

ANALYSIS OF BEING IN APORIA R OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS:
"WHETHER THE 'ONE' AND 'BEING' THEMSELVES ARE THE SUBSTANCE
OF EXISTING THINGS, OR, WHETHER THESE TWO BELONG TO SOME
OTHER SUBSTRATUM, WHICH IS THEIR UNDERLYING NATURE."

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the
College Department of St. Meinrad Seminary
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for Degree of Bachelor of Arts

JOSEPH ANDREW HALL
APRIL 1963

ST. MEINRAD SEMINARY
ST. MEINRAD, INDIANA




TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	page
I. INTRODUCTION	1.
II. PROPOSAL AND DIALECTICS OF THE QUESTION	6.
III. NUMERICAL IDENTITY OF UNITY AND BEING; PROOF THAT BEING IS NOT A SUBSTANCE	11.
IV. THE MISTAKE OF PARMENIDES: SOLUTION OF HIS DILEMMA IN THE NOTION OF POTENTIALITY	23.
V. SUBSTANCE AS THE SUBJECT OF PREDICATION, NOT THAT WHICH IS PREDICATED	37.
VI. ERROR ABOUT UNIVERSALS IN TRANSFERRED USES OF THE TERM "ELEMENT"	48.
VII. CONCLUSION: DISTINCTION BETWEEN <u>ENS COMMUNE</u> AND <u>ENS UT ENS</u>	50.
FOOTNOTES	56.
BIBLIOGRAPHY	63.

I. INTRODUCTION

The intent of this paper will be to treat being in the context of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Two reasons prompt that at the outset we extend our outlook to the whole embrace of metaphysics. First of all, this written thesis is an individual contribution to the joint effort of many papers which are exploring and tracing the different aporiae of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Since these problems are interconnected and woven together, it will be necessary that at various times this paper make reference to the works of other papers dealing with different explorations. Secondly, this science of metaphysics is a universal science. It is only fitting, then, that we see why Aristotle collects all doubts together at the very beginning of Book III, which is considered the starting point of his Metaphysics.¹ Because the Philosopher intends to establish what is true about this science, he states what he expects to do. He says that with a view to this science which we are seeking about the first principles and what is universally true of things, then "We must ...first recount the subjects that should be first discussed."² He declares that there are disputed points for two reasons, either because the ancient philosophers held erring opinions, or because they completely neglected to consider opinions about

the realm of first principles. Aristotle proceeds after this to give four arguments why he considers it necessary to raise questions about the different subjects before the truth is established.

First, he states that it is worthwhile to ponder the difficulties well so as to be able to examine and posit the question well. It is often said that a question well put is already half answered. Aristotle is certain that this consideration is necessary, because the subsequent study of truth is really the solution of earlier difficulties; his example of a knot bears out his point. For it is impossible to untie a knot of which one does not know. Now a difficulty about some subject is related to the mind as a physical knot is to the body, and, likewise, insofar as the mind is puzzled about some subject, it experiences something similar to those who are tightly bound and cannot move forward. Therefore, just as one who wishes to loosen a physical knot must first inspect the knot and the way in which it is tied, so one who wants to solve a problem must first survey all the difficulties and their reasons.

Secondly, Aristotle says that those who wish to investigate the truth without first considering the problem are like those who do not know where they are going. It is evident that one who does not know where he is going cannot go there direct-

ly, unless by chance, and thus neither can one seek the truth directly, without having first seen the problem.

Further, just as one who is ignorant of where he is headed will not know whether he should stop or go further even when he has reached his goal, so similarly is the case of one who will not know whether he has reached the solution to his search for the truth if he has not considered the problem beforehand.

Fourthly, there stands witness the status of a judge. For just as a judge must pass judgment as bearing on the things which he hears from all sides, so, too, is the philosopher in a better position to judge if he will first hear all of the contending arguments of the disputants.³

But the main one of all of Aristotle's reasons for proposing all the difficulties at the very first, comes from the scope of this science of metaphysics. For St. Thomas points out that while in other works, Aristotle sets down the problems one at a time, in order to establish the truth about each one, this work of Aristotle sets forth all the problems at once, and only afterwards is the proper order established in regard to the truth about them. The given reason is that other sciences consider the truth in a particular way so that it belongs to them to raise problems of a particular kind about individual truth; but this science makes a universal study of truth so that it be-

longs to its realm to discuss all the problems pertaining to the truth, and thus it does not discuss its problems one at a time but all at once. To put it succinctly, if the science is universal, there can be universal doubting.

Thomas Aquinas brings out explicitly, too, the fact that Aristotle wished to reorder previous opinions. The Philosopher begins with things which are sensible and evident and proceeds to those separate from matter, while the other philosophers attempted to apply intelligible and abstract principles to sensible things. Additionally, Thomas mentions, also, the Commentator Averroes' reason that Aristotle proceeds such because of the relationship of this science to logic, i.e., the kindredship of dialectics and metaphysics, the discussion of which Aristotle takes up in Book IV.

Having seen the importance and need of viewing the problems of the metaphysics as a unity, we can with this frame of mind go forward to examine the dialectical proposal of this paper, the eleventh aporia, problem R: whether being is the substance of all things. Now it must be noted here that due to the vast extent of this problem two separate papers have been given to its exploration. Aristotle formulates it rather in the question whether the one and being are the substances of all things. A colleague in this endeavor will examine the nature of the one as

such, particularly in its historical connection and its transferred meaning to the units and numbers of the Platonists and Pythagoreans. However, it is to be remembered that these two terms of one and being cannot be completely divorced or separated from each other, as we shall see.

In Book III Aristotle proposes the problem and then restates it: first, in order to formulate, determine, and clarify it; secondly, to manifest the real difficulties involved and introduce the dialectical arguments given pro and con in context to the presentation of the problem. We shall quote both statements in full, proceed with the arguments to be considered, and lay out successively after each argument the critical point to be examined in the structure of this paper.

II. PROPOSAL AND DIALECTICS OF THE QUESTION

In 996^a 4-8, Aristotle gives us the problem, which he describes as most difficult to take up because the whole philosophy of Plato and others are founded upon the way in which they conceived of this aporia:

... There is the question which is the hardest of all and most perplexing, whether unity and being, as the Pythagoreans and Plato said, are not attributes of something else but the substance of existing things, or this is not the case, but the substratum is something else -- as Empedocles says, love; as some one else says, fire; while another says water or air.

Then in 1001^a 4-18, for the purpose of dialectical argument, he recapitulates for more specific historical context what he previously said:

The inquiry that is both the hardest of all and the most necessary for knowledge of the truth is whether being and unity are the substances of things, and whether each of them, without being anything else, is being or unity respectively, or we must inquire what being and unity are, with the implication that they have some other underlying nature Plato and the Pythagoreans thought being and unity were nothing else, but this was their nature, their essence being just unity and being. But the natural philosophers take a different line; e.g., Empedocles -- as though reducing it to something more intelligible -- says what unity is; for he would seem to say it is love: at least, this is for all things the cause of their being one. Others say this unity and being, of which things consist and have been made, is fire, and others say it is air. A similar view is expressed by those who make the elements more than one; for these also must say that unity and being are precisely all the things which they say are principles.

Arguments arise from both sides of the question. On one side, in support of Plato and Pythagoras, there are three arguments posited for the consideration of this problem. The first two arguments of this stand base their foundation on the two different untenable consequences which follow if unity and being are not a substance.

1. Unity and being are said to be the most universal of all, and therefore, if unity and being are not separate in such a way that unity itself or being itself is a certain substance, it will then follow that no universal is separate. Thus it will follow that there is nothing in the world except singular things. For, according to the Platonists,⁴ if the universals are not separate, they are not principles; but if they are separate, they are principles. The crux of the matter, here, is whether the universals are principles, or not.

2. And, besides, number is nothing else than units, because number is composed of units; for unit is nothing else than unity itself. Therefore, if unity itself is not separate as a substance existing of itself, it will follow that number will not be a reality separate from those things which are found in matter. But, again universals must be separate to be principles. This fact was shown of necessary propriety in view of what has already been stated in the first argument. Hence it cannot be

said that unity and being are not a substance which exists by itself. Plato⁵ believed that the elements of the Forms are the elements of all beings, and from this the Platonists said that the substance of things, i.e., their form, is the one. Hence, since the one was thought to be the substance of being (because he did not distinguish between the one which is the principle of number, and the one which is convertible with being), it seemed to him that a plurality of different Forms might be produced from the one, which is their common substance, in the same way that a plurality of different species of number is produced from the unit. Now the difficulty to be solved here is whether first of all, there is any distinction between unity and being, and, then whether there is a unity itself and a being itself.

3. Thus should this second untenable consequence be conceded, there follows in addition the further following argument. And if there is something which is a unity itself and being itself, and it exists separately, it must be the substance of all those things of which unity and being are predicated. For everything that is separate and is predicated of many things is the substance of those things of which it is predicated. But nothing else is predicated of all things in as universal ~~as~~ unity and being. Therefore unity and being will be the substance of

all things. The question to be answered is whether or not everything separate and predicated of many things is truly the substance of those things of which it is predicated. This is in reference to whether Plato's species are substances.⁶

In support of Parmenides comes argument in behalf of the philosophers of nature, who oppose the opinions expressed by the previous three arguments. On the other hand, if there is something which is itself being and unity as something existing separately, it will be necessary to say that unity is the very same thing as being. But that which differs from being is non-being. Therefore it follows, according to the argument of Parmenides, that besides the one there is only non-being. Thus all things will have to be one, because it could not be held that that which differs from the one, which is essentially separate, is a being.⁷ The task here is to show whether there is anything besides the one, and, if so, whether it is something other than non-being.

Now this argument of Parmenides creates a difficulty in the case of the position of Plato. However, the fact that Plato's number cannot be a substance, either if unity is not a substance or if there is a unity itself which is a substance, does not seem to add anything to my question formulated from Parmenides' argument, but seems rather to belong to the other part of prob-

lem, R, the one.⁸

Zeno likewise raises an argument which in more ways than one suspends Plato's calling numbers the substances, but this aspect belongs to unity, too, and at this point we can dismiss and delegate it to the study of "one."⁹

III. NUMERICAL IDENTITY OF UNITY AND BEING; PROOF THAT BEING IS NOT A SUBSTANCE

To take the most basic aspect of the problem, namely, whether unity and being are substances existing apart as unity itself and being itself, we must first of all examine whether there is any distinction between unity and being. In Book IV, 1003^b 22-34, Aristotle clearly gives us the way in which these two terms are related:

Now although being and unity are the same and are a single nature in the sense that they are associated like principle and cause, they are not the same in the sense that they are expressed by a single concept. Yet it makes no difference even if we consider them to be the same; in fact this will rather support our undertaking.¹⁰

As we will notice, Aristotle states that it matters not whether unity and being are the same even conceptually as well as numerically, for his intent is to prove that unity and being belong to the same study, and that the species of one corresponds to the other. To reach this conclusion, Aristotle gives two arguments, which Thomas Aquinas broadens in explanation for our better understanding. Both arguments prove that unity and being are numerically the same.

Aristotle presents his first argument thus:

For one man and human being and man are the same thing; and nothing different is expressed by repeating the terms when we say, "This is a human being, a man, and one man." And it is evident that they are not separated either in

generation or in corruption. The same holds true of what is one. Hence, it is evident that any addition to these expresses the same thing, and that unity is nothing else than being!¹¹

The major follows from the principle that any two things which when added to some third thing cause no difference are wholly the same. The truth of the minor is clear. For it is evident that a man is never generated without a human being being generated, nor is a man ever corrupted without a human being being corrupted; and those things which are generated and corrupted together are themselves one and the same. Likewise, when a man is generated, one man is generated, and when a man is corrupted, one man is also corrupted. And thus it can be seen that the apposition of one or being to man does not express something different numerically. But if unity and being were the same conceptually, it would be nonsense to say, "a human being," and "one man." St. Thomas reminds us here that the term man comes from the quiddity or nature of man, while thing is from the quiddity alone; and the term being is derived from the act of being, but one from the order or lack of division; for what is one is an undivided being.¹² To point out their proper relations, he then remarks,

Now what has an essence, and a quiddity by reason of that essence, and what is undivided in itself, are the same. Hence these three -- thing, being, and one -- signify absolutely the same thing but according to different concepts.¹³

Aristotle's second argument has to do with sameness or identity of subject. Briefly, he again reaches his conclusion in these words: "Further the substance of each thing is one in no accidental way; and similarly it is something that is."¹⁴ This argument points up the fact that any two attributes essentially, and not accidentally, predicated of the substance of each thing are the same in subject, or numerically the same. We know that unity and being are such that they are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing, for the substance of a thing is one in itself and not accidentally. So the major follows that one and being are the same in subject. The proof of the minor, that is, that the terms being and one are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance, comes from the opposite view. For if unity and being were predicated accidentally of the substance of each thing (as something added to it), they would have to be predicated again of the added thing, and still again of the one and being added in turn to it, and so on to infinity, all of which is impossible. Therefore a thing's substance must be one and a being of itself and not by reason of something added to it.¹⁵ St. Thomas mentions that Avicenna held unity and being to be accidents of a thing's substance, because he believed that being was interchangeable only with the one which is the principle of numbers,

the species of quantity, but since number more properly involves the unity, rather than the being of this problem, any pertinent refutation of Avicenna's argument will appropriately belong to the treatment of "unity." More about Aristotle's conclusion inferring here that all beings belong to the study of one science will have to be taken up later in this paper.

For the sake of clarity in proving that unity is not a substance, Aristotle reiterates in Book X and, as a matter of fact, bases his proof on the fact that unity and being are used in an equal number of ways and, in a sense, signify the same thing.¹⁶ He says "in a sense" because as we have seen from his other two arguments above, unity and being are the same in their subject and differ only in meaning. For unity adds nothing other to being than the note of undividedness; what is one is an indivisible or undivided being.¹⁷ Aristotle gives three reasons why unity and being signify the same thing. We shall use Thomas Aquinas' presentation of them, which when compared to the Aristotelian text say nothing different but are rather exemplified for our methodical and systematic minds.¹⁸

The first is that unity belongs to all of the different categories and not just to one of these, that is, it is not comprised within substance, or quality, or any other category. But unity is related to all of them just as being is.

To go further, his second reason posits that when a man is said to be one, the term one does not express a different nature from man, just as being does not express a nature different from the ten categories; for, otherwise, an infinite regress would necessarily result, since that nature, too, would be said to be one and a being. This conclusion, then, must be the same as that of the first argument.¹⁹

"The third reason is that everything is said to be one inasmuch as it is a being. Hence when a thing is dissolved it is reduced to non-being."²⁰

Finally, in indicating what the common thing is to which all things are reduced, Aristotle confirms and recapitulates in Book XI,

It makes no difference whether that which is referred to being or to unity. For even if they are not the same but different, at least they are convertible; for that which is one is also somehow being, and that which is being is one.²¹

It is evident, then, that the one and being are the same numerically, and that all things are referred to these as to something common, since these are predicated essentially of their subject, as was seen above. Their reference to all things prompts the quest how they are related to all, whether they are the substances themselves of all things, or whether they have some underlying nature or substratum to which they belong. Whether they are substances we will examine in this section.

What they are will be reserved until after the answers to the dialectical questions which were proposed in the second division of this thesis.

For review of the historical and dialectical record, Plato thought that the plurality of different forms came from the one, which was the common substance of all things. And since unity and being are the most universal, for everything that 'is' is a one and a being, Plato posited these as the substances of all things. To examine, then, whether being, the area of our investigation, is a substance or not, we must clarify the two basic terms around which any proof must take its stand. These are 'universal' and 'substance.'

In chapter 13 of Book VII, Aristotle gives us their relation to each other:

As the substratum and the essence and the compound of these [definitions] are called substance, so also is the universal . . . the substratum . . . underlies in two senses, either being a 'this' -- which is the way in which an animal underlies its attributes -- or as the matter underlies the complete reality. . . . firstly the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it, which does not belong to anything else; but the universal is common, since that is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing.

Aristotle then argues that if the universal is to be the substance of one, this one will, then, be the others also, for things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves also one. Then he gives a second contrast of the two

terms:

Further, substance means that which is not predicable of a subject, but the universal is predicable of some subject always.²³

The Philosopher goes on to assert that if the substance is one, it will not consist of substances present in it. This result involves the difficulty that every substance, then, would be incomposite, so that there would not even be a formula or an intelligible expression of any substance. Now the answer to the above difficulty is that in one sense, substance is composed of substances and in another it is not, for substance is composed of potential substances, not of actual ones.²⁴ However, its solution must come from problem F, which will show from the part in definition that universals are not substances, and from aporia O, which demonstrates, in relation to sensible substance, that universals are not separated because the separated Platonic ideas cannot be defined.

In Book VII, 1040^b 16-24, Aristotle proposes the first of his arguments why unity and being cannot be the substance of things:

Since the term 'unity' is used like the term 'being' and the substance of that which is one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be a substance. . . . Now of these concepts 'being' and 'unity' are more substantial than 'principle' or 'element' or 'cause,' but not even the former are substance, since in general

nothing that is common is substance; for substance does not belong to anything but to itself and to that which has it, of which it is the substance. Further, that which is one cannot be in many places at the same time, but that which is common is present in many places at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from its individuals.

The major premise of the first argument presupposes a prior proof that nothing common is substance; this basis will be founded on problem F, which will show that no universal is a substance. However, it will still remain our task to see the true reason why the universal and therefore being cannot be a substance. This fact will become clear later on in the treatment of predication.

The second argument, which begins, "Further," does bring us to this conclusion, which is evident if universals are not substances.

Now Aristotle states that those who assume certain ideal forms are right insofar as they claim that these are separate, because they hold that these are the substances of singular things; for by definition a substance is something that exists of itself. But "unity cannot be something that exists of itself if it exists in some singular thing, and the reason is that if it does exist in one singular thing it cannot exist in others..."²⁵ And thus, on the other hand, the Platonists were not right when they said that there is one form in many things; for these two statements certainly seem to be opposed, namely, that something

may be separate and exist of itself and at the same time have being in many things. The Platonists posited this double mode of a one-in-many because they reasoned that there must be some incorruptible or incorporeal substances, since the notion of substance is not bound up with corporeal dimensions. To convey some knowledge of these incorruptible substances, which transcend the senses, they supposed them to be specifically the same as corruptible substances, differing only in the fact that the former were explained as separate substances with the name of a form in itself. Aristotle says that they invent a 'man -- himself' and a 'horse -- itself' by adding the word 'itself' to sensible things.²⁶ The Philosopher here alludes to the fact that even if we do not know what non-sensibles there are, it is doubtless necessary that there should be some. Any further treatment about eternal substances in this reference will properly come under problems E and F.

In Book X, 1053^b 17, Aristotle reiterates that being is not a substance for the same reason that unity is not:

If then no universal can be a substance, . . . and if being itself cannot be a substance in the sense of a one apart from the many (for it is common to many), but is only a predicate, clearly unity also cannot be a substance.

He then concludes,

Therefore, on the one hand, genera are not certain entities and substances separable from other things; and on the other hand the one cannot be a genus, for the same reasons

for which being and substance cannot be genera.²⁷

At this point we deem it necessary to show why being cannot be a genus, for if it were, it could be called a substance inasmuch as a genus is called a second substance in the sense that it is the subject of accidents alone and is supported by first substances.²⁸ An example is a particular man who is subject of the genus 'animal.'

As will be shown later on, first substance has the unity of being. Being is either by reason of itself or on account of another. First substance is in the real order, the particular, the singular. However, second substance is the universality understood, and thereby it has the unity of essence; in this sense, second substance would seem to be the nature of a being, since being is the most universal of all and predicated of all things. Plato had reasoned in this manner. But second substance is universal and abstracted in such a way that as Aristotle says, "if unity or being is genus, no differentia will either have being or be one."²⁹

Now it is impossible to predicate a species of a difference for two reasons: first because a difference is predicably broader than species, and, secondly, since a difference is given in the definition of a species in the sense that difference is the formal principle of a species. Genus itself is predicated

of its differences inasmuch as they inhere in a species. But no difference can be conceived of which unity and being are not predicated, because any difference of any genus is a one and a being. The fact that, otherwise, difference could not constitute any one species of being makes evident Aristotle's conclusion that unity and being cannot be genera.³⁰ For fuller comparison, since a difference does not participate in a genus, it must lie outside the essence of a genus. But there could be nothing outside the essence of being which could constitute a particular species of being by adding to being; for what is outside of being is nothing, and this cannot be a difference.³¹ Truly, then, unity and being are not genera but are common to all things analogically, whereas genera are common only univocally, since, as it was stated, these have no essential difference.³²

It is clear, then that being is not a substance, but so far our proof has been based on dialectic, that is to say, our procedure has been according to extrinsic (logical) reasonings. The real demonstration of our proposition will be brought to light when we recall Aristotle's conclusion above that the one could not be a genus for the same reasons that being and substance could not be genera. We have seen why being is not a genus. The final step must come from substance's inability to

be a genus, i.e., more properly a universal which allows predication of itself to many; substance, as was pointed out above, is peculiar to itself and does not belong to another. In a later section of this paper, we shall obtain the full scope of our answer when we investigate whether or not everything separate and predicated of many is truly the substance of those things of which it is predicated.

IV. THE MISTAKE OF PARMENIDES; SOLUTION OF HIS DILEMMA IN THE NOTION OF POTENTIALITY

We have seen that Plato posited the separate Forms because he was not able to account for the differences between corruptible and incorruptible things, these last of which he reasoned certainly to be, even though he could not know what they were, since they transcend the senses. None of the ancient philosophers could give any reason why some beings are destructible and some are not. In the search for the origin of all things, then, Plato had been led to place his Forms or Ideas as the first principles. Empedocles proposed love and hate, while other natural philosophers stated different contraries. The theological poets held that all things came from the simple privation of Night, i.e., they generate the world from non-being. Parmenides could see that none of these adequately explained why things are distinguished into corruptible and incorruptible. So in order not to be driven to posit that all things come from non-being or to account for the difference between things, he held that all things are one, thereby entirely doing away with the distinction between things.³³ Our investigation here will lead us to see whether there is anything besides the one, and, if so, whether it is something other than the non-being which Parmenides posited.

Now, at first, we may want to disdain such a postulation that there is nothing but the one, as if the whole universe were a single being, for truly we can see the many particular things around us. Aristotle points out in the fifth chapter of Book I that this statement is not in conformity with nature, because it does away with motion in things and likewise with causality, but, as he points up, examination of the monist theory as implicated by Parmenides is relevant to our study, especially as he expressed himself "with more insight." For Parmenides employed the argument that besides being there is only non-being which he believed to be nothing. Hence he thought that it necessarily followed that being is one and that whatever is other than being is nothing. Compelled by this argument, he held that all things were one, but compelled to accept what appeared to the senses, he aimed to conform to both of these. He said, then, that all things are one according to reason, but many according to the senses. Now inasmuch as he admitted a plurality of things according to the senses, he was able to hold that there is in the world both cause³⁴ and effect. Hence he posited two causes: the hot, which he ascribed to fire, and the cold, which he referred to the earth. The hot pertained to the efficient cause, and the cold to the material cause. But to keep his position from contradicting his own argument that whatever

is besides being is nothing, he said that the "hot" cause is being, and that the other "cold" cause -- the one besides ~~being~~ being -- is non-being according to both reason and the truth of the thing itself, and is being only according to the senses.³⁵

Here, St. Thomas states that in a way Parmenides was very close to the truth:

...for the material principle which he held to be the earth is not an actual being. And in a similar way, too, one of the two contraries is a privation, as is said in Book I of the Physics [I,3 (186^b 5)] . But privation does not belong to the intelligible constitution of being. Hence in a sense cold is the privation of heat, and thus is non-being.³⁶

Now it is said that privation does not belong to the intelligibility of being because the conception first makes known the existing thing and subsequently its privation. Hence, if science is a conception of the thing known existing in the mind, the same science must deal with contraries, one primarily and one secondarily. Hereby the Philosopher shows that the same conception applies to a contrary and to a privation.³⁷ For just as a privation is explained by negation and removal (e.g., the removal of sight explains blindness), in a similar way a contrary is explained by negation and removal, because privation, which is the removal of some attribute, is a sort of first principle among contraries. For, in the case of all contraries, one stands as something perfect and the other as something im-

perfect and the privation of the former. Hence for the truth that cold is the privation of heat,³⁸ as Parmenides said.

But Parmenides' argument touched on unity according to the intelligible structure, i.e. according to form. Indeed in this sense, nothing can be added to the concept of being by which it might be diversified. For whatever is added to being must then be other than being, and anything outside being is non-being and thus nothing. Hence it appears that this mental addition cannot diversify being, just as difference does not participate in a genus, which would otherwise have the essence of a difference. And definitions would be nonsense if, when a genus is given, the difference is added, granted that the genus were the generic essence of the difference. Likewise, it would be nonsense if the species were added, since a difference would not in any way differ from a species. According to such reasoning, Parmenides concluded that those things which are outside the substance of being must be non-being, and thus cannot diversify being. But his mistake lies in the fact that he used being as if it were one in intelligible structure and also in nature, like the nature of any genus. But we know that this situation in nature is impossible from our demonstration above that being is not a genus, but is, as we shall show later, predicated of different things in many ways. Being is analo-

gous and does not have one nature like one genus or one species.³⁹ Therefore being's ad another cannot be confined to the mental reservation of Parmenides' one.

Analogy requires some real relation of one being to another in respect of their reference to one primary subject.⁴⁰ But it must be understood that that one to which diverse relations are referred in analogical things, is one in number and not merely one in ratio, as is that one designated through a univocal name.⁴¹ Otherwise, there remains the problem of Parmenides' one, which stands adamant in respect to any other being. The question is how there is some plurality reciprocally effected by these mutual relations. The Philosopher places the basis of this answer in motion or change, which will correct Parmenides' false notion of the absolute one opposed only by total nothingness.

In 1067^b 25-1068^a 7, Aristotle tells us that in relation to change the term non-being is used in the same number of senses as being is. One meaning -- the one used by Parmenides -- is the combination and separation found in a proposition; and since this kind does not exist in reality, but only in the mind, it cannot be moved. Now regardless of whether Parmenides admits motion or not, he at least implicitly has to affirm it in his postulation of the two contraries of cause, out of which

came the plurality of things according to the senses, which he accepts as separate from reason. For causes necessarily involve change or motion to reach their effects. Thus in regard to motion, the Philosopher points out that being and non-being are used in another sense, and these in this instance are with reference to actuality and potentiality. That which is actual is a being in an unqualified sense, but that which is potential only is a non-being. Now if this non-being is no different from Parmenides', the same dead end will be reached. Aristotle concedes that even that sort of non-being which is a being potentially but not actually cannot be moved:

True, the not-white or not-good can be moved incidentally [accidentally], for the not-white might be a man; but that which is not a particular thing at all can in no wise be moved.⁴²

Obviously the change which we must have for plurality of subjects needs be that producing another substance, for accidental change leaves us merely with the same 'one' previous substance with modified accidents. But in regard to this fact, Aristotle had already restricted that "change which is not accidental is found not in all things, but between contraries, and their intermediates, and between contradictories." He says further that "we may convince ourselves of this by induction,"⁴³ whereby we see the allocations of contradictories in truth and falsity, between which there is no intermediate. Now this is

in respect to the truth of Parmenides' principle of contradiction.

In agreement, then, with Parmenides that no non-being can be moved and that no intermediate stands between two contradictories, Aristotle states that neither generation nor corruption is motion because these two are contradictories. Otherwise, one could validate that non-being is moved, for that which is not is generated, even accidentally. Similarly, non-being cannot be at rest due to its unqualified state which allows it to be neither in motion nor in rest since it is not. Furthermore, non-being is not moved since "everything that is moved is in a place."⁴⁴ Nor is destruction motion, for the only thing opposed to motion is motion or rest. But since destruction is opposed to generation, generation would have to be either motion or rest if destruction were motion. Since generation can be neither of these, then, destruction is not motion.⁴⁵ From the circumstances here eliminating any changes from negative to positive or vice versa, where contradictories are involved, it happens in motion or change "that only the change from positive into positive is movement."⁴⁶ For, as Aristotle had pointed out in Book IV in connection with the contraries,⁴⁷ from the fact that a thing cannot both be and not be it follows that contraries cannot belong to the same subject at the same time.

Then he clarifies this positive movement by saying that "the positives are either contrary or intermediate⁴⁸ (for even privation must be regarded as contrary), and are expressed by an affirmative term, e.g., 'naked' or 'toothless' or 'black.'⁴⁹

This positive aspect of motion leaves Parmenides' contrary of the "cold," which is absolute non-being, incapable of being moved by the efficient contrary, the "hot." For, as the ancients argued, nothing comes from nothing.⁵⁰ Besides, there's the question of a positive intermediate in connection with motion, for every change is from one contrary to another.

Aristotle lends us two bases for an underlying subject for motion. First, one contrary is not changed into another. Thomas Aquinas clarifies this statement, "...for blackness itself does not become whiteness, so that, if there is a change from black to white, there must be something besides blackness which becomes white."⁵¹ Again, throughout every change something is found to remain. For instance, in the change from black to white a body remains, whereas the other thing, the contrary black, does not remain. If there were change of this change and another change of the last change, this process would have to go on to infinity, all of which is impossible. There is, then, some third thing besides the contraries. And Aristotle labels this as matter. In Parmenides' case, this sub-

ject or so-called matter is not taken into account, as he continues to state the principle of contradiction in his context of the one in the mind alone.

Aristotle then shows us what kind of being matter is by defining for us its four states of change:

. . . simple generation and destruction, which is change in substance; increase and decrease, which is change in quantity; alteration, which is change in affections (and constitutes the third species of quality); and "local motion," or change of place, which pertains to the where of a thing.⁵²

Matter, then, which changes must be capable of both states of change in substance, that from which and that to which. "And since that which 'is' has two senses, we must say that everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually, e.g., from potentially white to actually white, and similarly in the case of increase and diminution."⁵³ This statement meets the difficulty of the ancient philosophers who did away with generation because they did not think anything to come from non-being, since nothing comes from nothing; or to come from being, since a thing would be before it came to be. In the category of substance, then, all things come to be both from being and non-being. St. Thomas' paraphrase of Aristotle's conclusion relates us more specifically to the language of Parmenides' context, wherein any non-being was considered as absolute nothing. The following words emphasizing the notion

of potentiality⁵⁴ are the solution to Parmenides' dilemma:

A thing comes to be accidentally from non-being inasmuch as it comes from a matter subject to privation, in reference to which it is called non-being. And a thing comes to be essentially from being -- not actual being but potential being, i.e., from matter, which is potential being. . . .⁵⁵

Then Aristotle mentions the following theories which showed some notion, though not a full concept, of matter:

And this is the 'One' of Anaxagoras; for instead of 'all things were together' -- and the 'mixture' of Empedocles and Anaximander and the account given by Democritus -- it is better to say 'all things were together potentially but not actually.'⁵⁶

Parmenides is not among the names of these men because he did not know or admit of any kind of potency or of generation, which brought potential privation to fulfillment. He merely reiterated that the many without distinction are one.

But since generation is a change from non-being to being, Aristotle points out that one could ask from what sort of non-being generation proceeds, since non-being is said of three things. St. Thomas distinguishes these three in their proper relation to generation. From the kind of non-being which does not exist in any way, nothing is generated, because in reality nothing comes from nothing. From the second type said of privation, which is considered in a subject, there comes only accidental generation, inasmuch as something is generated from a subject to which a privation occurs. The third meaning is

said of matter itself, which, taken in itself, is not an actual being but a potential one, and from this kind Aristotle says that if one kind of being is potentiality, then from such a principle, i.e., non-being, something is generated essentially.⁵⁷ The Philosopher emphatically declares that even "if, then, one form of non-being exists potentially, still it is not by virtue of a potentiality for any and every thing, but different things come from different things."⁵⁸ For they differ in their definite matter from which they come to be, because there must be a proportion between matter and form. And even though first matter is in potentiality to all forms, it nevertheless receives them in a certain order. This view is opposed to the view of Anaxagoras, whose "mind" is the one matter from which, then, it would be necessary to say that only one effect would follow. His thought results in an undifferentiated unity such as Parmenides postulates. Aristotle then arrives at the conclusion, his hylomorphic theory, which gives basis to the opposition and fact of the one and the many:

The causes and principles, then, are three, two being the pair of contraries of which one is definition and form and the other is privation, and the third being the matter.⁵⁹

Hence it is clear that the reason for many substances -- the question which in Book XIV Aristotle declares that Parmenides should have asked -- is analogy. The application of the number

and kind of these principles to the diversity and plurality established by them will here need be released to problem P, within whose realm it pertains. Likewise, the distinction between corruptible and incorruptible things, which Parmenides was unable to make, will have to be explored by aporia Q, which examines and states the difference between corruptible and incorruptible things. The fact that herein is contained the plain reality that there are diverse and many things is sufficient for our treatment. There are things other than the one.

Having seen above the only kind of non-being, potential being, that can be a principle, we shall attempt to relate briefly the one and the many in the context where Parmenides failed. In 1054^a 22. Aristotle says that "that which is either divided or divisible is called a plurality, and that which is indivisible or not divided is called one." If, then, as the Philosopher states, the one and the many are opposed as contraries, we know from above that each of the two contraries must be a positive reality. In this light the one and the many could not be opposed as pure privation and possession, but rather ". . . the one derives its name and its explanation from its contrary, the indivisible from the divisible, because plurality and the divisible are more perceptible than the indivisible, so that in definition plurality is prior to the indivisible, be-

cause of the conditions of perception."⁶⁰

We must clarify here what seems to be a vicious circle in this quoted statement. Firstly, we must say that insofar as unity itself is considered to be complete in itself and to have a certain species, it is opposed to plurality, since what is one is not many, nor vice versa. But insofar as it is considered to be incomplete as regards form and species, it is not opposed to plurality but is a part of it.⁶¹ Parmenides could not resolve unity as the basis of plurality because he believed that one of two contraries did not ground the other but rather destroyed it. Nor, in the second place does anything prevent one and the same thing from being prior and subsequent in intelligible according to different traits that are considered in it. In disregard of any connection between reason and sense and in allowance of no circularity between the one and the many if unity should include privation of plurality, Parmenides denied that any plurality existed, since for him anything besides being, the first concept of the intellect, was non-being. For the unity which is interchangeable with being implies the privation of formal division, which comes about through opposites, and whose primary root is the opposition between affirmation and negation. But, actually, in multitude it is possible to consider multitude as such and division itself, as St. Thomas says:

Thus from the viewpoint of division multitude is prior in intelligibility to unity; for that is one which is undivided. But multitude as multitude is subsequent in intelligibility to unity, since a multitude means an aggregate of units or ones.⁶²

Fuller treatment of the relation of the one and many in regard to numeric and specific determination will have to be taken by problem P, as we previously mentioned. Our establishment here that there is besides the one, something as other than complete non-being will be the groundwork for the further question whether principles are universal or singular, the realm of aporia S.

V. SUBSTANCE AS THE SUBJECT OF PREDICATION, NOT THAT WHICH
IS PREDICATED

However, the search for that relation between the one and the many has involved us deeply in this matter in regard to the nature of substances, for Plato considered even the separate universal Forms to be substances predicated of all things. And from this belief he concluded that unity and being will be the substances of all things. We have seen that his conclusion is wrong. But, nevertheless, the statement accepted by all that unity and being are the most universal of all had brought him to this decision. And, besides, Aristotle seemed to have to posit a double truth in the rejection that unity and being could not be substances, for he said that unity and being are not the substance of the things of which they are predicated and yet affirmed that unity and being do not express a nature different from the things of which they are predicated.

In lessons 1-4 of Book IV, aporiae A-I manifest that metaphysics treats all being. In particular, problems C, D, and G will show that the science of metaphysics considers all substance and whatever per se belongs to "communia" of being, which this science studies. For those things which have one term predicated of them in common, not univocally but analogously, belong to the consideration of one science, because the term

being is thus predicated of all beings. In the beginning of the second chapter of Book IV,⁶³ Aristotle gives us this statement:

There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be,' but all that 'is' is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to 'be' by a mere ambiguity.

But, here, it must be noted that a term is predicated of different things in various senses: sometimes according to a meaning entirely the same -- univocally, as animal of horse and ox; sometimes according to meanings entirely different -- equivocally, as dog of star and animal; and sometimes according to meanings which are partly different and partly not ("different inasmuch as these different relationships are referred to one and the same thing"),⁶⁴ and then it is predicated analogously or proportionately. Another thing not to be overlooked is that the one thing to which the different relationships are referred analogically is numerically one and not just one in meaning, which is the kind of oneness designated univocally. Aristotle's words, "one definite kind of thing," as well as his following examples indicate clearly that although the term being has many senses, it is referred analogously to its subject. For Aristotle's term of healthy is not predicated univocally of food, medicine, urine, and animal, but rather refers to one and the same health, which an animal receives, of which urine is the

sign, which medicine causes, and which food preserves. In this case many things are related to one thing as end. The Philosopher's second example relates many things to one thing as an efficient principle. The one thing here is called medical because it possesses the art of medicine (e.g., a skilled physician), or because it is naturally disposed to possess this art (e.g., the person who easily acquires the practice of medicine), or because it is necessary for healing (e.g., a physician's instruments), or because it is used itself as a potion in restoring health. Aristotle then reiterates the connection of his examples with the many senses of being,

And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point. . . .⁶⁵

and proceeds to give the different modes of being which possess being in some way. St. Thomas reduces his listings to four. The one most imperfect, that is, negation and privation, exists only in the mind, since the mind busies itself with these as kinds of being while it affirms or denies something about them. Another less imperfect type is that of generation and corruption, which has some admixture of privation and negation because motion is an imperfect kind of actuality. A third mode, which includes qualities, quantities, and properties of substances, admits of no admixture of non-being, but nevertheless its mem-

bers exist not of themselves but in something else. The fourth mode is that of substances themselves, which are most perfect since they have being in reality without any admixture of privation and have solid being inasmuch as they exist of themselves.⁶⁶ Thomas Aquinas then recapitulates for us how Aristotle has related the other modes to this last one:

Now all the others are reduced to this as the primary and principal mode of being; for qualities and quantities are said to be inasmuch as they exist in substances; and motions and generations are said to be inasmuch as they are processes tending toward substance or toward some of the foregoing; and negations and privations are said to be inasmuch as they remove some part of the preceding three.⁶⁷

It is evident, then, that every being somehow belongs to a subject. This truth is witnessed also in that philosophical lexicon, Book V, where Aristotle divides being into essential being and accidental being, based on the fact that one thing is predicated of another either essentially or accidentally. Now we saw in the first part of this paper that being is predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing, for the substance of a thing is one in itself and not accidentally. Hence the term being, applied to a thing by reason of its very existence, designates the same thing as the term which is applied to it by reason of its essence. If this is the case, substance is the primary kind of being, since all other kinds of being are referred to this one primary thing, on which they

depend for their being. And in this way unity and being are the common attributes of substance and are chiefly predicated of it. Likewise, all those things which the figures of predication signify are said to be essentially, for being cannot be narrowed down to some definite thing in the way in which a genus is narrowed down to a species by means of differences, because difference does not participate in the essence of a genus. Being, then, must be narrowed down to diverse genera on the basis of a different mode of predication, which flows from a different mode of being, for a thing is signified to be in just as many ways as we can make predications. "And for this reason," says, St. Thomas, "the classes into which being is first divided are called predicaments, because they are distinguished on the basis of different ways of predicating."⁶⁸ Thus there follows this conclusion of Aristotle:

Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where,' others its 'when,' 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these.⁶⁹

Hence there must be a mode of being corresponding to each type of predication.

Now a predicate can be referred to a subject in three ways. In one way the predicate states what the subject is, as in the example that Socrates is the thing which is an animal. This

predicate signifies a particular substance of which all attributes are predicated, as is clear when we recall that substance is the primary being. Another way in which a predicate is referred to a subject comes about when the predicate is taken as in the subject, whether essentially as flowing from its matter (and then it is quantity), or as coming from its form (and then it is quality); or it is not in the subject absolutely but with reference to something else (and then it is relation). The third way in which a predicate is referred to a subject occurs when the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject. This happens in two ways. In the first sense, the source from which the predicate is taken is totally extrinsic to the subject: if it does not measure the subject, it can be predicated as a habitus; if it does, the predicate is taken either in reference to time (when), or in reference to place without order of parts considered (where), or with order of parts (position). The second sense is that in which the predicate is taken from without but yet from a certain point of view within the subject of which it is predicated: if from the viewpoint of principle, it is predicated as an action, but if from the viewpoint of its terminus, it will be predicated as a passion.⁷⁰

It is quite obvious that these figures of predication are

all of the subject rather than the subject of them. But there is a way whereby the particular subject can be predicated of another. Nevertheless, this feat is accomplished only in an accidental sense, because the thing to which belongs the accident of which this subject is itself predicated, itself is.⁷¹ The question remains, however, whether substance can be predicated of many things, for, if it can be, it must be a separate universal common to many. The answer, then, lies in the investigation whether or not universals are substances.

In different instances we have already seen that substance is the primary and principal kind of being and that the other types are only by reason of it. Aristotle's first chapter of Book VII reiterates what he has said in this regard in Books IV and V:

And so one might even raise the question whether the words 'to walk,' 'to be healthy,' 'to sit' imply that each of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing.⁷²

He says further that substance is first in time, in order of knowledge, and in definition, the proofs of which are not necessary to be gone into here since problem C will show the 'primary' circumstances of substance when it demonstrates that substance is the more proper subject of metaphysics. We can ac-

cept substance, then, as first and separate since it can stand apart. Here we must return again to chapter 13 of Book VII, where we previously saw the contrast of substance and universal. Before, this comparison was pertinent to the proof that the particular universal 'being' was not a substance, and there we alluded to the fact that fuller proof would have to follow in regard to whether substances are universals.

Now universals can be taken in two senses. First, they can mean the nature of the thing to which the intellect attributes the aspect of universality. Examples of this type are genera and species which signify the substances of things inasmuch as they are predicated quidditatively. Secondly, Plato claimed that a universal can be taken insofar as the nature predicated of a thing falls under the aspect of universality, i.e., insofar as animal or man is considered as a one-in-many. Aristotle, as St. Thomas witnesses, sets out to show that animal or man in general is not a substance in reality, but rather that the form animal or man takes on this generality insofar as it exists in the mind, which abstracts from all individuating principles.⁷³

Aristotle gives two reasons why universals cannot be substances on the grounds that they are predicated of many things.

Firstly, from the fact that the universal is common to many (while the substance of each thing is proper to each and

does not belong to something else), it is said to belong by nature to many things⁷⁴ and is predicated of many, and hence if a universal is substance it must be the substance of something, either being the substance of all the things to which it belongs or of one. But it cannot be the substance of all things, because one thing cannot be the substance of all things due to the fact that those things are many whose substances are many and distinct. And, on the other hand, should it be the substance of one of the things in which it is found, it must be the substance of all the others to which it belongs. However, since those things of which the substance and essence are one must also be one, thus a universal cannot be the substance of all things of which it is predicated or of any one of them, and hence it cannot be the substance of anything.

Secondly, a substance refers to something which is not predicated of a subject. But a universal is something which is always predicated of some subject. This conclusion, then, is the same as that of the first argument.

Anticipating, however, that someone might answer to his first argument, that it is impossible for a universal to be a substance in the way that an essence is, Aristotle replies that it is substance only as something existing in these particular things, e.g., animal in man and horse as a formula of essence.

But it makes no difference even if it is not the intelligible expression of essence, for the universal must be the substance of something whether it has a definition or not, because even though this common substance is not proper to any one of its inferiors, it must still be proper to that common substance in which it is first found. ". . . For the universal, e.g., 'animal,' will be the substance of that in which it is present as something peculiar to it."⁷⁵ Hence, since this substance is proper to one thing, it will be impossible for it to be predicated of many things.⁷⁶

Any further consideration of the universals as substances will be treated by problems E, F, and O, which examine whether there are any substances besides the sensible ones. But still we must see what Aristotle meant when he affirmed that to be predicated of a subject is not opposed to the notion of substance. Thomas Aquinas rightly explains that in the Categories the Philosopher was speaking this way from the viewpoint of logic. For a logician considers things insofar as they exist in the mind, and therefore he regards substances inasmuch as they take on the character of universality from the way in which the intellect understands them. Thus in reference to predicating, which is an act of reason, the logician says that the substance is predicated of a subject, i.e., of a substance exist-

ing outside the mind.⁷⁷ Hence any apparent discrepancy in this sense is resolved. We have seen in the discussion above on predication how the first philosopher, since he considers things insofar as they are beings, views no difference between existing in a subject and being predicated of a subject. A substance predicated of another subject in this light would certainly be contrary to the notion of substance. Herein lay Plato's invalid argument in making being a substance.

VI. ERROR ABOUT UNIVERSALS INHERENT IN THE TRANSFERRED USES OF
THE TERM "ELEMENT"

On the foundation that the universal is not a substance, since the universal is part of the definition and essence (the proof of which is being established by the jointed problems E and F), rests the answer to the next problem of our investigation: whether the universals are principles. For in 1038^b 23-29 Aristotle states in conclusion that universals, in having been shown not to be substances, must not be regarded as constitutive elements of substance, since, then, non-substances would be prior to substance. This progression advances us with response to Plato's conditioned statement that the universals are principles only if they are separate. On this basis, the previously demonstrated inability of universals to be substances denies any attempt to make the universals principles. However, long before any answer is given, it is clearly seen that the transferred use of the term 'element' dismisses this realm to other aporiae treating more specifically of it. In Book V the Aristotelian definition of element in the most common sense is the primary component of each being. But the ancients invented two senses of element. First, they called the most universal things elements; for a universal is one in definition and is simple and is found in many things, whether in all things, as

unity and being are; or in most things, as are the other genera. And, secondly, by the same reasoning they called points and units principles or elements, because each of them is one simple thing and useful for many purposes.⁷⁸ The first point can be delegated to problems J and K, which show that the universals as such cannot be principles of things, but it will be clarified, however, that there can be a separate, immobile substance, which is itself the first being (by problem O), and which is the prior principle and cause of the unity of all things (by problems A and S). The second point is relevant to the complementary paper on aporia R where the one is treated.

VII. CONCLUSION: DISTINCTION BETWEEN ENS COMMUNE AND ENS UT ENS

We have seen that being is not a substance, nor a separate entity of a one-itself to the exclusion of other things, nor even a genus. The early philosophers sought principles and elements not of any particular type of beings, but of all being without exception, for these had to be of being according to its very nature. What, then, is this nature of being, which is universal and necessary, and yet is not generic?

Joseph Owens, spokesman for the Gilsonian school, states that Aristotle isolates one definite nature which is the nature of being itself, but he seems to play up his own $\pi\rho\acute{o}s\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ equivocal definition of the nature of being to the near exclusion of the fact that ens is also a $\pi\rho\acute{o}s\ \tau\epsilon$, whose foundation of relatedness is broader than and inclusive of $\pi\rho\acute{o}s\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$.⁷⁹ Though he leans heavily upon being's nature of the primary instance, he nevertheless remains aware of the other side of being, for he asks, "How can 'Being qua Being' be universal, if it is restricted to one type of being?"⁸⁰ Another author, speaking for the Louvain school, says that ". . . the absolutely universal viewpoint of being is likewise an absolutely first point of departure, just as it offers a point of support that is absolutely irrefragible."⁸¹ In the third chapter of recapitulations in

Book XI,⁸² Aristotle confirms that being is an all-embracing common term, whose study, then, will fall under one science. Furthermore, in connection with this allegement, St. Thomas summarizes the matter in this way:

Now the subject of this science can be taken either as that which has to be conceived generally in the whole science, and as such it is unity and being, or as that with which this science is chiefly concerned, and this is substance.⁸³

Moreover, he states in Book VI that "no one of these particular sciences determines of being simpliciter, i.e. of being in common, nor even of any particular being insofar as it is being; just as arithmetic does not determine of number insofar as it is being, but insofar as it is number."⁸⁴ The contrast within the statement that the particular sciences treat neither of being in common, ". . . not even of any particular being insofar as it is being. . . ." seems of significance.⁸⁵ Apart from the fact that throughout the Metaphysics its subject of being is given the nature of ens commune and ens ut ens, this indication that these two terms may be distinct prompts all the more an examination of these to see whether they are identical or not.

Each science is said to have its own subject, which differentiates that science from every other. All of the particular sciences presuppose the necessary quid est and quia est of their subject, from whose definition comes the medium of demonstra-

tion.⁸⁶ But each science always has a proper genus about which it demonstrates, because in those sciences of which there is a diverse genus-subject, such as arithmetic (which is of numbers) and geometry (which is of magnitudes), the demonstration does not touch upon that which proceeds from the principles of one science.⁸⁷ Now the subject of one science can be the species of the subject of a superior science, but metaphysics does not consider the different species of common being so that this is rather the task of the special sciences.⁸⁸ And, in a second instance, the subject of an inferior science can be compared to the subject of a superior one, just as the material subject is compared to the formal, whereby the perspective of a visual line is considered in regard to geometry; or vice versa, one science can be under another through the application of the formal to the material subject, just as music applies formal number (which arithmetic considers) to the matter of songs.⁸⁹

This relation of formal and material subject seems to clarify the connection between ens commune and ens ut ens. Now the diversity of sciences is not according to the material diversity of the things known, but according to their formal diversity, whereby the formal ratio or perspective of knowledge is taken in regard to the principles from which something is known.⁹⁰ The subject of a science is not the first principles themselves

but rather is that which has the first principles and causes or elements into which it is resolvable.⁹¹ Hence the subject of metaphysics is common being as such, not the first principles, nor God, nor the separated substances, nor the attributes of common being. And common being as such includes both substances and accidents, whether material or immaterial,⁹² for being is analogously predicated of all things. Thus ens commune is really a common subject to all the sciences, though not for each in the same way. Here the aspect under which the being is considered confines and limits the subject of any one science, which is distinguished from others. As the universal science, metaphysics is concerned with all being, since the study of this science takes into account all attributes insofar as they are reduced to one primary being, but only from the viewpoint of being as being.⁹³ This science studies the whole being. The subjects of the other sciences are parts of being, which is the subject of metaphysics, but they are not parts of metaphysics, for they are distinct sciences by reason of the aspect under which they consider their subject.⁹⁴ Each distinct science considers being in a different way: arithmetic from the viewpoint of number; philosophy of nature from the aspect of natural substance; and similarly every particular science treats being from some individual aspect according to the operation of the

intellect.⁹⁵ The intellect can through simple apprehension abstract what is not separate in reality.⁹⁶ Since the intellect can consider a part of a thing or its whole, the subject of a science does not simply mean the things considered by the science, i.e. its subject - matter, but the term subject also designates the formal perspective or ratio under which these things are considered in the science. St. Thomas defines the relation between a science and its subject as analogically the same as that between a faculty or habitus and its object:

Now, properly speaking the object of a faculty or a habitus is that under whose formal perspective (ratio) all things are referred to that faculty or habitus; as man and stone are referred to sight in that they are colored. Hence 'colored thing' is the proper object of sight.⁹⁷

St. Thomas, then, definitely brings to us from the Aristotelian Posterior Analytics the basis for a distinction between ens ut ens and ens commune, the two of which together constitute the subject of metaphysics. For if ens ut ens is the differentiating factor distinguishing metaphysics from the other sciences, it should be the formal subject for the diversity of metaphysics from the particular sciences, because sciences are not diverse according to material diversity. But allowance of this specific formality held in focus must come from the pliability or extension of the material subject considered. Now the matter considered in metaphysics is ens commune, which is

being as the ultimate common note fitting any reality. Without this all-embracing commonness there could be no consideration of the subject from the aspect of being as such. And thus as ens ut ens considers substance primarily, the scope of metaphysics is not confined to that of a special nature.⁹⁸ Due to ens commune, which has wider extension than ens ut ens, metaphysics is not only the study of substance as substance, which is itself a limitation excluding other beings analogically so called, but it also takes their object at a more profound level, that of being as being.

The study of being should leave us with these convictions: being is the analagon; substance is the primary analogate; quantity, quality, and other determinations of substance are secondary analogates.

FOOTNOTES

1. Justification of this assertion might prove rather difficult, but the opinions of many are that the first two books were written after the others. Their intrinsic formulation can easily merit this statement, since they are founded in terms of the insights and insufficiencies of the analyses of Aristotle's predecessors, and since in these books the metaphysical difficulties are adumbrated in what Aristotle says of the definitions of philosophers and of the methods which they used in contrast to his own method of procedure in considering the truth. Richard McKeon appears to verify these two books as added later on by reason of these said bases in the Introduction of his The Basic Works of Aristotle, New York: Random House, 1941, p.xviii.

2. McKeon, op. cit., Metaphysics, Book III, 995^a 23.

3. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, translated by John P. Rowan, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1961, 2 vols., Book III, C (Commentary numbers) 338-42.

4. Ibid, Book III, C443.

5. Ibid, Book I, C159.

6. Ibid, Book III, C490-92.

7. Ibid, Book III, C493.

8. Ibid, Book III, C494-95.

9. Ibid, Book III, C496-97.

10. Ibid, Book IV, 1003^b 22-25, p. 221. The translation of Aristotle cited in the Commentary is quoted here due to the unwieldy (though not inaccurate) order of the English used at this point in Richard McKeon's The Basic Works of Aristotle, the standard text which will be used for quotations from Aristotle.

11. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book IV, 1003^b 25-31.

12. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book IV, C549-53.

13. Ibid, Book IV, C553.

14. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book IV, 1003^b 32-34.

15. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book IV, C554-55.

16. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book X, 1053^b 24-28 and 1054^a 13-19.

17. This is the basic character of the 'one' being explored by the other paper concerned with aporia R.

18. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book X, C1975-78.

19. The argument here is actually the inferred minor to argument two in this regard in Book IV of the Commentary, where Thomas earlier inserted it. It is taken again from Book X to emphasize the statement that the one and being are said not to express a different nature from man, the example used. This note of emphasis on this point has also a secondary purpose of significance in our looking ahead in this paper: if unity and being are not substances of those things of which they are predicated -- a question to be examined later -- there would seemingly be a contradiction between this fact and the statement of the proof cited above that unity and being do not express a nature different from man.

20. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book X, C1977.

21. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book XI, 1061^a 15-17.

22. Ibid, Book VII, 1038^b 1-11.

23. Ibid, Book VII, 1038^b 16.

24. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book VII, C1591 and 1606.

25. Ibid, Book VII, C1641-42.

26. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book VII, 1040^b 35-36.

27. We must remember here that unity and being signify the same thing. For, a few lines further in 1053^b 23, the Philosopher reminds us, "Now 'unity' has just as many meanings as 'being,'" so that to be one is just to be a particular thing. Here, there is involved the nature of the one, which in every class is a definite thing, and in no case is its nature just unity itself. He then establishes what unity is by showing

that it is what is primary in each class of things. But this consideration belongs to the paper which treats the 'one' as such.

28. This distinction of primary and secondary substance is given in the very first paragraph of chapter 5 in the Categories. First substances are by their nature the subjects of all other things, e.g., genera, species, accidents. Second substances are the subjects of accidents alone, and they have this nature only by reason of primary substances; examples of secondary substances are genera and species, whose true nature is supported in and by their particular subject.

29. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book III, 998^b 26.

30. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book III, C433.

31. Ibid, Book V, C889.

32. Ibid, Book XI, C2170.

33. Ibid, Book XII, C2651-52.

34. Parmenides' admission of cause makes his position pertinent to metaphysics, which investigates the causes; since Xenophanes and Melissus' theories of application completely deny causality (for a single being, which is the only one, cannot be its own cause), Aristotle disregarded them altogether, because they had already been refuted sufficiently in the Physics (186a 10).

35. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book I, C134 and 142-43.

36. Ibid, Book I, C144.

37. Nevertheless, the conversion of this is not true, for not every privation is a contrary. Cf. Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book X, 1055^b 18-19.

38. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book IX, C1790-91.

39. Ibid, Book I, C138-39.

40. Further treatment of analogy will be taken up later on where predication is examined in detail.

41. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book IV, C535-36.
42. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book XI, 1067^b 27-29.
43. Ibid, Book VI and XI, 1027^b 18-19 and 1067^b 11-13.
44. Ibid, Book XI, 1067^b 35-36.
45. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book XI, C2368-75.
46. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book XI, 1068^a 4.
47. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book IV, C606.

48. It has just been previously stated that there is no intermediate between contradictories, as shown by the contradictions of truth and falsity.

49. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book XI, 1068^a 5-7.

50. Aristotle will have to solve this difficulty when he shows that generation is both from being and non-being.

51. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book XII, C2429.

52. Ibid, Book XII, C2431.

53. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book XII, 1069^b 15-18.

54. Cf. Fredrick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1955, vol. 1, p. 52.

55. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book XII, C2433.

56. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book XII, 1069^b 20-24.

57. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book XII, C2437.

58. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book XII, 1069^b 27-29.

59. Ibid, Book XII, 1069^b 33-34.

60. Ibid, Book X, 1054^a 26-29.

61. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book X, C1994.

62. Ibid, Book X, C1996.

63. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book IV, 1003^a 33-34.

64. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book IV, C535.

65. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book IV, 1003^b 5-6.

66. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book IV, C540-43.

67. Ibid, Book IV, C543.

68. Ibid, Book V, C890.

69. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book V, 1017^a 25-28.

70. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book V, C891-92.

71. Ibid, Book V, C888.

72. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book VI, 1028^a 20-25.

73. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book VII, C1571.

74. In paragraph 1574 Thomas Aquinas notes why Aristotle describes a universal as what is naturally disposed to exist in many rather than what exists in many, "because there are some universals which contain under themselves only one singular thing: . . ."

75. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book VII, 1038^b 23.

76. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book VII, C1570-78.

77. Ibid, Book VII, C1575-76.

78. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book V, 1014^a 25 - 1014^b 15.
Cf. also St. Thomas' commentary in C803-6.

79. Being is not confined within any one of the categories but is common to all of them. Cf. Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book X, 1054^a 12-19.

80. Joseph Owens, C.Ss., R., The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics', Toronto: Pontifical Institute of

Medieval Studies, 1951, p. 154.

81. Rt. Rev. Louis De Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis, 1957, pp. 28-29.

82. McKeon, op. cit., Meta., Book XI, 1061^a 10-17.

83. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book V, C842.

84. Ibid, Book VI, C1147. Translation is my own.

85. The "nulla . . . nec etiam" of the Latin brings out this contrast very clearly.

86. St. Thomas, op. cit., Book VI, C1149-51. Cf. Also St. Thomas' In Posteriorum Analyticorum, Book I, C14-15.

87. St. Thomas, In Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum, Italy: Marietti, 1955 (In Posteriorum Analyticorum, Book I, C129-30).

88. St. Thomas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book IV, C547.

89. St. Thomas, In Posteriorum Analyticorum, Book I, C208.

90. Ibid, Book I, C366.

91. St. Thomas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book IV, C533.

92. William H. Kane, O.P., "The Subject of Metaphysics," The Thomist, 18(October, 1955) 513-14. Cf. Also St. Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book IV, C534.

93. Cf. the same references as noted in footnote 92.

94. St. Thomas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences (Questions V & VI of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, tr. by Armand Maurer, C.S.B.), Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1953, Q.5, a.1, ad 6^m, p.15.

95. St. Thomas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book XI, C2266-67.

96. St. Thomas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences,

p. XVII of Introduction; also (In Boetii 'De Trinitate', Q.5, a. 3), p. 28; likewise the Summa Theologiae, I, Q.85, a.3, ad.1^m & 2^m.

97. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 1, a. 7. Tr. is Armand Mauer's as cited in pages XV & XVI to Thomas' Aquinas' The Division and Methods of the Sciences.

98. St. Thomas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book VI, 1147-49 and 1169-70.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquinas, St. Thomas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, tr. by John P. Rowan, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1961, 2 vols.

_____, The Divisions and Methods of the Sciences (Questions V & VI of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, tr. by Armand Maurer, C.S.B.), Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1953.

_____, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, Taurini: Petri Marietti, 1915.

_____, In Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum, Italy: Marietti, 1955.

_____, Summa Theologiae, Ottawa: Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis, 1941, pars I.

Ashley, O.P., Benedict M., "The Role of the Philosophy of Nature in Catholic Liberal Action," The American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings, 30(1956) 62-85.

Bittle, O.M.Cap., Celestine N., The Domain of Being, Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1939.

Brumbaugh, Robert S., "Aristotle's Outline of the Problems of First Philosophy," Review of Metaphysics, 7(1954) 511-21.

Copleston, S.J., Fredrick, A History of Philosophy, Westminster Md.: Newman Press, 1955, vol. 1 (6 vols.).

De Andrea, O.P., Mariano P., "Soggetto e oggetto della metafisica secondo S. Tomasso," Angelicum, 27 (1950) 165-95.

De Raeymaeker, Rt. Rev. Louis, The Philosophy of Being, tr. by Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer, S.J., St. Louis: B. Herder Co., 1957.

Gilson, Etienne, Being and Some Philosophers, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949.

Glenn, Paul J., Ontology, St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1939.

Gredt, O.S.B., Joseph, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, Barcelona: Herder, 1936, vol. 2(2 vols.).

Harper, S.J., Thomas, The Metaphysics of the School, New York: Peter Smith, 1940, vol 1(3 vols.).

Kane, O.P., William H., "Introduction to Metaphysics," The Thomist, 20(April, 1957) 121-42.

_____, "The Subject of Metaphysics," The Thomist, 18(October, 1953) 503-21.

McKeon, Richard, The Basic Works of Aristotle, New York: Random House, 1941.

Owens, C.Ss.R., Joseph, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics', Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951.

Pegis, Anton C., "The Dilemma of Unity and Being," Essays In Thomism, New York: Sheed and Ward (1942) 151-83.

Rather, S.J., Aloysius, Being, Philadelphia: Peter Reilly Co., 1924.

Reith, C.S.C., Herman, The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1962.

Ross, W.D., Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, 2 vols.

ARCHABEY LIBRARY



3 0764 1002 9679 2