

MON TEMPS N'EST PAS LE VOTRE

La différence de climat entre Mon Temps n'est pas la Vôtre, et la plupart de mes pièces est sans doute de nature à déconcerter le lecteur. Pour moi-même, elle constitue jusqu'à un certain point un sujet d'étonnement.¹

Mon Temps n'est pas le Vôtre is a highly disconcerting work. Un Homme de Dieu, Claude Lemoyne, had slowly realized that more often than not dogmatic omniscience blinds--the interrogative spirit is necessary for real existence. In Croissez et Multipliez, Agnes Courteuil questioned indeed; but she lacked the true openness of the interrogative spirit. But the impulsiveness of Alfred Champel in Mon Temps n'est pas le Vôtre, the unexpected insights of minor personnages, as well as the often dissonant contrapuntal thematic development of the play as a "whole," leaves the reader wondering whether Gabriel Marcel has not retired to the theatre of the absurd. A closer scrutiny, however, reveals the elaboration in scene of the contemporary predicament.

Alfred Champel, a minister in the French diplomatic corps, and his wife, Elizabeth, have two daughters, Perrine and Marie-Henriette. In keeping with current trends, the girls travel extensively--on their father's checkbook. Alfred is not so selfish as to begrudge the girls these opportunities; but he is disturbed that they have no respect for the places and peoples they visit.² So the next trip will be without spending money!

This catches the girls off guard, and he leaves before they can protest. Elizabeth sides with the girls. After all, times have changed, and

the girls have their own tastes.³ She is conscious of her childhood privation, as well as the suffering the girls endured during the war.

Je me rends compte, aujourd'hui, que mes parents étaient de fossiles.⁴

Si ces pauvres petites, en attendant qu'un nouveau cataclysme fasse d'elles des orphelines ou des veuves, prennent un peu de bon temps dans des conditions de tout repos...⁵

Alfred just can't see why the girls aren't satisfied: they have a nice house, plain but sufficient. Furthermore, while they travel the globe, their parents spend their vacation at home. But even Elizabeth is discontented with the "bicoque"⁶ he calls home: "Mon ami, si tu t'étais montré plus généreux pour leur argent de poche..."⁷

Perrine and Marie-Henriette, at least in the beginning, appear as typical mid-twentieth-century gad-flies. They like to travel. They like the new-style bathing suits. They like asynchronous music: both have become intrepid fans of Alexandre Prusz, Marie-Henriette because of his Central European accent, Perrine because of his ideology. At this point, all that is known of the man is that he is a music critic who detests tradition for the sake of tradition:

Mais, nous avons tous connu ces affreuses vieilles filles, généralement surmontées d'un chignon brioche, qui, armées d'une règle, tapaient sur les doigts du petit souffredouleur, sous prétexte que ses deux mains n'étaient pas synchronisées. J'y vois la férocité qui s'attache à tous les préjugés. La nature déteste l'unisson; elle a raison, sans doute. Qu'on tâche de me comprendre: je ne dis pas que toute musique doit être asynchrone. Je félicite seulement Esau Glockenfelder d'avoir tenté une incursion dans un domaine encore mal défriché. [...]

Je ne me demande pas si j'aime ou si je n'aime pas le Quatuor Panique d'Esau Glockenfelder. C'est une question qui ne convient pas. Ce que je sais, c'est que cet ouvrage est valable.⁸

And the two girls adore him, much in the way American teenagers fawn upon

Elvis Presley and the Beatles--"C'est au courant."

During these first three scenes, Madame Pochette, Elizabeth's friend, presents the most perplexing picture, both in character and observation. At times she seems little more relevant than did Madame Lemoyne or Madame Lemaige de Pierrefort. Yet, unwittingly or not, she reveals an undercurrent of the drama: the ideal is often stronger than the real, fiction is truer than fact.⁹ She also highlights the family conflict:

Votre père est une victime. Il est votre victime. Si vous n'aviez pas été vous prélasser en Grèce, il aurait fait avec votre maman un joli petit voyage, au lieu qu'il a une mine atroce. Il est à un âge où on ne doit pas jouer avec sa santé.¹⁰

This is not to say that she is the Champel's Bruno: no, she is too naive for such a profound role. Bruno, sensitive to the light he reflected, evoked positive questioning; Madame Pochette only provokes squabbling!

At this point, an apparent hors d'oeuvre interrupts the main line of development. Marie-Henriette reveals to her mother that during the Mediterranean cruise they have stopped at a little known island. Six or eight of them--male and female--had gone to a small inn where the wine ran fast and the fans slow. The kids tried to make themselves comfortable, loosening their clothes. Suddenly the lights went out. Marie-Henriette doesn't remember exactly what happened. Perrine does, however: "Pour moi ce n'était pas la première fois."¹¹ Furthermore, one Christophe Morillot was so shocked by the affair that he thinks he has molested Marie-Henriette and plans to tell Alfred.

Elizabeth goes immediately to abbé Jourdain. Like abbé Petitpaul, he insists on dictating what should be done. The girls must confess, and Alfred must be told. He reproaches Elizabeth for not having the authority

to force them to confess. He accuses her of complicity in not telling Alfred. But he himself is unable to name the "incident" and, in one way or another, dispel Elizabeth's confusion.

Je suis terriblement déçue. Je comptais tellement sur votre largeur d'esprit pour me rassurer... Vous avez l'air si à l'aise dans notre époque. Moi, je fais mon possible pour m'adapter, mais j'ai bien de la peine.¹²

She asks him to tell Alfred. She refuses, nor will she force her daughters to confess. "Ce serait, du reste, dangereux pour leur santé."¹³ They have suffered so much and Alfred is so reactionary...

Abbé Jourdain maneuvers to have her tell Alfred, who has just entered; but Elizabeth refuses, despite abbé's cries of complicity: "Parce qu'au fond tu ne ressens que de la curiosité; aucune sollicitude, aucune affection. C'est répugnant."¹⁴ Suddenly Christophe breaks in, fighting off a very determined Perrine. He begins very indirectly, but Alfred listens intently! His speech is prepared and, although couched in technical terminology, vague. He has infected Marie-Henriette. He accese Perrine of admitting to previous affairs. Perrine struggles to quiet him. The abbé is horrified; Alfred is amused: "Je me crois chez J. H. Fabre. Oui, nous sommes chez les insectes."¹⁵ Christophe insists he must marry Marie-Henriette; Perrine would have her aborted first. Elizabeth tries to calm Christophe: but she can find no word to characterize the incident--it is too horrible, too unreal. Champel summarizes the quandary: "[...] nous sommes dans l'innommable."¹⁶

And, according to Marcel, here lies the relevance of the episode:

La phrase de Champel, prononcée sur un ton glacial: "Nous sommes dans l'innommable," tire de là la plénitude de sa signification; on glisse insensiblement du "il n'y a plus de mots pour rien" au "il n'y a plus rien," constatation sur laquelle se clôt le premier acte, qui, elle, n'a plus rien

de comique et constitue ainsi comme la charnière de la pièce.¹⁷

Sartre would end here, in absurdity; but there are four acts to follow.

Enter Flavio Romanelli, concert pianist in Paris to prepare for the North Blessington prize competition. Alfred and Marie-Henriette are immediately drawn to him.¹⁸ He is frank and open. He doesn't consider himself a great pianist: it is only his job.¹⁹ He thinks his real vocation is to compose; but a pianist makes a poor composer, unless he be a genius: Chopin, Liszt...

C'étaient des génies, monsieur. On ne peut pas se comparer à ces hommes-là. Et pourtant, je compose. Au piano... Oui, il me faut encore un piano pour composer... Voyez-vous, monsieur... il ne faut pas vous moquer: je sens que ces hommes extraordinaires m'admettent parmi eux; ils m'accueillent, je suis avec eux. Je n'ai pas d'autre ambition, monsieur, être avec eux...²⁰

Flavio only hopes to be in the presence of greatness: not to obstruct the light shining through him.

For him this light is the music of the masters, which is being displaced by the cacophony the avant-garde call asynchronous music. In one of Marcel's few poetic analogies:

Cela veut tout simplement dire qu'une petite phrase tout aussi stupide se forme dans votre cerveau--comme certaines fleurs sans parfum poussent dans les mauvais terrains ou il y a de la ferraille abandonnée.²¹

Flavio is terribly impatient with anyone who would distort the truth. For him this impatience is Christian: not "amabilité, tisane trop sucrée," but "vérité."²² It is this truth which he humbly acknowledges. It is this truth which makes him shiver at the thought that Marie-Henriette could be attracted to him, an engaged man.

His fiancée, Diana Pisoni, brings news that Emilio Keyser, the

master to whom he had submitted a composition, would conduct the piece that season. Flavio falls into tears: the piece owed its existence to his best brother who had been killed during the war. It was only right that he should be present to hear it. Alfred is visibly moved at this, though it is yet unclear exactly why: "Je regarde un homme--un vrai."²³

After supper, the Champels discuss Flavio and Diana. Elizabeth finds them charming, but the others are not so non-committal. Marie-Henriette is enraptured. Perrine is disgusted with this "mufle intégral, un villageois mal embouché," "un garçon coiffeur, un Adonis pour boniches." Alfred cannot bear such slander: "Tais toi!"

C'est un être exceptionnel sous tous les rapports. [...] Entre parenthèses, j'ai toutes les raisons de supposer qu'il est mon fils.²⁴

So sudden and so casual! He gives the girls no explanation.

Later Elizabeth squeezes a story out of him. It was in 1927. Only one night. She preferred to marry an Italian. She had never mentioned the son as theirs, but his age was right. Elizabeth is disbelieving. But Alfred continues:

Elisabeth, t'es tu jamais douté de ce qu'est la vie d'un homme livré aux femmes--un homme dont le plus ardent désir a été frustré, le désir d'avoir un fils? ...

Et moi, si je suis quelque chose, c'est tout simplement parce que je comprends que je ne suis rien; je m'en suis aperçu tardivement. Je fais mon métier honorablement, mais avec le sentiment de plus en plus désolant de son insignifiance et de la mienne.²⁵

Elizabeth has also yearned for a son, but... she forgives him for his stubbornness:

Ce que tu ne me pardonnes pas, c'est de voir de plus en plus clair en nous, en ces chères petites, en ce monde affreux qui n'est qu'ineptie et mensonge, en ce vide béant que seule la présence d'un fils pourra combler.²⁶

Furthermore, he has sublet the girls' rooms to students in the area. Elizabeth is enraged. She calls abbé Jourdain. It is late and, in typically bourgeois clergy fashion, he hangs up. She turns to Alfred: "Moi je te dis qu'il n'est pas ton fils; il est mille fois trop bien pour ça." So right, but for such wrong reasons!

Thus the familial dissolution suffered by Thierry in Croissez et Multipliez is initiated by Alfred, at least on the real plane. The intersubjective reciprocity emphasized by family ties in Croissez et Multipliez is here shown to be more than a physical relationship. Marcel says more in his Postface:

Rien n'est certes plus mystérieux que la genèse d'une oeuvre d'imagination, mais si j'en crois mon expérience, et en laissant même de côté tout ce qui a été écrit sur ce sujet, il me semble qu'elle s'organise nécessairement d'une façon qu'on pourrait dire quasi biologique autour d'un élément central qui, dans certains cas, mais assez rarement de nos jours, peut être un caractère, mais qui plus communément se présente comme une relation entre des êtres, ou comme une situation dans laquelle ceux-ci sont engagés. [...] Alfred Champel souffre de se sentir comme annihilé par une femme insignifiante et bavarde et par deux filles chez qui apparaissent à nu tous les travers de la jeune génération. [...] Champel ne trouve pas dans sa vie professionnelle de quoi compenser les déboires de sa vie familiale. [...]

La nostalgie du fils qui lui a été refusé, et avec qui il est sûr qu'il aurait pu faire face aux trois femmes, se présentait naturellement à moi comme une disposition fondamentale chez cet homme vieillissant, étranger à toute croyance religieuse, et qui sentait chaque jour plus cruellement sa solitude. [...]

Après tout, chacun de nous, romancier ou auteur dramatique, a sa thématique personnelle à laquelle il faudrait toujours se référer pour apprécier telle ou telle oeuvre considérée en particulier. Ce thème de la paternité comme passion me semble être un de ceux qui, sans que je puisse dire exactement pourquoi, ont toujours eu pour ma conscience une résonance particulière.²⁸

Alfred is a victim of this passion, so much so that he strives to create a bond between himself and Flavio. At this point, however, this can only be

an illusion: an illusion prompted by a desire to escape the situation he is in. And just such an illusion gives rise to some unpleasant consequences --especially for Marie-Henriette.

Complacently being led by Perrine through the ordeal of being "au courant," a sudden series of shocks had brought her up short: the incident on the island, her meeting Flavio with his "manieres si directes," and Alfred's impulsive affirmation. Her lack of conviction left her standing in midstream with no log to latch on to. Yet, perhaps this very lack of set ideas enabled her to find answers Claude Lemoyne was prevented from receiving because of his preconceived questions. This is not to say that she soaked up all everyone told her--her openness was coupled to a thinking self, a self committed to what Marcel has called the "spirit of truth."²⁹ She listens rather than questions.

Christophe is still pestering her, trying to persuade her to visit a priest-psychoanalyst friend of his. "Il connaît tous les trucs les plus modernes."³⁰ But Miette never was taken in by his technique. "Si jamais je t'épouse, ce sera pour divorcer tout de suite après."³¹ "[...] tout cela c'est burlesque, c'est épouvantable, et ils finiront par faire de moi une marionnette, une marionnette comme eux."³²

Madame Champel is beginning to notice the widening gap between her and the girls. Miette thinks she has lost her faith, that perhaps she never had it (another hint of Claude Lemoyne). She has been reading: "l'Eglise n'a pas le sens du tragique. Elle ne travaille qu'à l'obturer."³³ But this loss is only superficial, only pertains to the external manifestations.

This is indirectly evoked by Perrine, who has just met Alexandre Prusz. As much as Flavio has recalled Marie-Henriette, Prusz has further

tisted Perrine: "une idée, c'est un moyen de tuer d'autres idées dont on ne veut pas. Quand elle a servi, il n'y a qu'à la mettre au rancart."³⁴ She views with contempt Flavio's effect on her sister--"ait su toucher ton coeur..." She is through with all this "sentimentality," of love and fidelity, she is incapable of suffering--the perpetuation of Corinne. But it is this "sentimentality" which Marie-Henriette loves in Flavio, so that her mother can say: "Ah! ma chérie! voilà qui prouve que les grâces du baptême ne sont pas complètement dissipées."³⁵

Dramatic action has almost stopped. So in comes Alfred to tell the girls their rooms have been rented and their vacations (without spending money) must begin. Elizabeth is dumbfounded. Perrine seizes the opportunity to break away:

Tout ça est odieux et burlesque. Tu retardes pour cela comme pour tout le reste. Maman aussi, d'ailleurs, et son indulgence m'horripile autant que ta sévérité. Nous n'avons de comptes à rendre à personne. [...] Je ne resterai pas une minute de plus dans cet appartement qui sue le mensonge et l'hypocrisie.³⁶

Alfred expected Marie-Henriette to follow, but she remains with him, for the first of two father-daughter talks. It is obvious that Alfred has been itching to vent his opinions: he minces no words...

Comme toute votre génération, comme les artistes et les écrivains que vous admirez, vous êtes des conformistes à rebours; vous vous évertuez à prendre le contrepied de ce qu'on a toujours pensé, toujours cru. Votre audace prétendue est la pire des lâchetés. Dans ce monde où chacun entend se singulariser, le seul courage qui vaille est de refuser cette faussee originalité devant laquelle les imbéciles plient les genoux parce qu'ils ont peur de passer pour rétrogrades. Ce qui est si admirable chez ce petit Flavio, c'est qu'il n'y a pas trace chez lui de cette prétention, de cette lâcheté.³⁷

Miette's reaction is more like Agnes' than Edmée's: can you swear that Flavio is your son? She loves him, but if he is her brother... She has never gone to bed with a man! "Il y aurait peut-être des moyens techniques

de s'en assurer."

Tu es quelqu'un d'affreux: tu aimes humilier, et Perrine est comme toi. Elle te ressemble bien plus que tu ne le crois. Moi, je ne sais pas ce que je suis, je ne suis peut-être rien; mais j'aimerais admirer, j'aimerais respecter. C'est pour cela que j'ai cru si longtemps que j'étais croyante. [...]

Toi, d'abord, est-ce que tu crois par hasard que je peux te prendre au sérieux? tes principes, tes habitudes, ton affreux égoïsme. Tu es comme Perrine, tu ne te vois pas, et, à ton âge, c'est pire, c'est sans excuse...³⁸

Alfred retorts, "avec passion":

Sans excuse? Tu te permets de juger du haut de ton ignorance au nom de deux ou trois idées toutes faites qui s'entrechoquent dans ta malheureuse cervelle d'enfant pervertie. Une vie d'homme, même manquée, une vie d'homme avec son harcelant labeur, ses aspirations, ses échecs et le poids de l'inévitable qui s'appesantit sur elle, c'est autrement digne de respect que tes velléités incohérentes et ta révolte dérisoire. Je ne suis qu'un médiocre, je l'accorde, au besoin je le proclame. Pour porter cette sentence sur moi-même, crois-tu que j'aie besoin de toi, qui n'est qu'une enfant sans coeur, et probablement vicieuse? Oh, je sais; la passion aberrant dont tu t'enorgueillis te justifie et t'exalte. Qui sait, du reste, si ce n'est pas dans l'espoir de me soutirer une confidence, un désaveu que tu viens de l'étaler devant moi avec cette impudeur effarante.³⁹

The pressure Alfred is living under is tremendous: the solitude he suffers: all with only gabby women to throw trite sympathies at him while pushing him further into the mire. He...

But Diana brings news that Flavio has ceased practicing. He has dreamt that his mother is ill. All he does is write music. Their whole life depends on that North Blessington prize. She cannot reconcile Miette's romantic rantings about the creative artist and his milieu: "Vôtre romantisme me donne plutôt à penser que vous épouserez un fabricant de conserves ou d'appareils sanitaires."⁴⁰ She begs Alfred and Marie-Henriette to talk to Flavio.

Flavio breaks in, obviously distraught. He first chases Diana home and then addresses himself to Alfred and Marie-Henriette. They cannot possibly help him. Only he can feel his anguish, the anguish of not being a creator! He begins to play at the piano, turns to them with hate in his eye and leaves.

Marie-Henriette collapses into tears. Suddenly, Alfred, realizing some sort of link between himself and Miette, and between her and Flavio, confesses:

Mon enfant, je te dois un aveu: Flavio n'est pas mon fils; sa mère n'a jamais été ma maîtresse. [...] Je ne peux pas expliquer. D'abord, je ne me suis jamais consolé de n'avoir pas de fils, et c'est un peu comme si j'avais voulu faire violence à la destinée.⁴¹

But he cannot continue in such a frame of open-mindedness. They remain together for a while, oblivious of Elizabeth's raving that all Alfred's plans have been cancelled.

But lest the main theme be forgotten, Madame Pochette appears, lamenting her husband who suffers from an imaginary disease: "[...] quand quelqu'un est un malade imaginaire, il se croit malade. Inversement, s'il se prend pour un malade imaginaire, c'est qu'il a une maladie véritable, peut-être grave."⁴² And lest Madame Pochette appear too out of character, she makes an idle allusion to the island incident, in such a way as to disconcert Christophe who has come to see Marie-Henriette.

Marie-Henriette tolerates his presence--she could love him if his efforts at love were only fruitful. But Alfred sends him running.

Alfred and Marie-Henriette have been having frank and open conversations. Now Miette brings up the ultimate test: if Flavio should ask to marry her, Alfred would have to confess his lie. But he cautions her not to

rely on dreams: Flavio and Diana have been reconciled. Miette yearns to be happy. Alfred counsels:

Le bonheur, crois-moi c'est difficile et très rare. Cela ne se trouve pas dans un soulier le matin de Noël. Il faut peut-être arriver aux approches de la mort... pour soupçonner les mystérieuses conjonctures sans lesquelles le bonheur n'est qu'un mot, une étiquette sur un emballage dont le contenu s'est perdu au cours d'un sinistre ou d'un déménagement. [...]

Tant que j'ai été absorbé par mon métier, avec la pensée des échelons à gravir, je n'ai jamais songé à me demander si j'étais heureux. Peut-être, d'ailleurs, lorsqu'on se pose cette question, enfreint-on les règles de ce jeu, de cette partie incompréhensible dans laquelle nous avons été jetés, Dieu sait par qui ou par quoi; mais on ne peut pas s'en empêcher. Il vient un moment où on s'interroge.⁴³

But that is far away. Then, with typical impulsive casualness, he mentions that his heart is failing and that Flavio's mother is coming to visit.

Perrine brings in Alexandre Prusz unexpectedly. They are discussing his philosophy of destruction. Alfred confronts him. Prusz remains firm:

Ce que vous désignez sous le terme d'ennui, c'est l'angoisse, monsieur, c'est la vertige intolérable qu'éprouvent les derniers survivants d'un monde anéanti en présence d'un temps qui ne leur offre plus la moindre prise.⁴⁴

Alfred counters:

Bien sûr, bien sûr, mon temps n'est pas le vôtre. Mais c'est que votre temps n'est plus celui des hommes réels, c'est celui des robots, pis encore, c'est le temps illusoire que projettent devant eux des cerveaux affolés par le désir de dissembler.⁴⁵

Perrine then interjects an allusion to Flavio and Prusz hints that his concert will be sabotaged. Alfred demands an explanation, advances toward Prusz, then suddenly succumbs to a heart attack. He dies a few days later.

Marcel could have ended here, but he continues with fifty pages of meditation concerning what has happened. It is difficult to determine whether this is meant as some sort of resolution or only a means of pre-

cisioning the questions being asked throughout the first four acts.

Marie-Henriette explains to abbé Jourdain what has happened. But a further complication increases her quandary: before he died, Alfred insisted: "quoi que j'aie pu te dire, Flavio est mon fils. Je te demande de te le rappeler et d'agir en conséquence."⁴⁶ She loved her father, she feels herself the only one who did: now she is alone, must she fulfill his last wish? Abbé Jourdain reminds her of complicity, telling her she must expose the lie.

C'est la voix du bon sens. Mais ne peut-on attendre d'un prêtre qu'il parle autrement qu'un aliéniste? Vous êtes déjà tout prêt à le traiter comme un cas. Je ne puis m'y résoudre. Et puis enfin, mon père a vécu une vie d'homme; êtes-vous tout à fait certain de pouvoir en dire autant?⁴⁷

Or is he only a systematic Christian, living by the book?

Flavio and Diana come to pay their respects and offer sympathy. While discussing his mother's visit, he practically quotes Alfred's words to Prusz: "Mon temps n'est pas celui de mes contemporains."⁴⁸ The mention of Prusz turns Flavio's stomach. Marie-Henriette begs him to explain. A cabal had been arranged against his concert. Diana is still solicitous for their material future; Flavio seems locked in the past.

La nouveauté, c'est une réclame, un mot de marchand; mais dans ce pays intérieur, qui est mon pays, on ne vend plus rien, on n'achète plus rien; c'est le pays de la contemplation, le pays de la grâce. [...]

Sans doute, il faut payer un tribut à ce monde qui est celui de l'argent et du péché, mais payer un tribut ne veut pas dire: vendre son âme; c'est seulement faire un travail pénible et honorable pour se donner le droit de contempler ou de créer, comme les moines l'ont compris. [...]

Malgré eux, sans l'avoir voulu, sans jamais s'être dit: qu'est-ce que je pourrais bien inventer de nouveau, d'intéressant? Souvent dans l'angoisse, dans le remords, et seulement parce qu'ils n'avaient pas d'autres moyens d'exprimer l'essence éternelle qui était l'objet de leur ferveur intime. Mais

aujourd'hui, c'est parce que cet objet a disparu, parce que l'essence éternelle n'est plus aperçue par personne,--que des fous inventent n'importe quoi pour la remplacer ou la faire oublier; comme si l'éternel était remplaçable, comme si l'éternel était oubliable.⁴⁹

Such are the sentiments voiced by Alfred. Such is the condemnation of men like Sartre.

But this connection troubles Flavio, so much so that he had asked his mother if Alfred and she were more than close friends. Sibilla explains to Marie-Henriette that she had fallen in love with Alfred; but seeing that he did not, would not love her, she had left lest he feel obliged to say he loved her--basing their marriage on a lie. Flavio did not resemble his father in looks nor temperament. He had always been serious, sensitive. When Marie-Henriette reveals Alfred's impulsive affirmation, Sibilla can only exclaim: "Flavio son fils! Flavio notre fils!... un songe... un songe plus beau que la vérité."⁵⁰

Perrine demands the truth from Sibilla. She replies: "Je n'admettrais pas qu'on vienne défigurer la mémoire d'un homme dont, sans m'en douter, j'ai peut-être fait le malheur."⁵¹ Elizabeth is on the verge of asking the same question, when Flavio and Diana enter. The orchestra has walked out on Keyser; Flavio's concert will never be played. Diana is overjoyed that finally "il sera un grad pianiste"--"livré aux marchands, aux snobs et aux imbéciles."⁵² Flavio is broken. Perrine had written him a letter alluding to Alfred's affirmation:

Quel motif mon père avait-il de l'aimer? Prusz, qui est l'homme le plus intelligent que je connaisse, disait l'autre jour: "Le rôle de l'art est de détruire": pour-quoi ne pas mettre dans la vie ce que d'autres réalisent avec des pinceaux ou avec un orchestra?⁵³

His mother had also told him that Alfred was his father, "parce que [...elle

aurait] voulu que ce soit la vérité."⁵⁴

Flavio closes the play:

Personne ne m'a appris comment on peut vivre sans orgueil et sans cesser d'être un homme. Je veux dire seulement ceci: Si, par impossible, on parvenait à me démontrer que je suis bien le fils de Massimo Romanelli, rien ne pourrait faire qu'il n'y ait eu, autour de moi, un réseau de mensonges dont je ne me dégagerai plus jamais.⁵⁵

Alfred had adopted Flavio. But Flavio refused to make it reciprocal. When his mother identified with Alfred, was he to deny her? Or at least the perfect bond they had established? But no one understands:

Dans quelques jours je serai l'époux de Diana. C'est auprès d'elle que je menerai, je le sais maintenant, une vie pesante et misérable. Je croise encore que le don céleste m'avait été accordé, mais je sais maintenant qu'il m'a été retiré. Et cette maison aura été le lieu de ma disgrâce.⁵⁶

Whodunit? Yet no amount of Conan Doyle maneuvering seems able to unravel the mystery. Marcel emphasizes, in his Postface, that the character development was not premeditated. He began with no philosophical thesis involving the problem of values and time. The play was not to expose his views regarding music, although

[...] sans l'exaspération que j'ai souvent ressentie en voyant certains tableaux, en écoutant certaines musiques, en entendant formuler telle appréciation inepte, il est à peu près certain que cette pièce n'aurait jamais vu le jour.⁵⁷

Yet the central theme appears as one possible hinge on which the development hangs--more positively so than the notion of ingualifiable. Paternity as a passion caused Alfred's revolt, precipitated Marie-Henriette's change, hardened Perrine, completely bypassed abbe Jourdain, greatly disconcerted Elizabeth, and disoriented a disheartened Flavio. Madame Pochette's observation, "L'imagination, c'est quelquefois pire que la réalité," appears almost a clairvoyant understatement of the consequences

evolving from a casual "j'ai toutes les raisons de supposer qu'il est mon fils." Raisons!

The intersubjectivity indicated chiefly by familial relationships in Croissez et Multipliez was heightened on this ideal plane--the dissolution consequent upon a non-recognition of personal ties in Croissez et Multipliez is not prevented by devotion to an ideal. That is, neither one of the complementary elements of fatherhood can be isolated to create the reality of sonship. The idea can become so strong (like Christophe's conviction that he had molested Marie-Henriette) as to dominate one's course of action. But action is in reality. And ideas are not reality.

The dyadic dynamism must be preserved. This reality is not the crass materialism of Elizabeth and Diana, nor the idealistic may-it-be of Sibilla and Alfred; it is not the systematic elaboration of Christophe and abbe Jourdain, nor the meaningless void of Perrine and Prusz. The anti-nomies are but mental obstructions of an order achieved through grace and served through faith.

"La vérité, c'est la vérité." Although it shall make men free, it also makes men suffer. Although reason can grasp its intellectual import and consistency, feeling is required to appreciate its full psychological implications. Marie-Henriette perceived this lack in her father and tried to fill the gap with love, with other-centered openness. But this requires reciprocity, intersubjectivity. Even Alfred's lie became real for Sibilla because of this type of receptivity: but because he closed himself to it, for Flavio it became even more unreal.

This closing up is perhaps Alfred's chief weakness. He was dissatisfied with his flat existence. He perceived a saving relationship, but

confined it to an ideal, regarding consequences no more than did his anti-thesis, Alexandre Prusz. Even Marie-Henriette's love could not break this shell of possessiveness. One wonders whether he held the relationship or it held him.

Thus Alfred's fidelity was thwarted in the reduction to an idea of a real presence, a person. It was further frustrated in his increasing closed-mindedness. Yet he was not wholly responsible. The egoistic in-turning of those around prevented the full fruition of a fidelity to the presence effected by grace. The recognition of the sacred had lost all meaning, except perhaps for Marie-Henriette.

CONCLUSION

To present a systematic summary of Marcel's idea of fidelity would be tantamount to betraying our very purpose. Rather, since Marcel's dramatic work is so intimately bound up with his philosophy, its approach complements his philosophical research: the spontaneous development of man in situation. Progressively, across these three plays, Marcel exposes various characteristics of fidelity. Each individual exhibits one or more of these features in varying degrees, though the deficiency is more obvious because of the often tragic consequences. In this way, Marcel elucidates various obstacles and concentrates his philosophical perspective on the essentials of fidelity.

Claude Lemoyne finally realized that he had somehow betrayed fidelity. For there is no easy system to be followed; it does not involve constant activity, unemotional devotion to man in general. Fidelity is not directed to an ideal conception, to a blind, objective truth. For an ideal implies goal, end, rest; the ideal system allows for no exceptions--it is perfection. Under such a determinism, every possibility is omnisciently anticipated as consequent upon specified conditions. Techniques are available to guarantee these conditions. Thus, such fidelity to an ideal is basically egocentric, for it involves a definite knowledge that this or that will happen, the ego's every whim is entertained without the slightest risk of contradiction. As perfect, an ideal is supposedly valid for everyone and thus, if he has this ideal, one man can direct the lives of others

not so fortunate. He can, he must protect them: he knows all, tells all, solves all--so abstractly, so brutally, so irrelevantly. Such an ideal does not provide for suffering, feeling, spontaneity, question, freedom,... for human beings.

Agnes Courteuil was actually conscious of the utter irrelevance and crushing impersonalization of such a blind adhesion to an ideal. Only she lives her life du dedans. No one, no moral entity with hundreds of years of experience, no backlog of "similar cases" can interpret or determine this personal life du dehors. This is not to say that the conflict and suffering of daily existence is without appeal, that absurdity and nausea is the only human condition. The harmony of music and light is something real, something beyond, beneath, behind the apparent techniques--spatial metaphors lose all significance here.

This presence is not some abstract ideal, but is present within each and every person, beyond any sort of external observation and verification. Francis Thompson caught its reality:

O world invisible, we view thee,
O world intangible, we touch thee,
O world unknowable, we know thee,
Inapprehensible, we clutch thee.¹

This mysterious reality is unintelligible to the naked rational intellect; it is beyond mere sensibility. It is not a neo-Platonic idea existing "somewhere out there"; it is not some tangible, definable aspect of the here and now.

Bruno reflected this reality, though he himself could not voice any technical formulation, could not fabricate any easy rule of thumb. It is not something that can be purchased at the neighborhood department store, nor even verbally transferred from person to person--it is not capable of

systematization. Intersubjectivity, mutual other-directedness is its realization.

Alfred Champel clearly showed that this reality is stronger, more compelling than simple fact. But egotistically, he tried to control it. He lacked that other-directed openness, the readiness to respond. He insisted on dictating the form of this reality. The presence is innommable, a vocation rather than a job, found by listening not talking. Listening... silence. The conflict and tension of our busy workaday world is only superficial: the harmony is overlooked in the rush to the office, in the hurry to construct that sermon, in the impatient ending of a conversation to allow time for that cigarette or term paper.

Life is a gift from God, a gift only He can revoke. Inherent in this gift is a freedom, a freedom to betray God's intention. This freedom must never be subsumed under any rational or materialistic system. It is a freedom to be lived by the individual, who is conscious of his tragic condition, of his imperfect perfection, and who remains open to the reality around him. The individual must never, can never escape to the comfort of a technique or the oblivion of absurdity, for that would be a betrayal of his human condition.

Pour Gabriel Marcel la principale mission du théâtre est de "tendre vers une prise de conscience de plus en plus large, de plus en plus profonde, de plus en plus généreuse." Le théâtre lui apparaît comme le moyen d'éclairer dans toute sa complexité et sa profondeur le caractère des hommes et de la vie: il est pour lui une entreprise de lucidité par excellence.²

This concurs with Marcel's philosophical perspective regarding the human situation. The values which Marcel desires to make relevant, to highlight are incarnate in this human condition. To abstract them into a

dogmatic formulation is to distort their authenticity. Thus the use of the phenomenological approach, even in drama.

Marcel is not so terribly concerned about dramatic action as about character portrayal. His plays are highly psychological; to say "intellectual" would rob them of the intense feeling which is a part of any psychology. "Psychological play" involves some sort of identification on the part of the audience: this is a very delicate vocation for Marcel's audience. For the very presupposition of the human condition precludes total immersion in another. Rather the identification is a type of response, a recognition coupled with action.

This dialogue is, of course, the dominant characteristic of Marcel's dramatic approach. Through reciprocal confrontation each character is realized: the accent is on receptivity, however, for active and unfeeling frankness are but brutal manifestations of egotistic systematization. This dialogue contains no imagery--Marcel seeks to avoid romantic sentimentality and escape as much as rational idealism. Drama is a type of bergsonian art:

Ainsi, qu'il soit peinture, sculpture, poésie, ou musique, l'art n'a d'autre objet que d'écarter les symboles pratiquement utiles, les généralités conventionnellement et socialement acceptées, enfin tout ce qui nous masque la réalité, pour nous mettre face à face avec la réalité même.³

This, at least in part, explains the procedure used in this paper. In an effort to "reproduce" Marcel's approach as well as his content, extensive quoting of original texts was used. The analyses are this author's response to Marcel's presentation. A word should be said concerning some obvious omissions, however.

Marcel's extensive preoccupation with the inter-relation of fidelity and death was avoided because of the very complexity of the issue. Any

comprehensive consideration would require no small degree of familiarity with metapsychical research: and even then it is doubtful whether such a development would be profitable.

The correlation of Thomism and Marcel's concrete philosophy would be possible, provided one idealist misconception be exposed: in Thomistic or any philosophy worthy of the name, secondary truths are not deduced from first principles.⁴ Furthermore, there is definitely a difference between the properties of being as existing and as known.

Finally, and perhaps most controversially, there remains the question of Marcel's relation with contemporary Christian thought. It was felt that in times such as these, with Vatican II and ecumenical dialogues, with the constant Protestant-Catholic, humanist-Christian confrontations, such an orientation would be monotonous. Furthermore, as would be evident in an extensive comparison of Vatican II proceedings with Marcel's writings, such an approach would be no less than tautological. For many of the questions being discussed at the Council, especially religious liberty and ecumenism, are prevalent notions in Marcel's writings.⁵

Yet, for those who feel, think, or sense that Marcel's approach is merely a confusing of novelty with progress, a reading of the Sapiential Books of the Old Testament would prove rewarding.

Cette sagesse est internationale. Elle a peu de préoccupations religieuses, elle s'exerce sur le plan profane. Elle éclaire la destinée des individus, non par une réflexion philosophique à la manière des Grecs, mais en cueillant les fruits de l'expérience. Elle est un art de bien vivre et une marque de bonne éducation.⁶

FOOTNOTES

for Preface and Introduction

1. Cf. Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead (Signet Books; New York: The New American Library, 1963). Published by arrangement with the Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., New York. Copyright, 1943. Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism, an extreme form of individualism in reaction to her experiences with collectivist society, is being popularized through the Nathaniel Branden Institute and The Objectivist Newsletter. An interesting and not unbiased review of her ideas appeared recently: Ernest W. Ranley, C.P.P.S., "The Rand Thesis: man exists for himself," The National Catholic Reporter, February 3, 1965, p. 9.
2. Ayn Rand, op. cit., pp. 671-678, especially:

"Altruism is the doctrine which demands that man live for others and place others above self. No man can live for another. [..]

[..] I wished to come here [his trial for dynamiting a public housing project] and say that the integrity of a man's creative work is of greater importance than any charitable endeavor."
3. E.g., race relations, birth control, contraception, business ethics, welfare, the list is growing daily.
4. Gabriel Marcel, Regard en arri re, taken from the commemorative book on Marcel's work written by a group of French thinkers and critics and edited by Etienne Gilson, Existentialisme Chr tien (Collection "Presences"; Paris: Plon, 1947), p. 315. The English title:

"An Essay in Autobiography," The Philosophy of Existentialism, trans. Manya Harari (New York: Citadel Press, 1961), p. 124. This is the paperback edition of The Philosophy of Existence, trans. Manya Harari (London: The Harvill Press, 1948). Hereafter, once an initial reference has been made, further references to the same work by Marcel will be given by title and appropriate page number, unless ibid. suffices. If an English translation is available to this author, corresponding references will follow in parentheses.

5. Ibid., pp. 318-319 (127-128). Marcel here rejects the Aristotelian idea of theoria, at least such as Dewey conceives it. Cf. John Dewey, "Philosophy," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Edwin R. A. Seligman ed. (15 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), Volume 12, pp. 118-129.
6. This sketch of his life is based on the essay just cited; M.-M. Davy, "Esquisse d'un Portrait," Un Philosophe Itinerant, Gabriel Marcel (Paris: Flammarion, 1959), pp. 11-70; and Kurt F. Reinhardt, "'From Refusal to Invocation': Gabriel Marcel," The Existentialist Revolt, the Main Themes and Phases of Existentialism (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 203-228.
7. Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 216, compares Marcel's approach to the method of negative theology.
8. Regard en arrière, p. 319 (128).
9. Davy, op. cit., p. 7.

"Le biographe peut sembler avoir trop insisté sur les éléments de la quête et insuffisamment souligné les certitudes acquises, mais cette acceptation de la quête à poursuivre durant toute l'existence constitue justement à ses yeux la seule raison de continuer son chemin en se nourrissant de la manne, c'est-à-dire du pain donné gratuitement au voyageur

engagé dans le désert à la poursuite de la terre promise."
(ibid., p. 8)

10. Marcel has often expressed his disdain for "professors" and "techniques." His attitude is further reflected by his own career as a free-lance intellectual. Cf. Regard en arrière, p. 315 (124); Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, trans. G. S. Fraser (A Gateway Edition; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), pp. 39 and 104. This last is a paperback edition of Men Against Humanity, trans. G. S. Fraser (London: The Harvill Press, Ltd., 1952). The work first appeared in France as Les Hommes contre l'humain (Paris: La Colombe, 1951). Also cf. Davy, op. cit., p. 21, and Seymour Cain, Gabriel Marcel (New York: Hillary House, 1963, 1963), p. 124. This statement must not be construed, however, to imply that philosophy is a type of function of life.
11. F. H. Heinemann, "The Mysterious Empiricist," Existentialism and the Modern Predicament (Harper Torchbooks, The Cloister Library; New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 135.
12. Though strikingly similar to Proust in this respect, Marcel did not fabricate a "Recherche du Temps Perdu":

"Cependant je m'effraye, en écrivant ces mots, de l'injustice que je commets malgré tout envers ceux qui entourèrent mon enfance d'une sollicitude si tendre et si constante, et qui ne pouvaient réellement pas soupçonner l'espèce de surtension anxieuse à laquelle ils me soumettaient. Me voici forcé de constater une fois de plus que penser, formuler, juger, au fond, c'est toujours trahir." (Regard en arrière, p. 304 (114))
13. Curiously, Kierkegaard's father was the exact opposite, dogmatic and very unpatriotic, yet Marcel has admitted many affinities with the Dane, especially regarding faith. Cf. Regard en arrière, p. 310 (119-120).

14. Marcel questioned his aunt about his mother's death once, and her evasive reply prompted this rejoinder: "Plus tard, je chercherai à savoir." (Davy, op. cit., p. 19) Cf. Gabriel Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 25. This book is a publication of the William James Lectures given by Marcel at Harvard in 1961-62.

15. Regard en arrière, pp. 302-303 (112-113). Suspension points are author's unless bracketed. Albert Camus also suffered greatly from his mother's death, an incident which colored much of his writings. But Camus's reaction, revolt in the face of an absurd world, was only the first step for Marcel; rather, it wasn't even the correct first step, being the mark of a simple-minded man. Cf. Man Against Mass Society, pp. 116-120; Gabriel Marcel, "The Refusal of Salvation and the Exaltation of the Man of Absurdity," Homo Viator -- Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope, trans. Emma Craufurd (Harper Torchbooks, The Cloister Library; New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 185-212. This is the paperback edition of the same work published in hard cover in 1951: Henry Regnery Company, Chicago. The work first appeared in France as Homo Viator: Prolégomènes à une métaphysique de l'espérance (Paris: Aubier, 1945). Also cf. James Collins, Three Paths in Philosophy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), p. 16.

16. "[...] on ne semblait guère distinguer entre moi et mon rendement scolaire." (Regard en arrière, p. 301 (111)) Cf. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 8.

17. Regard en arrière, p. 296 (106).

18. Cf. ibid., pp. 297-297 (107). Also cf. Seymour Cain, "Gabriel Marcel's Way," Commonweal, 73 (December 9, 1960): 27-274. And infra, page 9.
19. This attitude is a prelude to Marcel's philosophical distinction between mystery and problem. Cf. infra.
20. His opposition to Carteisianism even in approach is here evident. Descartes travelled to get clear and distinct ideas of strange peoples and customs. Marcel's taste for travel was hardly prescientific in the laboratory sense of collecting specimens. Cf. René Descartes, Discourse on Method, tr. Laurence J. La Fleur (2nd ed. rev., "The Library of Liberal Arts"; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Subsidiary of Howard W. Sams and Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 6-7.
21. Cf. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 23-24.
22. Marcel wrote his first two plays at the age of eight. Cf. Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 203.
23. Cf. Gabriel Marcel, Journal Métaphysique (Paris: Gallimard, 1927), pp. 60-61 (Entrée pour 6 février 1914). The appendix contains the article, Existence et Objectivité, which first appeared in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. The English title: Metaphysical Journal, trans. Bernard Wall (London: Rockliff Publishing Corporation, Ltd., 1952), pp. 59-60 (Entry for February 6, 1914). Also cf. Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 215; and Regard en arrière, p. 319 (120).
24. A name which Marcel does not claim for himself. Heinemann explains that the rejection of this epithet was prompted by the general misunderstanding of the reading public and more directly by the condemnation of existentialism simpliciter in the encyclical Humani Generis (1950). This would explain Marcel's action after this date,

but the fact is that Marcel takes special pains to abstract his philosophical approach from any one religion. Cf. Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Farrar, Strauss, 1964), pp. 79 and 170. This work first appeared in France as Du Refus à l'invocation (Paris: Gallimard, 1940). Also cf. Man Against Mass Society, pp. 119 and 252; Homo Viator, p. 160; and Gabriel Marcel, Fresh Hope For the Modern World -- Moral Rearmament in Action, trans. Helen Hardinge (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1960).

25. Cf. Regard en arriere, pp. 300-301 (110-111).
26. An interesting and not untypical observation which has only recently come under serious scrutiny with Vatican II's decree on religious liberty and freedom of conscience. The so-called Protestant ethic is being studied, perhaps for the first time, by Catholic theologians.
27. Regard en arriere, pp. 297-298 (107-108).
28. Cain, op. cit., pp. 11-19.
29. E.g., Journal Métaphysique; Etre et Avoir (Paris: Aubier, 1935); and Présence et Immortalité (Paris: Flammarion, 1959).
30. Cain, op. cit., p. 17.
31. Cf. Regard en arriere, p. 297 (107). The whole of the William James Lectures were predicated on this. Cf. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, passim.
32. Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, trans. Katharine Farrer (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1949), p. 100. This translation of Etre et Avoir (cf. supra, fnnt 29) was also published in 1951: Beacon Press, Boston.

Quotation cited in The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 80. Curiously, Marcel alludes to the recognition of a mystery of knowledge in the ontological order by Jacques Maritain at this same time [Jacques Maritain, Réflexions sur l'intelligence et sur sa vie propre (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1931)], though he claims that any similarity is only a misconception on his own part. He did not agree with Maritain and could not accept the Thomist's interpretation--this was revealed in a series of conversations he and Charles Du Bos had with the French philosopher that winter. Later, Maritain attributed the distinction to Marcel. Cf. Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics (A Mentor Omega Book; New York: New American Library, 1962), p. 12. Marcel quotes another passage from Being and Having in The Mystery of Being, Volume I: Reflection and Mystery, trans. G. S. Fraser (2 vols, a Gateway Edition; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960), pp. 260-261. This is a paperback edition of The Mystery of Being, Volume I: Reflection and Mystery, trans. G. S. Fraser (2 vols.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951), originally published in Great Britain in 1950: Harvill Press Ltd., London. It is a publication of the first series of the Gifford Lectures given at Aberdeen in 1949. The passage:

"A problem is something which I meet, which I find complete before me, but which I can therefore lay siege to and reduce. But a mystery is something in which I myself am involved, and it can therefore only be thought of as 'a sphere where the distinction between what is in me and what is before me loses its meaning and its initial validity.' A genuine problem is subject to an appropriate technique by the exercise of which it is defined; whereas a mystery, by definition, transcends every conceivable technique. It is, no doubt, always possible (logically and psychologically) to degrade a mystery so as to turn it into a problem. But this is a fundamentally vicious proceeding, whose springs might perhaps be discovered

in a kind of corruption of the intelligence. The problem of evil, as the philosophers have called it, supplies us with a particularly instructive example of this degradation.

"Just because it is the essence of mystery to be recognized or capable of recognition, it may also be ignored and actively denied. It then becomes reduced to something I have 'heard talked about' but which I refuse as only 'being for other people'; and that in virtue of an illusion which these 'others' are deceived by, but which I myself claim to have detected.

"We must carefully avoid all confusion between the mysterious and the unknowable. The unknowable is in fact only the limiting case of the problematic, which cannot be actualized without contradiction. The recognition of mystery, on the contrary, is an essentially positive act of the mind, the supremely positive act in virtue of which all positivity may perhaps be strictly defined. In this sphere everything seems to go on as if I found myself acting on an intuition which I possess without immediately knowing myself to possess it--an intuition which cannot be, strictly speaking, self-conscious and which can grasp itself only through the modes of experience in which its image is reflected, and which it lights up by being thus reflected in them"

"Without mystery, life could not be lived." (Abel in L'Iconoclaste,

(Paris: Stock, 1923). Cited in Creative Fidelity, p. 152.)

Kenneth T. Gallagher ["Problem and Mystery," The Philosophy of Gabriel

Marcel (The Orestes Brownson Series On Contemporary Thought and Affairs; New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), pp. 30-49]

notes four points of difference between problem and mystery:

"(1) The basis for all points of difference is in this view of an object as something external to me, something which is set over against myself. [...] A problem, then, is an inquiry which is set on foot in respect to an object which the self apprehends in an exterior way. [...] A mystery, on the other hand, is a question in which what is given cannot be regarded as detached from the self. [...]"

"(2) [...] A problem admits of a solution which can be known in complete isolation from the thought processes which first laboriously found them out. [...] it is not its insoluble character which defines a mystery, but the fact that it is not objectifiable, the fact that it is a reality which takes in the reality of the subject. [...]"

"(3) We have seen that an object is indifferent to me; it is simply there 'for anyone' (and ultimately, Marcel says [Journal Metaphysique, p. 289 (Entrée pour 26 février 1923))

(298)], this means that is there for 'no one'). [...] Not so in the case of a mystery. It is the singular person who must ask these questions, with all his singularity. [...]

"(4) Finally, the mood in which these questions are asked differs widely. The moving force in a problematic inquiry is curiosity of some more or less intensity. [...] mystery [...] wonder."

Thus mystery is not external to the subject, is not objectifiable, is only for the individual, and is subject only to wonder.

33. Marcel points this out in Regard en arrière [p. 297 (107)] and even based the William James Lectures given at Harvard in 1961-62 on his plays, pointing out how the situations dramatized were only later philosophically "idea"-ized and researched. Cf. supra, fnnt 14.

34. Marcel has often described his abhorrence of philosophica systematization and technique, and his "idea" of philosophical research as based on the "ontological exigency."

"[...] on voudrait realiser dans l'ordre de la raison quelque chose d'analogue a un mecanisme qui fonctionne par lui-meme independamment de la volonte -- quelque chose qui marche tout seul. C'est contre cette mecanisation de la pensee qu'il s'agit de protester." (Journal Métaphysique, p. 74, (Entrée pour 12 février 1914) (74))

Cf. The Mystery of Being, Volume I: Reflection and Mystery, pp. 1-94; The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 5-13, 72-84; Man Against Mass Society, pp. 39, 41, 206, 257, 273; "On the Ontological Mystery," The Philosophy of Existentialism, op. cit., pp. 9-46; Gabriel Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, trans. Manya Harari (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1955). This last first appeared in France as Le Declin de la sagesse (Paris: Plon, 1954).

Of course, Marcel's approach has not gone uncriticized. The first and obvious objection is his emphatic refusal to translate pensée

pensante into pensée pensée. Heinemann, loc. cit., asks, honestly, how he can avoid such a translation: he writes. But, on the other hand, his writing is always open at one end. His "solution" are not final. Gonzague Truc [Histoire de la littérature catholique contemporaine (Paris: Casterman, 1961), pp. 210-213] seems to be more lenient, characterizing Marcel's thought as pensée veçue as opposed to pensée pensée. But Marcel himself appeals to "Blondel's term" pensée pensante in The Existential Background of Human Dignity [p. 23]. In Creative Fidelity [p. 13], he attributes this distinction to Bergson and maintains that "a concrete philosophy is a philosophy of the pensee pensante."

Upon comparing Marcel with Louis Marie Régis [Epistemology (Christian Wisdom Series; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959)], the former seems to have stopped short; but, again, père Régis' book is only an epistemology of generalized knowledge--not specific, concrete instances of this accident of human existence. The case for or against Marcel is not yet closed. One wonders if such Kantian terminology as "case" and "trial" is valid in this situation.

35. Cf. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 13-18. Régis points out that "to define knowledge as life is to stress the knowing subject and his inner dynamism." (Régis, op. cit., p. 256) Also cf. "Testimony and Existentialism," The Philosophy of Existentialism, op. cit., pp. 91-103; Jeanne Delhomme, "Temoignage et Dialectique," Existentialisme Chrétien, op. cit., pp. 117-202.
36. Francis H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1893). Marcel does not say when he

read this work. In fact, little external evidence exists, dating the various insights of this philosopher before 1914. Therefore, an ontological rather than chronological approach will have to be attempted.

37. Cf. Creative Fidelity, pp. 58-82. Edgard Sottiaux [Gabriel Marcel, philosophe et dramaturge (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1956), pp. 9-10] quotes L. Chaigne [Vie et Oeuvres d'Ecrivains, tome IV, p. 186] regarding this change of attitude as attributed to the influence of Henri Bergson:

"Sa parole articulée sans hâte et avec une dignité constante, s'agrémentait d'inflexions d'une tendre musicalité. Au centre même du Bergsonisme, le jeune philosophe fixera sa philosophie de l'être, devant les étapes mesurées de son maître."

38. Marcel summarizes this transition in the short essay, Existence et Objectivité (cf. supra, fnnt 23).
39. Homo Viator, p. 22.
40. Cf. Man Against Mass Society, pp. 13 and 20; The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 45 (the German in der Welt sein), 61, 83, 151; Homo Viator, p. 41.
41. "On the Ontological Mystery," p. 14.
42. Cf. Man Against Mass Society, p. 173. Cf. the Preface to his Metaphysical Journal.
43. Cf. The French title of "On the Ontological Mystery": Positions et approches concretes du mystere ontologique.
44. Cf. Man Against Mass Society, pp. 122 and 134.
45. Cf. Decline of Wisdom, and Gabriel Marcel, La Dimension Florestan (Paris: Plon, 1955).

45. Journal Métaphysique, p. 261 (Entrée pour 3 decembre 1920) (269). The English was cited in The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 46-47.
46. Homo Viator, p. 69. Cf. "Incarnate being as the central datum of metaphysical reflection," Creative Fidelity, pp. 11-37.
47. Gabriel Marcel, Fragments Philosophiques, 1909-1914 (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1962), p. 93. Cited in The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 26-27.
48. Journal Métaphysique, p. 67 (Entrée pour 10 février 1914) (66-67).
49. Man Against Mass Society, pp. 88 and 184. Cf. The Mystery of Being, Volume I: Reflection and Mystery, pp. 48-69.
50. Man Against Mass Society, p. 22. Grace seems synonymous with faith:

"La croyance véritable apparaît donc a la pensée réfléchissante comme ce que celle-ci devient une fois qu'elle s'est niée. Et par là, je crois que je viens de définir la grâce."
 (Journal Métaphysique, p. 51 (Entrée pour 13 janvier 1914) (50))
51. "Being and Nothingness," Homo Viator, pp. 166-184; and "The Refusal of Salvation and the Exaltation of the Man of Absurdity," Homo Viator, pp. 185-212. Also Man Against Mass Society, *passim*.
52. Man Against Mass Society, p. 171. I.e., it cannot be determined dogmatically within some philosophic system. Value is a call which can only be accepted or rejected. E.g., truth is a value for Marcel, or rather the "spirit of truth" is a value which implies openness, animation, reciprocal giving and receiving between man and reality. It is not, however, "some sort of pliable relativism according to which all opinions, after all, are worth something, and yet remains equally below the level of an accessible reality."

(Man Against Mass Society, p. 151) But this value is not entirely independent of the existential situation of the articulation of it, e.g., Nietzsche's private judgment "God is dead" as compared to Sartre's saying the same thing to the press at an airport. (Cf. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 63-64) The role of the subject as being-in-a-situation is of paramount importance,

53. Man Against Mass Society, p. 172.

54. Cf. The Mystery of Being, Volume I: Reflection and Mystery, pp. 95-126.

"Roughly we can say that where primary reflection tends to dissolve the unity of experience which is first put before us, the function of secondary reflection is essentially recuperative; it reconquers that unity." (ibid., pp. 102-103)

55. The term is used by Heinemann, op. cit., Cf. fnnt 32.

56. "On the Ontological Mystery," p. 25.

57. The Mystery of Being, Volume I: Reflection and Mystery, p. 264. Cf. Man Against Mass Society, pp. 117-118.

58. Man Against Mass Society, pp. 46-47. This distinction was first mentioned in the Journal Métaphysique, 16 mars 1923:

"Au fond tout se ramène à la distinction entre ce qu'on a et ce qu'on est. Seulement il est extraordinairement difficile de l'exprimer sous forme conceptuelle, et il doit cependant être possible de le faire. Ce qu'on a présente évidemment une certaine extériorité par rapport à soi. Cette extériorité n'est pourtant pas absolue. En principe ce qu'on a ce sont des choses (ou ce qui peut être assimilé à des choses, et dans la mesure précise où cette assimilation est possible). Je ne puis avoir au sens strict du mot que quelque chose qui possède une existence jusqu'à un certain point indépendante de moi. En d'autres termes, ce que j'ai s'ajoute à moi; bien plus, le fait d'être possédé par moi s'ajoute à d'autres propriétés, qualités, etc., appartenant à la chose que j'ai. Je n'ai que ce dont je peux en quelque manière et dans certains limites disposer, autrement dit pour autant que je puis être considéré comme une puissance, comme un être doué de pouvoirs. Il n'y a de transmission possible que de ce

qu'on a. Si par hasard une puissance est transmissible, il faudra en conclure que cette puissance est par rapport à un moi plus substantiel à peu près ce qu'est mon porte-plume (le porte-plume que j'ai) par rapport à cette puissance. Si vraiment la catégorie de l'être est valable, c'est qu'il y a de l'intransmissible dans la réalité." (p. 301)

E.g., I don't have my body, I am my body.

Translation of the first half of the quotation (from the Metaphysical Journal, p. 311) cited in The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 97.

59. Collins, op. cit., p. 13.

60. "On the Ontological Mystery," p. 39.

61. "A mystery," cf. Homo Viator, pp. 68 and 97; The Mystery of Being, Volume I: Reflection and Mystery, pp. 242-270; "On the Ontological Mystery," p. 36.

"An encounter," The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 67.

"We might say that presence is always dependent on an experience which is at the same time irreducible and vague, the sense of existing, of being in the world," Homo Viator, p. 15.

"that inward realization of presence through love which infinitely transcends all possible verification because it exists in an immediacy beyond all conceivable mediation," "On the Ontological Mystery," p. 15. This last sums up presence in its transcendental, intersubjective, and mysterious aspects.

Also cf. Roger Troisfontaines, "La Notion de 'Présence' chez Gabriel Marcel," Existentialisme Chrétien, op. cit., pp. 203-268.

62. "Being open towards others [...] whether that is conceived as agape (charity) or philia (attachment): these two notions, in any case,

I think, tend ultimately to converge," Man Against Mass Society, p.

24. Cf. The Mystery of Being, Volume I: Reflection and Mystery, pp. 210-241; and Fresh Hope for the Modern World, passim.

"With," The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 40-41.

"Fraternity," ibid., p. 147.

Presupposing a "reciprocal openness between individuals," Man Against Mass Society, p. 267.

Cf. "Belonging and disposability," Creative Fidelity, pp. 38-57.

63. "Le problème traditionnel de la liberté ne m'a guère préoccupé; je veux dire par là que j'ai toujours eu la conviction que l'homme ne peut pas ne pas posséder la liberté qu'il requiert, et que par conséquent celle-ci n'est pas matière à problème." (Regard en arrière, p. 317 (126))

"Leaving on one side Revelation properly so called, which has always remained in relation to any thoughts put forward in this work at, as it were, the horizon, I would say that we all have to radiate this light for the benefit of each other, while remembering that our role consists above all and perhaps exclusively in not presenting any obstacle to its passage through us. This, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, is an active role: it is an active role just because the self is a pretender, and a pretender whose duty is to transcend or to destroy its own false claims. This can only be achieved through freedom and in a sense is freedom." (Man Against Mass Society, p. 263. Also cf. ibid., pp. 13-25.)

"Reflection on what I have called 'at-home-ness' allows us, further, to clarify some of the concrete conditions apart from which there is not and cannot be a freedom worthy of the name. [...]"

"[...] The truth is that it is impossible to conceive of freedom without emphasis on a whole congerie of conditions, so complex as to verge on the contradictory, which each of us is obliged both to experience and to dominate, without, however, cherishing the hope of being able to do so absolutely, whether with respect to oneself or to circumstances.

"Along these lines, one might be tempted to say that the essential question can be formulated only in a personal form, and in the first person, and only from that moment where our life stretches behind us like a well-travelled landscape, reconstructing the progress--so often halting and problematic--that has been ours. At that moment, it

seems to me, we can ask ourselves, 'Am I conscious of having been a free man?' Certainly it is then that the question takes on meaning, although it is manifestly impossible to answer it by a simple yes or no." (The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 151-153)

"Creativity," ibid., pp. 156-157.

"Our liberty is implicated in the recognition of our participation in the universe," Creative Fidelity, p. 35. Cited in Gallagher, op. cit., p. 48.

Also cf. "Existence and Human Freedom," The Philosophy of Existentialism, op. cit., pp. 47-90--an analysis of the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre.

64. Being and Having, p. 114. Cited in Gallagher, op. cit., p. 48.

65. Cited in Gallagher, op. cit., p. 67.

66. "But we cannot fail to see that intersubjectivity, which it is increasingly more evident is the cornerstone of a concrete ontology [cf. fnnts 37 and 62], is after all nothing but charity itself." (from The Mystery of Being, Volume II: Faith and Reality. Cited in Gallagher, op. cit., p. 78.)

"The universal against the masses [...] The universal is spirit or mind--and spirit or mind is love. [...] Between love and intelligence, there can be no real divorce." (Man Against Mass Society, p. 9. Cf. Homo Viator, pp. 23-24)

"the dominant fact about our world today is that life is no longer loved." (Man Against Mass Society, p. 188)

"[...] eros, above all when taken in its romantic sense, consists of an aspiration to merge one's being in another's, or perhaps rather to merge with the other in a higher--or undifferentiated--unity. Agape, on the contrary, transcends fusion, it can take place only in the world of beings--I would say 'in the world of persons,' but that the term 'persons' since Kant's day has tended to take on too formal and juridical a sense; while the confused 'personalist movement' in contemporary philosophy does not seem to me to have restored its value. [...] Thus, would the highest unity not be one created between beings capable of recognizing each other as different, but of loving one another in their very difference? Such a unity lies at the opposite pole from any attempt at reduction: for ultimately

every reductive process robs the reduced components of certain specific, differentiating qualities." (Ibid., p. 218. Also cf. ibid., p. 171.)

"In this [his speculative analysis of faith in the first part of the Journal Métaphysique] there was a Kantian echo, to be sure. But what was constantly at stake, even in this rarified atmosphere, was to safeguard what from then on appeared to me of supreme importance--I mean love, and love understood in the deepest, widest, and least psychological sense." (The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 27)

67. Marcel characterized hope in a lecture given to the Scolasticat de

Fourvière in February, 1942, published as "Sketch of a Phenomenology and a Metaphysic of Hope," Homo Viator, op. cit., pp. 29-67.

"Hope is situated within the framework of the trila, not only corresponding to it, but constituting our being's veritable response." (p. 30)

"It seems very important to me to stress here, in connection with what I have just said about existence in general being a captivity, that hope, by a nisus which is peculiar to it, tends inevitably to transcend the particular objects to which it at first seems to be attached." (p. 32)

"The truth is that there can strictly speaking be no hope except when the temptation to despair exists. Hope is the act by which this temptation is actively or victoriously overcome." (p. 36)

"It is obvious that in hope there is something which goes infinitely further than acceptance, or one might say more exactly that it is a non-acceptance, but positive and hence distinguishable from revolt." (p. 38)

"relaxation [...] to take one's time [...] patience with others." (p. 39)

"[...] in hoping for liberation I really help to prepare the way for it, and that, inversely, in raising a doubt about its possibility I reduce the chance of it to some degree. It is not that strictly speaking I impute a causal efficacy to the fact of hoping or not hoping. The truth is much rather that I am conscious that when I hope I strengthen, and when I despair, or simply doubt, I weaken or let go of, a certain bond which unites me to the matter in question. This bond shows every evidence of being religious in essence." (p. 48)

"We might say again that if time is in its essence a separation and as it were a perpetual splitting up of the self in relation to itself, hope on the contrary aims at reunion, at recollection, at reconciliation: in that way, and in that way alone, it might be called a memory of the future." (p. 53)

He cites it as the center of the ontological mystery:

"[...] hope is a mystery, its mystery can be ignored or converted into a problem. Hope is then regarded as a desire which wraps itself up in illusory judgments to distort an objective reality which it is interested in disguising from itself." ("On the Ontological Mystery," p. 29)

"... speaking metaphysically, the only genuine hope is hope in what does not depend on ourselves, hope springing from humility and not from pride." (Ibid., p. 32)

"The authentic formula of hope, according to Marcel, is: 'I hope in you for us.'" Cited by Gallagher, op. cit., p. 75.

68. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 68.

69. "Fidelity," The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 54-74;

"Obedience and Fidelity," Homo Viator, pp. 125-134; "Creative Fidelity," Creative Fidelity, pp. 147-174.

The inference regarding Royce's influence is based on a few facts.

Marcel mentions him explicitly in The Existential Background of Human Dignity [p. 1]; makes many allusions to him the Journal Métaphysique. Marcel also did an extensive analysis of this American philosopher's thought: La Métaphysique de Royce (Paris: Aubier, 1945).

70. "On the Ontological Mystery," p. 36. In the whole first part of his Journal Métaphysique, Marcel had investigated the conditions of faith in its pure state. The second part was devoted to an investigation of the conditions of the first investigation.

"To over-simplify the question without, however, distorting the essentials, I will say that faith on the one hand became

clear to me from the moment I thought directly about fidelity; while fidelity, on the other hand, was clarified beginning with the thou, with presence itself construed as a function of the thou." (Creative Fidelity, p. 149)

71. Creative Fidelity, p. 153.
72. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 69.
73. Creative Fidelity, p. 156.
74. Ibid., pp. 156-157.
75. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 69-70. Marcel also cites a similar example in Creative Fidelity, pp. 159-160.
76. Creative Fidelity, p. 162. Note the similarity to hope.
77. Ibid., p. 166.
78. Ibid., p. 167.
79. Cf. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 73. "Fidelity cannot be separated from the idea of an oath; this means that it implies the consciousness of something sacred." (Homo Viator, p. 132) This is the renewal Marcel implies in saying, "Life is no longer loved." (Man Against Mass Society, p. 188) This is the living reality of Albert Schweitzer's "reverence-for-life" philosophy. Cf. Albert Schweitzer, "Schweitzer's Own Story," Chicago Sunday Sun-Times, March 29, 1964, Section Two, pp. 1-3. Reprinted from the 1964 World Book Year Book.
80. Creative Fidelity, p. 169.
81. This transcending of the requirement of evidence for truth stems from the very meaning of mystery, and was one of the first insights Marcel received in writing his Journal Métaphysique.
82. "Quantum Mechanics (Non-Relativistic)," Van Nostrand's Scientific Encyclopedia (3rd ed.; Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand

Company, Inc., 1958), p. 1338.

83. " ... to be faithful to myself is to respond to a particular inner call which enjoins me not to be hypnotized by what I have done, but on the contrary, to get clear of it, that is to say to go living and thus find renewal." (Homo Viator, p. 130)
84. Man Against Mass Society, p. 262.
85. Paris: Grasset, 1925.
86. Paris: Plon, 1955.
87. Paris: Plon, 1955.

for Un Homme de Dieu

1. There have been several analyses of Un Homme de Dieu, all of more or less intensity, and from different points of view. Marcel himself referred to the play in The Existential Background of Human Dignity [pp. 108-110] as illustrating the human condition of ambiguity. Joseph Chenu treats of it in his work Le Théâtre de Gabriel Marcel et sa signification métaphysique [Paris: Aubier, 1948], pp. 109-120], the central question being one of authenticity or sincerity. E. L. Allen ["Gabriel Marcel: A Theatre of Sincerity," Contemporary Review, 181 (February, 1952): 99-103] uses a shorter but similar approach. Edgard Sottiaux ["Un Homme de Dieu," Gabriel Marcel, philosophe et dramaturge (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1956), pp. 134-173] presents by far the most comprehensive analysis, utilizing Chenu's work as well as those of Roger Troisfontaines [De l'Existence à l'Etre, La Philosophie de Gabriel Marcel (2 vols.; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1953)]; G. Fessard Théâtre et Mystère, Introduction à la Soif de Gabriel Marcel (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1938)]; and Louis Chaigne [Vie et Oeuvres (5 vols.; Paris: Lanore, 1954), Tome IV]. Sottiaux specifies two themes: the experience of non-communication and the discovery of one's own psychology. While unavoidably including these other aspects, this analysis will center on Claude's discovery of his own psychology and personality: "Etre connu tel qu'on est." The procedure will be one of letting the text speak for

itself.

2. Sottiaux, op. cit., p. 134.
3. Ibid.
4. Un Homme de Dieu, pp. 201-209.
5. Sottiaux, op. cit., p. 163.
6. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
7. Un Homme de Dieu, p. 3.
8. Ibid., pp. 3-6. Megal is a young neighbor whose wife is an invalid.
9. Ibid., p. 9.
10. Ibid., p. 11.
11. Ibid., p. 17.
12. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
13. Ibid., p. 18.
14. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
15. Ibid., p. 27.
16. Ibid., p. 28.
17. Ibid., p. 30. This is the heart of the problem, as Edmée will elicit later; but Claude is blind to it.
18. Ibid., p. 31.
19. Ibid., p. 41.
20. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, "No Exit," No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. Stuart Gilbert and Lionel Abel (Vintage Books; New York: Random House, Inc., 1946), p. 23. Reprinted by arrangement with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Of course, the personality and situation of Inez is more hardened than that of Claude's; what is of interest here is the blind trust in a supposed fait accompli.

21. Un Homme de Dieu, p. 42.
22. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
23. Ibid., p. 44.
24. Ibid., p. 51.
25. Chenu, op. cit., p. 101.
26. Un Homme de Dieu, p. 54.
27. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
28. Ibid., p. 55. Edmée becomes even more explicit in the fourth act.
29. Ibid., p. 60-61.
30. "Non, maman n'oublie jamais rien, maman est terrible." (Ibid., p. 13)
31. Ibid., p. 63.
32. Notice the similarity to Agnes Courteuil of Croissez et Multipliez.
33. Un Homme de Dieu, p. 67.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 69.
36. Ibid., p. 70.
37. Ibid., p. 73.
38. Ibid., pp. 73-74. But Claude is slow to catch on.
39. Ibid., p. 75.
40. Ibid., p. 77.
41. Ibid., p. 99.
42. Ibid., pp. 103-104.
43. Ibid., pp. 109-111.
44. Ibid., p. 114.
45. Ibid., p. 115.
46. Ibid., p. 116.

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 117.
49. Ibid., p. 120. Compare her reaction to Claude's, supra, ftnts 17 and 27.
50. Ibid., pp. 120-121.
51. Ibid., p. 121.
52. Ibid., p. 122.
53. Ibid., p. 124.
54. Ibid., p. 128.
55. Ibid., p. 131.
56. Ibid., pp. 134-135.
57. Ibid., pp. 136-137.
58. Ibid., p. 138. Cf. supra, ftnts 29, 40, and 43.
59. Ibid., p. 140.
60. Ibid., p. 147.
61. Ibid., p. 153.
62. Ibid., p. 155.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., p. 180.
65. Ibid., p. 181.
66. Ibid., pp. 183-184.
67. Ibid., p. 185.
68. "Le bonheur ne serait-il pas une certaine façon d'être présent à soi-même? Et plus je me suis présent à moi-même, plus les autres existent eux aussi pour moi. C'est l'indivision intérieure dont j'ai parlé à propos de la volonté et qui la rend possible. Vouloir, c'est réussir à ne pas se diviser avant l'action. Si avant d'agir je me regarde d'une certaine manière, c'en est fait de ma volonté. Tout au plus obtiendrai-je de moi un geste que le plus profond de moi

désavouera." (Journal Métaphysique, p. 280 (Entrée pour 24 octobre 1922) (289))

The indigence of which Claude is slowly discovering. Cf. Chenu, op. cit., p. 116 (ftnt). Also cf. infra, ftnt 86.

69. Un Homme de Dieu, p. 187.

70. Ibid., p. 189.

71. Ibid., p. 192.

72. Ibid., p. 199.

73. Ibid.,

74. Chenu, op. cit., p. 179.

75. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 110.

76. Cf. supra, ftnt 22.

77. Cf. supra, ftnt 35.

78. Journal Métaphysique, p. 152 (Entrée pour 12 decembre 1918) (153).

Cited in Chenu, op. cit., p. 115. Cf. supra, Introduction, ftnt 34.

79. Journal Métaphysique, p. 196 (Entrée pour 15 octobre 1919) (200).

Cited in Chenu, op. cit., p. 52, within the context of a consideration of the toi, pp. 49-65.

80. Journal Métaphysique, p. 277 (Entrée pour 8 juillet 1922) (286). Cited in Chenu, op. cit., p. 52.

81. "I hope that," not "I hope." Cf. supra, Introduction, ftnt 67.

82. Cf. Un Homme de Dieu, p. 190.

83. Cf. Sottiaux, op. cit., p. 157.

84. Cf. Huis clos.

85. Cf. Albert Camus, The Stranger, trans Stuart Gilbert (Vintage Books; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1946). This first appeared in

France as L'Etranger (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1942). Marcel comments:

"1. Il me semble que l'indigence intérieure implique toujours l'exercice à vide d'une réflexion: je ne suis pas cet état-ci --et par conséquent cet état en son fond n'est rien; mais je ne suis pas non plus autre chose; donc il n'y a que cet état, qui lui-même n'est rien. Formule du désespoir théorique, du pessimisme; pressentiment qu'il n'y a pas de ressource."
(Journal Métaphysique, p. 281 (Entrée pour 25 octobre 1922) (290))

This anticipation is, of course, to be avoided.

86. Cf. Allen, loc. cit.
87. The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 110. Claude had degraded the Socratic gnôti seauton into a technical problem of "know how." Cf. ibid., p. 165.
88. Sottiaux, op. cit., pp. 156-157.
89. Régis, op. cit., admits this even regarding generalized knowledge. Cf. pp. 326-336.
90. "Doing is activity; and he will still be doing." (the Constable in Shakespeare's Henry V, Act III, Scene 6)
91. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 18, 1c.
92. Chenu, op. cit., p. 65. Also cf. ibid., pp. 141-168.

for Intervening Development and Croissez et Multipliez

1. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1933. Remarks about this play are from The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 90-93; Chenu, "Le Monde Casse et le Mystere Ontologique," op. cit., pp. 127-168; and Sottiaux, "Le Monde Casse," op. cit., pp. 174-212. Cf. Allen, loc. cit.
2. Cf. Introduction.
3. Le Fanal (Paris: La Vie Intellectuelle, supplement, 1936; and Paris: Stock, 1936); Le Chemin de crete (Paris: Grasset, 1936); Le Dard (Paris: Plon, 1936); and La Soif (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1938). This last was republished as Les Coeurs avides (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1952). Remarks about these plays are from The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 11-135; and Chenu, "La marche vers la Lumiere," op. cit., pp. 179-213. Cf. Allen, loc. cit.
4. Chenu, op. cit., p. 195.
5. Cited in The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 134.
6. The Mystery of Being, Volume I: Reflection and Mystery, pp. 242-270.
A shortened version appeared as "The Mystery of the Family Bond," Hibbert Journal 48 (July, 1950): 317-324. A photocopy of this latter is included in the Appendix. Also cf. "The Mystery of the Family" and "The Creative Vow as the Essence of Fatherhood," Homo

- Viator, pp. 68-97, 98-124; and "Human Dignity," The Existential Background of Human Dignity, pp. 114-135.
7. "Presence as a Mystery," op. cit., p. 248; "The Mystery of the Family Bond," p. 319.
 8. Ibid., p. 263; and p. 322.
 9. Cf. The Mystery of Being, Volume II: Faith and Reality.
 10. The only interpretative commentary available is Marcel's Postface, Croissez et Multipliez, pp. 201-213.
 11. "Plus sans doute qu'aucune autre de mes pièces, celle-ci est une pièce à problème, je ne dis pas une pièce à thèse, la distinction est essentielle..." (Ibid., p. 201)
 12. Cf. Madame de La Fayette, La Princesse de Clèves, edited with introduction by H. Ashton (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930).
 13. Croissez et Multipliez, p. 208.
 14. Ibid., p. 1.
 15. Ibid., p. 4.
 16. Ibid., p. 6. "[...] c'est ce qui nous sauve de la vie." (ibid., p. 39)
 17. Ibid., p. 7.
 18. Ibid., p. 8.
 19. Ibid., p. 10.
 20. Ibid., p. 11.
 21. Ibid., p. 19. A sad commentary on modern society.
 22. Ibid., p. 20.
 23. Ibid., pp. 22, 23, 23-24.
 24. Ibid., p. 34.
 25. Ibid., p. 39.
 26. Ibid., p. 42.

27. Ibid., pp. 44, 44-45, 46.
28. Ibid., p. 46.
29. Ibid., p. 48. How true!!
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 50. "Je compte sur Bruno pour m'éclairer." (ibid., p. 79)
32. Ibid., p. 51.
33. Ibid., p. 58.
34. Ibid., p. 60.
35. Ibid., p. 68.
36. Ibid., p. 81. "L'enfant, c'est encore un leurre, une promesse qui ne sera pas tenue, ou plutôt... non, pas même une promesse..." (ibid., p. 82)
37. Ibid., p. 85.
38. Ibid., p. 88.
39. Ibid., p. 90.
40. Ibid., p. 93.
41. Ibid., pp. 94, 94-95. Note the similarity to the description of faith as unverifiable.
42. Ibid., p. 102.
43. Ibid., p. 121.
44. Ibid., p. 139. I.e., Guillaume and Corinne.
45. Ibid., p. 140.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 143.
48. Ibid., p. 146.
49. Ibid., pp. 154-155.

50. Ibid., p. 156.
51. Ibid., p. 173.
52. Ibid., p. 177.
53. Ibid., p. 178.
54. Ibid., p. 185.
55. Ibid., p. 186.
56. Marcel has edited a collection of essays illustrating this notion in action: Fresh Hope for the Modern World -- Moral Rearmament in Action.
57. Croissez et Multipliez, p. 192.
58. Ibid., pp. 192-193.
59. Ibid., p. 193.
60. Ibid., pp. 194-195. This is before Vatican II.
61. Ibid., p. 197.
62. Ibid., p. 199.

for Mon Temps n'est pas le Vôtre

1. Postface, Mon Temps n'est pas le Vôtre, p. 237. Again a Postface is the only interpretative commentary available.
2. Cf. Mon Temps n'est pas le Vôtre, pp. 1-2, 21-22.
3. Cf. ibid., pp. 2, 16.
4. Mon Temps n'est pas le Vôtre, p. 10.
5. Ibid., p. 26.
6. Ibid., p. 5.
7. Ibid., p. 6.
8. Ibid., pp. 15-17. Here Sartre is "busting out all over."
9. Cf. ibid., pp. 7, 25.
10. Ibid., p. 24.
11. Ibid., p. 33.
12. Ibid., p. 44. Recall that this is what disgusted Osmonde.
13. Ibid., p. 40. Cf. ibid., pp. 91, 96.
14. Ibid., p. 49.
15. Ibid., p. 55.
16. Ibid., p. 58.
17. Ibid., p. 246. The set reflects this: " ... quelques taches d'eccentricité." (ibid., opposite p. 1)
18. Cf. ibid., pp. 65, 83, 85.
19. Cf. ibid., p. 65.
20. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

21. Ibid., p. 81.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 88.
24. Ibid., p. 97.
25. Ibid., pp. 101, 102.
26. Ibid., p. 104.
27. Ibid., p. 107.
28. Ibid., pp. 240, 241, 242.
29. Of course, there is always the possibility that Marie-Henriette is completely ignorant of what she is doing. Yet again, perhaps this is a necessary prerequisite for doing it well--for being really open to reality.
30. Mon Temps n'est pas le Vôtre, p. 109.
31. Ibid., p. 112.
32. Ibid., p. 117.
33. Ibid., p. 114.
34. Ibid., p. 126.
35. Ibid., p. 127.
36. Ibid., pp. 129-130.
37. Ibid., pp. 131-132. Compare this with Bruno's first words to Agnes, and Michel Sandier's first words to Edmée.
38. Ibid., pp. 134, 135, 135-136.
39. Ibid., p. 136.
40. Ibid., p. 147.
41. Ibid., pp. 154-155.
42. Ibid., pp. 158-159.

43. Ibid., pp. 178, 179.
44. Ibid., p. 185.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 196.
47. Ibid., pp. 197-198.
48. Ibid., p. 202.
49. Ibid., pp. 208, 209.
50. Ibid., p. 217.
51. Ibid., p. 219.
52. Ibid., p. 225.
53. Ibid., p. 229.
54. Ibid., p. 230.
55. Ibid., p. 233.
56. Ibid., p. 235
57. Ibid., pp. 246-247.

for Conclusion

1. From Francis Thompson, "The Kingdom of God," Complete Poems of Francis Thompson, ed. Wilfrid Meynell (The Modern Library; New York: Random House, n.d.), pp. 356-357.
2. From the backcover of the paperback edition of Mon Temps n'est pas le Vôtre (Paris: Plon, 1955).
3. From Henri Bergson, Le Rire. Cited in André LaGarde and Laurent Michard, Collection Textes et Littérature, Vol. VI: XX^e Siecle (Paris: Bordas, 1962), p. 82.
4. Cf. Regis, "XII. Infallible Knowledge of Mediate Truth," op. cit., pp. 424-465.
5. Cf., e.g., "Orthodoxy versus conformism," "On the fringe of the ecumenical," and "The phenomenology and the dialectic of tolerance," Creative Fidelity, pp. 184-221.
6. From the Introduction to Les Livres Sapientiaux, La Sainte Bible traduite en français sous la direction de L'Ecole Biblique de Jerusalem (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1961), p. 597.

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