

THE ACTIONS OF THE WILL

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Every agent acts on account of an end. An end is a good that terminates something. All things seek that which is good. The end is desired and sought because it is good. The end, the good, is the object of the appetite, and every appetite is concerned principally with the good.

Appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid. Nihil inclinatur nisi in aliquid simile et conveniens. Cum igitur omnis res, in quantum est ens et substantia, sit quoddam bonum, necesse est ut omnis inclinatio sit in bonum.<sup>1</sup>

Every form, every nature, has an end, and therefore a natural inclination to that end. Every form has a definite inclination towards a definite end. This definite determination to an end is imprinted or given to the form by the author of nature. Since this determination in each form to a definite end is imposed by the author of nature, there is no need of a distinct power or separate and distinct appetite to incline it (the form) towards its end, nor does the form need knowledge of the end or of the desirableness of the end. Indeed, each form immediately has an appetite natural to itself, or the form and its natural appetite are the same thing looked at from different points of view. "Cum omnis inclinatio consequatur aliquam formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur formam in natura existentem."<sup>2</sup>

There are other appetites besides the natural appetite.

Appetitus sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus seu rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, sequitur formam apprehensam. Sicut igitur id in quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum. Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid ten-

dat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni.<sup>3</sup>

Now animals and men acquire sensible forms which are known or apprehended. The known sensible good results in a desire for the good. But since a sensible form may be known but not always desired, it is clear that to know a sensible form and to desire it are distinct, and hence, that to know a sensible form and then to desire it are actions of two distinct powers—the cognitive sense powers and the sensitive appetites.

Since what is known by the senses is particular and what is known by the intellect is universal, and since the "appetible" does not move an appetite unless it is known or apprehended, the inclinations to the "appetible" apprehended as particular or universal come from different appetites—the sensitive appetite and the rational appetite or the will. (Now the sensitive appetite and the rational appetite both have this natural and necessary inclination or natural appetite to their natural ends. For a natural appetite follows each and every form).

The sensitive appetite tends towards the object by reason of its appetibility, that is, by reason of its pleasurable, usefulness, and the like. The sensitive appetite tends towards this particular pleasurable object and not for the pleasurable as such. The rational or intellectual appetite tends towards the object because of its absolute appetibility. Firstly, it seeks goodness. Then it seeks this particular object insofar as it manifests a participated goodness.

The burden of this thesis is the actions of the will. That is, what are they and how they attain and help the subject attain the end.

Now just as all powers are specified by their acts and their objects, so is the will. For whatever is ordained to something by reason of its essence, is specified thru its order to that. Its order is its acts and its objects. The acts of a power and the object specify the power. That is, the power receives all its meaning from the acts and the object to which it is directed. Indeed, the acts are in the definition of the powers. For the powers distribute the diversity of nature according to the diversity of actions. But the powers depend on the acts and the objects as to their end.

The actions of the will are six. The actions of the will attain the end of the will which is bonum in communi. The will by nature is directed towards good in general, and by its actions to singular objects. Three actions of the will, namely, volition, intention, and enjoyment are concerned with the end. Then, the other three, namely, consent, election, and use are concerned with the means. They are concerned with the means to the end on account of the end.

We shall not treat these actions of the will according to the above division. Rather, we shall treat them logically as they come into play alone with the actions of the intellect which we shall also consider, although in a very limited way. (The actions of the intellect about the end are simple apprehen-

sion, and judgment. Those about the means to the end are counsel, discursive judgment of the means, command, and use. "Quamvis quilibet actus voluntatis praesupponat cognitionem rationis, non tamen semper in actu voluntatis apparet id quod est proprium rationis"<sup>4</sup> ).

The will and the intellect are ordered to each other. But the actions of the will can react upon themselves, and the actions of the intellect can react upon themselves. Although the actions of the will and the intellect do not always move upon each other perfectly, nevertheless, "quando una potentia est movens alteram,<sup>5</sup> tunc actus earum sunt quodammodo unus." Moreover,

cum proprium rationis sit ordinare et conferre, quando-  
cumque in actu voluntatis apparet aliqua collatio vel  
ordinatio, talis actus erit voluntatis non absolute,  
sed in ordine ad rationem.<sup>6</sup>

Again,

cum voluntas moveatur in suum objectum sibi propositum a ratione, diversimodo movetur, secundum quod diversimodo sibi proponitur. Unde, cum ratio proponit sibi aliquid ut absolute bonum, voluntas movetur in illud absolute. Cum autem proponit sibi aliquid sub ratione boni, ad quod alia ordinentur ut ad finem, tunc tendit in illud cum quodam ordine, qui invenitur in actu voluntatis, non secundum propriam naturam, sed secundum exigentiam rationis.<sup>7</sup>

The first act of the will is necessarily specified by the first act of the intellect presenting the good in general. Indeed, since the will by its very nature is an inclination to the good apprehended by the intellect, hence, by the very fact that the intellect apprehends good, immediately a tendency or lean-

ing towards the good or simple volition of the good arises as an action of the will. The first apprehension of the good as the end specifies the act of volition. This first apprehension only considers the end as good. The good, the end, is willed because of itself. The will is always attracted by good. The essence presented by the intellect by simple apprehension intices the will and moves it finally. That is, the essence understood and produced in a certain type of concept as a good and end. The intellect perceives the good in the perception of any particular good.

Simple volition is an act of the will tending towards good absolutely. Now this simple volition is love. For it is the first act of the will. And St. Thomas says: "Primus motus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor."<sup>8</sup> And again,

Amor respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum. Unde amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et propter hoc, omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem, quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum amatum: neque aliquis gaudet nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter tristitiam, et cetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri, sicut in primum principium. Unde in quocumque est voluntas vel appetitus, oportet esse amorem: remoto enim primo, removentur alia.<sup>9</sup>

Simple volition is the will being specified by the intellect, by an object, a good presented by the intellect. For powers are specified by their acts and objects. The formal object of the will is bonum in communi as apprehended by the human intellect.

Hence, the will reaches bonum in communi thru a good abstractly known. "Omnis actus denominatus a potentia nominat simplicem actum illius potentiae. Simplex actus potentiae est in id quod est secundum se obiectum potentiae."<sup>10</sup> To will or volition is named from the power called the will. Volition is the will reaching bonum in communi under or in ens apprehended by the intellect. Volition is the will moving itself. However, "actus voluntatis quo vult finem aliquem non semper est in ipsa voluntate. Per hunc movet seipsam. Unde non sequitur quod semper seipsam moveat."<sup>11</sup>

Volition concerns only the end. Now the will as a power thru other actions may look towards the end or its object, and also the means to its object. For if a power is determined to a certain object, it must certainly try to attain it and the means are used to obtain the end. Then,

ad ea enim se extendit unaquaeque potentia, in quibus inveniri potest quocumque modo ratio sui objecti... Ratio autem boni, quod est obiectum potentiae voluntatis, invenitur non solum in fine, sed etiam in his quae sunt ad finem.<sup>12</sup>

But volition, as the first action of the power of the will, properly concerns only the end.

Simplex actus potentiae est in id quod est secundum se obiectum potentiae. Id autem quod est propter se bonum et volitum est finis. Unde voluntas (nominat actum) proprie est ipsius finis. Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, non sunt bona vel volita propter seipsa, sed ex ordine ad finem. Unde voluntas in ea non fertur, nisi quatenus fertur in finem: unde hoc ipsum quod in eis vult, est finis.<sup>13</sup>



The end is willed on account of itself, but the means are willed on account of the end. Volition comes to or wishes the end alone.

Since nothing is moved unless it is moved by another, the will must be in potency to its object and must be moved or specified by its object. Now bonum in communi is the formal object of the will. Now the will as an appetite only inclines towards its object. Moreover, it, since it is a spiritual power, can only incline towards a spiritual object or in one that is rendered immaterial. But only the intellect can present an immaterial object, and the will inclines towards this object presented by the intellect. And the object presented by the intellect must not only be true but also have the ratio of good and appetible. Hence, the will is moved by the intellect. The will is moved by, in this life, the abstracted particular good under the aspect of bonum in communi. Then, in some sort of way, we may say that the will moves the object thru its volition. Moreover, since nothing is moved by something general, but only by a definite thing, the will is not inticed by speculative principles of the intellect but by its practical conclusions or judgments. St. Thomas would continue:

Voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitum actus: quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte objecti, intellectus movet voluntatem: quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri. Et sic patet quod non est idem movens et motum secundum idem.<sup>14</sup>

We may say that the senses move the will. For there is nothing in the intellect unless first in the senses. Hence, the intellect must abstract whatever it knows from the senses. And the will seeks its object from the intellect. "Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum objecti."<sup>15</sup>

St. Thomas says that something seems agreeable and good in two ways, namely, from the condition of that which is proposed and of that to which it is proposed. Now this is so because agreement has the ratio of relation. St. Thomas continues to say that according to the passions of the sensitive appetite, man is changed to some disposition. And when man is in some passion, something seems agreeable to him which did not seem agreeable to him when he did not have the passion. He concludes that in this way, from the part of the object, the sensitive appetite moves the will. But again, man can be moved to some particular good without the passions of the sensitive appetite. For the will is not only moved by the universal good apprehended by the intellect, but also by the good apprehended by the senses alone without the sensitive appetite and its passions.

Once the will is presented with its object or the end by the intellect, the will then proceeds to move itself by willing or loving the end or the object. Hence, when the will wills the end by the action of volition, it moves itself from potency to act, or it reduces itself from potency to act. That is, the ca-

pability to love an object or end is realized.

Volition is not free. That is, man must will bonum in communi. Never can he not will it. For the object of the will is bonum in communi. The will naturally tends towards bonum in communi. The will is determined by bonum in communi. All things can agree to the will because all things are good. The will naturally loves good, and only good. St. Thomas would say:

Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum objectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis: ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia bona.<sup>16</sup>

The will is power in man. The will is naturally and of necessity in man. For if we say that man has an intellect, he must of necessity have an intellectual appetite which is the will. Now when we say that it is natural for man to do something, we mean that it is natural for his powers to do this. Now if man naturally wills good in general, then at least one of his powers must will good in general. The will is the only power in man that wills good in general, and the will wills good in general naturally. Moreover, whenever the will as a power would move towards good in general, it must do so naturally. In fact, we shall see that in all the actions of the will which concern the end, the object or bonum in communi, it (the will) moves naturally.

When the will is said to be moved by necessity, this refers to the fact of the will being moved by specification— that the will is being moved by this object and not by another. The will must be moved by some object.

Unde si proponatur aliquod objectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud, si aliquid velit: non enim poterit velle oppositum. Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod objectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas feretur in illud. —Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle: quod est beatitudo. Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona: et secundum hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes.<sup>17</sup>

Having mentioned in our introduction that the acts of the will react upon one another, we would be reminded of this as we consider the will as loving the end. By one action the will simply loves the end, and by another or others, it will love the means on account of the end in one and the same action.

Manifestum est quod unus et idem motus voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius actus est quod fertur in ipsum finem absolute.<sup>18</sup>

Intention is the second action of the will. It follows the second action of the intellect. "Cognitionem praesupponit, per quam proponitur voluntati finis ad quem movet."<sup>19</sup> Now the second act of the intellect is judgment. By this action of judgment, the intellect judges whether the good apprehended by the first

act of the intellect is possible of attainment and if it is truly a good hic et nunc. Intention is the act of the will which immediately follows the judgment of the intellect. "Intentio nominat actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem."<sup>20</sup>

Intention is an act of the will in relation to end. Intention has the notion of reaching the end. By intention, the will looks to the end as a term which is to be reached— "in aliquid<sup>21</sup> tendere."

Intention is motion in the end according to which the end is acquired thru means.

The intention pursues the end as a term to be reached and by the means which are attached to it. The intention is essentially an impulse, an outburst, or the spring of the will tending towards an object. However, it implies an action of the intelligence.<sup>22</sup>

Again,

in the act of intention, the means are, not determined and willed with precision, but connoted, at least in a confused manner, at the same time that the end is willed with precision.<sup>23</sup>

"In aliquid tendere" means that there is an action of something moving and that there is another thing that it (the something moving) can move— the idea of potency and act; the will thru the intention is moved by the end as able to be attained.

Indeed, intention inclines towards this certain set end.

Cum proprium rationis sit ordinare et conferre, quandoque in actu voluntatis apparet aliqua collatio vel ordinatio, talis actus erit voluntatis non absolute, sed in ordine ad rationem: et hoc modo intendere est actus

voluntatis; cum intendere nihil aliud esse videatur quam ex eo quod quis vult, in aliud tendere sicut in finem: et ita intendere in hoc differt a velle quod velle tendit in finem absolute; sed intendere dicit ordinem in finem, secundum quod finis est in quem ordinantur ea quae sunt ad finem... Cum proponit sibi aliquid sub ratione boni, ad quod alia ordinantur ut ad finem, tunc tendit in illud cum quodam ordine, qui invenitur in actu voluntatis, non secundum propriam naturam, sed secundum exigentiam rationis.<sup>24</sup>

Intention properly looks to the end. Now the end is a term. A term may be ultimate as the end of all motion. Again, a term may be some means which is the beginning of one part of motion and the end and term of another part of motion. "Terminus habet rationem ultimi; sed non semper ultimi respectu totius, sed quandoque respectu alicuius partis."<sup>25</sup>

Since the end has the ratio of term and a term may be ultimate or mediate, that is, known as mediate but considered as ultimate, we see that intention is a motion to an ultimate end and to a mediate end that is considered as ultimate. Moreover, the mediate or proximate end is ordered to the ultimate end. And if two things are ordered to each other, one is able to intend both at the same time. Again, the will, by intention, can intend or incline towards more things at the same time even if they are not ordered to each other. For that which is not one secundum rem can be taken as one secundum rationem. And therefore, "ea quae plura secundum rem, possunt accipi ut unus terminus intentionis, prout sunt unum secundum rationem."<sup>26</sup>

Properly speaking, intention is only found in intellectual souls. However, we may say that it is in vegetative and sensi-

tive souls also, but improperly. The vegetative and sensitive souls are moved by another. For in the case of sensitive souls, if intention is "moventis et moti," then "moventis" would refer to nature, the end which has been implanted in sensitive souls by the author of nature. For sensitive souls are moved to an end by natural instinct, and they are also moved to acquire the end by natural instinct. Now in the case of vegetative souls, if intention is "moventis et moti," the "moventis" would be the end determined for them by God, the author of nature. For no form or end is inherent in them. Vegetative souls move only in respect to the execution of motion. The "moti" in both of the said cases would refer to the individual sensitive or vegetative thing that is moved. Hence, intention is hardly said properly of sensitive and vegetative souls. For the intention in each of the said cases is in the order of nature.

Although the end has been apprehended, loved, and intended, it is not yet attained nor has there been a consideration of means to the end, or an approval of the means proposed by the intellect. Hence, a new act of the intellect and a corresponding one of the will about the means come into play.

Thru intention, in this interaction between the intellect and the will, the intellect investigates or inquires into means for following an opportune end. Counsel is about means to reach the end. Counsel is a final judgment about means in

general.

Finis in operabilibus habet rationem principii: eo quod rationes eorum quae sunt ad finem, ex fine summuntur. Principium autem non cadit sub quaestione, sed principia oportet supponere in omni inquisitione. Unde, cum consilium sit quaestio, de fine non est consilium, sed solum de his quae sunt ad finem.<sup>27</sup>

St. Thomas would re-emphasize that counsel is only about means to the end. He says: "Motus appetitivus in finem, non applicatur consilio: sed magis consilium ipsi, quia consilium praesupponit appetitum finis."<sup>28</sup>

Consent is motion of the will to the means or the desire of the will for the means. It is the general and equitable approval of the means proposed by the intellect. Consent expresses a determination of the intellectual appetite, which is active rather than passive. It is the application of the appetitive power, the will, to the means, insofar as it cleaves to them.

By consent, the will approves or seeks the utility of means. "Consensus importat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliquid agendum."<sup>29</sup> "Consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis."<sup>30</sup> Now, "ad aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis" presupposes an end and hence speaks of means. Moreover,

applicatio motus appetitivi in finem apprehensum, non habet rationem consensus, sed simplicis voluntatis. De his autem quae sunt post ultimum finem, inquantum sunt ad finem, sub consilio cadunt; et sic patet esse de eis consensus, inquantum motus appetitivus applicatur ad id quod ex consilio iudicatum est.<sup>31</sup>

Consent is the application of appetitive motion to seek the end.



Consent saves the intention. Again, St. Thomas says this of consent:

Quia actus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio ad rem ipsam, secundum quandam similitudinem ipsa applicatio appetitivae virtutis ad rem, secundum quod ei inhaeret, accipit nomen sensus, quasi experientiam quamdam sumens de re cui inhaeret, inquantum complacet sibi in ea.<sup>32</sup>

Consent is the desire of the means in globo. As yet, therefore, there has been no selection of one definite means to be preferred to others. This will come in the act of choice. That each means meets with approval is or concerns consent. The application of the appetitive movement to the resolution of counsel concerns consent.

Consent concerns means to the end. (We consent to the end inasmuch as we consent to the means on account of the end). For consent follows counsel and counsel is concerned with means to the end. "Cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem."<sup>33</sup> Also, St. Thomas says that consent is "applicatio appetitivi motus ad determinationem consilii."<sup>34</sup> For the appetite of those things which are with a view to the end, or the appetite for the means presupposes the determination of the act of counsel. Appetite for the means presupposes that the means have been presented that they may be desired. Again, consent presupposes a determination that is more active than passive.

To re-iterate the point of the acts of the intellect and will becoming one in some sort of way, we quote St. Thomas.

He says:

Consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis non absolute, sed consequenter ad actum rationis deliberantis et iudicantis: in hoc enim terminatur consensus, quod voluntas tendit in id quod est ratione iudicatum. Unde consensus potest attribui et voluntati et rationi.<sup>35</sup>

Potest enim contingere quod per consilium inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quodlibet placet, in quodlibet eorum consentitur: sed ex multis quae placent, praeaccipimus unum eligendo. Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod placeat, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum: ut consensus dicatur secundum quod placet agendum; electio autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae non placent.<sup>36</sup>

Properly speaking, consent belongs only to intellectual souls. For consent is to apply appetitive motion to something on account of the end. Such appetitive motion does not properly agree to sensitive or vegetative souls. For sensitive souls seek means by natural instinct implanted in them. There is only passive determination in sensitive souls. Vegetative souls are determined to this or that means by God.

After the general consent of the will to the means, the intellect replies to it by examining the means to find out which are more fitting and opportune to obtain the end. This examination is a discerning judgment about the means, about contingent and singular things. It is a practical judgment. For, by it the intellect says that this means is hic et nunc useful to direct towards an end. This judgment considers the good or the evil in a thing. After "quaedam discretio unius ab altero,"<sup>37</sup> the will, by election accepts or chooses one or more means in preference

to others. Hence, "inquantum motus voluntatis fertur in id quod est ad finem, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio."<sup>38</sup>

Indeed, election and consent are not the same. "Electio addit supra consensum quandam relationem respectu eius cui aliquid praeeligitur: et ideo post consensum, adhuc remanet electio."<sup>39</sup>

The will, thru election chooses this definite means precisely because the determination which comes from the last practical judgment has been caused by its (the will) own influence upon the intellect in the formation of that last practical judgment. For the will, having given general consent to the means, and acting upon the intellect, causes the intellect to consider the good that is in this object rather than the good in another. Hence, the last practical judgment will affirm that this means be embraced in preference to all others, and hence, the will specifies the act of choice. But the act of choice is free action because its determination both in the order of specification and in the order of exercise has been caused by the will itself. For the will directs the intellect which specifies, and the will elicits the act of choice in the order of exercise.

When the motion of the will is brought into that which is to definitely obtain the end, there is election. Election is completed in a certain motion of the will to good, to means which are precisely chosen. Election is the selection of one or more definite means as preferred to others. For there are diverse

means for reaching an end. Hence, the will cannot be determined<sup>40</sup> to one means. "Electio sit praeacceptio unius respectu alterius" Election is indetermination regarding the means. Election means that the will can choose this or that means. It is not determination to one thing or one means.

Voluntas est quidem, secundum naturae ordinem, determinata ad unum commune, quod est bonum, sed indeterminate se habet respectu particularium bonorum. Et ideo proprie voluntatis est eligere.<sup>41</sup>

Election is the attraction of the will to one or more particular means. Now election is only concerned with means. Election is an act of the will by which the will tends into something or a means proposed as a particular good by the intellect. Hence, the intellect moves the will in the order of specification, and by election, the will has freedom of specification. St. Thomas says:

Electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi. Unde illud cadit sub electione, quod se habet ut conclusio in syllogismo operabilium. Finis autem in operabilibus se habet ut principium, et non ut conclusio. Unde finis, in quantum est huiusmodi, non cadit sub electione.<sup>42</sup>

Election presupposes the end. However, since something can be chosen which is a means, it does not mean that it cannot be an end also. Hence, in this limited and improper sense, election can be of end.

Ita contingit id quod est in una operatione ut finis, ordinari ad aliquid ut ad finem. Et hoc modo sub electione cadit... Sed ultimus finis nullo modo, sub electione cadit.<sup>43</sup>

Election implies freedom in man. But election, as an action of the will is not the sole source of freedom in man— freedom from determination to one. For the rational appetite is not a cognitive power. Knowledge is required in order that the will choose this or that means. The rational appetite must follow the intellect in the order of specification. Hence, the intellect plays a part in the freedom of man. The intellect moves the will finally and formally.

The last practical judgment which says that this means or that means is hic et nunc useful or is preferred to others, specifies the act of the will called choice or election. Election presupposes a certain comparison of means. For election comes after a judgment which is free as it is brought into diverse things.

Freedom in man is referred to both the intellect and the will, but in different ways. St. Thomas says:

Quandocumque autem duo concurrunt ad aliquid unum constituendum, unum eorum est ut formale respectu alterius... Sic igitur ille actus quo voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis... Electio substantialiter non est actus rationis, sed voluntatis: perficitur enim electio in motu quodam animae ad bonum quod eligitur.<sup>44</sup>

Man only chooses what is possible. For choices always refer to our actions, and we can only do what is possible. For we cannot follow the end thru that which is impossible.

Nullus tenderet in finem, nisi per hoc quod apparet id quod est ad finem esse possibile. Unde id quod est impossibile sub electione non cadit.<sup>45</sup>

It cannot be said that because we frequently choose those things which we are not able to complete, that we elect the impossible. For the object of the will is the good. The impossible is not a good, but has been apprehended as a good. Hence, election has been of that which was apprehended as possible of choosing.

St. Thomas says that ignorance does not only pertain to the intellect, but also to the will. Nevertheless, he also says: "Ignorantia dicitur esse electionis, non quod ipsa electio sit scientia: sed quia ignoratur quid sit eligendum."<sup>46</sup>

Man does not choose from necessity, but freely. "Radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subjectum: sed sicut causa, sit ratio."<sup>47</sup> For although the will is determined in the order of specification by the intellect, the intellect is able to consider some good or defect or evil in all the particular goods that are apprehended. Hence, man is able to apprehend particulars as delectable or avoidable. (Only the perfect good, which is God, is not able to be apprehended with a ratio of evil or with some defect. Now this only happens when man has left his body behind. Hence, in the next life, man will will God from necessity, and he will not be able not to will that he possess this all perfect good which is God. Now since election does not concern the end, but the means to the end, there is no election of the perfect good). But, St. Thomas says:

Non oportet quod semper ex fine insit homini necessitas ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem: quia non omne quod

est ad finem, tale est ut sine eo finis haberi non possit; aut, si tale sit, non semper sub tali ratione consideratur.<sup>48</sup>

Again,

Nihil prohibet, si aliqua duo aequalia proponantur secundum unam considerationem, quin circa alterum consideretur aliqua conditio per quam emineat, et magis flectatur voluntas in ipsum quam in aliud.<sup>49</sup>

The will necessarily wills beatitude or its own happiness.

Nomine beatitudine intelligitur ultima perfectio rationalis seu intellectualis naturae: et inde est quod naturaliter desideratur quia unumquodque naturaliter desiderat suam ultimam perfectionem.<sup>50</sup>

Now if man necessarily wills his own happiness in general or good in general or his ultimate perfection, he also necessarily chooses those things without which his own happiness in general or ultimate perfection cannot be had. Hence, man necessarily chooses existence, life, and knowledge, as it were, just as means to his ultimate perfection.

Election does not belong to sensitive souls or rather to brute animals. For election is indetermination to one thing, and it is only found in a rational appetite. For a rational appetite is undetermined as to particular goods or means. Election is the great difference between the sensitive appetite and the will. Election has no place in those things which are determined to one. Now the sensitive appetite is determined to some particular according to the order of nature. The animals only have a sensitive appetite. Hence, they are determined to some one particular. Hence, not every drive or inclination of

every appetite on account of the means to an end is called election, but only when the inclination to the means is with a certain discretion of one thing from another.

By the efficacy or impression of election, the intellect is moved to command. By this command, the intellect sets something in order to do something. Command is a declaration, notification, a hint. Command imposes, induces, or disposes. Command is an impetus to work. "Imperare est quidem essentialiter actus rationis: imperans enim ordinat eum cui imperat, ad ali-  
<sup>51</sup>  
 agendum, intimando vel denuntiando."

Use, an action of the will pursues the command of the intellect. By use, the will applies the executive powers to assume the means. It applies them to operation. Use is the motion by which the will moves to execution, and it preceeds the execution of the work. Indeed, by the efficacy of election, the intellect presents to the will the powers necessary to accomplish the means. The intellect knowing the means abstractly, refer the means to an executive power and to the will. Use follows command. By use, an action of the will, the will, as the first mover, moves the executive power to which the means have been referred by the intellect in order that the will, by moving the executive power may accomplish the means. Use comes after command because the will must first know what to move, and the will is not a knowing power, but the intellect is. By



the force of command, the intellect presents the means to the powers or under the influence of the intellect, the other executive powers apprehend the means. Then, the powers accomplish the means under the influence of the will by its action of use. The will moves the other powers of the soul efficiently, even the intellect.

The appetite, by nature is drawn by things. The appetite does not draw things to itself. Now as we have said before, the appetite is a power which tends in the good. Now the appetite tends in the good when it is not had, and is joyful, as we shall see, over a good that is had or possessed. But the appetite cannot apprehend and possess the good. Hence, the appetite has under itself powers which it moves efficiently, and by the help of these powers, the will, as it were, possesses its object.

The very activity of the other powers is contained under the object of the will, so that it is represented by the intellect just as some good or just as a means or rather just as an instrument or means to other means, and by the help of this activity of the other powers, the good existing in the nature of things is apprehended and possessed. The perfection and end of whatever power, inasmuch as it is a certain good, is contained under the object of the will. The object of the will is good in general. The will moves the other powers just as means to an end. Nay, the will moves all the powers of the soul to their acts. The will uses them. St. Thomas says:

Bonum in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est objectum voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus: utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona: semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus.<sup>52</sup>

The will exercises efficient causality in the operations of the soul, so that it moves certain powers immediately and other mediately on account of the subordination of the diverse powers among themselves. For example, the will immediately moves the intellect and the phantasy. Then, mediately, the phantasy being the medium, the will moves the sensitive appetite, by exciting images in the phantasy.

Just as the will, so also the sensitive appetite efficiently moves the powers subordinated to it. For the sensitive appetite is also drawn by things or goods, and at the same time, the sensitive appetite, like the will, cannot apprehend the good of itself to which it tends by its very nature. So, since the sensitive appetite follows the sense powers, and since the ends of all sense powers are limited or particular, only the limited perfection and limited end of whatever sense power is contained under the object of the sensitive appetite.

Use imposes the application of something to operation. Use imposes the application of the powers of the soul or the members of the body and also exterior things, for example a stick, to operation. Use is to apply some beginning of action to some-

thing. The will, by use, predetermines the other powers, and hence, the will, by use, is joined with the operation of the power which it uses. For the will, by use, impresses action, as it were, on the power which it uses. Hence, St. Thomas says:

Voluntas est quae movet potentias animae ad suos actus; et hoc est applicare eas ad operationem. Unde manifestum est quod uti primo et principaliter est voluntatis, tanquam primi moventis; rationes autem tanquam dirigentis; sed aliarum potentiarum tanquam exequentium, quae comparantur ad voluntatem, a qua applicantur ad agendum, sicut instrumenta ad principale agens. Actio autem proprie non attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti. Unde manifestum est quod uti proprie est actus voluntatis.<sup>53</sup>

Use only concerns the means. It imposes motion of the will to the executive powers to accomplish the means to the end. "Uti importat applicationem alicuius ad aliquid. Quod autem applicatur ad aliud, se habet in ratione eius quod est ad finem. Et<sup>54</sup> ideo uti semper est eius quod est ad finem." But St. Thomas also says: "Finis assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, ut voluntas in illo quiescat. Unde ipsa requies in fine, quae fruitio<sup>55</sup> est, dicitur hoc modo usus finis."

The will uses the powers subordinate to it sometimes despotically, and sometimes politically. When it uses the powers despotically, the power moved is not able to resist the influence of the will. When it uses the powers politically, the powers are able to resist the will.

Usus sequitur electionem: si tamen accipiatur usus, secundum quod voluntas utitur executiva potentia movendo ipsam. Sed quia voluntas etiam quodammodo rationem movet, et utitur ea, potest intelligi usus eius quod est ad finem secundum quod est in considerationem rationis

referentis ipsum in finem. Et hoc modo usus praecedit electionem.<sup>56</sup>

Frui importat absolutum motum appetitus in appetibile: sed uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum. Si ergo comparentur uti et frui quantum ad objecta, sic frui est nobilius quam uti: quia id quod est absolute appetibile, est melius quam id quod est appetibile solum in ordine ad aliud. Sed si comparentur quantum ad vim apprehensivam prae cedentem, major nobilitas requiritur ex parte usus: quia ordinare aliquid in alterum est rationis; absolute autem aliquid apprehendere potest etiam sensus.<sup>57</sup>

"<sup>58</sup>Uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum." Now animals do something thru their members by the instinct of nature. They do not know the order of the members to the operations. Thus, use does not properly apply to them. They are not said to apply their members to operations or to use their members.

Simultaneously with the action of use, the intellect also uses the executive powers or more accurately, it is directing the other executive powers. The intellect, continually tells them, as it were, what to do, and the will moves them as it is the first mover. Now when the powers have apprehended the means, and the end has been attained, there arises in the will an action called fruition or enjoyment.

We have seen before, that in the action of simple volition, the will loves the end. Now enjoyment also pertains to the love of the end. However, in the case of simple volition, the will only tends towards the end just as loved. In the case of enjoy-

ment, the will is pleased because the end has been attained.

Now,

in delectatione duo sunt: scilicet perceptio convenientis, quae pertinet ad apprehensivam potentiam; et complacentia eius quod offertur ut conveniens. Et hoc pertinet ad appetitivam potentiam, in qua ratio delectationis completur.<sup>59</sup>

The appetible has the ratio of end, and the action of the will by which the will is concerned with the end as attained is called fruition or enjoyment. Specification of the object of the will is completed in the action of enjoyment. "Frui importat<sup>60</sup> absolutum motum appetitus in appetibile."

Fruition is the rejoicing over the acquiring of the end. Now St. Thomas speaks of the end in a twofold way. The end may be the thing itself, or the acquiring of the thing. However, there are not two ends, but one end considered in itself and applied to something else. Hence, fruition means that the appetible has been fully reached. Fruition is that action of the will by which the end is perfectly had. Indeed, the will is drawn or attracted by things, and hence, it is unlike the cognitive powers which draw things to themselves. Hence, the will does not apprehend the good; rather it is pleased with the good that has been apprehended and is now possessed. The will, by fruition, loves the possessed good with a certain complete or perfect sweetness or delectation. Indeed, the appetible is delectable.

Fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est finis.

Finis autem et bonum est objectum appetitivae potentiae. Unde manifestum est quod fruitio est actus appetitivae potentiae.<sup>61</sup>

Fruition concerns the end that is possessed or had. The end is able to be had perfectly and imperfectly. If the end is had perfectly, it is not only in intention, but also in the thing. If the end is imperfectly had, it is only in intention. But fruition concerns the perfect acquisition of the desired. Hence, fruition concerns the end that is had perfectly.

Fruition is properly of the ultimate end, and someone truly enjoys when he enjoys the ultimate end. According to St. Thomas, we may consider the ultimate end as simpliciter and secundum quid. The ultimate end simpliciter stands alone; but the ultimate secundum quid is the last end in a certain line, and thus may be a means. Now the appetible must be delectable if it is to be enjoyed, and the appetible as a means is not always delectable. Hence, fruition, properly speaking, does not concern enjoyment of the ultimate end secundum quid or of means to the end.

Non quiescit simpliciter nisi in ultimo: quia quandiu aliquid expectatur, motus voluntatis remanet in suspensio, licet iam ad aliquid pervenerit. Sicut in motu locali, licet illud quod medium in magnitudine, sit principium et finis; non tamen accipitur ut finis in actu, nisi quando in eo quiescitur.<sup>62</sup>

Again, St. Thomas says:

Objectum autem est quod dat speciem actui: sed ab agente dependet modus agendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus, secundum conditionem agentis. Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus finis, fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens a specie fruitionis. Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est fruitio propria quidem, sed imperfecta, propter imperfectum modum habendi ultimum finem.<sup>63</sup>

Fruition means absolute quiet in the end. Fruition means the fulfillment of the desired— the end has been attained. However,

quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur: uno modo, ex parte objecti, quia scilicet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliud ordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appetentis finem qui nondum adipiscitur finem.<sup>64</sup>

Fruition brings happiness or rather has the ratio of happiness. When the end is had, one is said to be happy.

If an end is known, certainly its acquisition is known. Now we say that sensitive souls have imperfect cognition. For we say that they apprehend a particular good or end by their senses. Hence, they imperfectly know the acquisition of the end, and they imperfectly enjoy it. For they have a sensitive appetite, and enjoyment of the end possessed is a motion of every appetite. For the enjoyment of the end possessed is the completion of the specified object of the appetite. Again, since vegetative souls do not know ends, enjoyment is not applied to them properly or improperly.

Now we have given a general and strictly psychological treatment of the actions of the will. The main and best source of this treatment was St. Thomas' special examination of these actions in his Summa Theologiae, I,II, q. 8-17.

## FOOTNOTES

- 1) St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I,II, q. 8, a. 3 c.
- 2) Ibid.
- 3) Ibid.
- 4) St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 22, a. 13, ad 3.
- 5) St. Thomas, S. th., I,II, q. 17, a. 4, ad 1.
- 6) St. Thomas, De verti., q. 22, a. 13 c.
- 7) Ibid.
- 8) St. Thomas, S. th., I, q. 20, a. 1 c.
- 9) Ibid.
- 10) Ibid., I,II, q. 8, a. 2 c.
- 11) Ibid., q. 9, a. 3, ad 2.
- 12) Ibid., q. 8, a. 2 c.
- 13) Ibid.
- 14) Ibid., q. 9, a. 1, ad 3.
- 15) Ibid., q. 9, a. 2 c.
- 16) Ibid., q. 10, a. 1 c.
- 17) Ibid., q. 10, a. 2 c.
- 18) Ibid., q. 8, a. 3 c.
- 19) Ibid., q. 12, a. 1, ad 1.
- 20) Ibid., q. 12, a. 1, ad 3.
- 21) Ibid., q. 12, a. 1 c.
- 22) L' intention la (fin) poursuit comme un terme à atteindre et par les moyens qui y acheminent. L' intention est essentiellement une impulsion, un élan, ou le ressort de la volonté tendre vers un but. Elle implique cependant un acte de l' intelligence. Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1927, 15 vols.), p. 2267.
- 23) Dans l' acte d' intention les moyens sont, non pas déterminés et voulus avec précision, mais connotés, au moins d' une façon confuse, en même temps que la fin. Ibid.
- 24) St. Thomas, De verti., q. 22, a. 13 c.
- 25) St. Thomas, S. th., I,II, q. 12, a. 2, ad 2.
- 26) Ibid., q. 12, a. 3, ad 2.
- 27) Ibid., q. 14, a. 2 c.
- 28) Ibid., q. 15, a. 3 c.
- 29) Ibid., q. 15, a. 2 c.
- 30) Ibid., q. 15, a. 3 c.
- 31) Ibid.
- 32) Ibid., q. 15, a. 1 c.
- 33) Ibid., q. 15, a. 3 c.
- 34) Ibid.
- 35) Ibid., q. 74, a. 7, ad 1.
- 36) Ibid., q. 15, a. 3, ad 3.
- 37) Ibid., q. 13, a. 2, ad 1.
- 38) Ibid., q. 12, a. 4, ad 3.
- 39) Ibid., q. 15, a. 3, ad 3.
- 40) Ibid., q. 13, a. 2 c.
- 41) Ibid.
- 42) Ibid., q. 13, a. 3 c.



- 43) Ibid.
- 44) Ibid., q. 13, a. 1 c.
- 45) Ibid., q. 13, a. 5 c.
- 46) Ibid., q. 13, a. 1, ad 3.
- 47) Ibid., q. 17, a. 1, ad 2.
- 48) Ibid., q. 13, a. 6, ad 1.
- 49) Ibid., q. 13, a. 6, ad 3.
- 50) Ibid., I, q. 62, a. 1 c.
- 51) Ibid., I, II, q. 17, a. 1 c.
- 52) Ibid., q. 9, a. 1 c.
- 53) Ibid., q. 16, a. 1 c.
- 54) Ibid., q. 16, a. 3 c.
- 55) Ibid., q. 16, a. 3, ad 2.
- 56) Ibid., q. 16, a. 4 c.
- 57) Ibid., q. 16, a. 2, ad 1.
- 58) Ibid.
- 59) Ibid., q. 11, a. 1, ad 3.
- 60) Ibid., q. 16, a. 2, ad 1.
- 61) Ibid., q. 11, a. 1 c.
- 62) Ibid., q. 11, a. 3 c.
- 63) Ibid., q. 11, a. 4, ad 2.
- 64) Ibid.

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