmas in solid
 and very clear terms affirming that God is spirit and incorp-²²⁰
 structing them wisely that the simple and uncircumscribed is
 present wherever a man might go. Thus, out of custom it speaks
 of three men, lest it do violence to what is common and used by
 everybody. And it says one for the sake of accuracy, lest it
 disturb that which is perfect and apprehended in the nature ²²⁵
 of things. The one we think of as condescension effected for
 the utility and advantage of the immature, and the other we de-
 fine as dogma set forth for the establishing and for handing
 down of perfection.

But there are some who are inquisitive and determined to ²³⁰

let nothing go undisputed, for the industrious exercise, as it
 seems to me, of those who speak and of those who listen; they
 overlook what we have said and accept as admitted what has not
 been granted, and by the use of incorrect reasoning they con-
 strue a specious argument and say that as we say: hypostasis* 235
 in so far as it is ^{*} hypostasis, that is, just as hypostasis,
 differs in no way from hypostasis, and yet for all that, all hy-
 postases are not one hypostasis; and again, substance in so far
 as it is substance differs in no way from substance, and yet for
 all that all substances are not one substance; so we would 240
 say God in so far as he is God in no way differs from God, and
 yet for all that the three hypostases, of whom God is predicated,
 are not one God. And again by saying that man in so far as he
 is man differs in no way from man we do not do away with the
 fact that Peter and Paul and Barnabas are three men. For 245
 substance differs from substance not just as substance, but as
 such a substance and hypostasis from hypostasis as such an hy-
 postasis; likewise man differs from man in so far as he is such
 a man, and again God differs from God in so far as he is such a
 God. But such or such is customarily said with regard to two 250
 or more things. But these are the things, as we said, that they
 say, and we will show that the whole thing is a sophism and that
 their statement is nothing else but that; we shall prevail in
 absolutely no other way than by using those very statements and
 showing that it is not necessary to say such a God and such 255
 other God, or to say such a man and such other man, but perhaps*

this hypostasis of God and this hypostasis of man, for we right-
 ly say that there are many hypostases of the one man and three
 hypostases of the one God. The such, then, so used intends to
 distinguish something from some other thing that shares that 260
 appellation to which the such is added. Thus we say such an
 animal, intending to distinguish man from horse, that is to say,
 the horse has the name animal in common with him, but differs in
 regard to rationality and irrationality. For nothing is dis-
 tinguished from something else, either by substance or by hy-265
 postasis, or by substance and hypostasis. Now by substance man
 is distinguished from a horse, while by hypostasis Paul is dis-
 tinguished from Peter, and both by substance and by hypostasis,
 this hypostasis of man is distinguished from this hypostasis of
 the horse. But as the explanation has been made manifest of 270
 the things that differ simply as to substance and of the things
 that differ as to hypostasis and not as to substance, it will
 also be very evident concerning the things distinguished as to
 substance and hypostasis together. Then of these let the ex-
 planation be examined by us. For we ourselves do indeed ad- 275
 mit that things differing as to substance are called two or
 three substances and things differing as to hypostasis are like-
 wise called two or three hypostases. But we differ because with
 regard to Peter and Paul they say it is necessary to speak of
 two* men. But we on the contrary* (affirm that this is)* not280
 right and in accord with ^{the} scientific. For now we have not one
 word to say concerning the common and abusive usage; for this is

of no avail either for the destruction of a thing, or for its es-
 tablishment. Therefore indeed let us first make this clear: why
 do we say, namely, that man and horse or horse and dog differ²⁸⁵
 as to such and such substances. Or clearly because they differ
 from one another according to things customarily characterizing
 the substances, such as reason and irrational, neighing and
 yelping and anything else of like sort. For instead of such
 differences and properties there is added to the substance or²⁹⁰
 even to the whole genus, in order to distinguish the subordinate
 species, the such and such, as for instance* substance, instead
 of sensitive or insensitive, or such an animal instead of ra-
tional and irrational. And again we say Paul differs from Peter
 in so far as such a hypostasis (belongs to)* each of them, ²⁹⁵
 since they differ from one another according to something that
 is apt to make up the hypostasis and not the substance, such as
 by baldness, size, paternity, sonship, and any such thing; For
 it is very evident that species and individual* are not the same
 thing, that is to say, substance and the hypostasis. For ³⁰⁰
 when someone says individual, that is, hypostasis, immediately
 he conveys the mind of his hearer to look for the curly, the
 grey-eyed, son, father, and anything of this sort; but saying
species, that is substance, (he moves his hearer)* to know,
 namely, the rational, mortal animal capable of understanding ³⁰⁵
 and science, the irrational, mortal, neighing animal and the
 like. But if substance and individual, that is, hypostasis, are
 not the same, the things characterizing the one and the other

are not the same either. But if these also are not the same, neither is it possible that they be adopted to the same names³¹⁰ but rather some to names assigned to substances, other to names for individuals. Now there are three names, concerning which there is question: substance, individual, man. Now to substance we attach the such to distinguish, as I said, the subordinate species differing substantially from one another. Again like³¹⁵ wise we join to hypostasis the such for the separating of persons, that have this name (hypostasis) in common with one another, and differing from one another not by the things which characterize substance, but by the things called accidents. In what way, then, do they wish to attach the such to the name ³²⁰ man; (For disputed questions receive their solution from points held in common.) To substance? Will then its (man's) inferiors be distinguished from one another by a substantial difference? It is not so; for Paul and Peter, of whom man is predicated, differ in no way as to substance, To hypostasis? Then the ³²⁵ word man is manifestative of person and not of substance, which is illogical. For the name man signifies the common of substance and not an individual person, that of Paul, for example,* or Barnabas. So in no way is the such fitted to man according to scientific reasoning. For if common use is in difficulty ³³⁰ about this and has misused the names for substance to manifest person, this has nothing to do with the strict rule of logical science. But why do I run down the customary misuse that is in such straits in this regard, while covering up that men, learned

in scientific discourse, often do not succeed well in express-335
ing their thought to others in suitable phrases, and so them-
selves misuse words to set forth what they have to say? But*
let this be clear to us, that, if we said concerning Peter and
Paul that man in no way differs from man, in so far as he is 340
man, but in so far as he is such a man, and substance in no way
differs from substance in so far as it is substance, but in so
far as it is such a substance we would be able to speak so about
them. But if it is not possible to say this, since the substnace
of Peter and Paul is one and the same, then neither is it pos-345
sible to say that other, since the name man is manifestative of
substance. But if it is not consistant to join such with the
name man, then neither indeed do we say rightly two or three men.
And if these things have been shown concerning man, how much more
rightly concerning the everlasting and divine substance is it 350
fitting that neither ~~each~~ of the hypostases be called such a God
and such a one nor the Father and Son and Holy Spirit be ex-
pressed God and God and God, nor three gods be held as doctrine,
though only mentally. It is established therefore by our precise
consistent and scientific discourse that we say one God crea- 355
tor of all, even though He is contemplated in three persons or
hypostases -- of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit.

Critical Notes on Translation

*1. 1, p. 27 - person (πρόσωπον). πρόσωπον will be translated person through out the translation. See text 1. 1, p. 16.

*1. 4, p. 27 - substance (οὐσία). οὐσία will be translated substance through out the translation. See text 1. 2, p. 16.

*1. 5, p. 27 - uniquely (ἐν). See text 1. 4, p. 16.

*1. 16, p. 27 - pertaining to (ᾧ ἐστί). Also belong to. See text 1. 12, p. 16.

*1. 28, p. 28 - second (δεύτερον καί). This is added in text by Jaeger. See text 1. 21, p. 16.

*1. 42, p. 28 - number (I added for clarity). Comes after (καὶ). See text 1. 30, p. 17.

*1. 50, p. 29 - even though (εἰ καί). In the present and past indicative the words express an admitted fact. For this apparently odd, but well substantiated usage see the detailed work of Denniston, with its copious quotations from the many authors. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles, (Oxford, 1939), pp. 299 and 300 (6) (i). See text 1. 35, p. 17.

*1. 61, p. 29 - by reason of (διὰ). This is added in text by Jaeger. See text 1. 42, p. 17.

*1. 70, p. 29 - the same holds (I added for clarity). Comes after (ὅμοια). See text 1. 49, p. 18.

*1. 71, p. 29 - setting down (παριστάνειν). Found in other texts as (παριστοῦν). See text 1. 50, p. 18.

*1. 74, p. 29 - reference to (λεγόμενα). See text 1. 53, p. 18.

*1. 75, p. 30 - natures (φύσεων). φύσις will be translated nature through out the translation. See text 1. 53, p. 18.

*1. 80, p. 30 - peculiar (I added for clarity). Comes after (ἰδίον). See text 1. 56, p. 18.

*1. 83, p. 30 - yet (δὲ). This is added in text by Jaeger. See text 1. 58, p. 18.

*1. 127, p. 32 - causes (αἰτίαι). Cause as efficient; but used also in the general sense of any principle and so may be used in divinis. Corresponds to Latin causa and principium. See the Latin causa in sense of principium. See text 1. 88, p. 19.

*1. 138, p. 32 - substances (οὐσίαι). In accusative case and plural. See text 1. 98, p. 19.

*1. 138, p. 32 - after a fashion (ὑπόπιν). Accusative of specification. See text 1. 97, p. 19.

*1. 159, p. 33 - infact (ἐπεὶ δὴ καὶ). Means this in regard to the Trinity. See text 1. 113, p. 20.

*1. 181, p. 34 - Scripture (γραφή). This passage is mentioned in Gen. 18.2. See text 1. 131, p. 21.

*1. 182, p. 34 - men (ἄνδρες). ἄνθρω is equal to the Latin vir. ἄνθρω and ἄνθρωπος (vir & homo) are terms which we cannot easily convey in English. See text 1. 131, p. 21.

*1. 197, p. 34 - why (οὐ γὰρ). Literally it means because of which. See text 1. 143, p. 21.

*1. 198, p. 34 - man (ἄνθρωπον). ἄνθρωπος is equal to Latin homo. ἄνθρωπος and ἄνθρω (homo & vir) are terms which we cannot convey in English. See text 1. 143, p. 21.

*1. 198, p. 34 - according to statement (καὶ). Statement is expressed in text by (καὶ). This passage is mentioned in Ps. 102. 15. See text 1. 144, p. 21.

*1. 200, p. 34 - in the singular (ἐν ἑκῷ). See text 1. 145, p. 21.

*1. 235, p. 36 - hypostasis (ὑπόστασις). ὑπόστασις will be translated hypostasis through out the translation. See text 1. 172, p. 22.

*1. 236, p. 36 - in so far as (it is) -- (ἵνα). See text 1. 174, p. 22.

*1. 256, p. 36 - perhaps (εἰ ἄρα). Also can be translated if then. See text 1. 186, p. 23.

*1. 280, p. 37 - two (δύο). This is added in text by Jaeger. See text 1. 201, p. 23.

*1. 280, p. 37 - contrary (μεντοι). Here it marks an objection. See text 1. 202, p. 23.

*1. 280, p. 37 - affirm that this is (I added for clarity). Comes after (μεντοι). See text 1. 202, p. 23.

*1. 292, p. 38 - as for instance (οἷον). See text 1. 213, p. 24.

*1. 294, p. 38 - belongs to (I added for clarity). Comes after (ὑπόστασις). See text 1. 215, p. 24.

*1. 299, p. 38 - individual (ἄτομον). ἄτομον will be translated individual through out the text. See text 1. 218, p. 24.

*1. 304, p. 38 - he moves his hearer (I added for clarity). Comes after (πρὸς τὸ). See text 1. 222, p. 24.

*1. 328, p. 39 - for example (φέρε εἰπεῖν). See text 1. 239 p. 25.

*1. 337, p. 40 - But (πλὴν). Here begins Gregory's conclusion to the problem he has discussed in this treatise. See text 1. 247, p. 25.

Summary: Discussion of Terms in Text

οὐσία, φύσις, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον

In the 4th century the Trinitarian question, although not a simple matter of terminology, was greatly aggravated by different meanings given to οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. From the 5th century the Christological question too, was a similarly confused doctrinal question, but was rendered obscure by terms used in different senses and variations of certain concepts, such as, οὐσία, φύσις, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον. The following notes will be useful to bring the difficulties into relief and to suggest the care needed in their solution:

1) οὐσία -- (substantia), substance. St. Basil, whom Gregory, his brother, follows in this matter, defined the οὐσία for substance:

That which is common in individuals of the same species possessed in the same measure by all, so that the whole class is given one name, not having particular reference to the individual.¹¹

Gregory teaches that the οὐσία is not shared by the Divine Persons in such a way that there are three οὐσίαι, as there are three πρόσωπα.¹² It is abundantly clear that the οὐσία of God is not to be understood as an abstract species, but as a single undifferentiated substance, which each fully is, in each of the three Persons.¹³

If the community of οὐσία is taken as implying an antecedent matter, divided up into the three Persons, says Basil (c. Eunom. l. 19), that is as great a blasphemy as saying that the Persons are unequal, as the Eunomians frankly did: the right way of understanding the community of the οὐσία is by the recognition that the same account must be given of one Person as another;

if the Father, for instance, is regarded as possessing the content of light, then the οὐσία of the Son is also light; and on this reasoning the Godhead is one. Again the mere fact that names differ does not imply any necessary variation in the οὐσία; Peter and Paul have different names, but there is one οὐσία of all mankind.¹⁴

Gregory writes that the οὐσία of the several Persons, whatever it really is -- for it is ineffable in speech and incomprehensible in conception -- is not parted into any contrariety of nature. There is no difference of οὐσία in respect of the Holy Trinity apart from the relationship of the Persons. Each Person is a concrete individual entity, yet in the three there is discoverable only a single content.¹⁵

The Father is an οὐσία, he (Gregory) writes (De Comm. Not., Migne 45.177A), the Son is an οὐσία, the Holy Spirit is an οὐσία, yet there are not three οὐσίαι because the one οὐσία is indistinct.¹⁶

2) φύσις -- (natura), nature. It signifies the individual nature of a being. It can have a more complex meaning; for example, its natural and immediate sense is that of an individual and concrete nature; it is the essence as having reality in beings in which it is considered as principle of operation. Often φύσις takes on the meaning of οὐσία. It takes meaning of οὐσία when:

God, whose nature is essentially one, is spoken of, in study of the Trinity, but οὐσία still was more usual. Or when it means the sum of individual species, rather than one individual in particular, the same is true. But in this case φύσις cannot be confused absolutely with οὐσία, which designates the essence or the species as such.¹⁷

φύσις, sometimes takes the meaning of person.

This divergency of expression derives both from the vagueness of the concept of person in many Fathers, and from concrete standpoint from which they usually envisage it.¹⁸

It must be noted that this sense is given to φύσις only in Christological matters and never in Trinitarian Theology.¹⁹

3) ὑπόστασις -- hypostasis. This word is complicated by a vagueness of thought and both the word and idea are ruled by the viewpoint which dominated Oriental speculation in these matters.²⁰

The Cappadocians had been careful to note that the character proper to the ὑπόστασις is the existence in se of a substantial being.

St. Gregory of Nazianzus insists on the concepts of totality, independence and intelligence as characterizing the person. St. Gregory of Nyssa adds to it spontaneity and liberty, which form a part of the moral and judicial concept of personality rather than of the metaphysical concept, which alone is in question here.²¹

It is a person considered in its most concrete aspect: "first substance" as Aristotle and Scholastics say; it is being possessing all the attributes of complete reasonable and autonomous nature.²² Such a being is obviously more than an accident; it is a substance, it has a complete nature; it is in a way, a nature. Each person is φύσις. Thus their concrete point of view led the Greek Fathers to throw into relief all that brings the person nearer to the nature, rather than to distinguish them. Hence, the term ὑπόστασις, which by its origin (etymology) signifies substance, corresponds very well to this realist conception of personality.²³

4) πρόσωπον -- (persona), person. It was accepted only with reserve by Basil on account of its origin; having come from the

theatre and meaning the playing of a part, it might seem to lend itself to Sabellianism, which taught that the distinction of persons in God was no more than the expression of the various parts played by one and some Divine Person.²⁴

In summary, then, with reference to the major terms in the treatise Adversus Graecos De Communibus Notionibus, οὐσία means substance and refers properly to the Trinity as a whole, common to each of the persons, indicating not that God substands accidents, but that God is subsistent. φύσις means nature in the sense that the divinity is the principle of the act of the Divine Persons. ὑπόστασις means hypostasis, again not in any sense of substanding accidents, but in the line of essence as subsistent. ὑπόστασις differs from οὐσία as subsistence from substance, that is, from the final completion of substance in the line of essence. The Persons of the Trinity are hypostatic, in that they subsist. πρόσωπον means person and refers to the individual subsistent relations of the Trinity.²⁵

Footnotes

¹ πρὸς Ἑλληνας ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοειδῶν.

² Werner Jaeger, Gregorii Nysseni Opera (Leiden, 1958), III, I, 17-33.

³ Werner Jaeger, Gregorii Nysseni Opera (Leiden, 1958), III, I, V.

⁴ Otto Bardenhewer, Patrology, trans. Thomas J. Shahan (St. Louis, 1908), p. 295.

⁵ F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), I, 424.

⁶ H. Leclercq, Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, 1910), VII, 17.

⁷ Werner Jaeger, Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius: Rediscovered Works (Leiden, 1954), p. 73.

⁸ qui ex communibus notionibus i.e. more philosophico doctrinam Nysseni explicat, atque quasi cum omnibus Graecis communicat. Werner Jaeger, Gregorii Nysseni Opera (Leiden, 1958), III, I, IX.

⁹ F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), I, 425.

¹⁰ F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), I, 432.

¹¹ F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), I, 434.

¹² F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), I, 436.

¹³ G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London, 1952), p. 265.

¹⁴ G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London, 1952), p. 243.

¹⁵ G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London, 1952), p. 265.

¹⁶ G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London, 1952), P. 265.

¹⁷F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), II, 11.

¹⁸F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), II, 12.

¹⁹F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), II, 12.

²⁰F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), II, 12.

²¹F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), II, 12.

²²F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), II, 12.

²³F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), II, 12.

²⁴F. Cayré, Manual of Patrology, trans. H. Howitt (Paris, 1936), I, 435.

²⁵The problem of terms has been perennial between Oriental and Occidental Theology, especially in this highest of the mysteries of Faith. For a clear presentation of the problem in Occidental Theology from the view point of the Scholastic West and the necessary directions of its control and solution, see the lucid observations of the Common Doctor in the First Part of his Summa Theologiae, Q. XXIX, for instance, noting especially Art. 2, ad 2, where one of the thornier aspects is carefully handled.

Bibliography

- Altaner, Berthold, Patrologie. Freiburg: Herder, 1958. 492 pages.
- Bardenhewer, Otto, Patrology. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1908. 680 pages.
- Bardy, ^{G.}(Abbe), The Greek Literature of the Early Christian Church. St. Louis: Herder, 1929. 191 pages.
- Cayre, F., Manual of Patrology. Paris: Desclee & Co., 1936. vols. I & II.
- Fuerst, Bartholomew, O.S.B., A Reading Course in Greek. Indiana: A Grail Publication, 1953. Book I.
- Godet, P., Dictionnaire De Theologie Catholique. Paris: Librairie Letouzey Et Ane, 1925. Tome 6(2).
- Goodwin, Elliot & Gulick, Charles, Greek Grammar. New York: Ginn & Co., 1930. 472 pages.
- Graef, Hilda, Ancient Christian Writers. Maryland: Newman, 1954. 210 pages.
- Huber, Johannes, Die Philosophie der Kirchenväter. München: J.G. Gotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1859. 362 pages.
- Jaeger, Werner, Gregorii Nysseni Opera. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1958. vol. III, I.
- Jaeger, Werner, Gregory of Nyssa & Macarius: ^{Two} Rediscovered Works. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954. 301 pages.
- Leclercq, H., Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Co., 1910. vol. VII.
- Liddell & Scott, Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940. vols. I & II.
- Payne, Robert, The Holy Fire. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. 313 pages.
- Prestige, G.L., God in Patristic Thought. London: S.P.C.K., 1952. 303 pages.
- Quasten, Johannes, Patrology. Maryland: Newman, 1950. vols. I & II.

Stiglmayr, J., Lexikon Für Theologie Und Kirche. Freiburg:
Herder, 1932. vol. IV.

Weiswurm, Alcuin, C.M.M., The Nature of Human Knowledge Accord-
ing to Saint Gregory of Nyssa. Washington: Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, 1946. 250 pages.

Vita

Name: Henry Andrée Schmitt

Place of birth: Louisville, Kentucky

Date of birth: October 30, 1937

Educational Institutions attended:

Grade School:

Holy Trinity Grade School, Louisville, Kentucky


High School:

St. Meinrad Seminary, High School Department.

College:

St. Meinrad Seminary, College Department.

Previous Publications: none



ARCHABBEY LIBRARY

3 0764 1003 1173 2